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Introduction1 
A fascination with urban 1.1 
development projects
The world is changing. Cities are changing. Contracts are changing. These 
statements are probably true for every era. But developments since the 1980s 
have made these statements particularly relevant. What do they mean in the 
context of the present day? They mean that the world economy has changed 
and is still undergoing enormous changes, that the economies of major west-
ern cities have changed and that there are many indications that cities need 
to do away with their remaining heavy industries and instead invest in a 
service-based economy if they are to be successful in the 21st century (Zukin, 
1995; Florida, 2005).
This is precisely what the cities examined in this study – New York, Am-
sterdam and London – have done during the past three decades. In particu-
lar, their economies have become much less dependent on their port facilities. 
They are all national leaders in service and finance. New York and London are 
global leaders.
To maintain or improve their leading positions, they need to create new 
spaces. Not just office space, but new attractive neighbourhoods that com-
bine office space with attractive green zones, infrastructure, shops, leisure fa-
cilities and apartment buildings that range from top-end to assisted rental 
units. These newly planned neighbourhoods aim to combine the dynamics for 
which their cities are known – such as the great variations in height and the 
energy of Manhattan, the Victorian architecture of London, and the tolerant 
mix of the Amsterdam canals – with the competitive demands of the 21st cen-
tury. If globalisation ever had a meaning, it can certainly be found in the com-
petition between cities to attract international head offices and the people 
that come with them.
Some of these newly planned neighbourhoods are in fact centuries old, but 
now find themselves in a run-down state and in need of a new future. Other 
neighbourhoods are being created on new or underdeveloped land. What they 
have in common is that they all share the ideal of becoming new, successful, 
21st century-proof places.
These new development projects are fascinating because they involve so 
many public and private parties, so many ambitions and billions of dollars, 
pounds or euros. They aim to combine the best features of their cities’ rich 
past, the insights of the present and the forecasts of the future.
This study finds its point of departure in the author’s fascination with ur-
ban development projects and the public-private coalitions that are necessary 
for their realisation.
The projects shape the cities in which they are located, provide them with 
new skylines and new landmarks, but their makers still have to acknowledge, 
in the light of so many past failures, that it is very difficult to plan successful 
[ 1 ]
neighbourhoods.
For its realisation, a project has to rely on coalitions of public and private 
parties that are committed to its goals and are reasonably sure that their par-
ticipation will yield a profit (cf. Van Ark, 2005).
There are many of these coalitions, and they operate at all project levels 
from the drafting of the first plan to the decision to invest in a part or the 
whole of the project. Public and private parties – that have different identities 
and set different goals for the future – have to convince one another that they 
can be reliable partners in the context of these projects. I am interested in 
these coalitions.
Not only the world is changing, not only cities are changing, contracts are 
also changing. Or should we say: when the world changes, when cities change, 
contracts have to change as well? Contracts create obligations: they embody 
the expectations and commitments of the parties concerned. When these ex-
pectations change, contracts have to change too. It should be noted that we 
are not primarily discussing contract law here, which has changed for various 
internal and external reasons (Luhmann, 2004), but the content of agreements. 
This content may eventually change the law (cf. Luhmann, 2004: 232) but that 
is only of passing interest in this study, which focuses mainly on the content 
of development agreeements: the agreements that contain the specific condi-
tions under which all parties are willing to cooperate for the realisation of an 
urban development project. Such projects are found in many western cities, 
and their aims are often surprisingly comparable, but the legal systems that 
govern them are, at first sight, quite different. Every country has it own laws 
that apply to urban development projects. However, London, New York and 
Amsterdam are similar in that urban development projects take place in all 
three, there are laws applicable to those projects, and there are legal docu-
ments in which the parties to such projects write down their agreements.
Legal systems may differ, but when cities initiate urban projects that in-
volve coalitions, would the actual agreements also differ? Would they not 
share the same mentality, the same aim to get things done?
The concept of the development agreement is presented in Chapter 4. 
These development agreements, made between public and private parties in-
volved in urban development projects, are the main focus of this study.
The term ‘development agreeement’ is used in a specific sense throughout 
this study, but the terms ‘contract’, ‘legal agreement’ and ‘contracting’ will 
also be used in much the same context. These terms will be defined in great-
er detail in Chapters 3 and 4. At this point, I will only indicate their general 
meaning. An agreement lays down the sum total of obligations to be met by 
the parties. A legal agreement is an agreement that is enforceable in a court 
of law. In this study, the term ‘contract’ is generally used as a synonym for a 
legal agreement of this kind. Wherever possible, the more general sense of 
the term ‘contract’ is avoided. As we will see in Chapter 3, however, that is 
[ 2 ]
not always possible. Finally, ‘contracting’ is used as a general verbal noun to 
denote the process of reaching a legal agreeement.
Projects covered by this study1.2 
I studied four major urban development projects. Within the context of each 
one, I looked for focal projects – smaller projects that involved contracts be-
tween public and private parties. These focal projects may differ in many re-
spects, but that they are all subprojects of a major urban development proj-
ects and all include development agreements. Details of the focal projects 
investigated are given below.
New York: Battery Park City and Hudson Yards (Chapters 5 and 6)
Battery Park City is a 92-acre (37.2 ha) landfill site situated in the lower west 
side of Manhattan (see Figure 5.1), next to the World Trade Center (WTC) site. 
In 2005, it housed 9.3 million sq. ft. (86.4 ha) of commercial floor space and 
9,000 inhabitants on 7.2 million sq. ft. (66.9 ha) of residential floor space. In 
addition, there were 22 restaurants, 3 public schools, two hotels and a cine-
ma (BPCA, 2006). At that time, 6 plots were still open for development. Battery 
Park City is owned and managed by the Battery Park City Authority (BPCA), a 
public benefit corporation of the State of New York.
Two focal projects in Battery Park City were studied in depth. These includ-
ed mixed-use buildings consisting mostly of residential space, which were 
developed as ‘green buildings’. The development agreements for these proj-
ects were based on leases granted by BPCA, which owns the land, to private 
developers. They are subject to tensions between the environmental goals of 
BPCA and its aim to make money, as well as political tensions and the tension 
between short-term goals and long-term strategies.
The Hudson Yards project is situated in the Far West Side of Manhattan 
(see Figure 6.1). This part of Manhattan currently consists primarily of open 
parking lots, industrial units, small commercial and residential buildings, and 
transportation infrastructure including the entrance and exit roadways and 
plazas for the Lincoln Tunnel as well as approximately 26 acres (10.5 ha) of 
open rail yards serving the operational needs of the Long Island Railroad and 
Pennsylvania Station (HYIC, 2007).
Because of this underdevelopment on the otherwise highly urbanised is-
land, the area is sometimes referred to as the ‘last great frontier in Manhat-
tan’ (Fox, 2005). As rezoned, Hudson Yards has capacity for approximately 24 
million square feet (2.2 million sq. m) of new office development, 13,500 units 
of housing (of which almost 4,000 units will be affordable), 1 million sq. ft. (9.3 
ha) of retail space and 2 million sq. ft. (18.6 ha) of hotel space. In addition, the 
Javits Convention Center will be re-developed and expanded. This convention 
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center is located in the ‘superblock’ bounded by West 34th Street, 11th Avenue, 
West 39th Street and 12th Avenue.
I studied agreements relating to Hudson Yards in which the City of New 
York (on behalf of the state-owned Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 
MTA) leases land from private developers to construct the No. 7 subway ex-
tension. These agreements are subject to tensions between the interests of 
the speculative developers who bought land to construct large buildings on in 
and those of the city and MTA that want to construct the subway extension 
within their budgets.
Amsterdam: Zuidas (Chapter 7)
The Zuidas project is the biggest strategic urban project of both Amster-
dam and the Netherlands. In 30 years time, it aims to develop 1.1 million 
sq. m (12 million sq. ft.) of office space, the same area of residential space 
and 500,000 sq. m (5.4 million sq. ft.) of public facilities. The Zuidas is cre-
ated on land – until recently mostly used for sports facilities – at either side 
of the Amsterdam ring road linking the city centre with the national airport, 
Schiphol (see Figure 7.1).
Two focal projects in the Zuidas development were studied: Mahler4 that 
consists of 9 high buildings (8 office towers and 1 residential tower) and 
Gersh win, a project that focuses on residential space. The agreements here 
specify the conditions under which the City of Amsterdam that owns the land 
in the area is willing to close a lease with private developers. They are subject 
to many tensions that are mostly related to the complex interplay between 
the city as a pro-active, developing landowner and the private parties.
London: King’s Cross (Chapter 8)
The wider King’s Cross area measures 133 acres (54 ha) in the centre of Lon-
don, situated in the boroughs of Camden (the larger part) and Islington. The 
largely run-down area (which is however already undergoing some gentrifi-
cation) is located near three railway stations: Euston, St Pancras and King’s 
Cross (see Figure 8.1). The redevelopment of the area is closely linked to the 
redevelopment of the two last-mentioned stations.
The focal project studied here is the Regent Quarter development that 
forms the heart of the redevelopment project. This area (67 acres or 27.1 ha) 
lies between King’s Cross Station and St Pancras International Station and ex-
tends north beyond Regent’s Canal. In 2007 outline planning permission was 
granted for approximately 743,000 sq. m. (8 million sq. ft.) of mixed-use devel-
opment (including 455,000 sq. m./4.9 million sq. ft. of office space, 1,900 new 
homes, 46,000 sq. m./495,000 sq. ft. of retail space plus hotels, serviced apart-
ments, student accommodation, leisure, health, cultural, community, educa-
tion and other uses).
The agreement that applies here is known as a S106 agreement (see Sec-
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tion 4.2 and Chapter 8). It specifies the planning obligations that the private 
parties have to undertake to receive planning permission from the planning 
authority (Camden Council). The tensions here are mostly related to the pub-
lic-private nature of the agreement that includes both private law obligations 
and public policies.
Research questions1.3 
In defining the research questions of this study, we need to be aware that this 
is – to the best of my knowledge – the first study to look into development 
agreements in the context of urban development projects from a compara-
tive perspective that focuses on the content (and not so much the ‘oughts’, 
cf. Camacho, 2005a) of the agreements. In Chapter 4 we will see that develop-
ment agreements have been studied in some other contexts and meanings 
(see Section 4.4).
The research questions should emphasise this, while reflecting the au-
thor’s fascination with urban development projects and agreements.
I identified five research questions.
How do development agreements function in the context of urban development 1. 
projects?
This thesis studies development agreements in three cities, New York, London 
and Amsterdam, that all have their own laws and own legal cultures.
The main question that it poses is: How do these agreements function? In 
Chapter 4 we will distinguish four functions that characterise a development 
agreement: (1) the exchange function: the quid pro quo of the agreement; (2) 
the statutory function: the goals and rules governing the activities of the par-
ties; (3) the planning function; and (4) the instrumental function: the goals 
that the public party hopes to achieve through the project.
These four functions are the first way in which we approach the question 
and they will guide the assessment of the agreements in Chapter 10.
A second, more inclusive, approach to the question is found in relational 
contract theory that was chosen as the theoretical framework for this study. 
We will assess the development agreements with reference to the norms and 
spirit of this theory. Relational contract theory states that ten common con-
tract norms are present in every contractual relation. It further draws a dis-
tinction between discrete transactions and relational transactions. A discrete 
transaction may be sketched, in its most extreme form, as an anonymous 
transaction with a machine. It is completely planned and confines all rela-
tions between parties to one, unique transaction. A relational transaction in 
its most extreme form is a marriage or embodies the complex relations that 
emerge in a small village where different small family businesses engage in 
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similar transactions (one acting as the butcher, another as the baker and so 
on) while the different families are also related by marriage (Macneil, 1980). 
This distinction between discrete and relational transactions reflects that be-
tween classical contracts that leave everything out of the contractual relation 
except what the parties have expressly consented to and more flexible con-
tracts based on an evolving relation between the parties.
These extremes are however almost never encountered in real life. But 
agreements have discrete and relational elements and may tend to either side 
of the spectrum. Relational contract theory is discussed at length in Chapter 3.
We will use the common contract norms this theory embodies to help us to 
understand how the various elements of the development agreements func-
tion, while the discrete-relational scale allows us to characterise the various 
agreements or their sub-parts. Application of the same approach to all devel-
opment agreements means that we can compare the outcomes of the various 
analyses. This comparison is performed in Chapter 9, and leads to two further 
questions specifically related to relational contract theory.
What is the significance of the ten common contract norms in the context of the 2. 
development agreements studied?
What are the relative positions of the different agreements studied on the discrete-3. 
relational scale?
When we have answered these questions, we are left with a lot of material 
on the various cases. That brings up the problem of comparing the outcomes, 
and assessing the various agreements from a normative perspective. Hence, 
our final questions are:
Can we compare and assess the various development agreements?4. 
Can we say anything about the development agreements that could lead to im-5. 
provement of the contractual processes and their content in the future?
Case studies1.4 
The case-study approach was essentially chosen for its ability to provide real-
life agreements that could be studied while they were performing their tasks 
in the projects. In addition, the case-study methodology helps us to get a grip 
on the specificities of the cases.
The focus on a small number of cases facilitated in-depth analyses involv-
ing multiple observations. The focal project approach enabled us to place a 
subproject within the context of a larger urban development project (cf. Yin, 
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1994). In addition, the visits to the projects and the interviews helped us to 
get an idea of the mindset of the actors and of the project culture. We will see 
in the next three chapters how this approach yields a systematic analysis of 
the development agreements and a detailed description of the projects, but 
not a quantitative analysis of either the interviews or the contracts. The case-
study approach does not provide enough data for a quantitative analysis. The 
underlying premise is therefore that every case reflects a specific aspect of 
urban development projects and development agreements, so that its analy-
sis provides insights that extend beyond the individual case itself (George & 
Bennett, 2004).
Review of the successive chapters1.5 
Chapter 2 sets the scene for the study by specifying the various problems to 
be dealt with. Chapter 3 explains the theoretical background of this study, 
relational contract theory. It describes the main features of this theory and 
shows how it can be used to analyse the cases. Chapter 4 introduces and de-
fines the concept of the development agreement, used in the present study 
to describe the cases and compare and assess the outcomes. Chapters 5-8 
are devoted to the case studies. In Chapter 9, the cases are compared and as-
sessed from the perspective of relational contract theory, while in Chapter 10 
the concept of the development agreement is used in combination with re-
lational contract theory as a basis for comparison and assessment of agree-
ments. General conclusions are drawn concerning the minimal content a 
development agreement should have and the moment at which problems 
should be tackled. This chapter also provides rules of thumb for practitioners. 
It also revisits the research questions posed in this introduction, and consid-
ers whether they have been properly answered. Finally, it proposes further re-
search and briefly evaluates the applicability of relational contract theory and 
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Reference to the research questions in the various chaptersTable 1.1 
How do development agreements (DAs) 
function in the context of urban development 
projects?
Urban development projects are described in Chapter 1.
The concept of a DA is the main topic of Chapter 4. This research 
question then leads to the case studies of Chapters 5-8. 
What is the significance of the ten common 
contract norms in the context of the 
development agreements studied?
The ten common contract norms are discussed in Chapter 3. They are 
used as a basis for analysis of the development agreements of the case 
studies, and for comparison of the agreements in Chapter 9.
What are the relative positions of the different 
agreements studied on the discrete-relational 
scale?
The discrete-relational scale is discussed in Chapter 3. It is used to 
locate the case-study agreements, and for assessment of each individual 
norm in Chapter 9.
Can we compare and assess the various 
agreements?
The agreements are compared and critically assessed in Chapters 
9 and 10, with reference to case-study data and the theoretical and 
methodological framework of Chapters 3 and 4. The theoretical 
background of this question is discussed in Chapter 2.
Can we say anything about the agreements that 
could lead to improvement of the contractual 
processes and their content in the future?
Suggestions for improvement of the agreements are discussed in 
Chapter 9 with reference to the common contract norms and in Chapter 
10 with reference to the concept of the development agreement.
the development agreement concept for this and future studies.
I will end this introduction by introducing the figure of the ‘undercov-
er lawyer’, a part I often felt I was playing while conducting this study. This 
rather playful term, which still has real relevance for the present work, was 
coined by analogy with the ‘undercover economist’ introduced by Tim Har-
ford (2005). In his book of the same title, Harford takes the perspective of the 
economist who is confronted with phenomena of daily life such as the price 
of a cup of coffee at Starbucks or the attempts of politicians to reduce the use 
of motor cars. By discussing such matters from an economic viewpoint, he 
throws new light on issues that are more often discussed from another angle 
such as fairness (often thought not to be an economic concept).
I often felt myself to be an ‘undercover lawyer’ when I studied the urban 
development projects discussed in this thesis from a legal perspective, which 
often forced me to dig really deep to find an answer to the questions I had 
posed in legal terms.
Being an undercover lawyer in the context of the present study, however, 
mainly related to the kind of glasses I was wearing while conducting my re-
search or, to stick with the original analogy, the text of the newspaper behind 
which I was hiding to spy on the urban developers. But as we will see in the 
next three chapters, one cannot study urban development projects solely with 
reference to the legal context: one has to become a contextualist as well.
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Urban development 2 
projects and the problem 
of comparing contracts
This chapter intends to describe the context wherein this study takes place, it 
introduces some terms and scientific discussions that are in themselves not 
the main subject of this study but that provide the necessary context to un-
derstand the theoretical Chapters 3 and 4 and the case-study Chapters 5-8.
The chapter has three parts. In the first part we will discuss the main char-
acteristics of the urban development projects that were studied for this the-
sis. It also explains why the term urban development project was chosen and 
how it relates to the focal projects of the case studies. Some attention is paid 
to the criticisms to which urban development projects have been subjected. It 
briefly introduces these focal projects; the urban development projects (that 
provide the larger context) were briefly introduced in Chapter 1.
The second part of this chapter starts with a scientific positioning of the 
study (Section 2.5). While focusing on development agreements, the study 
combines aims and methods from various scientific disciplines and can 
therefore be characterised as a mixed-discipline study. This section discusses 
the elements of which this mix consists.
Having discussed the scientific positioning of the study, we will have a brief 
look at the problem of comparing legal documents that are drafted in differ-
ent legal systems. We will oppose the law-as-culture approach to a function-
alist approach and use this comparison as a basis for discussion of the notion 
of a legal culture. The Dutch legal system is commonly known as part of the 
civil-law system, whereas the English and American legal system are part of 
the common-law system. We will discuss some main differences between the 
two systems and reflect on their importance for this study.
Having done that, we may take the final step towards the main focus of 
this study: the functioning of development agreements. We will discuss vari-
ous dimensions of transactions and discuss which perspective this study 
should take on those dimensions. This brings us to the final topic of this 
chapter: the place of the legal agreement within those various dimensions.
Characteristics of the projects2.1 
In this section we discuss eight characteristics of the urban development 
projects of this thesis. The first six characteristics concern recent develop-
ments and trends in Western cities. Most readers will recognise these devel-
opments, they are not meant as statements or as arguments in a debate. The 
final two characteristics bridge the gap between the general characteristics 
and the focus of this study: the functioning of development agreements. The 
special project approach (Section 2.1.8) and processes of cooperation between 
public and private parties (Section 2.1.7) facilitate the use of agreements in-
stead of – or in addition to – statutes and regulations. We may say that the list 
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of characteristics stops where the study starts; the characteristics are meant 
to provide the general context wherein the urban development projects exist. 
The specific contexts of the cases are found in Chapters 5-8 (the case-study 
part). Note that the first and second characteristics of the cases also apply to 
the context of the cases in Amsterdam but not in the same way to the context 
of London and New York. Amsterdam did not experience these developments 
in the same intensity as those two cities.
The reason for this may be found in the difference between the Anglo-
American economies and the Dutch economy. In the scientific discipline 
named ‘Varieties of Capitalism’, the economies of England and United States 
are often characterised as liberal market economies (LME), whereas the Dutch 
economy is characterised as a coordinated market economy (CME). The lat-
ter is less open, and more controlled by various institutions wherein various 
interest groups – such as employers and employees – meet (Hall & Soskice, 
2001; Touwen, 2006). For LMEs it are not so much these institutions but rather 
market forces that coordinate their economic systems. As a result these LMEs 
respond faster to economic changes than the CMEs, the institutional infra-
structure of which is less responsive to trends in the market.
The need for office space2.1.1 
In the introduction to this thesis we noted that cities have changed in the 
sense that the economy of most western metropolitan areas no longer de-
pends on heavy industries. Instead most successful cities now focus on the 
service sector (Zukin, 1995; Fainstein, 2001; MacLeod et al., 2003; Florida, 
2005). Not only has the economy of (most) western cities changed, the focus 
on service industries has also proved to be a way for cities to reinvent them-
selves economically. Two of the cities where the projects of this study are 
situated, London and New York, have experienced a strong economic growth 
based mostly on the growth of their (financial) service sectors, after a period 
of strong decline. And not only London and New York have experienced the 
growth of the service sector, Amsterdam – the third city of this thesis – has 
experienced the same development but that city did not suffer as much as 
New York and London from the economic downturn in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Now that the economies of these cities have become based on service indus-
tries – including finance, and creative industries – even in this ‘wireless age’, 
they need office space to facilitate the growth of these industries and hence 
the growth of their economies.
Amsterdam, London and New York have suffered of recent years from a 
lack of (state of the art) office space that would permit further growth and 
accommodate existing businesses that wish to relocate (City of Amsterdam, 
2004; City of New York, 2005; GLA, 2002). The cases of this thesis can there-
fore be regarded as new business districts. The Zuidas in Amsterdam creates 
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a central business district (CBD), a concentration of office buildings that is 
regarded as the commercial heart of the city, that hardly has a counterpart 
in the city, since Amsterdam until recently lacked a (high profile) CBD (see 
Section 6.1.5). The head offices in Amsterdam were scattered over the histor-
ic centre and a few new business districts that lack the high profile of the 
Zuidas (City of Amsterdam, 2001).
The projects in New York and London are probably better described as ex-
tensions of existing CBDs but they are planned as new, up to date, business 
districts.
The first characteristic of the subject of this thesis is therefore that the 
three cities considered are planning for a future that, in their view, will most 
likely depend on the growth of the service industries. New office space has to 
be created to accommodate that growth.
Demand for apartments2.1.2 
The second characteristic of the cases is that cities try (or have tried, see Sec-
tion 5.1.10) to meet the need for affordable housing – housing for the lower 
incomes – and affordable housing – housing at lower than market prices – in 
addition to prestigious up-market apartments.
During the last twenty years the population of the city centres has 
changed. After some decades where the middle and upper middle classes left 
the city centres for the suburbs, during the last two decades they have moved 
back (Macleod et al., 2003).
Cities have trouble to accommodate this new demand for apartments and 
have seen housing prices climbing very fast. The centres have changed in na-
ture: until the late 1980s large parts were populated by lower income groups 
that could not afford to move to the suburbs. But during the last two decades, 
these groups have been gradually pushed out of the city centres that are now 
mostly dominated by the middle class that are willing (and able) to pay large 
sums for relatively small homes. In the three cities of this thesis, often even 
the middle classes can no longer afford a house in the centre. In London, New 
York and Amsterdam prices have gone too far up, forcing the middle classes 
to look at the fringes of the centre and pushing the lower income groups ever 
further out. Cities have acknowledged this shortage of residential space that 
exists for both the lower and the middle-income groups. In their new neigh-
bourhoods and renovated neighbourhoods they implement programmes to 
accommodate the needs of both groups.
This movement was most visible in New York and London but can also be 
observed in Amsterdam where the centre and the fringes of the centre have 
experienced a boom in housing prices. And although, due to its high levels 
of affordable housing, these neighbourhoods remain more mixed than their 
counterparts in New York and London, the trend is the same. The cities al-
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ways had trouble to provide enough affordable housing but now they are ex-
periencing that even the middle classes can no longer afford an apartment in 
the city.
At the beginning of the 21st century, there aren’t too many areas left in the 
centre of cities that can facilitate a planned mix of social, affordable and com-
mercial housing. Sometimes projects in the centre are referred to as the last 
chance, or the last frontier, to create new social and affordable housing (e.g. 
City of New York, 2005).
Mixed neighbourhoods2.1.3 
The third characteristic of the projects is that they seek to create mixed 
neighbourhoods.
During the last decades, opinions have changed on the kind of neigh-
bourhoods a city needs to plan for (Garvin, 2002; Majoor, 2008; Jacobs, 1962). 
A strong separation of functions between residential and commercial neigh-
bourhoods is not longer the norm. Residential neighbourhoods often lack 
liveliness during daytime whereas commercial neighbourhoods become quiet 
and sometimes scary places after working hours. The prestigious commercial 
neighbourhood la Défense in Paris offers an example of this and there are 
many others (Swyndegouw, 2005; Trip, 2007; City of Amsterdam, 2001). Thus, 
in the 21st century cities plan for mixed neighbourhoods that accommodate 
combined residential and office development and also include cultural, edu-
cational and other facilities (Florida, 2005).
Focus on infrastructure2.1.4 
Infrastructure forms an important part of urban development projects. We 
notice that, with an ever increasing intensity of traffic, the accessibility of 
places has become of key importance. A short commute is one of the reasons 
for people to accept a job and is regarded as a valuable asset of the company 
that aims to hire them (Florida, 2005).
To be successful, a new district has to be accessible. City centres however 
experience high traffic densities, forcing companies to look for locations at 
the outskirts of the city or on ring roads. New projects need to focus on infra-
structure; they are preferably situated at a hub of infrastructure. This is exact-
ly what the projects of this thesis have in common: infrastructure is an im-
portant aspect in all of them. All projects are situated near – existing, newly 
created and/or renovated – railway and lightrail stations.
Another reason for this approach is that the inaccessibility of the area was 
widely understood to be one of the main reasons why it took so long for the 
London Docklands project, a very large urban renewal project that created a 
business district in the former docklands, to become successful. It took years 
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before Docklands was connected to the city’s subway system (Fainstein, 2001; 
Foster, 1999). Cities have learned from these mistakes and a 21st century proj-
ect provides the infrastructure in an early stage of its development.
Sustainable strategies2.1.5 
Nobel and Costa (1999) describe sustainability as the ideal of ensuring con-
tinued availability of resources, maintaining standards of living in already 
developed areas and addressing the steadily mounting concerns about envi-
ronmental pollution. These concerns have received more attention during the 
last twenty years.
We may say that the focus on infrastructure and the focus on mixed neigh-
bourhoods go hand in hand with this fifth characteristic. Cities try to imple-
ment sustainable strategies, where ‘sustainable’ has (at least) three mean-
ings: it means foremost that with an ever worsening climate and the constant 
problems of air pollution, cities try to have new projects developed in an envi-
ronmentally sustainable way; it refers to policies aimed at reducing the ener-
gy use of buildings and at making the mobility of its inhabitants and visitors 
less dependent on cars.
The second meaning reflects the aim of cities to create their neighbour-
hoods in such a way that they find a balance between different population 
groups. They try to not push (all) the present residents out of the deprived 
areas that will soon be renovated but to create a ‘sustainable social climate’ 
of different income groups and different kinds of households (single person, 
multi family/students and elderly etc.).
By creating the neighbourhoods in a sustainable way, cities also hope that 
over time the new buildings will not be abandoned but, like their historic cen-
tres, will be able to accommodate new functions (City of Amsterdam, 2004). 
Here economic and sustainable policies become reconcilable. One of the prob-
lems of real estate development is to construct the right buildings at the right 
time. Planning is an important aspect because you can only use one location 
once in so many years and because it takes so long to develop a building that 
it may no longer be needed by the time it is finished (Gordon, 1997b; Van der 
Veen & Korthals Altes, 2009). Buildings that can accommodate various uses 
will not as easily become redundant as mono-function buildings.
Competitiveness2.1.6 
The projects are not just of local importance. They also matter for the state or 
country where they are situated; they are meant to accommodate economic 
growth, and keep global cities on the map of 21st century.
In her thesis on Shanghai’s business district Pudong, Chen (2007) discusses 
literature that seems to hint at a new kind of competitiveness between cities. 
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What is meant is that the competitiveness is not so much between the fac-
tories or the companies within the cities, but between the cities themselves 
that compete with each other to attract new businesses, preferably the head 
offices of multinational companies (cf. Swyndegouw, 2005; Castells, 1997).
Public-private cooperation2.1.7 
Urban development projects require cooperation between public and private 
parties.
Local governments in most western cities, including the three of this study, 
have embraced models in which they work closely together with private par-
ties. Either in public partnerships whereby some risk sharing takes place 
or in forms whereby private parties – such as developers and large compa-
nies – participate in plan-making processes at an early stage and new regula-
tions are implement to support instead of hindering their wishes and needs.
Macleod et al. speak of a development that might lead to the hegemony 
of entrepreneurial Neo-Liberalism (2003: 1658): “One effect of this new urban 
politics sees the responsibility for ‘regenerating’ many erstwhile disintegrat-
ing inner-city zones and neighbourhoods falling on the shoulders of so-called 
public-private partnerships and growth coalitions.”
Indeed the case studies discussed here all involve some kind of public-pri-
vate partnership with a strong focus on commercial interests. Freeman (2000) 
speaks of a shift towards a negotiation paradigm. The government no longer 
adopts a ‘command and control’ model but instead sits round a table with 
stakeholders. All parties can put their interests on the table and every out-
come has the same value. If one party wins something, another party loses. In 
other words, this is a zero-sum process. The problem is however that the table 
may not be accessible to the parties who, in sense of social urgency, need to 
be there most, which may result in a sell-out of (some) public interests (Ca-
macho, 2005a).
Special project areas2.1.8 
The projects are all situated in special project areas; special rules and policies 
apply to them. Sometimes these rules are a mix of political agreements and 
informal policies embedded in regular city policies. But there may also be an 
interplay of hard rules (special policies) and other agreements. The result is 
more or less the same: the area becomes a separate part of the city (see also 
Section 2.4)
If one were to draw a map with rules and regulations of the cities where 
the projects are situated, one would find that all projects are in some respects 
isolated from surrounding areas. The different rules and policies that apply 
to the projects mostly concern business-friendly tax rules and subsidies. It is 
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not uncommon for projects to become special in the sense that a higher layer 
of government takes over authority for them. In Amsterdam’s Zuidas, the city 
government took authority over the project from the borough, in New York’s 
Battery Park City, the state took over authority from the city.
The concept of an urban 2.2 
development project
The preceding section provided characteristics of the urban development 
projects but not a definition of the term. I will refer to the cases as urban de-
velopment projects. This is meant to be a neutral term that states nothing 
more than that land development in the sense of the preceding section takes 
place within a city.
The reason for choosing a neutral term is that the main focus of this thesis 
is on development agreements that are used in urban development projects 
and not on the projects themselves. The aim, in other words, is not to contrib-
ute to the discussion on the nature of projects or the theoretical differences 
between various projects.
A short discussion of other terms I found in the literature may help to clar-
ify the choice of this neutral term. It is hard to find a meaningful label for the 
projects. They have been called megaprojects, city projects etc. In a recent ar-
ticle with a somewhat different focus we have called them strategic city proj-
ects (Van der Veen & Korthals Altes, 2009). In this context, ‘strategic’ refers to 
the aim of cities to position themselves strategically on a world map of global 
cities. It is mainly related to the first and sixth characteristics of the projects 
(Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.6): cities want to accommodate new economic develop-
ments and take part in – and win – a competition to attract prestigious head 
offices and the jobs that come with them.
Chen (2007) discusses the term urban mega project (UMP). She follows 
Carmona (2003) who defines a UMP as a single and unitary project, planned, 
designed and implemented according to determined phases, with different 
stakeholders, clear goals and objectives, a responsible authority and a prede-
termined cost and benefit structure.
The mega-part of of UMP refers to the size of the project. The four projects 
studied in this thesis would qualify under this definition. I find this definition 
quite meaningless, however, since we may ask ourselves if such megaproj-
ects really exist. In reality UMPs are often better understood as a collection of 
smaller projects that fall within one plan.
In his thesis on new urbanity in large-scale development projects, Majoor 
(2008) chooses the term large-scale development projects as a label for his 
cases. He defines a large-scale development project as a comprehensive and 
large programme of spatial investments, in combination with a timeline of 
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investments made by a variety of actors to realise this program, which is lo-
cated in a geographically bounded area (2008: 24).
He distinguishes between a project and a plan and follows Koolhaas (1978) 
who names the Rockefeller Center project in New York City as an example 
of a relatively compact, spatially contained and distinct investment project 
within a more strategic overall scheme for the development of Manhattan. A 
plan is a framework for several concrete investments, a project is character-
ised by its concreteness.
From that perspective, the distinction between a large-scale development 
project, and a plan becomes vague. Certainly, a project has a more concrete 
connotation than a plan. But the four large-scale development projects of 
the case studies considered in the present thesis are also plans that have 
to be materialised in more concrete (sub-)projects. The projects considered 
by Majoor (2008) – Amsterdam Zuidas, Barcelona’s Forum and Copenhagens 
Ørestad – are no exception to this rule.
Majoor (2008) speaks of large-scale development projects because of their 
programmatic characteristics (their size) but also because of their symbolic 
characteristics. By the latter he means that the projects are laid down in stra-
tegic policy documents.
Although the second characteristic in Majoor’s definition – the timeline 
of investments – is meant to distinguish between the plan and the project, 
I would hold that where large-scale development projects are concerned in 
the sense that Majoor uses the term, the distinction mostly fails to have real 
meaning. The projects of my (and his) case-studies are plans and the subproj-
ects of which they consist may not be executed as planned – for example in 
the event of an economic downturn or other unforeseen events. The Zuidas-
project in Amsterdam is an example of a plan that connects several projects. 
This distinguishes them from concrete materialisations like the Rockefeller 
Center or, for that matter, the development of a new railway station.
For this study, it does not matter whether the local government choos-
es the term project or plan since our study does not focus on the symbolic 
meaning of the term. The decisive feature is that a plan or a project must be 
associated with a specific area. However, in land use planning, this is almost 
by definition the case.
I therefore hold that the term project, as found in policy documents, must 
itself be understood as a rhetorical term. It is often used to suggest a con-
crete timeframe and specific and measurable actions. It is meant to convince 
private investors and the public (in that order) that there is not just a plan 
but a concrete initiative with limited goals. By the latter I mean that projects 
are framed in terms of competitiveness, mitigation of environmental impact, 
creation of new residential space and not in utopian terms of greater politi-
cal ideals such as the realisation of ‘a new kind of city for a new kind of man’. 
Such utopian ideas were found, for example, in the 1960s when the first plans 
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for Battery Park City were drafted (see Section 5.1.5)
I end this discussion by stating that labels are only meaningful within a 
specific context. Hence, we do not have to label the larger frameworks where-
in the focal projects exist. This thesis focuses on the concrete materialisations 
within the UMPs, large-scale development projects, urban plans or whatever 
one wishes to call them. It would have made sense to call the broader context 
of the projects plans and the focal projects (see Section 2.3) ‘urban develop-
ment project’. The only reason not to do this is that a neutral term should 
stay neutral; these initiatives refer to themselves as projects, as do the writ-
ers we just discussed. I will therefore also call them projects.
To sum up, I choose the term urban development project as a neutral des-
ignation for the cases considered. Within these urban development projects, 
we will discern ‘focal projects’ (see Table 2.1).
Focal projects2.3 
The focal projects consist of specific projects within the context of an urban 
development project.
The urban development projects of the case studies are divided into small-
er projects (see Table 2.2). These smaller projects range from the creation of 
parks to the construction of office buildings and from the creation of apart-
ment buildings to the construction of new subway stations. This may be vi-
sualised as a kind of tree, where an urban development project provides 
the overall framework within which a specific project takes place while this 
project in its turn may provide the framework for a smaller project. An ex-
ample of this is found in the Amsterdam Zuidas: one of the manifestations of 
the Zuidas project is the project Mahler4, that consists of 9 buildings that can 
also be regarded as separate projects (Section 6.3). For this study, the decisive 
factors are whether the project involves land development and how it is dealt 
with in the development agreement. The focus is on the agreement between 
public and private parties on the project, not on the projects that stem from 
that agreement. The museum that will be constructed in the Symphony tower 
in the Gershwin project of Amsterdam Zuidas lacks these decisive factors. Fo-
cal projects involve one development agreement between one or more plan-
ning authorities and one or more private parties.
For this thesis, I had to be strict: I picked only those projects of which I 
could study the agreements. This results in a variety of focal projects, as some 
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Various definitionsTable 2.1 
Plan A framework wherein one or more projects take place
Project A concrete materialisation of a plan
Large-scale development project Plan that uses the concrete terminology of a project
Urban development project Neutral term referring to urban development plans in which 
projects of focus are realised
Focal project A project within the context of an urban development project 
on which the case analysis focuses
agreements only deal with one building (Battery Park City, New York) where 
others deal with a whole new neighbourhood (King’s Cross, London).
Varieties exist not only in size but also in function. The functions range 
from residential and commercial to other functions – such as the creation of 
parks and cultural facilities – associated with the development of new neigh-
bourhoods. The agreements in the Hudson Yards project (Chapter 6) mostly 
deal with the lease of land by the local government to create a subway exten-
sion under land where developers want to develop – most probably – large of-
fice towers.
The decisive factor that makes the projects comparable is that all focal 
projects involve agreements between public and private parties and that all 
projects exist within the context of urban development projects that share 
the characteristics described in Section 2.1.
To summarise, focal projects have in common that they all exist within the 
broader context of the urban development projects and that they all involve a 
development agreement between planning authorities and private developers. 
These agreements are the main focus of this thesis.
Special project approach2.4 
We already discussed the special project approach as a general characteristic 
of urban development projects in Section 2.1.8. In the present section I want 
to use this approach as a basis for discussion of some of the criticisms that 
have been aimed at urban development projects.
The special project approach involves the creation of a special project area 
to facilitate the implementation of the urban development project (see Fig-
ure 2.1). The ‘special status’ of the project is used to create specific rules and 
procedures that replace normal city rules. In that way, public authorities can 
circumvent their own bureaucracies and create specific incentives to attract 
developers. Often a special public entity is created for the implementation. 
The urban development projects of this study have all used this kind of tech-
niques but not to the same extent. In Amsterdam, the parties intend to start a 
company in which public and private parties will cooperate. However, at this 
moment the special project approach is not found in regulations but rather 
in plans, vision documents and political agreements. In London, the same 
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Characteristics of the four projects of focusTable 2.2 
Urban development project Project of focus
Battery Park City (New York) The Riverhouse. Mixed building that focuses on residential space.
The Verdesian. Mixed building that focuses on residential space.
Hudson Yards (New York) Subway extension on private land, combined with new towers that 
will most likely have a commercial function.
Zuidas (Amsterdam) Mahler4. Eight office towers, one residential tower and some 
commercial facilities.
Gershwin. Mixed buildings that focus on residential space.
King’s Cross (London) Main site. Office towers, apartment buildings and various facilities.
is true for King’s Cross: the legal status of the 
project hardly differs from other projects. This 
is not true in New York, where special districts 
are created and where Battery Park City is 
managed by a special purpose corporation. We 
should note that the special project approach 
is often associated with the urban develop-
ment corporation (UDC). The UDC is an Amer-
ican invention that was also used in England 
in the 1980s whereby a public corporation received the right to expropriate 
land and develop it, setting aside the local political structures and instead be-
ing only accountable to the state government (U.S.) or the national govern-
ment (UK) (Foster, 1999). The cases in New York involve the participation of 
UDCs (see e.g. Section 5.1.3). Here we take a broader view of a special project 
approach, using the term to cover all situations where a planning authority 
separates an urban development project from the regular approach of the city 
involved.
The special project approach has been criticised for a number of reasons 
(e.g. Fainstein, 1993/2001; Swyndegouw, 2005; Camacho, 2005).
The first reason is that the process of creating special project areas often 
leaves the public (deliberately) out of the decision-making process. Decisions 
are now taken by a special purpose entity that is created to implement the 
plan, and no longer by the city council. This example often affects other au-
thorities as well as the UDCs: a city council may be locked in by commercial 
interests when it decides on a project.
In addition, the special project approach results in decision-making pro-
cedures that exist outside of the regular democratic procedures of (local) gov-
ernments. This therefore makes it very difficult for elected members to have 
a full understanding of how decisions within the project area were taken. The 
problem is that the people who take these decisions are not accountable (at 
least not to the elected bodies) for those decisions. This approach shows dem-
ocratic shortcomings and results in a lack of transparency (Edwards, 2006).
Finally, the parties involved in urban development projects may, especially 
in times of economic downturn, be inclined to give greater weight to busi-
ness interests than to the broader interests and needs of the city. Commercial 
interests are said to be in the interest of the whole city – they provide jobs in 
difficult times – and as a result facilities such as parks and affordable hous-
ing projects are cut to a minimum level. The projects of this study all provide 
examples of this (e.g. Section 7.2.11). When there is no democratic procedure 
to involve the public in these decisions, the public parties are just as inclined 
as the private parties to give greater weight to commercial interests than to 
other interests. The choice is then mostly framed as a choice between the im-
mediate construction of the project that results in direct economic profits for 
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the city and the long-term sustainable interests that might result in no con-
struction at all if private parties decide to step out of the project.
Still, the special project approach is not only criticised, it is also praised as 
being less bureaucratic than other approaches and for helping to fast-track 
the implementation of projects, meaning that it saves time. It is also praised 
because it implements the interests of private parties instead of creating an 
adversarial situation whereby the private parties have to fight to have their 
(legitimate) interests recognised. As a result, projects actually get developed 
instead of staying plans. Finally, a special project approach urges planning 
authorities to hire or train professionals to deal with the private parties in-
volved. These professionals understand both sides of the project (the private 
and the public); in negotiations they are able to defend the public interests 
when dealing with private parties while they are also able to defend the inter-
ests of the private parties towards the public officials (see Table 2.3) (Camacho, 
2005a and 2005b).
The critics of urban development projects have convincing arguments (Moo-
laert et al., 2003; Swyndegouw, 2005). But the special project approach is not 
necessarily so undemocratic, lacking in transparency and pro-business as to 
constitute a sell-out of public interests. Development agreements, the focus of 
this study, offer tools for a more inclusive and collaborative approach (Freeman, 
2000; Camacho 2005b) and the in-depth analysis of these agreements contrib-
utes to this goal by revealing their structure. If planning authorities understand 
their agreements better, they may be able to adopt these other models. Plan-
ning authorities are often local governments that lack the expertise needed to 
run a project of this size (Camacho, 2005b; Swyndegouw, 2005; Majoor, 2008). As 
a result, public parties often do not get the best possible deal, either because 
of a lack of expertise or sometimes because of political pressure to incorporate 
the interests of specific businesses (for an example of this, see Section 5.1.19).
An example of these processes is provided by the negotiations on the set-
ting up of the Zuidas Corporation, a public-private entity in which a combina-
tion of Dutch government entities and private parties will work together for 
the realisation of the most expensive part of the project, the dock. The dock 
consists of a plan whereby infrastructure (lightrail, rail and roads) will be 
tunnelled over a length of 1.1 km (0.7 mile). The land above the tunnels can 
then be used for the construction of buildings (see Section 7.1.3). Over the last 
three years, it turned out that private parties are not willing to bear the (high) 
financial risks of the project. The corporation will now probably be forced to 
adopt a model whereby many risks fall within the sphere of the public parties 
whereas the private parties will receive more powers of control. A Dutch poli-
tician writing in a national daily (Het Parool, 2008b) wondered what, in that 
case, was the point of working together with private parties, since the local 
government of Amsterdam would have been capable to execute the project by 
itself. The reason why it does not do that is first and foremost that it wants to 
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share the financial risks involved in the project and believes that cooperation 
with private parties will increase the quality of the project. If the private par-
ties are not willing to accept these risks, it makes less sense to work together 
with them in one project organisation. Still, political pressure will probably 
result in a scenario whereby even in that case the public parties will invite 
private parties to take part in the corporation.
A lack of insight into the process of contracting is one of the reasons why 
public parties do not always end up with the best possible deal. Chapters 9 
and 10 aim to provide this insight. Here we may summarise the argument giv-
en there by stating that local public parties often do not incorporate the con-
cept of ongoing negotiations in their vision on contracts but instead choose 
one ‘go/no go’ moment when all aspects of the deal are agreed to or not. Rep-
resentatives of the public can either consent or not consent to a document 
describing all aspects of the deal (see Section 8.2.8b for an example). Public 
authorities are often better at making rules than at bargaining to reach an 
agreement in which the best provisions are built in.
Camacho (2005a; 2005b) has proposed a model to overcome these criti-
cisms. He embraces the use of development agreements but recognises the 
problems involved in them. He states that his “model recognizes the limita-
tions of prospective, command and control regulation, but seeks to reincorpo-
rate principles of community involvement, local and regional equity, and flex-
ible comprehensive planning into agreement formation and implementation. 
The model embraces a multilateral orientation and seeks to resolve local land 
use disputes in a way that fosters unbiased, efficient, and well-planned – that 
is, adaptable, and thus durable – land-use agreements” (2005b: 272).
One of the aims that have shaped this study is to contribute to this way of 
theorising. Instead of opposing unstoppable developments, there is much to 
gain from improving the contracts and the contracting processes in urban de-
velopment projects. The title of this thesis: Contracting for better places, reflects 
this aim.
Scientific positioning2.5 
In the preceding sections we have sketched the context of the urban develop-
ment projects investigated here. Before we describe the approach this study 
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Negative and positive aspects of the special project approachTable 2.3 
Criticisms Positive arguments
Undemocratic Unbureaucratic
Too much emphasis on business interests Balance between public and private interests
Incentive to choose short term interests At least something gets built
Lack of transparency Professionalism
Huge investments of public money in special area Whole city profits from the new project
Not integrated with the rest of the city New urban space 
Growing (social) fragmentation of the city New job opportunities for local citizens
takes to them, it is appropriate to position the study within the relevant sci-
entific fields. The present section deals not so much with the methodology of 
the study (which is discussed in Sections 3.10 and 4.6), but rather with the re-
lation between this study and established scientific disciplines. Starting from 
the author’s fascination with urban development projects and agreements, 
this study mixes various scientific disciplines. The ingredients of this mix are 
the subject of this section.
Part of this study may be characterised as an example of sociology of law 
(Campbell & Wiles, 1980). The starting point of the study is the place of a legal 
phenomenon (the agreement) in the context of urban development projects. 
But then the question is turned on its head and becomes: “How do these de-
velopment agreements deal with urban development projects?” This question 
provides the basis for Chapters 9 and 10, where an internal perspective on the 
agreements leads to a normative analysis (cf. Banakar & Travers, 2002).
Campbell & Wiles (1980) draw a distinction between the sociology of law 
and socio-legal studies, stating that the sociology of law is interested in the 
relation between the legal order and the social order while socio-legal stud-
ies on the other hand focus on problems related to justice and law. In other 
words, socio-legal studies take a more internal perspective in their aim to im-
prove legal systems. Banakar & Travers (2002) point out that, at least in Brit-
ish law schools, the term socio-legal studies is used for both the sociology of 
law and the discipline concerned with policy debates on public sector institu-
tions and services. They add that the discussion on the nature of sociologi-
cal approaches to the law and on whether the sociology of law should be a 
sub-discipline of sociology or an independent discipline is still in full swing 
(Barnett & Travers, 2002; Nelken, 2002), and conclude that study of the rela-
tion between social theory and law is fruitful, but has not yet reached any 
definitive conclusions.
The main complicating factor in this discussion is probably that law in it-
self is a system that deals with most aspects of (social) life. Like economics 
it deals with all aspects of society but unlike economics it does not possess 
a single value like efficiency to measure behaviour by (Luhman, 2004; Nelken, 
2002; Teubner, 1993).
The distinction drawn by Campbell & Wiles does however help to clarify 
the approach taken in the present study. The use of techniques such as case 
studies to understand how development agreements function (see Section 
1.4) may be characterised as a ‘sociology of law’ approach. However, the nor-
mative focus of the study on the quality of the agreements reflects a socio-le-
gal approach related to private law. And, if this difference matters, its interest 
is not entirely sociological. By this I mean that urban planning, the discipline 
of the development of cities in an efficient and sustainable way (Camacho, 
2005a), may also offer a framework of reference here. In the last resort, de-
velopment agreements aim to contribute to an efficient and sustainable use 
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of scarce space in the city. As a result, they are both social phenomena and 
planning devices (see Chapter 3 and Section 4.4). The term socio-legal covers 
the planning function when used in the context of policy studies. The distinc-
tion drawn by Campbell & Wiles helps to separate the two interests. We may 
thus conclude that the study combines interests derived from the sociology 
of law and socio-legal studies, whereby the context of urban planning defines 
the aim of the contracts and private law – or the law of obligations – defines 
which documents are subject of study and which are not (see Table 2.4).
Comparing agreements from 2.6 
different legal systems
Now that we have positioned the study in its relation to scientific disciplines, 
we are left with the problem of comparing legal agreements closed in differ-
ent projects in different legal systems. Every study that conducts research in 
more than one system must explain why it thinks that it can compare out-
comes from different systems. Different countries and different legal systems 
are associated with different institutions, different languages and differ-
ent mentalities. Nelken (2002) makes us aware of the main problem of com-
parative research: in some cases, the findings of a scholar studying another 
system may tell us more about the preoccupations of his home system than 
about the system under study.
Since the main part of the present investigation is dedicated to the study 
of legal documents, the first fact that one should be aware of is that the proj-
ects are situated in three different countries, each with its own legal system. 
The English legal system and the American legal system are known to be part 
of the common law (the law of Anglo-American systems) whereas the Dutch 
legal system can be regarded as part of the civil law system, the dominant le-
gal system in the world. The civil law is also known as Romano-Germanic law 
(Zwalve, 2000; Zweigert & Kötz, 1998).
Questions may arise about the importance of these differences for this 
study. Development agreements are legal documents with many other dimen-
sions. The prevailing legal culture explains the way in which these contracts 
are drafted, whereas the nature of the project and the relation between parties 
explains the content of the provisions. We therefore need some awareness of 
these differences and the debate on their importance before we can move to 
the main subject of this thesis, the content of development agreements.
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Elements of the studyTable 2.4 
Sociology of law approach Socio-legal approach Planning studies approach Emphasis on private law
The study finds its point of 
departure in the author’s 
fascination with develop-
ment agreements in urban 
development projects.
Normative focus on the 
content of agreements 
within the context of public-
private cooperation in urban 
development projects. 
The study derives its subject 
from the context of urban 
development projects and aims 
to contribute to the creation of 
‘better places’ as reflected in 
the title of the thesis. 
The study focuses 
on the content of 
contractual agreements, 
not of public law 
documents.
Law-as-culture2.6.1 
When society changes, the law will not automatically follow. While it may 
be true that important political, economical and cultural changes will soon-
er or later be reflected in a legal system, a one-on-one relationship between 
law and society does not exist. Law operates in a society and is at the same 
time an autonomous system. The law does not get its validity from a source 
without the law, it is self-referential (Luhman, 2004; Teubner, 1993; Luhmann, 
1986). In his work, Law as an autopoetic system, Günther Teubner (1993) de-
scribes the law as a self-referential, self-reproducing system that is adaptive 
to its environment. Key terms are: autopoiesis, self-reference, self-description, 
reflection, self-organization, and self-regulation. Notice all the ‘self’-words: a 
legal system is first and foremost a system that keeps itself alive through var-
ious processes of reproduction. The next question is then how many of these 
legal systems exist and how they are related.
Another difficulty is the tension between a legal culture and the culture of 
a society. The cultural approach to comparative law starts from the proposi-
tion that legal cultures exist and that there are, generally speaking, four legal 
cultures. The first is the Western culture that is characterised by its rational-
ity and individualism, the second is Asian culture, known for the emphasis it 
puts on moral, religion and Confucian principles, the third is Islamic based on 
the Koran and the final one is African legal culture, which does not separate 
itself from religion and morals and starts from a collectivist rather than an 
individualistic point of view (Van Hoecke & Warrington, 1998).
Van Hoecke and Warrington (515) offer 6 basic elements of a legal culture: 
a common legal culture will have shared understandings on at least these six 
points.
A concept of law1.  – What is law? What is its relationship to other social 
norms?
A theory of valid legal sources 2. – Who has the power to create law, and under 
what conditions? What is the hierarchy of the legal sources? How, and by 
whom, are problems of collision between legal sources solved? What is the 
respective role of the various legal professions? Are non-legal texts or deci-
sions, such as religious ones, direct sources of law?
A methodology of law 3. – both for the making (at least if there is any deliberate 
law-making in the legal orders concerned) and for the adjudication of law. 
This consists in the first place in interpretation of the law. To what extent 
do the adjudicators of the law have the freedom and/or the duty to inter-
pret the law? Which methods of interpretation may be used? Do they have 
any hierarchical relationship? Which is the standard style of writing, e.g. 
for statutes or for judicial decisions?
A theory of argumentation4.  – Which kinds of argument and of argumentation 
strategy are acceptable? Are these strictly legal elements, or social, eco-
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nomical, political, ideological and religious ones as well?
A theory of legitimisation of the law5.  – Why is law binding? What if it conflicts 
with some other, non-legal, social norms, such as religious norms? What 
kind of legitimisation may give a binding force to the legal rules: a purely 
formal or (also) an ideological legitimisation (e.g. moral or religious val-
ues)? What kind of legitimisation gives the whole legal system its binding 
force? Is it sociological, historical or axiological? And, in case of more than 
one kind of legitimisation, in which combination and under what condi-
tions do these various legitimisations apply?
A common basic ideology: basic values and a common basic worldview 6. – A com-
mon view of the role of law in society and of the (active or passive) role of 
lawyers. A view on which problems are considered to be legal problems, to 
be solved properly by the legal system, and which (such as moral or eco-
nomic problems) remain outside the realm of the law.
Within cultures, legal families can be distinguished. In Western legal culture 
two legal families exist, the first being Romano-Germanic, the second being 
Anglo-American. The families are also known as civil law and common law 
respectively. The two families are both determined by their rationalist and in-
dividualist view on man and society, by a positivist view on law – unmoral law 
is still law – and an instrumentalist view on law: there are formal procedures 
to make law.
Differences also exist between the two families. Differences are found, for 
example, in the third and fourth area (the methodology and the argumenta-
tion). But, since both families are part of the same culture and share so many 
characteristics it is possible to compare them.
Van Hoecke & Warrington note that we have to recognise that the context 
is an important part of comparative research (1998: 532): “This context is not 
only the material context of sociology, history, economy, but also the ideologi-
cal context of the law and what could be called the “juridical way of life” (i.e. 
all elements not belonging to ideology in the strict sense but, rather to tradi-
tion, or to fashion).”
Within the law-as-culture approach they distinguish three levels of com-
parison:
Legal systems have to be located in the context of large cultural families 1. 
on a world scale.
Within the cultural families, comparative law is possible and should start 2. 
from the basic six elements named above.
A technical comparison is possible when systems have the same paradig-3. 
matical theories in each of those six areas, like the civil law countries of 
the European Union.
[ 25 ]
Common law and civil law can be said to be different families but they are 
also part of a common Western culture that makes it possible to compare the 
two. This can however not be a purely technical comparison since cultural 
differences between the two systems do play a role, as do other sociological, 
historical, and anthropological factors.
Legal culture is not only found on a world scale, it also exists at a national 
level. We may define a national legal culture as the view that aspects of law 
are themselves embedded in larger frameworks of social structure and culture 
which constitute and reveal the place of law in society (Nelken, 2002: 333). The 
relation between a legal culture and society as a whole is what makes the con-
cept complex. And it is especially hard to know whether a certain phenom-
enon – such as the way contracts are commonly drafted – is caused by the 
legal culture or by another cultural practice. Still, the notion of a legal culture 
is helpful. Common law culture does exist, as does civil law culture. Within 
those cultures various differences can be found that are related to national 
legal cultures. Nelken (2002), for example, refers to Blankenburg and Bruinsma 
(1994) who find that Germany has one of the highest litigation rates with re-
gard to traffic incidents, whereas the Netherlands have one of the lowest, de-
spite the cultural and social similarities and economic interdependency of the 
two countries. Blankenburg & Bruinsma explain these differences by referring 
to the paralegal alternatives to litigation (the supply side of law) that are ab-
sent from the German system. We may call this a difference of national legal 
cultures, but Nelken (2002) notes that it is doubtful whether the presence of 
such alternatives in Germany would also lead to a reduction of litigation rates 
there. In other words, what counts as an alternative to litigation in one society 
may not be regarded as such in another. The question then becomes: what can 
be explained by national legal culture and what by national culture?
For a socio-legal approach to law, both perspectives matter: we should lo-
cate a legal system in one of the four above-mentioned legal cultures, in its 
legal family and at the same time be aware of the legal culture of the country 
of study and its relation to society. This is a less complicated task than it may 
seem, it has more to do with making explicit what one is normally aware of 
when conducting research in various systems. The law-as-culture approach 
tells us that we should be aware of context and of the limits of cross-country 
comparisons, but we need to move one step further in the present study since 
our analysis takes place on the level of development agreements and not of 
statutes and rules. This demands a more instrumental approach to the study 
of the content of those agreements.
Functionalism2.6.2 
Opposed to the law-as culture approach is the functionalist approach. Func-
tionalists hold that, with the exception of those parts of the law that are in-
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tertwined with national culture, all modern economies need the same rules. 
If economic systems are converging, then their laws must also be. Zweigert 
& Kötz (1998: 40) state that: “(...) if we leave aside the topics which are heav-
ily impressed by moral views or values, mainly to be found in family law and 
in the law of succession, and concentrate on those parts of private law which 
are relatively ‘unpolitical’, we find that as a general rule developed nations 
answer the needs of legal business in the same or in a very similar way. In-
deed it almost amounts to a ‘praesumptio similitudinis’ (...)”.
This praesumptio similitudinis does not mean that rules are found in the 
same place. The structure of a legal system may very well cause a rule that 
is found in the private law domain of one system to be part of the public law 
domain of the system with which it is compared. A functionalist denies the 
importance of these different categorisations but instead focuses on the func-
tion the rule performs.
If he were to find a rule applicable in Dutch law, he should presuppose that 
English law probably has a rule that performs the same function and then 
start looking for it.
The position of the functionalist only makes sense when one takes an ex-
ternal view of the legal system; he is not interested in the function of a rule in 
a legal system but rather in its function in society. We may conclude that the 
law-as-culture approach on the one hand and the functionalist approach on 
the other might be irreconcilable but first and foremost they operate on dif-
ferent levels. The law-as-culture approach operates on the level of mentalities, 
the inherent meaning of rules in different legal cultures. Zweigert & Kötz stick 
to the more down-to-earth level of the rule itself and the function it performs.
Thus, when on the one hand a functionalist would say that all legal sys-
tems have adopted rules of good faith in consumer law or rules that perform 
a similar function, and on the other hand Teubner (1999) states that the rule 
of good faith that was imposed on English law by a European directive on 
consumer protection may very well be a different kind of good faith than the 
kind a continental lawyer is familiar with (Teubner calls this kind of transfer 
of a concept to another system a ‘legal irritant’), both views may be right. The 
question is: are the functionalist and the law-as-culture scholar on the same 
wavelength? I would argue that they are not, unless they transform their dis-
cussion into one on ‘legal transplants’ (the concept of transferring a rule from 
one system to another). If the functionalist holds that a rule from the system 
of origin will have the same meaning in another system, the law-as-culture 
scholar may respond that this is not at all sure.
A functionalist approach to law in this study means that we look at legal 
agreements simply as documents with a function to perform.
Nelken (2002: 344) mentions a trend towards a pragmatic legal instrumen-
talist view on the law, on the basis that a rule should first and foremost do its 
job. I would like to take this notion one step further and state that his view 
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does not mean to deny the notion of a legal culture, but regards law primarily 
as something with a function to perform. This is an external view of the law, 
since it judges a rule on whether it is fit for purpose. It makes sense to take 
this perspective on development agreements, which are in themselves meant 
as strategic documents, drafted as a means to an end. In that sense pragmatic 
legal instrumentalism is the most helpful approach to the agreements of this 
study.
The three approaches to study are summarised in Table 2.5.
Differences between common 2.7 
law and civil law
Legrand (2003) states that there is an unbridgeable gap between the common 
law and the civil law systems, not so much because of their differences on the 
level of rules, but rather because of the different mentalities of the systems.
Differences between the common law and the civil law can hardly be de-
nied. The historical roots of the systems differ, the methodologies they use to 
discuss a legal problem differ, as do their legal categories (Smits, 2002; Zwalve, 
2000). At the same time, Legrand (2003) argues that common law and civil law 
are such broad denominators that they lack meaning in specific circumstanc-
es. The systems have different mentalities but knowing whether one system 
is part of the common law or the civil law family has no predictive value for 
the content of a specific rule. It is rather a question of mindset, of mental-
ity. A common law lawyer and civil law lawyer live in different worlds and 
will probably have a hard time when they want to discuss the approach to a 
specific case. But I would not argue that the two could not communicate at 
a rule level. When one thinks in terms of existing problems and not of legal 
categories, it is possible to understand each other. This study focuses on the 
problems lawyers had to solve in their contracts. The question then becomes: 
can we understand these problems and see how the specific section in the 
legal agreement aims to solve it? This however, is not so much a strictly ‘legal 
comparison’ but results in a multi-dimensional analysis of agreements (see 
Section 2.8). The above-mentioned notion of pragmatic legal instrumentalism 
is also applicable here (see Section 2.6.2).
Different mentalities2.7.1 
The common law and civil law systems have different roots (see Table 2.6). 
The roots of the civil law are Romano-Germanic and those of the common 
law system are the laws of 12th century England (Zwalve, 2000).
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Approach to studyTable 2.5 
Law-as-culture Functionalism Pragmatic legal instrumentalism
Awareness of differences between:
Legal cultures1. 
Legal families2. 
National legal cultures3. 
Focus on the function of 
a rule, not on its legal 
characterisation. 
Combines awareness of cultural 
differences and the importance of 
context while remaining aware of 
the strategic function of contracts. 
Generally speaking, the main difference between the two families may be 
said to be that between an inductive and a deductive method of legal rea-
soning. The method of legal reasoning in the common law is inductive: ar-
guments start from the case, not from the general rule. In civil law, it is the 
other way around: the legal arguments depart from legal – and mostly codi-
fied – principles and apply them to the facts of the case. These methods are 
better regarded as general approaches or starting points than as absolute dif-
ferences: in the end we may sketch the common law method of reasoning 
as inductive-deductive and the civil law method as deductive-inductive (Lordi, 
2002).
We will also encounter these different mentalities in the cases studied in 
this thesis: a civil law lawyer uses his civil code as the starting point for writ-
ing his legal agreements. A common law lawyer on the other hand starts from 
the case and will – in a manner of speaking – write his own statute and call 
it a contract. If he thinks any statute to be of particular importance he will 
incorporate its provisions in his contract by quoting the relevant articles or 
definitions. Here again, we may also say that a civil law lawyer uses the civil 
code and case-specific agreements whereas the common law lawyer works 
the other way around (and then refers to statutes and general rules).
The systems are not so different that a civil law lawyer could not take a 
common law approach (and vice versa). In fact, the common law approach to 
a contract can, and often is (Flood, 2002), used for civil law contracts. The dif-
ference in approach reflects the difference in mentality that we are discussing 
here rather than an unbridgeable gap between the legal systems concerned.
Another difference of mentality is that despite the shared individualist 
world view of the two families, common law scholars and practitioners are 
inclined to judge the quality of a rule with reference to its economic efficien-
cy. Civil law scholars and practitioners put the unity of the system up front 
(Smits, 2002; Nelken, 2002). Civil law countries have all adopted civil codes 
and this may be an example of the stronger relation between the state and 
the law than in common law countries where the unity of the system (a state 
task) is traditionally regarded as less important.
We will now discuss three striking instances of the difference between the 
common law and civil law systems, with reference to the notions of codifica-
tion, good faith and consideration.
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Differences in mentality between civil law and common lawTable 2.6 
Civil law Common law
Romano-Germanic roots Roots in 12th century England
Deductive methodology Inductive methodology
Contracting takes place within the context of 
existing codifications and statutes
Contracts are approached as statutes; the context 
is explicitly written down
Law is predominantly thought of in its relation 
to the state
Focus on relation between law and economy
Codifications, good faith and consideration2.7.2 
Codifications
Civil law countries had all codified their laws by the 19th century or the very 
beginning of the 20th century. The common law is based on principles derived 
from case law, the decisions of the highest courts. Statutes do of course exist 
but they only apply to the situations for which they are specifically written. 
Even the more general attempts to codify legal principles have a more con-
crete meaning than the general principles of the European civil codes (Smits, 
2002; Zweigert & Kötz, 1998; Zwalve, 2000).
The general attempt to collect the principles of private law in one book is 
typical of civil law. Some authors hold that because of these codifications civil 
law systems are less flexible and creative than common law systems (Posner, 
1992).
Good faith
The good faith principle in civil law systems is a general norm, found in most 
civil codes, which can be used to interpret, complement and set aside con-
tractual terms or statutory duties (Rijken, 1994; Hesselink, 1999). The principle 
applies to the whole body of private law (Hartkamp, 1996). In the end, good 
faith is a general standard of fairness.
In comparative law the term general or objective good faith has been used 
(cf. Hesselink, 1999; Brownsword, 1996) to distinguish the civil-law principle 
from its common law counterparts.
While the term ‘good faith’ is often used in common law contracts, it does 
not have an independent meaning. A ‘good faith’ standard is a standard of 
honesty that can be used to interpret other duties. There is no such thing as 
an objective principle of good faith, or a general standard of fairness in com-
mon law systems (Summers, 2000; Chitty, 2004).
Some differences exist between English and American law (see Table 2.7). 
English law has not adopted a good faith principle but American law has codi-
fied a principle of good faith that refers to fair dealing and trade standards 
in the Uniform Commercial Codes that most states adopted in the course of 
the 1960s (Summers, 2000; O’Connor, 1999; Brownsword et al. (eds.), 1999; Bur-
ton, 1980). The principle there is also intended to implement a duty of hon-
esty in contracts. It does not, for example, apply to the pre-contractual phase 
nor can it provide a basis for independent duties. This is the main difference 
between the common law and civil law approach. In the following quotation, 
the renowned American jurist Allan Farnsworth (1928-2005) comments on 
the UNIDROIT principles for international contract law where the principle of 
good faith is introduced and the hope that the common law will adopt this 
principle in full, in a way that clearly illustrates the difference in mentality 
between the two systems (see Section 2.7.1). “Civil law lawyers demonstrate 
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an unsettling tendency to use the doctrine of good faith as a cloak with which 
to envelop other doctrines. While a common law lawyer would not combine 
the doctrine of good faith with that of unconscionability, it is not unheard of 
for a civil law lawyer to argue that a party who seeks performance of an un-
conscionable contract does not act in good faith. While a common law lawyer 
also would not confuse the doctrine of good faith with that of frustration of 
purpose, it is not unheard for a civil law lawyer to state that a party who seeks 
performance of a contract after its purpose has been frustrated also does not 
act in good faith. In this fashion, many contract doctrines can be subsumed 
under a single amorphous doctrine of good faith” (Farnsworth, 1995: 60-61).
The common law prefers piecemeal solutions for specific situations to a 
general principle. The ongoing debate on this topic (Bridge, 1999; Campbell & 
Vincent-Jones, 1999; Wightman, 1999; Summers, 2000; Chitty, 2004) has not yet 
led to any appreciable change in this common-law approach.
Consideration
A third important difference between common law systems and civil law sys-
tems that we need to discuss here is that the common law requires a ‘consid-
eration’ for a contractual obligation to come into existence whereas civil law 
systems do not. While this requirement is not in fact mentioned explicitly in 
the legal documents studied here (see Section 4.2), it is such a basic principle 
in common law (Chitty, 2004) that the legal documents analysed here cannot 
be properly understood without some awareness of its significance.
In common law countries, as a general rule, every contractual promise 
must be supported by consideration – something of value in the eyes of the 
law – to be enforceable; without consideration, contractual promises are un-
enforceable. A promise by C to give D an amount of money with no obligation 
on the part of D other than to accept the gift is thus in principle unenforce-
able in a common-law court of law because C’s promise is not supported by 
consideration provided by D. Such a requirement does not exist in civil law 
systems.
The consideration requirement is also important when contracts are modi-
fied. The ‘legal duty rule’ states that a promise to perform an existing duty is 
not a consideration. This rule can be illustrated as follows.
Suppose that A has contracted to build an office tower for B, for the price 
of € 1 million. While the work is in progress it turns out to take more time 
than A thought when he signed the contract. B agrees to pay him € 1.1 million 
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Good faith principle in three legal systemsTable 2.7 
Dutch law (civil law) English law American law
Good faith principle is the 
crucial open standard. It can 
interpret, complement and even 
set aside existing duties.
Good faith is not absent from English law 
but it does not exist as a general principle.
A good faith principle is found in the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. It is 
a general duty, but cannot be used as an 
independent source of obligations.
Good faith also applies to the 
negotiation phase.
As a general rule, good faith does not apply 
to the negotiation phase. Specific legal 
categories have to be applicable.
As a general rule, good faith does not 
apply to the negotiation phase. Specific 
legal categories have to be applicable.
instead of the original € 1 million if he finishes the work within the agreed 
period. The legal duty rule holds that B is not liable for the extra € 0.1 million 
because A’s duties have not changed and the original consideration was € 1 
million.
This rule also works the other way around. Suppose that A owes B € 1,000. 
A later agreement states that B will accept € 900 instead of the € 1,000. This 
amendment is in principle unenforceable by A. In other words, even if A can 
prove that B agreed to accept the € 900, the amendment would be void be-
cause the original consideration was € 1,000 and nothing has changed with 
regard to B’s duties.
Weighing up the differences2.7.3 
Discussions of the nature of the differences between common law and civil 
law tend to focus on two key concepts, substantive shift and convergence.
Substantive shift
While differences between common law and civil law systems still exist, the 
systems are also members of the same overall culture (see Section 2.6.1) and 
share significant experiences. One of the most important experiences of the 
20th century is that courts in both systems have focused on principles that al-
lowed them to come to a fair decision in specific cases rather than on formal 
rules. We may call this development the substantive shift. One of the scholars 
who makes this substantive shift full part of his view of the legal system is 
Melvin Eisenberg (2000). His theory of dynamic contract law starts from the 
normative thesis that contract law reasoning “should be substantive rather 
than formal, and that the rules of contract law should, where appropriate 
be individualized rather than standardized, subjective rather than objective, 
complex rather than binary, and dynamic rather than static” (Eisenberg, 2000: 
1745). Eisenberg’s positivist thesis is that Anglo-American law has indeed un-
dergone this development.
In civil law countries, substantive shift was mainly achieved by using the 
good faith principle (Zimmermann & Whittaker, 2000). In common law coun-
tries, other principles, such as promissory estoppel, unconscionability, and 
(notions of fairness in) implied terms, specific performance and injunction, 
were used to achieve the same results (Chitty, 2004). Gjerdingen (1993) speaks 
in this respect of the end of classical common law culture. In classical com-
mon law culture an ideology of non-state interference and personal autono-
my prevails, resulting in a state that has no role in redistribution of welfare 
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Some differences between civil law and common lawTable 2.8 
Civil law Common law
Most general principles are codified Most general principles are formulated in case law
General principle of good faith The requirement of good faith is embodied in 
various  legal categories
Consideration is not required for a contractual 
duty to be enforceable
Every promise has to be backed by consideration
and that should not interfere in the private affairs of its citizens. As to the 
disputes, judges use common-law categories to rule on a case but do not look 
behind those categories. This means that when an individual contracted in 
way that strikes us as unjust but that is not illegal, he should win the case.
Gjerdingen holds that the law has changed but the way in which the law 
is discussed by legal scholars and lawyers has not. In other words, classical 
common-law liberalism no longer exists in the courts but most writers keep 
using it as a common background.
There are many similarities between Gjerdingen’s view of classical com-
mon law culture and the liberal culture in civil law systems of the late 19th 
and early 20th century (Zimmerman & Whittaker, 2000). The difference may be 
that, as Gjerdingen puts it, while civil law theory has already fully embraced 
the changes that have taken place over the past century or so, common law 
theory has not yet done so. In fact, the changes are often regretted, since they 
reflect an interference of the state with the content of contract. Gilmore (1995) 
goes as far as speaking of the death of contract. We already saw that common 
law culture is more closely linked to economic rules than civil law culture.
Convergence
The convergence thesis holds that the legal traditions of common law and 
civil law systems are converging, which should make unification of their laws 
ultimately possible (Smits, 2002). The main causes of this convergence are 
Europeanisation and globalisation. The question is now whether this conver-
gence takes place at a surface level related to institutions, the binding force 
of precedent, the sources of law and the ways of reasoning employed or at a 
deeper level concerning fundamental questions about the nature of law, the 
functioning and content of rules and the role of law in society (Smits, 2002: 
103). Convergence of the legal systems at surface level is not much disput-
ed, but the existence of convergence at a deeper level is still under debate. 
Legrand (1996) and Teubner (1998) state that there is no convergence at this 
level, whereas others hold that it does exist (cf. Smits, 2002). The existence 
of convergence at rule level can hardly be denied, but there is no convincing 
proof that legal traditions or even national legal systems are converging at 
a deeper level (cf. Smits, 2002; Nelken, 2002). The substantive shift discussed 
above as a common experience of western legal systems cannot be taken as 
evidence of a wider convergence.
Dimensions of a transaction2.8 
Before we move towards the main subject of this thesis – the content and 
functioning of development agreements – we may ask ourselves why par-
ties enter into transactions. The existence of a legal system that secures their 
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rights and obligations would probably not be a sufficient inducement: they 
would not be likely to enter into a transaction if they were not expecting to 
gain from it, and if they did not trust their counterparty in the transaction 
enough.
In this section, we will discuss a short overview of approaches to the ques-
tions of why parties enter into a transaction and how they see the task of the 
law in this context.
Three approaches2.8.1 
We may distinguish three approaches to the question of why parties enter 
into transactions. The first approach holds that the parties’ calculations have 
shown sufficient proof that a specific transaction will be profitable for them. 
The second approach holds that the deliberations of a party do not only focus 
on economic profitability but that other reasons apply as well. Of those rea-
sons, trust is arguably the most important one. Another important reason to 
enter into a specific transaction is the wish to invest in a long-term relation. 
This may lead a party to accept less favourable terms or a smaller profit than 
it is used to because it expects that the relationship with the other party will 
be more profitable in the long term. The third approach is intermediate be-
tween the other two: it takes the same starting point as the first approach but 
tries to calculate the costs of the other aspects included in the second. For 
instance, it may take the costs of leaving a long-term relationship and start-
ing up a new one into account. But its main focus is still economic profitabil-
ity. I will refer to these three approaches as the law and economics approach 
(Cooter & Ulen, 2004; Posner, 1992), the relational approach (Campbell & Vin-
cent Jones, 1996; Macneil, 1980), and the transaction costs approach (William-
son, 1985; 1981) respectively.
In the cases investigated in this study, public parties are always a party to 
the transaction. This, however, does not change the picture of this analysis 
for two reasons. The first reason is that when governments act in their pri-
vate law capacity, they are also (but not only) commercial parties since they 
need to make a profit to realise their (public) goals. Thus, economic reasoning 
forms a part of their behaviour. The second reason is that we will use an ap-
proach that focuses on specific contractual relations, this means that the fact 
that one of the parties in a transaction is a public party may influence the re-
lation between the parties (and therefore the agreement) but not the analyti-
cal approach to it.
The law and economics approach2.8.2 
The law and economic approach has its roots in the Chicago school (Posner, 
2007) and holds that the inherent purpose of a legal system is to find the most 
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efficient rules. It incorporates the economic approach into the law (Thomas & 
Ulen, 2004). It pictures the individual as a utility maximiser. Whenever a party 
wonders whether he should enter into a transaction or not, he should make a 
calculation to find out whether the specific transaction will maximise his util-
ity. A transaction will maximise his utility when he trades a good for the high-
est price, or buys the good for the lowest price. If a party can choose between 
two similar products from two different sellers, he should buy from the seller 
offering the good for the lowest price. And when he trades a good, he should 
sell it to the buyer who is willing to pay the highest price.
The main reason for a party to enter a transaction is that he has reason to 
believe that the transaction will maximise his utility. The legal system should 
facilitate the enforcement of the most efficient rules. It fulfils an important 
role in the construction of markets. And it makes sure that parties will per-
form their duties. In doing so, it abstracts from the actual behaviour of parties 
both normatively and descriptively. The law and economics approach holds 
that parties are utility maximisers, and if they are not they should be, as ra-
tionality requires parties to enter into a transaction because it maximises 
their utility.
The relational approach2.8.3 
The relational approach states that transactions are embedded in relations 
between parties (Macneil, 1980; Collins, 1999). There are other norms and rea-
sons than the combination of economic profitability and legal security that 
constitute a decisive part of the decision as to whether or not to enter in-
to a transaction. Relational aspects are decisive in this context. The attitude 
towards transactions adopted in the relational approach may be said to be 
similar to that found in sociology. It examines what parties actually do when 
they enter into a transaction. In other words, while the law and economics 
approach holds that one should enter a transaction if it enhances one’s calcu-
lated utility, the relational approach holds that this calculation is only part of 
the story and does not in itself provide the basis for a normative theory (Mac-
neil, 1980; Collins, 1999).
In the relational approach, trust plays an important role. Trust is common-
ly defined as three different kinds of expectations (Sanner, 1997: 54):
Expectation of the persistence and the fulfilment of the natural and the 1. 
moral order.
Expectation of technically competent role performance from parties in-2. 
volved with us in social relationships and systems.
Expectation that partners in interaction will carry out their fiduciary ob-3. 
ligations and responsibilities, that it is their duty in certain situations to 
place the other’s interest before their own.
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An element that is often added to the definition of trust is risk. Since trusting 
someone is essentially a gamble, risk is what distinguishes trust from confi-
dence. Confidence is a legitimised variation of trust; this means that a party 
bases his confidence on reasons outside himself, and when it is violated he 
will probably not blame himself. Whereas when his trust is violated, he will 
probably also blame himself for trusting the counterparty (Weber & Carter, 
2003).
Collins (1999) distinguishes three functions of trust in the decision of par-
ties as to whether to enter into a transaction or not. (1) Trust guides the se-
lection of other parties. If one party trusts another party it will probably not 
examine every detail of the latter’s organisation but will rely on previous posi-
tive experience or the previous experience of others. (2) Trust overcomes the 
problem of the vulnerability of the first mover and serves to reduce the com-
plexity of the information to be considered about a transaction. Trust makes 
it possible to reduce the complexity of the available information. Parties that 
trust each other will decide that the actions of the other party are to a cer-
tain degree predictable (since they fulfil, or have fulfilled in the past, the three 
expectations mentioned above). Hence, they don’t need to examine every de-
tail of the other party’s behaviour. (3) Trust reduces the need to guard against 
disappointment by making very specific contracts in which a party explicitly 
guards itself against every eventuality. Instead, parties trust that the other 
party will fulfil reasonable expectations.
The legal system, as Collins states, plays a role in this process, and par-
ties may put their faith in the legal system. But its importance should not be 
over-estimated. A legal sanction is only one of three possible forms of sanc-
tion, and will often not be the most effective one. The other two forms are the 
non-legal sanction of a refusal to deal with the other party in the future if he 
does not fulfil his obligations and the non-legal sanction of self-enforcement, 
which is constructed by using legal rules but does not require litigation. An 
example of this kind of sanction is provided by the pawnbroker who keeps 
the pawned object when the money he has lent is not repaid.
Collins (1999) concludes that a close examination of the way in which peo-
ple decide whether to enter into transactions leads to the conclusion that the 
role of law is at best peripheral and in many instances irrelevant. Trust and 
sanctions are vital in order to overcome the risks of betrayal and disappoint-
ment, but within this mechanism the legal sanctions available for breach play 
only a marginal role.
Transaction costs approach2.8.4 
A transaction costs approach takes the findings of the relational approach 
into account and reformulates them as costs (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 
1981; Macneil, 1978). It thus states that parties when they consider if they will 
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enter a transaction also take the costs of the transaction process and other 
costs into account. When a party (A) wonders whether he should enter into a 
transaction with another party (B) with whom he has dealt to his satisfaction 
for a number of years, or with a party (C) of whom he has no experience but 
who offers a better price, the transaction cost approach will not ask which 
counterparty is most trusted, nor will it focus only on the best price. Instead, 
it will ask what the costs are of not dealing with the party A has dealt with 
for years. What are the costs of negotiating a new deal? What are the costs 
of getting to know the other party well enough to be willing to enter into the 
transaction with him? In other words, what are the costs of leaving the busi-
ness relation with B to start up a new one with C?
The transaction cost approach thus remains faithful to the law and eco-
nomics approach, but goes further. It holds that the most profitable transac-
tion is not the one that promises the lowest price, but the one that results 
in the lowest costs together with the highest profit after all transaction costs 
have been calculated. In contrast, the relational approach denies that it 
is even possible to estimate all costs that are involved in a transaction and 
holds that even if it were possible, parties would never do that because the 
costs of calculating all transaction costs are too high (Macneil, 1978).
Balancing the above three positions2.8.5 
In the case studies described in this thesis, private parties were asked why 
they entered into the transaction in question. Their answers can be sum-
marised as: “first the price, and then a number of other reasons follow.” These 
parties however were successful enterprises, not individuals. Individual 
agents of those parties often trusted their instincts or first impressions but 
then had to wait until their financial departments had done their calcula-
tions. Still, they all stated that those calculations were in the end not the only 
reason why they would decide to enter into a transaction. Since calculations 
can only predict next year’s market situation or quantify the risk of delay to a 
certain (limited) extent, trust in both the project and in the other’s party will-
ingness to act reasonably was almost equally important. In brief, the reasons 
for entering into a transaction are complex and only a part of them (although 
arguably the most important part) are economic ones.
However, a law and economics approach cannot explain why parties invest 
in projects that are profitable but seem less profitable than other projects, 
whereas both the relational approach and the transaction costs approach can 
easily explain this. The most important flaw of the relational approach, on 
the other hand, is that it can only tell us that an unlimited number of aspects 
matter when parties enter into a transaction (see Section 3.10). It does not 
help us to choose between these aspects. Still, an open approach that starts 
its analysis from the relation between parties is the most attractive one for 
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the purposes of this thesis because it does not force us to reduce the com-
plexity of reality in advance. and it can easily incorporate the aspects related 
to the maximisation of cost efficiency and utility without neglecting other as-
pects.
The place of the contract 2.9 
in the context of the deal
Collins (1999) distinguishes three different frameworks in which contractual 
behaviour takes place, namely that of the business relation, that of the eco-
nomic deal and that of the contract. These three frameworks are character-
ised by different types of reasoning and different types of communication 
systems (see Table 2.9).
Business relation 1. – The business relation between parties both precedes 
the transaction and is expected to persist after performance of the obliga-
tions. Trust and trustworthiness are essential elements of this relation (cf. 
Section 2.8.3). Collins states that failure to keep a promise that was only 
sealed by a handshake may be understood as a deliberate signal that the 
business relation is no longer a source of trust. And equally, if a party per-
forms a duty that was only sealed by a handshake but was not legally en-
forceable, this performance may enhance trust.
Economic deal2.  – The framework of the economic deal is the agreement be-
tween parties which specifies the reciprocal obligations created by the dis-
crete transaction and which establishes the economic incentives and non-
legal sanctions (Collins, 1999: 129). It suggests a calculus of short-term and 
long-term economic interests by which to measure and assess contractual 
behaviour. Its key term is not trust; instead, parties use rational self-inter-
est as the reference in their communication system (cf. Section 2.8.2 and 
2.8.4). The presence of a legally enforceable contract makes little difference 
to the credibility of commitments (1999: 130). Parties act in a cooperative 
manner, not because they feel they have to, but because they expect a prof-
it from it. A contract, or contract law for that matter, cannot force parties 
to act in a cooperative manner.
Economic transactions can be described as non-cooperative games (Col-
lins, 1999: 132). It should be stressed that the non-cooperative game model 
also provides a basis for understanding cooperative behaviour. It is derived 
from game theory and states that most transactions occur within a trad-
ing relation that persists over a period of time. Thus, normally not one 
transaction but a series of transactions exists. A party will only act in its 
short-term self-interest if it regards the specific transaction as the last of 
a series. And it will only be willing not to regard a transaction as the final 
transaction if it expects more benefit from the continuance of the series of 
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transactions than it expects from the short-term benefits of the endgame. 
In other words, only in the latter situation will it not cheat. In most cases, 
professional traders will expect more benefits from the continuance of the 
transactions since the benefits of a one-time cheat are unlikely to exceed 
those of an indefinite number of transactions.
Collins (1999) provides in this context the example of a consumer’s pur-
chase of goods in a store. This kind of transaction is likely to be one of an 
indefinite series of transactions. Only in the final transaction does an in-
centive exists for the shopkeeper to sell goods that he knows to be defec-
tive (i.e. an incentive to cheat). But because this is a non-cooperative game 
and series of transactions are inherently unstable, the consumer may be 
afraid that the shopkeeper will regard the current transaction as the final 
one; as a result, the consumer may be unwilling to enter the transaction. 
The solution to this problem lies in ensuring that for every transaction in 
the series, the shopkeeper will profit more from continuing the series than 
from cheating which would result in the consumer withdrawing from the 
series of transactions. In case of retail sales, this condition is likely to be 
met.
The transactions (projects) examined in our case studies take place over 
a relatively long period of time. Parties are then forced to adopt a more 
cooperative attitude, since they need each other to realise the project. Still, 
this provides only more incentives to act in cooperative manner, whereas 
it does not change the conclusion that cooperative behaviour (within the 
economic framework) is better analysed from a non-cooperative perspec-
tive.
Contract3.  – The framework of the contract is the third normative framework 
that Collins distinguishes. This framework is constituted by the standards 
provided by the self-regulation contained in the contract. The frame of ref-
erence consists of the identification of rights and obligations established 
by any formal documents, explicit agreements and accepted customary 
standards.
Of the three frameworks, only the third (the specific obligations laid down in 
the contract) is one where a default will result in an award of damages or oth-
er relief by a third party. But facilitating these awards of damages and other 
reliefs is not necessarily (and will often not be) the main function of a con-
tract (here understood as a legal agreement). The main function of the con-
tract will often be to enable the parties to formalise their agreements in a spe-
cific document, without any expectation that they will ever use that contract 
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Three frameworks of contractual behaviourTable 2.9 
Framework Description Frame of reference
Business relation Expected to persist after performance 
of obligations
Trust
Economic deal Financial incentives and non-legal 
sanctions to perform obligations
Self-interest
Contract Standards of the deal that are 
provided by self-regulation
Rights and obligations established by 
formal documents and customs
in a legal dispute. The contract is merely used for “the purposes of clarifying 
the problem and determining the allocation of risks and liabilities in advance” 
(Collins, 1999: 131). In other words, the contract has a planning function. Col-
lins wants us to distinguish between how the law thinks about the contract, 
and how the contract thinks about the relation between parties. The contract 
may contain provisions that the law regards as unenforceable but that parties 
consider as binding. He therefore describes the third framework as the one 
that determines how the contracts think about the relation between the par-
ties (Collins, 1999: 132): “The way in which the contract thinks about disputes 
is a framework which isolates the transaction from its economic and social 
context. The communication system of contract treats the obligations under-
taken as absolute undertakings, firm commitments, which cannot be revised 
except through the process of revising the contract itself by agreement. It is 
this framework which describes the discrete communication system repre-
sented by the contractual relation.”
Collins’ three dimensions are helpful, but it is better to conclude that these 
three dimensions are present and meaningful than to presuppose that there 
are only three dimensions. However, when Collins states that all his dimen-
sions are present in every relation, he is probably right. That conclusion is 
perfectly reconcilable with the relational contract theory that we will discuss 
in the next chapter.
In a transaction the dimensions of a business relation, of an economic re-
lation and of the contractual relation are probably always present. In some 
transactions the business dimension will be of enhanced importance, where-
as in others the economic dimension will be dominant. The problem that 
arises is then that of the nature of the contractual dimension that seems to 
be able to encompass the two other dimensions: it can formalise both kind of 
expectations in one document. This problem can easily be resolved if we de-
cide not to accept Collins’ dimensions as the only ones to be considered, but 
instead to opt for an approach whereby more aspects matter. Then trust and 
rationalised self-interest become (constitutive) parts of the relation. The func-
tion of the contract that formalises the relevant obligations and rights will 
then change from one context to another.
Collins’ re-framing of the conclusions of Steward Macaulay (1963) on the 
non-use of contracts in courts is interesting. Collins states that the parties 
may not intend to enforce their contracts in a court of law, but rather to use 
them as documents that comprise their central normative orientation. This 
makes sense and, as we will see, fits the results of our case studies (cf. Sec-
tion 10.4). The three dimensions that Collins discerns do help us to under-
stand why this non-enforcement comes about. In the first place, it may not be 
in the parties’ interest to jeopardise their relation or it may be against their 
(long-term) economic interest if they expect a (long) series of transactions. 
The written document (contract) thereby merely serves to specify their expec-
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tations concerning their mutual relation.
In the following chapters we will see that relational contract theory (Chap-
ter 3) and the concept of a development agreement (Chapter 4) both embody 
the dimensions discerned by Collins.
Conclusion2.10 
This chapter has paved the way for the main parts of the present study by 
introducing the scientific fields of urbanism, (social) legal theory and the 
problem of comparing projects in different systems. We ended with a discus-
sion of the dimensions involved in the process of contracting. The end of this 
chapter, however, is only the beginning of our study. The investigation of the 
relation between development agreements and the focal projects in urban de-
velopment projects is a complex field because both the urban development 
projects and the legal documents that govern them comprise so many dimen-
sions. We need to focus on specific aspects while at the same time bearing 
these many dimensions in mind, since this study aims not only to add to the 
results of previous investigators but also to open up a new field: the relation 
between development agreements and urban development projects has, to 
the best of my knowledge, not been subject of study yet.
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Relational contract theory3 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study. We will use re-
lational contract theory to assess the development agreements of the case 
studies. The chapter has three parts. (1) In the first six sections, the theory is 
introduced. Section 3.7 then provides an example where the theory is used as 
a basis for criticism of a case. (2) In Sections 3.8 and 3.9, the theory is put in a 
broader perspective; it is criticised and we will have a quick look at how it is 
embedded in other approaches to contracts. (3) In the final Section, 3.10, we 
will show how we will use the theory to assess the development agreements 
of the cases.
As Macneil (1980) uses the term ‘contracts’ and ‘contractual relations’ we 
will follow him in this chapter. However, in further parts of this study we will 
reserve the term contract for those legal documents that are regarded as con-
tracts (and not, for example, as leases or deeds) by the legal system in force 
locally. We will use the term ‘agreement’ as a neutral designation for obliga-
tions that parties have mutually agreed on. If we are specifically discussing 
the written part of the agreement, we will emphasise that. The term ‘contrac-
tual relations’ is also used in a neutral sense, to denote the relations involved 
in development agreements but not necessarily related to contracts in the 
strict legal sense of the term. It should be noted that misunderstandings can 
arise when Macneil uses the term contract in an ambivalent way to designate 
both the written agreement, the unwritten part of the same agreement and 
all other forms of human behaviour related to bargaining and exchange.
Introduction3.1 
All contracts are embedded in relations
“Just as contractual relations exceed the capacities of the neo-classical con-
tract law system, so to the issues exceed the capacities of neo-classical con-
tract law scholars. They must become something else – anthropologists, soci-
ologists, economists, political theorists, and philosophers – to do reasonable 
justice to the issues raised by contractual relations” (Macneil, 1980, quoted in 
Campbell (ed.), 2001: 9).
The quotation that starts this chapter clearly indicates the methodological 
problems involved in this study. Development agreements do not usually re-
sult in litigation and are therefore better interpreted as plans – or normative 
guides – for the future (see Section 2.9). The agreements underlying the cases 
we study, although laid down in legal documents, are embedded in other re-
alities. To understand them, we need to know something of their economic, 
social, political and other backgrounds.
The quotation also highlights another important fact. Although in the end 
the agreements are about profits and risk allocation, we would miss many rel-
[ 43 ]
evant aspects if we only studied the agreements from an economic perspec-
tive. Not all elements of the agreements can be analysed from a perspective 
of efficiency and ‘utility maximisation’. Other considerations, such as preser-
vation of the relation, are just as important when parties enter a long-term 
relationship. In Chapter 2 we already introduced the three frameworks within 
which contractual behaviour occurs (Section 2.9) and discussed the scientific 
positioning of this study with special reference to the sociology of law and 
socio-legal approaches (Section 2.5).
In this chapter we discuss the theory that provides a social view on con-
tracts and that can easily include other dimensions of contractual behaviour 
than the plain legal dimension in its analytical framework.
This analytical and normative approach to contracts is known as rela-
tional contract theory and was developed by Ian Macneil (born in New York 
City, 1929). It starts from the idea that a contract is “no more and no less than 
the relations among parties to the process of projecting exchange into the fu-
ture” (Macneil, 1980: 4). Although this approach has been criticised for its lack 
of specificity and its focus on the context of transactions instead of general 
principles (e.g. by Fried, 1981; Posner, 1992; Eisenberg, 2000, see Section 3.10), I 
regard it as the best approach for this study for the reasons indicated below.
Reasons for choice of relational contract theory
The first reason for choosing relational contract theory as a starting point for 
the analysis of our cases is that it urges us to study the context of the devel-
opment agreements involved. It demands a contextual approach. The theory 
states that if we leave the context out of our analysis, we are left without a 
clear image of the actual agreement; if we were to restrict ourselves to analy-
sis of the written documents, we would only know the general legal meaning 
of the contract but we would be left without a clear idea of the relationship 
between the parties and the meaning of the contract for that relationship. It 
may be the case that parties use a standardised contract without having the 
intention to use the remedies mentioned in the contract or to stick to the 
planning laid down in the contract (cf. Macaulay, 1985; 2003).
This argument relates to the differences between the contract as a real life 
document and contract litigation that takes place when the contract cannot 
longer serve as a plan for the future on its own. The mere text of an agree-
ment may provide you with a good idea of the outcome of a court case but 
that does not mean that it also tells you how parties plan to work together 
and if they are willing to start litigation when conflicts arise. The distinction 
between contracts that function in real life processes – the law-in-action ap-
proach – and contracts as the courts deal with them is important since the 
cases of this study do not usually involve litigation (Gordou, 1985; Campbell, 
2001; Macaulay, 1985; 2000).
Some economic research exists on the difference between soft remedies 
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and hard remedies. Soft remedies are remedies such as loss of reputation 
whereas hard remedies are classical legal remedies such as liquidated damag-
es (Macleod, 2005). The distinction between the two kinds of remedies fits the 
three dimensions of contracts as conceptualised by Collins. Soft remedies are 
then mostly related to the framework of the business relation (see Section 2.9).
The distinction between soft and hard remedies has in other words been 
recognised in academic literature but it cannot be recognised as such in the 
courts. Courts might theoretically be aware that a soft remedy could be a se-
vere punishment (loss of reputation could cost a party a lot of business) while 
a hard remedy could be relatively meaningless (for example a € 20,000 fine on 
a profit of € 10 million). But in current legal practice, courts exist to grant or 
not to grant a hard remedy.
Courts do not exist to recognise the meaning of a contract outside their 
walls. They may try to take the daily life meaning of a contract into account 
in their verdicts but they cannot act the other way around; courts cannot – in 
their verdicts – conceptualise the fact that parties do not always refer their 
contractual disputes to them. This does not mean that an individual judiciary 
cannot be aware of this ‘daily life’ meaning. But it does means that a law-in-
action approach to contracts cannot be achieved by studying court verdicts. 
And it has to be a law-in-action-approach, rather than an approach that stud-
ies the law as written down in verdicts and statutes (black letter law), that can 
include the non-use of litigation in its conceptualisation of contracts.
The second reason to choose relational contract theory as a basis for this 
study is that it offers a normative framework to assess the development 
agreements of the cases. A contract can for example pay too little attention 
to the complex problem of role integrity, that is the problem of sticking with a 
contractual role and the tasks that come with it (see Section 2.4.2). Relational 
contract theory can criticise the contract for that reason without being bound 
to the terminology of one legal system that would make the findings subject 
to the criticism that such a view is irrelevant for other legal systems. And, the 
other way around, the theory does not put every judgment in the perspective 
of cultural differences, which would make it impossible to make any judg-
ment at all. It thus provides a theoretical framework against which we can 
weigh the various outcomes of our research.
Relational contract theory has its origins in an Anglo-American debate that 
holds (among other things) that contracts need to be approached from a new 
perspective as opposed to a classical (strictly legal) approach. This makes the 
theory useful for this study as the classical approach to which Macneil and oth-
er writers refer (e.g. Benakar & Travers, 2002; Posner, 2000; Brownsword, 1999) is 
very much associated with the common law approach, whereas relational con-
tract theory is not linked to a common law or civil law system (see Table 3.1).
The upshot is that relational contract theory develops an inclusive, coher-
ent concept of contracts that suits our case studies and is reconcilable with 
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American, English and Dutch law (see also Section 3.8), not in the last place 
because it uses its own terminology to analyse a contract and is not limited 
to the legal concepts of one system with their specific, technical meanings.
Four core propositions3.2 
Relational contract theory, being a socio-legal approach to contracts, starts 
from its social perspective on the process of contracting. Understanding con-
tracting also requires an understanding of the concept of society. The theory 
is developed starting from four core propositions (Macneil, 1980):
Every transaction is embedded in complex relations.1. 
Understanding any transaction requires understanding all essential ele-2. 
ments of its enveloping relations.
Effective analysis of any transaction requires recognition and consider-3. 
ation of all essential elements of its enveloping relations that might affect 
the transaction significantly.
Combined contextual analysis of relations and transactions therefore pro-4. 
duces a better analytical product than a non-contextual analysis.
The four propositions are meant as an overarching theory; they stand on their 
own and do not depend for their validity on the validity of relational contract 
theory or any other theory (Macneil, 2001a/2001 : 370). Every student of trans-
actions should accept these principles, no matter his view on the law. These 
propositions are not controversial; what is debatable is how much of a trans-
action one needs to understand to be able to discuss it or judge it. A legal sys-
tem depends on its capability to abstract from the many realities of a contract, 
as does for example an economic theory. Still, the focus of this study is not on 
the question of what courts do or should do, but on how development agree-
ments function in the context of urban development projects. If you want to 
know how an agreement functions, you must accept the need to take into ac-
count many aspects that are not merely legal. A concept of a contract has to 
find a balance between these aspects (the legal and the contextual). We may 
say that once again the tension lies essentially in the difference between the 
law-in-action approach and the law as it is enforced in the courts. In other 
words, the first approach needs to take into account all elements it can possi-
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The relational approach versus the classical approachTable 3.1 
Relational contract theory Classical legal approach
Contextual approach Focus on the written document
The meaning of a contract is found 
outside the walls of the courts
Litigation provides the horizon in which the 
agreements are understood
Law-in-action approach Black letter law approach: this means that agreements 
are understood within the context of the legal system
The normative framework can be used to 
criticise a contract from both an internal 
and a comparative perspective
Agreements are criticised mostly from a perspective of 
legal soundness within the context of a (national) legal 
system
bly find, and the second only the elements it has recognised as important for 
the verdict of the court.
Macneil (1983) admits that the provability of his four propositions varies. 
The first proposition is a virtually undeniable observation of human inter-
course whereas it is impossible to find empirical proof for the last proposition. 
He draws a distinction between the behavioural aspects and the substance 
of contracts. The behavioural aspects of a contract relate to the way in which 
parties act towards each other, whereas the substance of contracts is best un-
derstood as their legal content. The core propositions apply to both. Does that 
mean that Macneil disagrees with the remark made at the end of the previous 
paragraph, that one’s understanding of a contract depends on whether one 
takes a law-in-action or a law-in-the courts approach? Probably not; he speaks 
of the study of contracts and not of the study of the law as it stands. He intro-
duces himself as a positivist: an agreement is what parties say it is, whereby 
‘saying’ does not necessarily involve words, it can be implied in their actions.
Macneil thereby solves the problem of finding a balance between the legal 
content of a contract and other aspects by introducing four general principles 
that apply to both the behavioural and the substantive elements of a contract.
However, the criticism that he fails to tell us where one has to stop study-
ing a contract has a point (Barnett, 1992, see section 3.9). How much context 
do we need? Does the context of a transaction also include previous trans-
actions? Does it include the cultural traditions of parties? And if so, to what 
extent should a student of transactions be familiar with them? We will see 
below that Macneil has addressed this problem by providing some rules of 
thumb. Still, his theory remains open-ended.
I solve this problem of vagueness and open-endedness in this study by ar-
guing that the amount of context we need to know depends on the nature of 
the transaction. Secondly, the purpose of the study is also of importance. The 
context of a credit-card purchase of a bottle of perfume in an airport shop 
matters less (in most circumstances) than that of the sale of a family cottage 
in a small village. And it also matters whether the researcher wants to quan-
tify his results, since that would almost necessarily mean that he would have 
to leave much of the context out. It is doubtful, however, whether the contract 
can ever be really understood if much of the context is omitted.
Macneil (2000a, 2001: 371) is more precise when he states that an analysis 
of any contract requires at least four elements:
A statement that the area of study includes extremely complicated con-1. 
tractual relations;
A brief description of these relations (with suggestions for further sources 2. 
of information);
An explanation why the analyst has concluded that the relations will not 3. 
affect the outcome of the analysis that focus on a narrow element (e.g. the 
price); and
[ 47 ]
The conclusion that 4. ceteris paribus is therefore appropriate in this case and 
constitutes adequate consideration of these relational impacts.
These four rules imply that one cannot say beforehand which aspects of a 
transaction need to be studied. It depends on the nature of the transaction 
and the purpose of the study.
Macneil defends his theory against the more accepted approach of ratio-
nal choice theory and the law and economics approach (which uses rational 
choice theory). These theories all presuppose that an individual is a rational 
person who wants to maximise his utility. The most efficient rules (rules that 
enable as many individuals as possible to maximise their utility) are also the 
best rules. The best contracts and the best court verdicts are all based on the 
most efficient rules (cf. Section 2.8.2).
Macneil’s argument is that these approaches are not descriptions of real 
human behaviour, as is often claimed, but are first and foremost theories 
in the sense that they are based on a core belief which is ultimately more a 
matter of faith than of scientific proof. The reason why these approaches are 
dominant is that the ideology of capitalist systems is based on the concept 
of a rational individualist (the utility maximiser) and rational choice theories 
fit in well with this approach. Macneil speaks of the domination of the ceteris 
paribus (other things being equal) rule. Rational choice theory and game theo-
ry sweep away all relations except pure competition, by bringing them under 
the ceteris paribus rule (Macneil, 2000a/2001: 369).
The main difference between the proponents of the Chicago School, known 
for its neo-liberal ideals and focus on law and economics, and the proponents 
of relational contract theory is that the Chicago School believes in a form 
of contract law that starts from the idea of the individual utility maximiser 
whose aim is to act in the most profitable way (cf. Section 2.8.2). Their anal-
ysis of contracts therefore focuses mostly on a minimisation of costs and a 
maximisation of efficiency.
The best example of this approach is probably the concept of efficient 
breach (Posner, 1992). Suppose that B contracted with A to buy a wagonload 
of tomatoes from A by the end of next month, but just before the end of the 
month B finds that he can buy a wagonload of tomatoes from C for only half 
the price he agreed to pay A. Suppose further that there are no penalty claus-
es in the contract and that B would only have to pay A’s damages if he broke 
the contract. If A was able to sell the tomatoes to another customer for the 
market price which was by then 80% of the price that B would have to pay 
A, A’s damages would amount to 20%. This means that B could buy the wag-
onload of tomatoes for 70% of the price (C’s price + A’s damages) he agreed 
to pay. A law-and-economics scholar would conclude that B should therefore 
breach his contract with A because it leads to the most efficient result (note 
that A would still get the full price).
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Macneil objects to this approach. He says that you would have to take a 
number of factors in account to reach this conclusion. What if B has been 
dealing with A for more than 20 years? Shouldn’t the resultant value of the 
relation be taken into account when examining this example? What about 
the transaction costs that were involved in the making of the first contract, 
what about the costs of the loss of reputation (B would be known as a less 
trustworthy person), what about the costs of (potential) litigation? (Campbell, 
2001; see also Section 2.8).
We may agree with Macneil’s critique of the law and economics approach 
that it is often not more than a model. But the question is whether he is re-
ally opposing their approach or their methods here or whether he is oversim-
plifying their points of view.
Macneil takes a more favourable view of transaction cost approaches. A 
transaction cost approach has an open eye for other aspects of a transaction 
than competition and price aspects. It starts from a concrete transaction and 
then looks at the costs that may be involved in it. For example, suppose that 
A (buyer of Dutch tomatoes) has a long-term contractual relation with B (who 
sells tomatoes) whereby he buys B’s tomatoes for price x. When C provides A 
with the opportunity to buy Dutch tomatoes for a price lower than B’s price, A 
will take into account not only C’s price but also the costs of ending his rela-
tion with B. These costs are not only the damages that he will have to pay B 
but also the costs that are involved in entering into a new long-term relation-
ship (B has been a trustworthy business partner for years, how long will it 
take before C becomes such a partner?). Transaction-cost theories take these 
costs into account.
But according to Macneil (2000a, 2001: 376): “In transaction cost analysis, 
once what appear to be the key transactions costs are identified, they take 
over as surrogates for the real interaction between the relations and the 
transaction.” What he means is that transaction cost analysis starts from the 
wrong end. A theory should start from the relations in which the transactions 
are embedded, not the other way around. However, a transaction cost ap-
proach takes ‘the transaction’ as its starting point and replaces the relations it 
found with the key costs of the transaction. It moves back to a rational choice 
approach as soon as it has found these other costs.
Relational contract theory does not abstract the transaction from the rela-
tions in which it is embedded but studies both at the same time. The differ-
ence is that it takes a contextual approach whereas the transactional costs 
approach is essentially non-contextual as it takes the costs out of their con-
text as soon as it has identified them. Since we are not primarily interested in 
costs in this study (costs are an important aspect of the agreements but not 
the only one), I find this a strong argument in favour of a theory that takes 
more aspects into account.
In the same way, an efficiency theory (which holds that if the costs of a 
[ 49 ]
given transaction are lower for party A than for party B, then A should bear 
these costs) cannot explain the allocations of all costs. Thus, it makes sense 
to study the relations between parties to understand why costs were allo-
cated in a certain way, rather than focus only on transaction costs. It makes 
sense to study the cost allocation and the relations at the same time: a law 
and economics approach or a transaction cost approach could then be used 
to criticise the outcomes.
Table 3.2 sums up the focus of different approaches to agreement.
The definition of contracts3.3 
Macneil defines a contract as the projection of exchange into the future (Sec-
tion 3.1). In the previous section (3.2) we have discussed the four core propo-
sitions of relational contract theory. These propositions, combined with the 
focus of the theory, require that the context should be included in an analysis 
of contract and defend this point of view as of more descriptive value than 
theories that describe contracts from the point of view of costs and efficiency 
(Section 3.2). It may now be asked which elements are included in the defini-
tion of contracts. Macneil speaks of ‘roots of contract’, the preconditions that 
are necessary for contractual behaviour to take place, and includes four such 
roots in his definition of contracts (Macneil, 1980: 1) that we will discuss these 
four in turn below:
society (the fundamental root)1. 
specialisation of labour and exchange2. 
choice3. 
awareness of a future.4. 
Society
“Contract without the common needs and tastes created only by society is in-
conceivable; contract between totally isolated, utility-maximizing individuals 
is not contract, but war; contract without language is impossible; and contract 
without social structure and stability is – quite literally – rationally unthink-
able, just as man outside society is rationally unthinkable. The fundamental 
root, the base of contract is society” (Macneil, 1980: 1). 
Macneil distinguishes three different levels of relations in society that enable 
contractual cooperation. The first level relates to the ontological fundamental 
social relations that constitute all human interaction. The quotation above re-
fers to that level.
The second level relates to the bourgeois society that provides the politi-
cal boundaries of the market. The existence of bourgeois society is of crucial 
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Focus of different approaches to agreementsTable 3.2 
Relational contract theory Law and economics Transaction cost theory
Does not exclude any aspects 
of an agreement
Focuses on efficiency and 
leaves the rest out
Does not exclude any aspects of 
an agreement but discusses them 
from an efficiency perspective
importance to understand the form of contracts that we are used to. Macneil 
(2001: 12) speaks of a sovereign imposition of norms by the external God Levi-
athan. The background of the social matrix comprising first-level and second-
level norms is essential to this relational level (see Section 3.4.11).
The third level relates to the internal and external norms that constitute 
contractual cooperation. The external norms are imposed by the law of the 
sovereign but also by other sources like private law (e.g. the standard norms 
of trade organisations). The internal norms are the ten norms that are com-
mon to all contracts (see Section 3.4). A development agreement, from this 
perspective, consists of provisions that stem from legislation (the sovereign), 
other sources, and the agreements that stem from the specific relations in 
which they are embedded.
Specialisation of labour and exchange
In a society different people specialise in different tasks; they exchange the 
fruits of their work and use contracts for the exchange when it doesn’t take 
place immediately.
Specialisation of labour is inevitably accompanied by the more obvious 
concept of exchange that defines a contract. A contract is about exchanging 
something for something (like money for labour). But there must be some-
thing to exchange and that is why we need specialisation of labour. Speciali-
sation of labour is, in other words, the root of the exchange-part of the defini-
tion of contract.
Choice
Without a sense of choice, i.e. the freedom to elect among a range of behav-
iours, a contract would become inseparable from the genetically programmed 
specialisation of labour and exchange that characterises the live of ants and 
other hardworking non-human creatures. The concept of a contract presup-
poses that individuals are able to choose between several options.
Awareness of a future
The last root that contract needs to come in full bloom is the conscious 
awareness of a future, since a contract is basically about projecting exchange 
into the future. That is what distinguishes contract from immediate exchange. 
A contract is about dealing with insecurity; in a contract parties try to con-
trol the future. A and B, for example, may agree that B will start construction 
a year after the contract is signed. Thereby they try to control (part) of each 
other’s future actions subject to circumstances beyond their control. The em-
phasis Macneil puts on society as the fundamental root of contract can hardly 
be disputed.
A question that remains open is what the necessary conditions are to 
make contracting between individuals from different societies possible. Willie 
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(2004), following Campbell (1990) and Durkheim (1964/1984), states that the 
socio-legal approach to contract holds that the constitutive part of a contract 
is not the work of individuals but of society; the institute of contract exists 
because of the regulations made by society, not by individuals. This would 
lead to the conclusion that (legal) cultures must not vary too much if inter-
cultural contracting is to be possible. This is the case for civil law and com-
mon law countries that are different families within the same legal cultures, 
as we saw in Section 2.6.1. Still, we will see that the development agreements 
of the cases studied in this thesis do not provide examples of cross-country 
contracting. One of the reasons may be that a development agreement is so 
much embedded in the local context of the project that it is preferably ex-
ecuted by a local developer.
Common contract norms3.4 
Introduction3.4.1 
Now that we have introduced the overarching theory of contracts, a definition 
of contracts and four roots of contract, we arrive at the core of relational con-
tract theory, namely the ten common contract norms that Macneil discerns 
and the difference between discrete and relational norms. We will start this 
overview with a discussion of the ten common contract norms, after which I 
will introduce the discrete and relational norms. Macneil (2001: 11) uses the 
following definition of a norm, taken from Webster’s dictionary: “A principle 
of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, 
control, or regulate proper and acceptable behaviour.”
Relational contract theory holds that ten norms are common to all con-
tracts (Macneil, 1980). Their content may differ in different contracts, as may 
their importance, but all contracts will involve all ten common norms. The 
theory does not name one of these norms as the most important one, as it 
does not hold that contract law can be described in terms of one principle 
(cf. Section 3.8.2). We will use the common contract norms as a framework to 
compare the contracts of the case studies (see Section 3.10).
During the discussion of the ten common contract norms, I will sometimes 
refer to the differences between the classical and the relational contract. The 
notion of a classical contract refers to the ideal of a contract as the document 
that governs fully the relation between the signing parties in a manner that 
deals with every aspect of their relation (i.e. complete contracting) but is also 
confined to the subject of the contract. The relation between the parties out-
side the agreement in question is not relevant to the contract. The notion of 
the relational contract puts Macneil’s definition of the contract up front. The 
focus on relations implies that the content of the contract changes when re-
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lations change (see also Section 3.5 and 3.6).
The ten common contract norms that relational contract theory discerns 
and that we will discuss below, are:
Role integrity1. 
Mutuality and reciprocity2. 
Implementation of planning3. 
Effectuation of consent4. 
Flexibility5. 
Contractual solidarity6. 
The linking norms: restitution, reliance and expectation interests7. 
Creation and restraint of power8. 
Propriety of means9. 
Harmonisation with the social matrix.10. 
Role integrity3.4.2 
…promoting stability through expectations about recognised social roles1
Parties enter into a transaction in a certain role, for example that of landown-
er, developer or financer. A role will result in different tasks that come with it. 
The role of a doctor, for example, involves not only the prescription of cures 
for patients but also informing family members in case of serious diseases.
Macneil (1980) discerns three aspects of role integrity: consistency, conflict 
and complexity. Consistency relates to the importance of adhering to your 
role over a longer period of time. It also means internal consistency, which re-
lates to specialisation and the limited capacities of particular roles. A problem 
of consistency may arise when a board changes and decides to adapt a differ-
ent strategy and also when different divisions of an organisation use different 
policies.
Conflict relates to the gap that exists between long-term and short-term 
goals and between the desire to maximise immediate selfish gains and to 
maintain social solidarity with other parties. Macneil (1978; 1980) uses ex-
change tension as the descriptive label here. A conflict situation arises when 
parties that are usually competitors join forces in a specific project for which 
they set up a specific organisation. Conflicts may then arise between their 
role as part of the project organisation and their roles as competitors outside 
that relation.
Complexity has its roots in the many different tasks a role may require a 
party to perform, some of which may be disliked. Macneil (1978) mentions the 
example of a doctor who dislikes some of the administrative tasks associated 
1   All short definitions in italics are taken from Vincent-Jones (2006: 4-6).
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with his role. Another real-life example of complexity is when a government 
enters into a transaction whereby it is at the same time landowner and regu-
lator of the land. Its role then involves a mixture of its proprietary and admin-
istrative capacities, both of which comprise different tasks.
The principle of limited order combines the principle of temporal and in-
ternal consistency and the principle of assessing the permissible ranges of 
conflict (Macneil, 1980: 44). It requires that areas of potential conflict, involv-
ing the need for struggle and compromise, are limited in scope and intensity. 
In other words, a conflict should not dominate the relationship between par-
ties since that could result in a state of ‘war’. A conflict about one aspect of 
the transaction could be submitted to arbitration while, in the best-case sce-
nario, the parties could continue to co-operate in fulfilling the obligations of 
the contract the content of which is not disputed.
Mutuality and reciprocity3.4.3 
…the idea that exchange is a process of mutual benefit
The norm of mutuality and reciprocity does not call for equality but for some 
kind of even-handedness. The concept of a contract presupposes that some-
thing is exchanged, and although this does not mean that the division of ben-
efits is equal, it still requires that both parties bear some burdens and col-
lect some benefits (Macneil 1980: 44). Suppose that one party sells a building 
to another party for the sum of ten euros. This may be a disproportionately 
small sum; in other words, there is not enough mutual benefit. And if the 
seller were to go bankrupt, a court might then force the buyer to undo the 
deal because it considered the transaction so uneven that the interests of the 
creditors deserve to be protected over those of the buyer. However, in most 
other circumstances the law will enforce the transaction.
Macneil (2001: 103-110), following Durkheim (1984) distinguishes three 
types of reciprocity. Generalised reciprocity is oriented toward a maintenance 
of social solidarity, it occurs when a donee is in need of something the donor 
has. The donor hopes that when he will be in need (some time in the future), 
the donee will help him too. The transactions of the case studies do not natu-
rally involve this kind of reciprocity, although forms of it may exist. An ex-
ample is when a developer provides a public facility in project A, hoping that 
a local government will grant him project B.
Non-specialised reciprocity occurs in situations where exchange is not a 
result of the division of labour. Macneil follows Durkheim (1984), in stating 
that this kind of reciprocity creates mechanical solidarity and also serves to 
enhance social solidarity. Mechanical solidarity is found in self-providing so-
cieties. We do not encounter this kind of solidarity in our case studies.
Specialised reciprocity results from the division of labour and produces or-
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ganic solidarity. It is characterised by a large exchange surplus. The keyword 
of this type of reciprocity is interdependence. Two parties need each other to 
reach a result. This is the kind of reciprocity most often encountered in our 
cases. Specialised reciprocity may be associated with varying degrees of soli-
darity (trust), ranging from a maximum as in a husband-and-wife relationship 
to a minimum as when an exchange takes place between strangers. Most cas-
es of specialised reciprocity exchange take place somewhere between these 
extremes, however.
Macneil’s views on the level of even-handedness needed for a contract to 
exist have shown some inconsistency. In his earlier work he stated that even 
in a slave labour camp there was some reciprocity, as food was exchanged 
for labour (Macneil, 2001: 119) whereas in his later work he stated that such 
cases of coercion should be ruled out (Campbell, 2001) because their level of 
reciprocity is simply too low. I disagree with Macneil’s view that such cases 
should be ruled out in advance because they lack sufficient reciprocity. It 
would be more appropriate to rule them out because they do not fit in with 
the concept of contract, since a slave worker will not normally have chosen to 
be in the position in which he finds himself.
Suppose that A threatens to kill B’s son if B does not agree to work for him 
and B then agrees to work for A. It is difficult to call this agreement a con-
tract, since B made it under duress. But the norm of mutuality is perfectly 
met, since by signing the agreement B earns the life of his son; it could be ar-
gued (somewhat cynically) that this is an excellent rate for the job.
An example of a situation where there is no mutuality is one in which 
physical force is used to force somebody to do something. If somebody beats 
me when I stop working or do not type fast enough, there is no mutual-
ity – only force.
Macneil (1986) states that there can be no contract when one party is un-
able to exercise any choice (that is, he is powerless). But normally there will 
be some choice (it could be argued that the father who agrees to work to save 
his child’s life in fact chooses to do so), which means that there will be signifi-
cant contractual elements present. This leaves us with a scale on which some 
relationships determined by force are more contractual then others. Although 
the law may not recognise all these relationships as real contracts (the kid-
napper of a child cannot go to court to enforce payment of the ransom he de-
mands), they have contractual elements. These extreme examples may help 
us to understand why some parties may feel bound to comply with an agree-
ment that is not enforceable at law: their motivation is that they expect a sig-
nificant benefit from it.
The upshot is that mutuality and choice are related. It makes sense to re-
strict the idea of choice to free choice, but to take a more positivist view of 
mutuality or reciprocity. As long as something is exchanged, there is an ele-
ment of reciprocity – even in the case of slave labour, for example. But in this 
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case, free choice – an essential aspect of a contract – is clearly lacking and it 
is this that makes the contract void.
Implementation of planning3.4.4 
…as a means of reducing uncertainty about the future
Contracts are about dealing with the future; their main function is to secure 
the way future circumstances are to be dealt with. This requires planning (see 
also Section 10.4).
The difference between a classical and a relational contract is that the lat-
ter will incorporate learning mechanisms and acknowledges the unpredict-
ability of the future by putting the relation up front. The classical contract 
must by definition implement a complete planning (see Section 3.6). The clas-
sical contract will emphasise the importance of this planning while at the 
same time it will hold that whenever a court ruling is required on a particular 
issue, the court must focus on the moment the contract was closed because 
that was when parties considered all issues. If on the other hand a court rul-
ing is required from a relational perspective, the court would have to look at 
how the relation has evolved.
Suppose that A contracted with B that B would pay him the rent on a prop-
erty every first day of the month. However, after a couple of months B starts 
paying on the 15th day of every month and A accepts this arrangement and 
never says a word about it for years. Now suppose that B wants to end the 
contract. The contract states that he can do that by notifying his landlord A 
two weeks before the rent is due. He notifies A on the first day of a certain 
month. A objects that he cannot end the contract before the 1st of the next 
month whereas B holds that the contract ends on the 15th of that month. If 
the dispute is taken to court, a ‘classical’ judge would probably decide the 
case in favour of A (on the basis of consideration of the contract as originally 
drafted), while a judiciary orientated towards the relational contract theory 
would probably decide in favour of B.
Effectuation of consent3.4.5 
…acquiescence of choice as a basis for obligation
The norm of effectuation of consent is linked to the concept of choice. Ev-
ery choice results in the sacrifice of other opportunities, but the contractual 
exercise of choice means that the power to restrain one’s future choices is 
conferred on the other party. If A agrees to pay B € 100 for his services within 
a month, A confers on B the power to decide what A can and cannot do with 
that € 100. On the other hand, A has the power to decide what B can do with 
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(part of) his time since B consented to provide services to A.
Choices are however not absolutely limited but only to the extent that legal 
and other remedies are effective. Classical contract law equates consent with 
planning, and holds that we must act as if all effects of a contract are subject 
to conscious consent at the moment of closing. It is this equation – denying 
the relevance of evolving relationships – that Macneil (1980: 49) opposes: “The 
equation of consent and planning is hardly an eternally valid one. Its artifici-
ality is immense: indeed as we look at complex, ongoing contractual relations 
we see that consent can play no more than some kind of a triggering role, that 
equating consent to the full scope of complex planning is downright silly.”
Although the two may not be equated, the combination of choice and plan-
ning is what distinguishes contracts from torts or free choice from coercion.
Suppose that a contract, as is often the case, includes a provision that urges 
a developer (A) to work harmoniously with other developers that own plots 
next to his land. A classical approach to the contract would spell out what that 
means. But suppose it does not, then a subsequent plan made by the several 
developers would be regarded in classical contract law as based on the original 
consent whereas relational contract theory would hold that A is bound by the 
plan because of the nature of his relation with the other developers.
A more debatable example is one where the contract includes the same 
provision but now all other developers make a working plan to which A does 
not agree, although they consulted him. Suppose that the provision urging 
him to work harmoniously with the other developers is used to get him to co-
operate with the plan anyway. Would we now construct his consent because 
he agreed to work harmoniously with them, which means that if he is the 
only one who has a problem with a working plan that should be his problem 
since the plan is only an effectuation of his consent? Or would we say that 
even though he consented to the general provision, he never consented to 
the particular plan? I hold that although his consent may be constructed here, 
the point is that he was asked to consent with the plan and he did not. The 
reason why his consent may be constructed is because it was unreasonable 
of him to withhold it and stick to his own planning. But we may also say that 
the nature of the relation obliges him to cooperate (this approach is in line 
with the good faith principle embodied in civil law, see Section 2.7.2).
Another example is when a party consented in advance to comply with a 
planning of a third party. An example of such a provision is when a develop-
er agrees to implement the forthcoming planning of a utility company in his 
own planning. However, the reason why that party would be bound by that 
planning is still because he consented to be bound at some moment in the 
future.
The upshot is that consent and planning may not be equated but there has 
to be a connection between the two if we are to be able to speak of choice and 
not coercion.
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Flexibility3.4.6 
…the recognition of the need to avoid rigidity in implementation and facilitate adap-
tation to changing conditions
Flexibility in contractual relations arises from bounded rationality, limited 
availability of information and the dynamics of the socioeconomic world 
(Macneil, 1980). Every contract has a capacity for change; in the last resort, it 
may even be breached under the pressures of change. In classical contracts 
flexibility is found outside the document whereas the relational contract with 
its emphasis on the ongoingness of contractual relations must necessarily in-
corporate principles of flexibility within the transaction. The norms relating 
to planning and role integrity norms may conflict with the flexibility norm. 
Macneil (1980: 51) speaks of the tension between the complete planning of 
a classical contract (the discrete transaction, see Section 3.6) and the chang-
ing world: “Thus we find, in a discrete transaction such as a properly draft-
ed short-term commercial loan, very precise planning respecting payment, 
lender’s remedies for breach, and the like; however the world may change, 
the planning and consent norms will govern the transaction. But the norm of 
flexibility will govern everything outside.”
In a long-term relation, flexibility is incorporated in the relationship and 
results in a two-way flow of consultation, advice, admonition etc. Macneil em-
phasises that this is true, even when a long-term contract looks the same on 
paper as a short-term loan.
Suppose that A and B closed a long-term finance contract whereby A re-
ceives funding for its store from B. The contract may look unambiguous, but 
when A has performed over a long period and then misses a term, B will prob-
ably look for a solution and not immediately use his right to terminate the 
contract or use a debt-collection agency to get his money. The point is that B’s 
readiness to use extreme remedies will depend on his relation with A and not 
exclusively on the terms of the contract.
Flexibility unavoidably enters a relation. The question however is whether 
it is embodied in the contract itself or whether the need for flexibility may 
have to lead to a change of the contract.
Contractual solidarity3.4.7 
…involves the extension of reciprocity in social relations through time
Contractual solidarity is the norm of holding exchanges together. Its sourc-
es are both internal (based on the contract itself) and external, which means 
that contractual solidarity is a general norm of justice. For discrete transac-
tions, norms of contractual solidarity are mostly external. The norm of con-
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tractual solidarity contributes to the preservation of the relation. It clearly 
embodies the concept of trust. A minimum level of trust is necessary to close 
an agreement and, in long-term relations, to stick to it when an opportunity 
for quick success appears (see also Section 2.8.3). For Macneil, solidarity and 
trust are almost synonyms (Macneil, 1981; see Campbell, 2001: 16-17). The 
norm serves to describe the web of interdependency that is externally rein-
forced as well as self-supporting, and expected future cooperation. Solidarity 
also refers to a merger of selfish interests, which means that what increases 
(decreases) the utility of one participant also increases (decreases) the utility 
of the other. This merger is seldom complete. An example that relates to the 
cases examined in this thesis is when a local government and a private party 
contract to implement an urban development project in which the local gov-
ernment will develop the public infrastructure and the private party will con-
struct, say, the condominium buildings. Suppose that the local government 
owns land and the private party agrees to lease or buy it when the infrastruc-
ture is completed. When the work progresses faster than foreseen, the private 
party will have to pay the agreed sum earlier. But the project will also be fin-
ished at an earlier stage and the condominiums can therefore be sold earlier. 
In other words, both parties profit (although not necessarily to the same ex-
tent) from the fact that work went faster than was predicted. The parties will 
most likely cooperate to make it possible for each other to finish the work as 
soon as possible. This element of cooperation makes the notion of individual 
utility maximisation inappropriate to describe contracts that also value the 
worth of the relation (Campbell, 2001).
The upshot is that a minimum of solidarity is required for contracts, since 
it promotes cooperation and prevents a party from dropping out at the first 
setback. In relational contracts solidarity is an internal norm, whereas in clas-
sical contracts it is imposed by courts and other institutions.
The linking norms3.4.8 
…expectation, restitution and reliance interest
Linking norms connect contractual obligations to contractual remedies. Since 
contracts are projections of exchange into the future whereby at least one 
party expects to receive his profit from the transaction in the future and not 
immediately, this expectation can be regarded as an interest and when it’s 
not met, the other party may under circumstances such as fraud, duress, mis-
representation, or other unforeseen circumstances be ordered to return what 
was already paid or to even pay (part of) the profit that the other party legiti-
mately expected to gain.
Macneil discerns the restitution, reliance, and expectation interests of a 
contractual relation as the linking norms. He notes that these norms need 
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not have their roots in (explicit) promises: for example, restitution may be re-
quired where no promise has been made but one of the parties simply re-
ceives too big a share of the benefits. An employee who has been treated de-
cently in the past may expect to be treated decently in the future even when 
no such explicit promise has been made. A businessman enters into nego-
tiations about a future transaction when he expects to make a profit and the 
other party should be aware of this expectation. Macneil also calls these in-
terests linking norms because they link all the other contract norms and be-
cause in many circumstances they will link the other norms to more precise 
rules of behaviour. For example, the expectation interest links promise and 
consent to rules of contract law.
Creation and restraint of power3.4.9 
…to control relations of domination and subordination
A contract can be described as a transfer of powers: powers that used to be 
vested in one party are now vested in the other and vice versa. We already 
saw an example of this in the discussion of effectuation of consent in Section 
3.4.5.
Suppose that A contracts with B to construct a building for B for the price 
of € 1,000,000 in 12 months. The contract places certain restraints on A’s ac-
tions for the next 12 months, to the extent that he has undertaken to con-
struct the building. It also vests power in B to control some of A’s actions: B 
can enforce A’s construction of the building. On the other hand, B can no lon-
ger spend his one million euros freely, since he has to pay A for his work. A 
can enforce B’s payment to him of the price they have agreed on.
A contract will usually consist of several elements of creation and/or re-
straint of power. It will give parties a say in each other’s actions that they 
would normally not have. Such a say may also consist in the right to prevent 
them from competitive actions. As we discussed in relation with the mutuali-
ty and consent norms, the power norm is also related to the concept of choice. 
Choice underlies the difference between coercion and contract.
An example that relates to the cases studied in this thesis is the following: 
Suppose that A and B have contracted that A will construct a building and B 
will construct the corresponding public infrastructure. The contract may grant 
A the right to review the designs of this public infrastructure. It may also pre-
vent A from constructing a new building in the same area within the next five 
years.
Still, the power norm is limited: it can never vest absolute control in one 
party over the other party’s actions. The controls are limited to the context 
of the contract and find their limitation in the legal system. In Anglo-Amer-
ican legal systems remedies are usually limited to payment of damages. In 
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the civil law systems like that of the Netherlands courts usually order specific 
performance of contractual obligations but in the end, the party that refuses 
to obey such an order will have to pay damages (a fine) as well (Chitty, 2004; 
Zwalve, 2000). The upshot is however that every contract creates one or more 
powers for a party that it would otherwise not have and restrains it in the ex-
ecution of some its powers.
Propriety of means3.4.10 
…placing constraints on the ways in which ends may legitimately be achieved
The propriety of means norm relates to the requirement that parties should 
be in possession of adequate means to perform their obligations. A contract 
in which A, a Dutch farmer, promises to deliver the famous Parisian landmark 
the Eiffel Tower to B’s house in the Dutch City of Groningen, at 9 a.m. tomor-
row will in most circumstances not comply with this norm because unless A 
secretly doubles as Superman, he will not possess the means needed to reach 
the intended result.
Contracts sometimes presuppose that parties are in possession of ade-
quate means. In the development agreements of the cases studied here, we 
will accordingly find a balanced division of tasks, providing the parties with 
the tasks for which they are in possession of the ‘most adequate’ means to 
reach the intended result. Sometimes, a party is in possession of the most 
adequate means but rules of law or customs prohibit their use. Classical con-
tracts are indifferent as to how results are reached, constraints are put on 
them by external norms. Relational contracts on the other hand often impose 
restrictions on the means that a party may use.
For example, a contractor could draw up a contract with one of his sub-
contractors embodying an agreement for the latter to increase production to 
a specified level. A classical contract might simply add, ‘no matter by what 
means’, while a relational contract would stipulate that this may not harm 
the quality of the work or be in conflict with relational norms such as preser-
vation of the relation between the parties (see Section 3.5).
Harmonisation with the social matrix3.4.11 
…reflects the need for contract norms to be consistent with wider social norms
Contracts are closed within a society and can only flourish when they fit the 
norms of that society. Macneil uses the term supra-contract norms for the 
norms of the social matrix. The supra-contract norms are set by society and 
not by the contract or the law of contract; they support a contractual relation 
but are not purely contractual. They include broad norms concerning such 
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matters as distributive justice, liberty, human dignity, social equality and in-
equality, and procedural justice (Macneil, 1978), and must be compatible with 
the requirements of social acceptability and (to some extent) with the above-
mentioned norm of social justice. It would be impossible to provide an ex-
haustive list of supra-contract norms.
Note that the norm of harmonisation with the social matrix does not nec-
essarily imply a restriction on the powers of the parties; sometimes laws are 
made that urge firms to compete more instead of less, for example. Macneil 
(2001: 370) discerns four characteristics of a social matrix: it provides (1) at 
least a means of communication understandable to both parties; (2) a system 
of order so that the parties exchange and do not steal from or kill each other; 
(3) a monetary system; (4) an effective mechanism to enforce promises. A so-
cial matrix thus incorporates some of the characteristics of a legal system (2 
and 4) but does not define these characteristics as necessarily legal in nature. 
We could imagine a society where those characteristics are not considered to 
be part of the legal system.
It follows that the supra-contract norms are the most difficult norms to 
grasp conceptually in the present context: they influence a contract, but are 
not in themselves contractual norms.
Discrete and relational norms3.5 
Common contract norms become binding guides for action in a specific 
contractual situation. They may be either relational or discrete in nature, or 
something in between.
The discrete contract and the relational contract3.5.1 
There are two archetypal contractual norms: the discrete norm and the rela-
tional norm.
The discrete norm relates to the ideals of (neo-) classical economy, and in-
cludes the concepts of discreteness and presentiation. Macneil (1980: 60) de-
fines these two concepts as follows: “Discreteness is the separation of a trans-
action from all else between the participants at the same time and before 
and after. Its ideal, never achieved in life, occurs when there is nothing else 
between the parties, never has been, and never will be. Presentiation, on the 
other hand, is the bringing of the future into the present. Underlying both is 
the ideal of 100 percent planning of the future.”
The discrete norm is attractive, as it embodies the ideal of liberal contract 
theory whereby free businessmen enter into a transaction of mutual profit 
and then go their separate ways. But the ideals of the classical contract have 
been outlived and no longer reflect the current state of the law, nor do they 
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provide us with an ideal we feel we should strive after. According to Macneil, 
the ideal world of classical contract law is a world of self-interested business-
men and only serves their interests, not any broader definition of justice.
Relational norms on the other hand take shape in the context of ongoing 
contractual relations. They put the relation in which the contract is embed-
ded up front, which means that they emphasise the value of the preservation 
of a relation and try to resolve any relational conflicts that may arise.
Macneil (1980) defines a discrete contract as a contract that leaves out ev-
ery relation between the parties apart from the simple exchange of goods. He 
equates this paradigm with the transaction of neoclassical microeconomics 
(Macneil, 1980). In fact, Macneil points out that this paradigm has conceptu-
al drawbacks, since every contract involves relations that are separate from 
the exchange of goods itself. Nevertheless, the ideal of the discrete contract 
and the two concepts of discreteness and presentiation that it embodies still 
dominate the conceptualisation of contracts. As the quote from Macneil given 
above indicates, discreteness means that no other relation exists between the 
parties except for the exchange, while presentiation is the associated ideal of 
bringing the future into the present (of being in full control of the future). The 
goal of presentiation is a by-product of discreteness and is best described as 
the restriction of future effects through definition and stipulation of events in 
the present. Like discreteness, presentiation enhances stability but it also re-
sults in risk-averse, conservative strategies, which do not generally suit pres-
ent-day dynamic markets that are better served by contracts that offer parties 
the opportunity to adapt their behaviour to changing circumstances than by 
stability. As Salbu (1991) puts it: “Risk aversion has been blamed for portfolio 
management of corporations as well as a consequent failure to innovate and 
operate effectively in competitive markets. Classical contracting and its ori-
entation toward stability may provide a disservice in today’s volatile markets.” 
In line with this observation, we may conclude that the discrete approach is 
not suitable for development agreements in urban projects since these proj-
ects require an approach that puts more emphasis on relational norms that 
value flexibility, learning, cooperation, and preservation of the relation (see 
Section 10.6).
Consideration of the time element is perhaps the best way of clarifying the 
difference between discrete and relational norms. At which moment do obli-
gations take shape? This is a difference between a static and a dynamic view 
of contracting, but also between legal security and uncertainty.
Relational contract theory argues that contracts are rooted in relations. If 
these relations evolve, the content of contractual obligations must evolve with 
them. The discrete approach presupposes that contractual obligations, once 
agreed to, do not change. If the relations in which the contract is embedded 
change, the parties are still bound to their original consent unless they nego-
tiate a new contract. The discrete norm therefore holds that after a contract 
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is signed, it is a matter of executing the (complete) planning. By putting one 
on-off moment up front for contractual obligations to come into existence, 
the discrete norm offers the best possible security for a party; he knows what 
he has consented to and will not be faced with (unpleasant) surprises. There-
fore, lease contracts in the cases studied in this thesis usually offer a com-
plete planning for the payments, for periods as long as 70 years (see Section 
5.3.1). The discrete norm denies that the world outside of the contract will 
change and cannot be known completely. Relational contract theory, however, 
acknowledges these two (basic) facts and internalises them in its approach 
to contracts. In doing so, it introduces a dynamic and flexible approach but it 
loses some security. If a party wants to know what his obligations will be two 
years from now, the answer has to be: “well, come back in two years and we’ll 
see.” Note that this is not necessarily a problem: since each party knows that 
his obligations will stem from his relationship with the other party, he is ‘pro-
tected’ against unpleasant surprises. It is generally third parties – like a bank 
that finances the transaction – that demand security.
Three types of contracts-relation 3.5.2 
with discrete and relational norms
In Section 3.4, we already encountered the difference between the classical 
contract and the relational contract. There is also an intermediate form, the 
neoclassical contract. This leaves us with three ideal types of contracts (Mac-
neil, 1974; 1980; 2000; Macaulay, 1996; 2000): the classical contract, the neo-
classical contract and the relational contract (see Table 3.3).
The classical contract serves the enhancement of discreteness and presen-
tiation. Relatively clearly marked standards of offer and acceptance mark the 
stages of being within or without a contractual relationship. The remedies for 
breach are relatively standard. The identities of the parties and nature of the 
agreement are more or less written out of the contract; because the contract 
is defined with reference to standard remedies, the identity of the parties 
doesn’t really matter (Salbu, 1991). For a standard short-term finance contract 
between a bank and its client, for instance, it is not relevant what the identity 
of the lender is; the contract will (to a certain extent) always look the same.
Neoclassical contracts are situated on a continuum between classical and 
relational contracts. The neoclassical approach seeks to enhance flexibility in 
long-term contractual relationships while maintaining a significant degree 
of stability and commitment (Salbu, 1991; Macneil, 1980). It can be described 
as planning for flexibility and incorporates the use of standards (such as cri-
teria for dissolution of the contract), direct third-party determination of per-
formance (non-judiciary settlement of disputes), one-party control of terms 
(option to continue or discontinue the relationship), and agreements to agree 
(agreements to settle things later). The agreements to agree are of questionable 
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legal force because in most cases it is not clear which legal sanction should 
follow if a party refuses to fulfil this obligation but otherwise performs its 
contractual duties. In common-law countries, another problem exists; it is 
easy to plead that these agreement-to-agree provisions lack consideration 
(see Section 2.7.3). Agreements to agree are however important for a good 
faith relationship as they leave room for flexibility and learning practices.
The neoclassical approach acknowledges that it is impossible for a contract 
to be fully discrete because it exists in an open system subject to environ-
mental change, and it cannot attain presentiation because the parties aren’t 
prescient or in full control over potential future contingencies (Salbu, 1991; 
Macneil, 1983). The neoclassical approach thereby seems to offer the best of 
both worlds: it is firm and classical when it can be and leaves things open 
that cannot be determined at the moment of closing.
A relational contract is commonly described as an incomplete long-term 
contract that emphasises the importance of ongoing relations (Eisenberg, 
1995; Goetz & Scott, 1981). The longevity of the contract is not a constitutive 
part. Macneil uses the term relational contract somewhat differently from 
other authors: in Macneil’s work, relational contracts emphasise relational 
norms. The main relational norms that are common to all contracts are the 
preservation of the relation between the parties and the resolution of conflicts 
(see Section 3.7). In addition, since all contracts are embedded in relations, it 
can be argued that in the end all contracts are relational (see Section 3.10). 
The main point of the relational contract is that it acknowledges that a con-
tractual relation changes when the nature of the relationship between parties 
changes (Eisenberg, 1995; Macneil, 1980). A relational contract leaves room for 
those changes: it incorporates learning processes and ad hoc solutions.
The discrete and relational norms3.6 
The discrete norm is a norm of precision that enables people to deal with one 
thing at a time. Relational norms tend to harmonise more with human rela-
tions than discrete norms, but nothing in the relational norms precludes an 
emphasis on precision and focus.
Characteristics of the discrete norm3.6.1 
Macneil distinguishes discreteness and presentiation as elements of the dis-
crete norm (Section 3.5.1). The discrete norm is a product of an enhanced im-
portance of the common contract norms of implementation of planning and 
effectuation of consent.
[ 65 ]
Three types of contractTable 3.3 
Classical contracts Neoclassical contracts Relational contracts
A contract should be 100% discrete: 
completely planned and embodying 
no relation with parties outside the 
contract.
Acknowledges the impossibility for a 
contract to be 100% discrete and tries 
to incorporate this in the contract by 
planning for flexibility.
Content of contract depends on 
ongoing relations: this means that 
contracts should encompass learning 
processes and ad hoc solutions.
Discreteness and presentiation combine the norms of effectuation of con-
sent and implementation of planning. For a transaction to be one hundred 
percent discrete, one hundred percent planning and one hundred percent 
consent are required. Macneil (1983) distinguishes the following seven char-
acteristics of the discrete norm, though it should be noted that in practice a 
given characteristic may be precisely the reverse of that predicated here.
Precision1.  – The discrete norm urges parties to focus on the deal alone; it is 
a norm of specificity. The norm is very precise. According to the discrete 
norm, a contract exists in an on-off manner: either there is a contract or 
there is not, there are no in-betweens. This is not only true for contracts 
but also for all obligations mentioned in them. The background of this 
norm is the liberal ideal that in a contract an individual can only be bound 
to do those things he has explicitly agreed to.
Planning2.  – The discrete norm presupposes that the future can be planned 
in a complete manner. Macneil (1983: 355-356) states that the fundamen-
tal principle, pacta sunt servanda (agreements are binding), also means 
that the planning should be followed through irrespective of consequences 
such as excessive costs to one of the parties. This used to be the point of 
view of courts before the substantive shift (Section 2.7.3). In the 20th centu-
ry, civil law countries adopted principles of unforeseen circumstances (re-
bus sic stantibus) while common law countries adopted their common-law 
counterparts of impractibility, frustration and impossibility.
Efficiency3.  – Efficiency is a key concern of the discrete norm. The discrete 
norm provides the basis for the efficiency required in neoclassical micro-
economics whereby the most efficient rules govern relations between par-
ties when they close a contract, plan for the future and allocate risks to the 
party that can bear them at the lowest costs. But the discrete norm also 
serves other concepts of efficiency such as specificity and the effectiveness 
of action that results from focusing on only one thing at a time.
Freedom of consent, freedom of choice4.  – Although the discrete norm empha-
sises freedom of consent and the freedom of individuals to choose, it is 
doubtful whether it really succeeds in realising these ideals because of the 
emphasis it puts on the implementation of planning. The discrete norm 
forces parties to make only one choice at a given time; this can come into 
conflict with the value of autonomy, since a party will be bound to his orig-
inal consent when he wants to choose something else. Fried (1981) argues 
that in the long run enforcing peoples’ promises will increase peoples’ op-
tions of choice. Macneil states that that is only an empirical argument; the 
increase in the number of options does not follow from the principle itself. 
He states that in some cases the enforcement of promises will increase 
freedom of choice (autonomy) in the long run, but in some cases it will not.
Conservative stance 5. – The discrete norm presupposes the status quo and 
goes on from there; it is a conservative norm. However, the emphasis put 
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on the discrete norm during the industrial revolution of the 19th century 
led to great social economic changes (Macneil, 1983). Therefore, in some 
cases the discrete norm may result in change rather than stasis. In other 
words, the discrete norm is conservative because it is not a norm of redis-
tribution, it does not interfere with (economic) power relations. This em-
phasis may still lead to changes in society.
Inegalitarian stance6.  – Although choice appears to be dominant for the dis-
crete approach, which may lead one to believe that the discrete norm is 
egalitarian, it is in fact an inegalitarian norm. Most notably because it pre-
supposes the status quo and refuses to correct unequal bargaining posi-
tions. Therefore, because the discrete norm presupposes a free individual 
who enters freely into a transaction, it does not correct existing inequali-
ties but rather deepens them by embedding them in enforceable contracts.
Sacrifice of relational norms 7. – The discrete norm conflicts with the values of 
preservation of the relation and resolution of relational conflicts because it 
abstracts from the actual relation between parties and focuses only on the 
contract and the promises that are made in it. In other words, the discrete 
norm does away with all other relations except for the temporary relation 
specified in the contract.
Characteristics of relational norms3.6.2 
Relational norms are not opposed to planning or efficiency, but they focus 
on other aspects. The basic claim of relational contract theory is that con-
tracts are embedded in relations and that different relations result in differ-
ent contracts. Since the main focus of the theory is not autonomy or freedom 
of choice but the relation between parties, relational contract theorists are 
not – like classical theorists – opposed in principle to contractual norms that 
are imposed by the government. They are for example not opposed to norms 
that enforce the bargaining position of ‘weaker parties’ like consumers and 
employees. The norms that are emphasised in relational contracts are role in-
tegrity, preservation of the relation, resolution of relational conflict, propriety 
of means and supra-contract norms.
Three of these norms (role integrity, propriety of means and supra-contract 
norms) are also part of the above-mentioned set of common contract norms. 
However, their meaning changes when they are placed in a relational con-
text. Role integrity becomes a complex norm (see Section 3.4.2), propriety of 
means becomes a norm of adequate means (see Section 3.4.9) and the supra-
contract norms become an internal part of the contractual relation. Preserva-
tion of the relation and resolution of relational conflict are specific relational 
norms, they are not common contract norms because they are absent from 
the discrete norm. Preservation of the relation means that parties put value 
on their relationship. They are not inclined to make use of a short-term gain 
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if it will put the relationship at risk. The norm is therefore related to contrac-
tual solidarity (see Section 3.4.7).
In this context, resolution of relational conflict means that parties will try 
to work conflicts out when they arise and will not immediately make use of 
remedies. The norm is related to role integrity (see Section 3.4.2). An example 
may illustrate this: Suppose that a principal has closed an agreement with a 
contractor. When the contractor cannot finish the work on time, the discrete 
norm implies that the principal should make use of whatever remedy is avail-
able to him. The relational norms hold that the proper remedy depends on 
the nature of the relation between the principal and the contractor and that 
the former should be inclined to work things out with the contractor to pre-
serve a good working relation and resolve any conflicts that may result from 
the delay.
Using relational contract theory 3.7 
as a basis for a critique of the law
Before we move to a discussion that places relational contract theory in a 
broader perspective, I want to provide an example of how the theory can be 
used as a basis for a critique of court rulings which may lead to different out-
comes from those derived from classical legal argumentation. It is more about 
how arguments should be weighed than about replacing contract law systems 
by something entirely new.
Joshua Rubin (1996) used relational contract theory to assess the court 
case brought by the township of Ypsilanti in the American state of Michigan 
against General Motors (GM). The Ypsilanti case was ruled on in 1993. After 
four years of a twelve-year tax exemption, GM announced plans to close its 
Willow Run facility in Ypsilanti and move it to Arlington, Texas. The town 
brought suit, and a state trial court judge placed an injunction on GM’s clo-
sure of the plant. The court held that GM had promised to retain jobs at the 
plant in return for the tax exemption. The verdict was reversed by the appel-
late judge, who ruled that the GM had made no such promise (Rubin, 1996: 
1277).
Rubin uses the common contract norms to assess the case and he reach-
es a different result. He shows that relational contract theory does not ask 
which promises were made when the contract was closed but assesses the 
case at the moment it reaches the court and then asks what kind of exchange 
relations exist. Rubin starts his analysis by stating that: “The relationship 
that develops over time between the owner of a large industrial facility and a 
host community is particularly complex and multifaceted…[and]…Ypsilanti 
provides an excellent illustration of how one negotiating party in an ongoing, 
complex relationship can string along the other without making an explicit 
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promise” (Rubin, 1996: 1820).
Rubin thus moves away from the theory of promissory estoppel, that would 
hold that a party may be estopped from executing a right because the oth-
er party could legitimately trust a promise that it would not do so (Feinman, 
1984). The usual way for a common law lawyer to assess a case like Ypsilanti 
is to find out whether GM had – explicitly or implicitly – made the promise 
referred to. The state court found that the township of Ypsilanti could reason-
ably rely on the behaviour and statements of GM that it needed the tax abate-
ments to guarantee jobs. It then concluded that a counter-promise had been 
made by GM to retain the jobs.
Rubin shows that this line of reasoning is flawed because a neoclassical 
approach that starts from a promise should conclude that GM never intended 
to make a promise since it could induce the incentives it required without 
making one. Making such a promise costs more than not making it, since in 
the latter case GM will still have the right to move its factory. The dominant 
position of GM must in a neoclassical analysis lead to the conclusion that it 
never promised to keep its factory in the township open. This was indeed the 
conclusion that was reached by the appellate court.
But relational contracting is not a purely economic practice. A relational 
approach holds that the relationship should in itself carry some weight. Even 
when unequal bargaining power does not justify a contract remedy, which is 
also the case under a relational approach. Parties desire to preserve their rela-
tionships and do so for reasons beyond pure wealth maximisation. Relation-
ships involve complex entanglements of reputation, interdependence, moral-
ity, altruism, friendship, and self-interest.
Parties in an ongoing economic relationship expect that each of them will 
lend the other support in bad times and will not stand on their rights to gain 
advantage from changed circumstances. This is the norm Macneil identifies 
as preservation of the contractual relation (Rubin, 1996: 1294). Relational con-
tract theory then suggests an inquiry into the degree to which the relocating 
corporation might be found to be violating the norms or spirit of the relation-
ship it maintained with the community by altering the balance of power and 
then seizing upon it.
Rubin points out that in cases like Ypsilanti a long-term relationship exists 
between GM and the township. In such a relation the norms of role integrity 
and solidarity are of enhanced importance and they produce the (relational) 
norms of preservation of the relation and resolution of relational conflict. Ru-
bin distinguishes the Ypsilanti case from the situation where a company has 
to close a factory because of economic necessity (one should not force an un-
profitable plant to stay in business). Both the nature and length of the rela-
tionship and the circumstances should therefore play a role in adjudicating 
the Ypsilanti case. The nature of the incentive (as-of-right or involving bar-
gains) should also play a role, as should whether representations have been 
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made according to their purpose and use.
Rubin’s main argument is that in this case the issue is not whether explic-
it promises were made but whether GM took advantage of the relationship’s 
norms.
One of the key terms in the relation between the township of Ypsilanti 
and GM is the word dominance. GM was the dominant party in the relation-
ship with the community. But in a relational inquiry the dominance of GM 
becomes relevant in a different manner. The relationship between GM and 
Ypsilanti is situated towards the relational end of the discrete/relational con-
tinuum, which makes the relational norms of enhanced importance. Rubin 
(1996) states that town officials may have believed that a direct request for an 
explicit promise was not necessary because of the nature of the relation with 
GM.
He discerns that the common contract norms of reciprocity, role integrity 
and solidarity are involved here as is the relational norm of preservation of 
the relation. Since GM took advantage of its power under changed circum-
stances, the norms of restraint of power and propriety of means are also im-
plicated. They may lead to the conclusion that preservation of the relation 
should override the option to profit from an advantage that becomes avail-
able due to new economic circumstances. The law should not eternally bind 
parties to each other against their wills, but exit should be in line with rela-
tional norms. Rubin concludes by emphasising that neo-classical law fails to 
protect relational interests by overstating the importance of discreteness and 
presentiation.
I find his arguments convincing: this approach not only makes sense, but 
is also specific enough to help a court to rule on a given case. However, one 
of the problems that arise is that this approach does not tell us in advance 
whether GM has the right to leave the contractual relation and what elements 
are of importance in this context. Rubin urges us to look at ‘all elements’ but 
as one of the arguments of the relationalist is that we cannot have full knowl-
edge of the world, how then can we know what all the relevant elements are, 
especially when our time is limited?
Notwithstanding this drawback, the approach Rubin proposes does on the 
whole seems fair for both parties.
The common contract norms 3.8 
in a broader perspective
Before we decide to use relational contract theory as the framework for the 
present study of development agreements, we need to answer two questions: 
(1) does relational contract theory, designed by a scholar with a common law 
legal training, also work for the civil law – more specifically the Dutch – ap-
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proach to contracts? And (2) how does the theory relate to the fundamental 
debate on the nature of contracts that is also of concern for this thesis?
Relational contract theory claims to give a description of contracting prac-
tices. While Macneil claims universal applicability for the common contract 
norms, he also acknowledges that he is no expert on civil law systems (Mac-
neil, 2001a). This may not matter for a theory that takes a broad perspective 
on law and studies contracts as a social phenomenon. But relational contract 
theory also claims to provide a critical perspective on contract law, and since 
the subject of study of this thesis consists of existing contracts that were 
drafted in specific legal systems, we need to know whether relational contract 
theory can be applied in detail to in the three legal systems – English, Ameri-
can and Dutch – considered in this study. Since as mentioned above Macneil 
was trained in the traditions of the common law, it may be assumed that ap-
plication of his theory to English and American law as embodied in the con-
tracts studied will not give rise to serious problems. It therefore remains for 
us to ascertain whether the theory can also be safely applied in cases involv-
ing Dutch law.
Relation between common contract 3.8.1 
norms and Dutch legal principles
We will now consider the relation between the common contract norms and 
the principles of Dutch contract law.
Dutch contract law theory starts from the ideal of freedom of contract (see 
e.g. Cohen & Pitlo, 2002). Hartkamp, in a standard handbook of Dutch contract 
law, surveys five general principles that explain under which circumstances 
contracts have or should have binding force (Hartkamp, 1996: 34):
The principle of autonomy explains that parties have a private sphere in 1. 
which they must be free to act as their own legislators.
The principle of trust holds that expectations based on the conduct and 2. 
statements of another party should be protected. It also protects the ex-
pectation based on the norms of society that certain circumstances will 
fall within the sphere of risk of one of the parties (principle of risk).
The principle of social justice demands compensation for some social in-3. 
equalities so that one party cannot profit too much from its superior bar-
gaining position.
The principle of being faithful to your promises basically requires that one 4. 
should be kept to his word.
The principle of social acceptability demands that the content of contracts 5. 
must be in line with the general demands of society (a contract to kill some-
body isn’t socially acceptable). Hartkamp (1996) states that this principle is 
about finding the right balance between the protection of personality, maxi-
misation of everyone’s freedom and efficient handling of judicial matters.
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These principles are not typical for Dutch law and they are certainly not 
absent from Anglo-American law. We have seen that the difference may be 
that the common law puts more emphasis on principles related to neoclassi-
cal economic ideals and less on ideals that relate to social justice (Wad dams, 
2000; Barnett, 1992, cf. Section 2.7). But efficiency is also a concern of the civ-
il law, and social justice of the common law. Being part of the same culture, 
general principles that explain the authority and concerns of the law of con-
tracts apply to both legal systems (see Section 2.6).
Barnett (1992), a common law lawyer, regards for instance will, reliance, 
efficiency, bargain and fairness as the main concerns of the law. These prin-
ciples don’t seem to contradict the principles mentioned by Hartkamp but 
provide mostly different labels for what are basically the same concerns. At 
an abstract level, will and autonomy are equivalent as are reliance and trust, 
while bargain and fairness both fall under the heading of social justice.
In line with the different mentalities of common law and civil law systems 
(see Section 2.7) the exception is that Hartkamp (1996) does not mention effi-
ciency as an independent principle of contract. It can however be included as 
an element of the principle of being faithful to one’s promises. We could also 
argue that it is more efficient for a society when promises are generally kept 
instead of having to wait and see in every specific case. And if that is true, it 
could be argued that the most efficient rules should be formulated that en-
force the most efficient promises.
Since the principles behind Dutch contract law are in line with the princi-
ples of common law contract law, they must also be in line with the common 
contract norms. The difference between the principles behind Dutch contract 
law and the common contract norms is that these principles are mostly of 
a normative nature, whereas the common contract norms are both norma-
tive and descriptive and have to be read in combination with the four roots 
of contracts (see Section 3.3). The common contract norms apply to all con-
tracts, sometimes as an internal norm and sometimes as an external norm. 
This is in line with the five principles that Hartkamp surveys. The principle of 
sticking to one’s promises can be an internal norm, but is always an external 
norm. It may finally be mentioned that the most important external norm of 
Dutch law that does not exist as a general norm in English and American law, 
the principle of good faith (for a discussion of this point, see Section 2.7.2), is 
not included in Hartkamp’s five principles. The reason is that this principle is 
a concern of the whole body of private law (including contract law) but is not 
a specific norm of contracts. Good faith may dominate the interpretation of 
contracts in the courts, but on the level of contracting it can easily be part of 
the norm of harmonisation with the social matrix. Good faith is the ultimate 
supra-contractual norm (see Section 3.4.11).
The autonomy principle can be related to the mutuality norm (Macneil 
combines mutuality with choice – an important aspect of autonomy; see Sec-
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tion 3.4.3) – and role integrity since role integrity implies autonomy of an in-
dividual. It can also be related to the creation and restraint of power norm, 
since autonomy implies the ability to transfer some of one’s power to some-
one else.
Trust is linked to contractual solidarity (Section 3.4.8). It can also be related 
to the linking norms insofar as it can be understood as a reliance interest. Fi-
nally, it can be related to role integrity since trust requires the other party to 
act consistently over a longer period.
Social justice can be related to mutuality; it requires a minimum level of 
reciprocity (combining the two also solves the problem of determining the 
minimum level of reciprocity that is actually needed as we discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4.3).
The principle of being faithful to your promises is related to the effectua-
tion of consent norm, but also to the propriety of means norm: you can’t keep 
your promises if you do not possess the necessary means. The implementa-
tion of planning norm can also be related to this principle, because contracts 
are about dealing with the future. Keeping one’s promises in other words im-
plies at least a minimum level of planning.
Social acceptability, finally, is equivalent to the harmonisation with the so-
cial matrix norm we discussed in Section 3.4.11.
The relation between common contract norms and Dutch legal principles 
are summed up in Table 3.4.
Unifying principles3.8.2 
In Chapter 2, we discussed the law and economics approach and the trans-
action costs approach to contracts and contract law (Section 2.8). We argued 
that these two are essentially single-aspect approaches; they regard efficiency 
as the purpose of law and describe and assess contracts and rules from that 
perspective. The relational approach however takes a broader perspective; it 
includes more aspects and holds that law does not have one single purpose.
Another debatable point is whether contracts and contract law can be 
brought under one unifying principle. Such a principle would then have both 
a descriptive and a normative/ exclusive function (the term ‘exclusive’ here 
means that if an obligation does not fit the principle, it cannot be enforced).
We may hold that there are two types of contract theorists: the first type 
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Relation between common contract norms and Dutch legal Table 3.4 
principles
Principles of Dutch 
contract law
Corresponding common contract norms in 
relational contract theory
Autonomy Mutuality/Creation and restraint of power
Trust Contractual solidarity linking norms/Role integrity
Social justice Mutuality
Being faithful to your 
promises
Effectuation of consent/Implementation of 
planning/Propriety of means
Social acceptability Harmonisation with the social matrix
doesn’t believe that contract theory can be reduced to one unifying principle, 
the other type believes that finding a unifying theory is possible and is in-
deed contract theory’s main task. In the latter category you can distinguish 
between authors who propose promissory principles and those who propose 
non-promissory principles (Oman, 2005; Barnett, 1999; Hillman, 1997; Fried, 
1981). This debate, which takes place mostly in the Anglo-American literature, 
is of some importance here, because relational contract theory is strongly op-
posed to ‘unifying theories’ (Macneil, 1980). We will restrict our discussion of 
these unifying theories to the ideas of promise and consent (see Table 3.5), 
both of which have received considerable attention in the Anglo-American 
literature.
Promises
An influential theory of contract relates contracts to promises. Charles Fried 
is often quoted in the American literature but he is certainly not the only one 
who believes that the unifying principle of contract law is the concept of a 
promise (see e.g. Gordley, 2001).
Fried (1981) maintains that contract is based on the moral obligation to 
keep one’s promises and that contract doctrines reflect that obligation (Well-
man, 1987; Fried, 1981). This view is called the contract-as-promise theory. 
The contract-as-promise theory has lately attracted new attention but is, for 
Anglo-American law, in fact rooted in an old debate on English law in which 
most writers and the court held that the law of obligations knew only two cat-
egories: tort and contract, if we leave the category of unjust enrichment out of 
consideration. This subdivision seems to imply that the only grounds for legal 
action are failure to keep a promise or a wrongdoing (Chitty, 2004). Generally 
speaking, civil law has also witnessed an evolution whereby consent became 
the decisive element of a contract; the question then arises which kinds of 
consent are enforceable (Gordley, 2001).
The theory of contract-as-promise is attractive because it offers a clear 
principle that explains why people are bound to agreements. You are bound 
to perform your duties because you promised to fulfil them. This principle is 
compatible with both Catholic law and liberal contract theory. Catholic law 
introduced the ‘pacta sunt servanda’ principle in the Middle Ages: you are mor-
ally bound to stick to your promises, even when the law doesn’t offer a way 
of making you keep them (Balliam, 1991). When contract law makes sure that 
you keep your promises, it is therefore doing the morally right thing. The con-
tract-as-promise principle is also attractive from a liberal perspective, where 
it is held that the state should keep interference with the life of its citizens 
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Views on the nature of contractsTable 3.5 
Promise A contract is nothing more than a promise to perform a certain obligation
Consent A contract implies that a party has consented to perform an obligation; 
this consent may be implied
More principles Various, possibly conflicting principles apply to a contract
Reconciling principles More principles apply to a contract but in case of conflict, these principles 
can be reconciled by using one theory
to the minimum. Individuals should be allowed to make agreements without 
the state interfering with their content. But the liberal will acknowledge that 
it is more efficient when the state tries to guarantee that citizens keep their 
promises, than when every citizen has to find his own way to do that (Rawls, 
1999). We have seen that ‘promise’ is also one of the principles of Dutch con-
tract law (Section 3.8.1).
The contract-as-promise approach is also compatible with the definition 
given in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1973). This Restatement is an 
attempt by the American Law Institute to formulate the leading principles of 
contract as laid down in American law; it is an authoritative source of law, 
though it does not have the force of law itself. The definition given in the 
Restatement is: “A contract is a promise or set of promises for the breach of 
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some 
way recognizes as a duty.”
The English standard work Chitty on Contracts (2004, 29th edition) discusses 
two similar definitions of contract applicable to the English legal situation:
a contract is a promise or sets of promises which the law will enforce (26 ■ th 
edition);
a contract is an agreement giving rise to obligations which are recognised  ■
by law (2nd edition).
The first definition, which seems to be preferred by the current authors, in-
cludes a promise as the unifying principle of a contract. They hold that this 
first definition is in line with the common law requirement of a consideration 
(see Section 2.7.3) whereas the second is mostly a civil law approach to con-
tracts. This implies that a difference exists between contracts in civil law and 
common law countries in that the common law systems put more emphasis 
on the importance of promise. We will see below that this is only one way of 
looking at the common law. Relational contract theory strongly opposes this 
view.
Promises in relational contract theory
The final question that rises in this section is thus how the roots of relational 
contract theory relate to the concept of a promise. Macneil (1980: 5) distin-
guishes his concept of contracts from classical definitions, saying that it is 
the difference between a contract-in-law and a contract-in-fact. He pleads 
for a more inclusive concept of contract: “While law may be an integral part 
of virtually all contractual relations, one not to be ignored, law is not what 
contracts are all about. Contracts are about getting things done in the real 
world – building things, selling things, cooperating in enterprise, achieving 
power and prestige, (…). If we wish to understand contract, and indeed if we 
wish to understand contract law, we must think about exchange and such 
things first, and law second.”
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We may conclude that contracts precede contract law. Macneil objects to 
a theory of contracts that takes promise as its central concept. A promise is 
a mechanism for projecting exchange into the future, and it is the essence of 
the classical contract but not of all contracts.
If we take a closer look at the concept of a promise to exchange, we may 
distinguish five elements:
the will of the promisor1. 
the will of the promisee2. 
present action to limit future choices3. 
communication4. 
measured reciprocity.5. 
All these elements are important features of a contract, but in addition a 
great range of non-promissory exchange projectors exists (Macneil, 1980: 8): 
“Key ones include custom, status, habit and other internalizations, command 
in hierarchical structures, and expectations created by the dynamics of any 
status quo, including markets.”
These non-promissory exchange projectors are often accompanied by 
promises. On the other hand, however, promises are always accompanied by 
non-promissory projectors. The reason for that is that non-promissory ex-
change projectors interact with the social matrix. A promise does not exist 
on its own but operates within the structures of the social matrix. A promise 
can therefore never encompass more than a fragment of the total situation. 
In addition, transforming promises into communication symbols takes effort. 
Since effort is a cost, not everything that can be transformed into promises 
will be (Macneil, 1980: 10, cf. Section 2.8.4): “A second factor in the inevitably 
limited role of promises is overt or tact recognition that the promise made is 
never exactly the same as the promise received. Every promise is always two 
promises, the sender’s and the receiver’s. The resulting non-mutuality ranges 
from subtle to gross differences in understanding. These differences can be 
resolved only by bringing into the picture something other than the promis-
es themselves. This something, whatever else it may be, is a non-promissory 
projection of exchange into the future.”
It is through this ‘something’ that words like reasonableness, good faith 
and legitimate expectations come into play here. And whereas the discrete 
approach does away with these norms, holding that contract law is better off 
when it focuses on classical ideals, relational contract theory holds that the 
acknowledgment of these relational norms should be central to contract law. 
There is no reason why they should all be combined in one principle.
Consent
We saw that a flaw of the contract-as-promise approach is that it fails to 
show why the concept of a promise is the fundamental root of all contractual 
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obligations. In all legal systems, the law protects legitimate expectations as 
contractual obligations even when no promises have been made and the de-
fendant did not intend to make a promise (e.g. Macneil, 1980; Wellman, 1987; 
Pitlo, 1995; Oman, 2005; Valk, 2003; Chitty, 2004). The concept of an implied 
promise hardly solves this problem; why should we call something a promise 
when it isn’t?
To solve this problem, Barnett (1992) introduced a theory of consent which 
he claims can tell us which concern should prevail in a specific case. As we 
saw at the start of Section 3.8.1, he regards will, reliance, efficiency, bargain 
and fairness as the main concerns of contract law. According to Barnett, the 
criterion of manifest intent or consent to be legally bound could be used to 
reconcile the competing demands of these disparate concerns. While Barnett 
does not choose one of these concerns as the dominant one, it is clear in any 
case that consent to be legally bound shows the same flaws as the principle 
of promise as a reconciling principle: it has to use artificial constructs to be 
consistent. The consent approach does however solve the reliance/ expec-
tation problem of the contract-as-promise theory: when an expectation de-
serves legal protection, the defendant should at least have behaved in a way 
that showed his intent to reach an agreement. A real intention to be bound 
isn’t necessary to create the expectation that a party wanted to be bound: it is 
enough that the other party was legitimated in its belief that the other party 
wanted to be bound (Waddams, 2003).
Waddams (2003: 7) discusses the concept of consent and then states that: 
“actual consent to be bound has been neither sufficient nor necessary in An-
glo-American contract law: not sufficient, because it’s ineffective in the ab-
sence of a bargain or a formality; not necessary, because contractual words 
and conduct are given effect according to the meaning reasonably ascribed to 
them by the promisee, not that actually intended by the promisor.”
Waddams (2003: 15-16) goes on to state that all approaches to subordinate 
Anglo-American contract law to a single classifying concept have failed: “(...), 
many instances of liability as part of contract law do not involve ‘contracts’ in 
any ordinary sense of the word: the body of law so called has been concerned 
with promises (as much as with agreements) and with reliance or expecta-
tions (as much as with consent or will), and with utility (as much as with mo-
rality).”
Still, it may be true that at some point some kind of intent to contract has 
to be shown (either intentionally or unintentionally) to get the whole process 
of contracting started. This would mean that without any manifest intent, 
there cannot be a contract (cf. Eisenberg, 2000). We will discuss this point in 
Section 3.9.2.
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Criticisms of relational contract theory3.9 
The discussion between Macneil and proponents of the law and economics 
school has been mostly one-sided, since not many scholars have responded 
to Macneil’s views (Feinman, 2001). However Richard Posner (2000) – prob-
ably the best known proponent of the law and economics approach – has ad-
dressed them to some extent (see Section 3.9.1). Other scholars (see Section 
3.9.2) have also criticised Macneil’s account of relational contract theory for 
its lack of specificity and its ambiguities.
The criticism of formalism3.9.1 
Let us first take a closer look at the critique of Macneil’s views given by Pos-
ner (2000) at a symposium held in honour of Macneil in 2000. The main differ-
ence between Macneil and Posner is not that Posner objects to Macneil’s view 
that many factors go to determine a contractual relation. He does however 
argue that most people, and certainly judiciaries, are incompetent to under-
stand these factors and hence to enforce the content of a contract. In Pos-
ner’s view, we should assume that courts fail to understand even the simplest 
of business transactions. There is no difference between long-term relational 
contracts and one-shot contracts in this connection. In both situations the 
contracts are subject to many contingencies that courts generally fail to un-
derstand. We may then ask why people make use of the courts if they are 
incompetent. Posner (2000: 754), an eminent judge in the USA Court of Appeal 
for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago himself, argues that their incompetence is 
not relevant here: “Some might argue that because contract law exists, and 
parties freely take steps to ensure that their agreements are legally enforce-
able, it must be the case that courts are not radically incompetent. If they 
were, people would abandon the formal legal system. In this paper, I argue, on 
the contrary, that even if courts are radically incompetent, people would still 
voluntarily enter legally enforceable contracts. Indeed, I go farther and argue 
that many elements of our legal system make most sense if we understand 
them to be a response to the regrettable but unavoidable fact that our courts 
are incompetent when it comes to enforcing contracts.”
Posner adds that if the law were competent to regulate relations among 
strangers, people would rely on it rather than spending so much time and ef-
fort establishing their reputations for trustworthiness and learning the repu-
tations of others. And he argues that courts are not very good at deterring 
opportunistic behaviour in contractual relationships. This is why so much 
contractual behaviour depends on reputation, ethnic and family connections, 
and other elements of non-legal regulation, and not on carefully written and 
detailed contracts enforced by disinterested courts. People are better at recog-
nising opportunistic behaviour than courts.
[ 78 ]
Courts can determine whether a contract exists or not but are no experts 
on the intentions of parties. Posner (2000) provides the example of family re-
lations: it is widely accepted that courts are not capable of understanding the 
ins and outs of such relations but they can determine whether two people are 
married or not. He then refers to a survey in which courts were asked about a 
credit price in a consumer contract that was higher than the cash price. The 
overall opinion of the courts was that the credit price was unfair, even though 
it was in line with regular interest rates and reflected the higher risk of the 
vendor when selling on credit (Posner, 2000: 758). Posner concludes that when 
Macneil asks a judge to become more than a judge, namely also a sociologist 
or anthropologist so that he can enforce the real contract – the full content of 
the contractual relations – he asks the courts to do more than they are, gener-
ally speaking, capable of.
The main function of contract law is that it serves to deter certain kinds of 
high-value opportunism, by which Posner refers to the situation whereby the 
incentive for A (buyer) to defect from his promise to B (seller) is so high that it 
is profitable even at the risk of loss of reputation which will normally prevent 
A from profiting from low value opportunism. The award of damages by the 
court, but above all the high costs of litigation, may additionally deter A from 
profiting from high-value opportunism (Posner, 2000: 768): “… although non-
legal sanctions are powerful, they cannot deter defections when the benefit 
from defection is high enough. When this occurs, the injured party benefits 
from the contract even when it is incompetently enforced. And both parties, 
not knowing in advance whether they will be injured or benefited by the price 
change, agree to the contract in order to protect themselves from defection.”
The main function of courts is thus to order the parties to pay the costs 
of litigation even when the outcome of that litigation is merely a question of 
luck – as judges are radically incompetent – and as a general rule will rule in 
favour of the party that has spent the most on litigation.
Thus, if A cheats B, both parties will be punished when B decides to sue 
A over the breach of promise. Posner states that this is in fact an important 
function of the courts and draws an analogy with a parent who punishes both 
of his children when he does not know which one of them has been naughty. 
The punishment (although unfair to one of the children) still makes sense be-
cause of the moral lesson can be drawn from it that bad behaviour cannot be 
tolerated.
The final element of Posner’s argument that courts should focus on for-
malism is that such behaviour is self-correcting: the courts have made the re-
quirements for contracts to be enforceable more flexible over time. This sub-
stantive shift (see Section 2.7.3) towards a lower emphasis on forms by courts 
may however not be as desirable as we tend to think, if we believe with Posner 
that the courts are incapable of fathoming the true nature of the contractual 
relationship (Posner, 2000: 770-771): “... courts are no longer as formalistic as 
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they used to be, there is no reason to believe that this trend is desirable, that 
judges are more competent than they used to be, or that contracts are more 
complex, or that the old attitude was wrong. The modern view is based on an 
empirical hunch, and no more, and on this basis contract law has slowly shed 
some of its formal requirements.”
The good thing about formalism is that parties can predict the outcomes.
Two elements are inherent to Posner’s point of view. The first is that he 
agrees with Macneil on the complex nature of a contract but holds that it is 
not the legal system that should embrace these complexities because courts 
are not capable of doing so. The second point is that he does embrace an eco-
nomic (utility maximising) approach by the law and uses that approach to 
determine the best rules and functions for courts. Society is better off with 
a legal system that abstracts from the relation between parties and takes a 
formal approach. The second point is of less relevance for this thesis, since 
its intention is not to propose changes to the American, English or Dutch 
legal system but to study the contractual relations and their complexities. I 
find the arguments of Posner on the incompetence of courts challenging but 
even if he is right – which I doubt – it would not make any difference for this 
study since it focuses on the actual behaviour of parties within the context 
of their legal systems and not so much on how the courts or the law should 
generally operate within that field. This study thus demands an approach that 
takes more aspects into account than only the formal signals. If it did not, 
this would almost imply that we might as well do away with a socio-legal ap-
proach to the law entirely.
Critique of Macneil’s ideas by other relationists3.9.2 
A more complicated critique of Macneil’s work is found in the work of Randy 
Barnett, most notably in an article that he wrote in 1992 in which he positions 
himself in relation to Macneil’s concepts. Unlike Posner, Barnett is also a re-
lationist. In this section, we will concentrate on his arguments, which may be 
taken as representative of those of a number of other adherents of relational 
contract theory. He states that that to a significant degree, we are all relation-
alists now (Barnett, 1992: 1200). Barnett means to say that most lawyers admit 
that there are more types of contracts than the discrete ones. But Barnett also 
sees significant flaws in Macneil’s theory and states that it fails to distinguish 
adequately between legally enforceable and non-enforceable contracts. More-
over, Macneil’s account of relational contract theory lacks a legal concept of 
contracts. Barnett claims that a theory based on consent can overcome these 
flaws (see also Section 3.8.2) but that Macneil could never accept such a the-
ory because his concept of consent is too narrow and his views of relational 
contract theory are communitarian as opposed to Barnett’s liberal approach 
to relational contract theory.
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Barnett agrees with Macneil however that a formal model, to be anything 
other than a mere abstract conceptualisation, must have some basis in the 
real world. Otherwise a theory is nothing more than just a game of logic. Bar-
nett and Macneil both look at concepts and theories as problem-solving de-
vices (Barnett, 1992: 1178, cf. the notion of pragmatic legal instrumentalism in 
Section 2.6.2).
Barnett also agrees with Macneil that the role of theory is to evaluate le-
gal rules, instead of determining them. Legal theory should provide principles 
(norms) that can be used to criticise doctrine. But Barnett also discerns three 
fundamental flaws in Macneil’s account of relational contract theory. Accord-
ing to Barnett, Macneil does not distinguish between consent and an explicit 
promise.
Barnett’s first point of criticism is that Macneil draws too stark a contrast 
between conscious consent and no consent. As a result he equates consent 
with an explicit promise. But consent may be subconscious or tacit. For ex-
ample, when someone consents to enter into a legal relation he can hardly 
be expected to (explicitly) consent to all the consequences thereof. Thus, the 
difference between consent and custom seen by Macneil is not a real one. As 
Barnett (1992: 1190) puts it, “When Macneil argues that “the ‘great sea of cus-
tom’ ... forms the main structure of contract” and explicit promise the excep-
tion, he does not realize that this argument against consent turns on itself.”
Consent helps to determine which contracts should be legally enforceable 
and which should not.
Barnett holds that the problem of distinguishing ex ante in a principled 
manner between legally enforceable and legally unenforceable commitments 
is simply not a social problem that interests Macneil enough for it to play a 
role in his social theory of contract. He goes on to state that (Barnett, 1992: 
1191): “…it does persons who would contemplate engaging in Macneilian con-
tractual exchanges little good to be told that “maybe legal sanctions will be 
used to ‘reinforce’ your relationship, but maybe not. Ask us again after you 
exchange”.”
While this point makes sense, it is not really relevant to the issues dis-
cussed in this thesis as it does not criticise the common contract norms but 
Macneil’s failure to distinguish between contracts that are (should be) legally 
enforceable and those that are not. Although the focus of this study is not 
the law as it is enforced in the courts, we cannot deny that black letter law 
is also a dimension of contracts and the theory may not do that well in case 
of conflicting norms in the courts. Still, what is gained by not choosing one 
reconciling principle may be of more value than what is lost: by not choos-
ing a unifying principle, the theory can describe every aspect of a relation as 
valuable (cf. Section 3.8.3). Finally, I would like to add in response to Barnett 
that the principle of consent helps to protect against an overenforcement of 
commitments by the courts but it does not help to understand all contractual 
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agreements that are (in fact) enforced. Sometimes courts enforce agreements 
because of the customs that exist in a certain trade. Does it help us to argue 
that by entering that trade, a party also (tacitly) consents to its customs?
Barnett’s second point is that a socially enforced system of property is not 
an inclusive part of Macneil’s theory and moreover. Macneil does not fully 
recognize the vital social function of freedom of contract.
Barnett argues that Macneil, although he repeatedly acknowledges the 
importance of property rights, fails to acknowledge the social functions of 
contract. Macneil speaks of the power to contract instead of the freedom of 
and from contract (that is, the freedom to contract or not to contract). For 
Barnett, freedom of and from contract arises from the recognition of back-
ground rights (in this case property rights) and he can judge the validity of 
legal rights from that perspective. Macneil fails to recognise such background 
rights. For him, the power to contract does not stem from property and lib-
erty rights; he sees contracts merely as a transfer of entitlements. A consent 
theory would never do that, according to him, but instead gives an account 
of the background rights that enable the individual to contract. It positions 
contracts within a broader spectrum of entitlements to property and in that 
way provides an account of the functional relationship between contracts and 
property rights. For Macneil it is almost as if the two are separate worlds: the 
property rights on the one hand, and the contracts that transfer them on the 
other.
As a result of the lack of a functional relation between property rights and 
freedom of contract, Macneil’s view leads to an overenforcement of commit-
ments that ought not to be enforced because it only focuses on exchanges 
and not on the relation with background rights. This is what Barnett means 
when he states that: “Macneil presents a relational theory that is at once too 
encompassing and not encompassing enough. His conception of contract is 
too encompassing in that it is unable (or perhaps, more accurately, unwilling) 
to distinguish between legally enforceable and legally unenforceable exchang-
es, preferring to focus instead on the common characteristics and functions 
of all exchanges. At the same time, Macneil’s account lacks sufficient breadth 
inasmuch as it fails sufficiently to integrate his conception of contract into 
the set of social norms that it presupposes” (Barnett, 1992: 1182).
Finally, by focusing on the power to contract instead of the freedom of con-
tract, he claims that Macneil focuses on exchanges and only seems to find 
them productive when the value of the exchanged products rises. But he does 
not give any account of the productive value of consensual exchange itself. 
Products can only get a market price if one can refuse to exchange.
These points of Barnett are valuable, but should be read in the context 
of the contradiction between the communitarian views of Macneil and Bar-
nett’s own liberal views – which are mostly of importance when we discuss 
contracts between individuals. For the contracts between planning authori-
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ties and private companies involved in the cases studied in this thesis, the 
difference may not matter so much. Companies are perfectly aware of their 
property rights and they are relevant for contracts – but not to the extent that 
the question of whether they are background rights or separate rights signifi-
cantly influences the contracting process. The question may impinge on the 
way in which a court rules on a certain case – will it include or exclude back-
ground rights in its verdict? – but court law is not the focus of this study (see 
Section 3.1).
Relational contract theory is ambiguous
The ambiguity in question resides in the fact that Macneil states first that 
there are discrete and relational contracts, suggesting that a discrete-rela-
tional spectrum exists, and then goes on to claim that all contracts are rela-
tional – even the discrete ones. Macneil himself believes that this ambiguity 
is only a matter of words and he solved it later by using the term intertwined 
instead of relational (e.g. Macneil 1987). Campbell (2001) states that the am-
biguity is not only a matter of words and has its roots in an even deeper am-
biguity that exists between communal and individual interests. Every hu-
man being is both a utility maximiser and a social person and this tension 
between solidarity and selfishness is what creates the fundamental problem 
for the theory.
The point that Campbell is trying to make is that Macneil wants to ac-
knowledge that both the classical contract and the relational contract exist. 
But where the classical contract is based on selfishness, the relational con-
tract also leaves room for cooperation. I agree with Macneil that there can 
both be a spectrum that goes from classical to relational contracts while at 
the same time all contracts are relational (or intertwined). But it is not clear 
why he initially chose the same terminology for these different arguments.
The critique of Campbell, who can be regarded as a proponent of Macneil’s 
views, is related to that of Barnett. Both claim that Macneil’s theory is not 
precise enough as a guide for the courts; it needs refinement when applied to 
specific legal doctrines (see Table 3.6).
The problem can be solved by accepting that the idea of a contract makes 
it possible to contract out of the relational approach. By doing that you agree 
to apply a set of norms (for example classical contract law or a consent-based 
theory) to your contract that is based not so much on reality as on a legal fic-
tion that is imposed on it. These contracts would still be rooted in the relation 
with the other party but may be interpreted in a classical way. This would 
mostly mean that a court would be led by the text of the contract and not by 
the relation as it has evolved when it has to decide a case.
But this goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Here I prefer to emphasise 
that I will look at contracts from the perspective that a spectrum exists that 
makes a contract more or less relational or discrete and use the common con-
[ 83 ]
tract norms to provide an overview of the content and specificities of those 
contracts.
We may end this overview by concluding that critics of Macneil’s views 
concentrate mostly on the fact that he tends to disregard the problem that 
contracts have to be enforced by courts. This however leaves the descriptive 
value of his views mostly untouched.
Case methodology3.10 
In the final section of this chapter I will provide a summary of relational con-
tract theory and end by explaining how I intend to apply this theory to the 
case studies.
Brief summary of relational contract theory3.10.1 
Macneil (1980; 1983) defines ten common contract norms that are present 
in all contracts. He also recognises the existence of relational and discrete 
norms that govern the content and importance of the ten common contract 
norms. The ten common contract norms are:
Role integrity:1.  promoting stability through expectations about recognized social 
roles2.
Mutuality and reciprocity:2.  the idea that exchange is a process of mutual benefit.
Implementation of planning:3.  as a means of reducing uncertainty about the fu-
ture.
Effectuation of consent:4.  acquiescence of choice as a basis for obligation.
2   All short definitions in italics are taken from Vincent-Jones (2006: 4-6).
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Critique of relational contract theoryTable 3.6 
A. Critique from a non-relational perspective
Courts are radically incompetent to understand even simple business transactions. Macneil 1. 
asks courts to do something of which they are incapable.
The law should encourage more formalism to increase predictability.2. 
B. Critique from a relational perspective
Macneil does not discern between promises and consent.1. 
Macneil lacks a legal concept of contracts: he does not discern between enforceable and non-2. 
enforceable elements.
Macneil is wrong to separate property rights (and liberty rights) from contracts.3. 
Macneil fails to see the productive nature of exchange itself.4. 
Macneil’s theory is ambiguous: it uses a discrete-continuum while at the same time asserting 5. 
that all contracts are relational. 
The ambiguity is fundamental: Macneil cannot solve the tension that exists in every individual 6. 
between his wish to maximise utility and his wish to act as a social being. 
Flexibility: 5. the recognition of the need to avoid rigidity in implementation and fa-
cilitate adaptation to changing conditions.
Contractual solidarity:6.  involves the extension of reciprocity in social relations 
through time.
The linking norms: restitution, reliance and expectancy interest.7. 
Creation and restraint of power:8.  to control relations of domination and subordi-
nation.
Propriety of means:9.  placing constraints on the ways in which ends may legiti-
mately be achieved.
Harmonisation with the social matrix: 10. reflects the need for contract norms to 
be consistent with wider social norms.
The discrete and relational norms govern the meaning of the common contract 
norms. They have their own characteristics: some of them are in fact common 
contract norms in their own right, while others are present in other norms.
A discrete contract leaves out every relation between the parties apart 
from the simple exchange of goods. The discrete norm is thus an approach to 
contracts that we may associate with such terms as (neo-) classical econom-
ics and formal legal rules. The discrete norms are:
Discreteness1. 
Presentiation2. 
Implementation of planning3. 
Effectuation of consent.4. 
Discreteness means that no other relation exists between the parties outside 
the exchange, whereas presentiation is the associated ideal of bringing the 
future into the present (to be in full control of the future). In other words, the 
goal of presentiation is a by-product of discreteness and is best described as 
the restriction of future effects through definition and stipulation of events in 
the present.
Macneil states that discreteness and presentiation are products of the en-
hanced importance of the (possibly conflicting) common contract norms of imple-
mentation of planning and effectuation of consent in certain situations: one hundred 
percent planning and one hundred percent consent are required for a transac-
tion to be one hundred percent discrete.
Unlike discrete norms, relational norms put the relation between parties 
up front and aim to preserve that relation. In addition, every relation produc-
es its own norms. The relational norms are:
Role integrity1. 
Preservation of the relation2. 
Harmonisation of relational conflict3. 
Propriety of means4. 
Supra-contractual norms.5. 
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Three of these norms are common contract norms: role integrity, propriety of 
means and supra-contractual norms. The other two, preservation of the rela-
tion and harmonisation of relational conflict, are the relational version (an in-
tensification and expansion) of contractual solidarity, whereby preservation of 
the relation is the background of resolution of relational conflict. The differ-
ence between the two is that the latter almost aims at ‘peace on any terms’.
Methodology3.10.2 
I use the common contract norms and the discrete-relational continuum to 
analyse smaller projects (‘focal projects’) that took place within the strategic 
urban projects. We focus on agreements that were closed between the plan-
ning authorities and developers. These projects are complex long-term proj-
ects that require a considerable amount of co-operation.
As a general designation, I use the term development agreements (see 
Chapter 4 and Section 3.1) and I then study how the content of the agree-
ments relate to the common contract norms and the discrete-relational scale.
I start from three premises. The first premise is that an agreement that 
gives a more specific account of the relations in which it is embedded is bet-
ter than one that fails to do so. The second premise is that such an agreement 
will be able to solve more of the problems that occur in these relations than 
one that fails to do so. The third premise is that it follows from the nature of 
the cases that relational norms are of key importance for a focal project to be 
successful.
I then assess every norm on a discrete-relational scale and characterise 
each contract by asking which discrete or relational norms were of enhanced 
importance in it (see Figure 3.1). This provides the basis for a case-specific 
analysis of the importance of the ten common contract norms, and a char-
acterisation on a three-point scale for every norm that ranges from more dis-
crete to more relational. In Chapter 9 these outcomes will be used to compare 
and assess the agreements. In Chapter 10 we will also draw conclusions about 
the value of this method.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 can be filled in to give concrete form to the analysis of each 
case. Table 3.8 is particularly useful in this context, as it gives a kind of ‘dis-
crete/relational profile’ for each agreement under investigation. Comparison 
of the profiles for the different cases can throw useful light on the nature of 
the different focal projects.
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Importance of discrete and relational normsTable 3.7 
1. Discrete norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Discreteness
Presentiation
Implementation of planning*
Effectuation of consent
2. Relational norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Role integrity
Preservation of the relation
Resolution of relational conflict
Propriety of means
Supra-contractual norms
* When the norms of discreteness and presentiation are not of enhanced 
importance, it makes more sense to view the implementation of planning 
norm as a relational norm. In other words, the importance of planning in such 
projects then follows from the nature of the observed relation between the 
parties rather than from the wording of the agreements.
Relational/discrete profile of the ten common contract Table 3.8 
norms in a specific case
Norm
More discrete 
than relational
Equally discrete 
and relational
More relational 
than discrete
Role integrity
Mutuality
Implementation of 
planning
Effectuation of consent
Flexibility
Contractual solidarity
Linking norms
Creation and restraint 
of power
Propriety of means
Harmonisation with the 
social matrix
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Development agreements4 
Introduction4.1 
This chapter discusses the concept of a development agreement that pro-
vides the content for the description of the urban development projects and 
the focal projects of this study. We will link the concept of the development 
agreement to the content of the cases and discern its various functions. This 
also means that we will already introduce some examples of the case studies 
to illustrate and clarify the functions of development agreements. The chap-
ter ends with a methodological description of the first two parts of the case-
study chapters. In the final section of Chapter 3 (Section 3.11), we discussed 
how relational contract theory is used to assess and compare the cases of the 
following chapters.
We have already explained in Chapter 1 that the main subject of this the-
sis is development agreements as used in the context of major urban devel-
opment projects in three world cities – New York, Amsterdam and London; 
these agreements yield the material for the detailed case studies presented in 
Chapters 5-8. We may define a development agreement as the agreement that 
contains the specific conditions under which parties are willing to cooperate 
for the realisation of an urban development project. Examples of such condi-
tions are: the payments for land, agreements on job trainee programs, agree-
ments on public space and other planning obligations and the phasing of the 
project. But the conditions may also include procedural obligations, such as 
the obligation on the parties to meet regularly. In line with the theory of the 
previous chapters, we may acknowledge that not all conditions will be en-
forceable in a court but that does not make them less relevant or less a part 
of the agreement (see Sections 2.8 and 3.1, and other parts of Chapter 3).
Contracts and agreements
In the interests of clarity, I recall here that a distinction is often drawn be-
tween an agreement and a contract (see also Section 3.1) according to which 
a contract consists of the legally enforceable part of an agreement. An agree-
ment consists of all promises made by the parties whether they are enforce-
able or not (e.g. Wilmot-Smith, 2006). It follows from this distinction that 
a contract is normally in writing and interpreted in line with the rules and 
norms of contract law. In Chapter 3 we saw that Macneil’s account of relation-
al contract theory does not strictly follow this distinction and is sometimes 
criticised for that reason (see Section 3.10). One of the reasons for not applying 
the distinction between a contract and an agreement is that the distinction is 
mostly relevant if it is applied to courts and even there it is often vague (cf. 
Section 3.9). We will not use the distinction in the theoretical account of the 
development agreement. In addition to the reasons just mentioned, one of the 
reasons for that choice is that the documents we study include, from a legal 
perspective, not only contracts but also leases and deeds (see Section 4.2.1).
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Note however that the main documents we examine in the case studies 
are the written agreements that the parties have signed and that examples 
are derived from these documents unless otherwise stated. The tension be-
tween the written document and the agreement as a whole is discussed at 
length in Section 4.3.
Possible approaches to study 4.1.1 
of the selected agreements
We start this section by taking a step back to the discussion of Section 2.5 
on the scientific positioning of the present study. We saw there the study has 
elements that can be related to the sociology of law, to socio-legal studies (it 
takes a normative approach towards development agreements), to planning 
studies (it aims to help create urban environments) and to private law be-
cause of its focus on legal agreements. This scientific positioning informed 
the approach to the study of the agreements selected.
One could in principle use three different approaches to the study of these 
agreements (see Table 4.1): firstly, in each case one could select from the vari-
ous development agreements that came into consideration one that would be 
recognised as a contract in law; secondly, one could use a single non-legal 
criterion to evaluate the selected agreement; and thirdly, one could focus the 
analysis on a certain relevant phase or topic within the context of the urban 
development projects in question.
It will come as no surprise that I chose the third approach: it allows us 
to study the selected agreements in their own contexts. In practice, our in-
vestigation of development agreements concentrated on the phase that starts 
with the decision of the parties to jointly undertake the project as a whole 
and ends when the parties lay down the details of their cooperation in the 
actual construction work. The agreements that the parties close may include 
more phases, but will never include fewer. Our interest stops at the moment 
that construction starts.
By contrast, the first approach simply limits the scope of the investigation 
by concentrating on a single type of agreement legally recognised as a con-
tract, e.g. finance contracts or contracts of intent. Evaluation of the content 
and quality of contracts would take place within the context of the legal sys-
tem in force in the country in question, and the enforceability of rules in a 
court would be the dominant criterion here. In this approach, we look at the 
project from the perspective of the legal document, not the other way around.
The second approach would involve using non-legal criteria such as effi-
ciency, sustainability or social justice – to mention but a few – to assess the 
agreements. The criterion selected could then be used either (1) to judge 
whether the provisions of the contract are fit for purpose or (2) to assess how 
the contract functions in the context of the project. If we chose efficiency as 
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our criterion, in case 1 we would ask whether a certain provision of the agree-
ment is the most cost-efficient one, while in case 2 we would assess the ex-
tent to which the development agreement contributes to the efficient execu-
tion of the urban development project in question.
Although this type of research based on use of a single criterion is attrac-
tive, it is probably too specific to be the best way of investigating how devel-
opment agreements function in the context of urban development projects in 
general. That is the main reason why it was not used in the present study. Of 
course, more than one criterion could have been chosen to assess the agree-
ments. An agreement could for example do really well from an efficiency 
point of view whereas it functions badly from the perspective of social justice. 
At a more abstract level, however, this approach simply comes down to the 
use of two or more single-criterion approaches so it was also rejected for the 
purposes of the present study.
Nomenclature4.2 
Significance of the term ‘development agreement’4.2.1 
The term ‘development agreement’ is used in two different senses in the lit-
erature. In the first sense (usually encountered in an industrial context), it is 
a contract whereby the parties agree to work together to develop for example 
a new kind of technology. This definition is useful because it implies the idea 
of a shared and concretised project; the various tasks are thought of from the 
perspective of one indivisible project (Salbu, 1991).
In the second sense, a development agreement (often called an urban de-
velopment agreement) is an agreement whereby a public party closes a con-
tract with a land developer concerning the conditions for the development 
of a certain area. The public party thereby typically offers not to change pub-
lic regulations and provides some benefits in exchange for facilities that the 
landlord will provide (Camacho 2005a; Wellman, 1987). The source of this de-
scription is American law but the American agreements of our study do not 
directly concern an agreement on the use of public regulation. The land use 
agreement (bestemmingsplanovereenkomst) in the Netherlands also fits the sec-
ond definition (Hennekens, 1995), but these land use agreements were not 
used in the cases we study here. The King’s Cross development involves an 
S106 agreement, which can be regarded as a typically English variant of the 
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Possible approaches to study of development agreementsTable 4.1 
Selection of appropriate 
type of legal document
Single-criterion analysis 
of fitness for purpose
Single-criterion analysis of 
function in context of project
Concentration on 
appropriate phase of project
Focus on type of contract Focus on contract Focus on project Focus on project
Evaluation in context of 
legal system
Criterion-based evaluation Criterion-based evaluation No evaluation in first 
instance. Contracts are 
studied in context of project
Focus on black letter law Focus on context of criterion 
(e.g. economy)
Focus on context of criterion 
(e.g. economy)
Focus on law in action
development agreement (see Section 8.1).
But even though they may not fit one of these two definitions perfectly, the 
agreements used in the cases we study all share features of both types. We 
may say that the first type of development agreement emphasises the private 
law aspects of such agreements whereas the second emphasises the planning 
goals (cf. Section 2.5). From that perspective, the S106 agreement used in Lon-
don leans over to the second definition, the Battery Park City leases combine 
both elements and the other agreements lean over to the first definition in 
that private law is important – though of course they are not aimed at the de-
velopment of a new type of technology in these cases, but at the development 
of a new built environment.
Government by contract
The development agreement, as the term is used in this study, combines two 
different ways in which the government uses contracts: as a means of admin-
istration (public contracting) and for transactions with private parties (private 
contracting). All kinds of mixes between the two now exist and the term gov-
ernment by contract involves both forms and all their intermediate provisions. 
Vincent-Jones comments on this term as follows (2006: 3): “The term ‘govern-
ment by contract’ is commonly used to describe a wide range of contractual 
arrangements involving public bodies, including traditional public procure-
ment, contracting out, public/private partnerships, franchising or state con-
cessions, agreements between the government and self-regulatory organiza-
tions, agreements between state agencies and individual citizens, and various 
types of agreement within government.”
Vincent-Jones (2006) discerns three types of contracts that are used by the 
government: administrative contracts, social contracts and economic con-
tracts. The category of social contracts, whereby the government contracts 
with social groups or individuals, does not really apply to the cases of this 
study although one might say that contracts that implement the interests of 
various local action groups share features with the contracts that fall within 
this category.
The economic contracts fit the development agreements of the cases best. 
Vincent-Jones defines them as (2006: 22): “…contractual agreements directed 
at improving public services through competition and/or the devolution of 
management powers to public purchasing or commissioning agencies in a 
variety of hybrid forms beyond simple market or bureaucratic organisation.” 
The numerous examples of public private partnerships and other types of 
contracts between the state and private parties fit into this category, as do 
procurement procedures.
Administrative contracts (2006: 21) “…are contractual arrangements in-
tended (or having potential) to increase the transparency and effectiveness of 
the operation or machinery of government.” An example would be an agree-
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ment between different departments to clarify who is responsible for which 
parts of a certain policy and to do away with contradictory policies. Devel-
opment projects often involve administrative contracts that are closed before 
the contracts with the private parties. Within the context of this study, we 
will place them in the category of enabling contracts (see Section 4.3).
The difference between the development agreements of this study and 
the economic contracts and administrative contracts of Vincent-Jones is that 
most of the contracts of this study where closed by the government in its 
‘private-law’ capacity. The exception being the S106 agreement in the King’s 
Cross project that basically implies a selling of planning permission (see Sec-
tion 4.2.1 and Section 7.2). Although the contracts that are discussed by Vin-
cent-Jones are private law documents, they are used as a way to perform ad-
ministrative tasks. The agreements of our cases, on the other hand, do both. 
They are first and foremost legal agreements that could have been closed be-
tween private parties, but they also include public goals. Again, the exception 
is found in the King’s Cross case.
Names used to denote the development 4.2.2 
agreements in the case studies
The written agreements that we encountered in the case studies have differ-
ent names and fall into different legal categories (see Table 4.2).
In New York, the agreements were leases: in a lease the right to possess 
property is transferred from one party to another for a certain period. A lease 
consists of a direct, not a projected, transfer of rights, it may (and will usu-
ally) do so under the condition of a continuous flow of money (payments to 
the landlord) but the transfer of the property takes place when the lease is 
signed (Smith, 2003).
The agreements in Amsterdam are named cooperation and development 
contracts but they have the same legal purpose as the agreements in New 
York: they provide the conditions under which the City of Amsterdam and the 
private parties are willing to enter into a lease agreement in the near future 
(Hartkamp, 1996; City of Amsterdam, 2005).
The agreement in London is both a deed and an S106 agreement. A deed is 
a document in writing, under seal, that grants a right to another party. It re-
sembles a contract (as opposed to a license that consists of a unilateral prom-
ise) under classical common law definition but is not subject to the require-
ment of consideration (Smith, 2003; see also Section 2.7.2).
An S106 agreement is an agreement under the British Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990. Section 106 of this statute allows local planning authorities 
to make their planning permission subject to an agreement on planning obliga-
tions. In this agreement, a developer off sets the impact of his development with 
(in kind or financial) payments for public facilities (Booth, 2003: see Section 7.2).
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Aspects of the development agreement4.3 
A development agreement has an important legal aspect but it also exists out-
side of its legal realisation; as we have seen, it is embedded in the relations 
between parties (see Section 3.1 and further). This means that a development 
agreement is an agreement that has both enforceable and non-enforceable 
features. Elements of the development agreements find their way into legal 
documents that sometimes but not necessarily carry the same name (see 
Section 4.2.2). In addition, the development agreement can also be situated in 
agreements that are not formalised (for example, oral agreements) or in the 
actual conduct of parties. However, in the cases of this study, the larger part 
of the agreement will normally be written down in a legal document (see Sec-
tion 4.2).
We may further draw a distinction between aspects of the project that 
were negotiable and aspects that were not (see Figure 4.1): you may hold that 
the constitution of the United States influences a specific project in New York 
City, but the provisions of the constitution aren’t negotiable. The customs of 
a trade influence the project and are not negotiable either but they do not 
necessarily apply to the specific contract. We therefore call them intermedi-
ate provisions since they will usually apply to the agreement if they were not 
specifically dealt with. The negotiable aspects of a development agreement fi-
nally are those aspects that are dealt with specifically during the negotiations. 
An example is a price that will be paid for a good.
The negotiated part of the agreement can be divided into:
Legally enforceable agreements that are in writing1.  – An example of a legally 
enforceable agreement in writing is the price that will be paid for land or a 
provision in the contract that holds that the apartments that are built for 
affordable housing will be conferred to a affordable housing corporation. 
Examples of enforceable agreement in writing in the Gershwin project:
Article 4 of the development contract mentions that the obligation of  ■
the consortium is to realise the (project in the) ‘Plan area’.
Articles 15.1 and 15.2 mention as the core obligation of the government  ■
that it has to deliver the project lands in a full serviced state.
Legally enforceable agreements that are unwritten2.  – Examples of enforceable 
agreements that are not written down include the promise to realise (an 
unspecified amount of) commercial rental units (case interview Amvest, 
GER 02-06-A1) and the promise to use a specific type of architect. Generally 
speaking, most agreements that are unwritten are enforceable as long as 
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Names of agreements in case studiesTable 4.2 
Case study Type of agreement
Battery Park City Lease
Hudson Yards Lease
Zuidas (Mahler4) Cooperation contract
Zuidas (Gershwin) Development contract
King’s Cross S106 (deed)
their existence can be proved (Hartkamp, 1996; Chitty, 2006).
Legally unenforceable agreements that are in writing3.  – An example of an un-
enforceable agreement in writing is the agreement that parties will bear 
a prestigious project like la Défense in Paris in mind when they discuss 
the project under hand. Such a point of reference is mentioned in the de-
velopment agreements that were closed in the focal projects in the Zuidas 
in Amsterdam (Chapter 7). It can also be found in some documents that 
represented the shared vision of the private consortium and the boroughs 
of Camden and Islington in the King’s Cross case (Chapter 8). Furthermore, 
some of the many obligations of reasonable endeavour found in the agree-
ments we have studied would appear to be unenforceable. An example of 
an unenforceable duty from the Meushar lease in Hudson Yards:
Section 9.03 states that landlord shall endeavour to promptly advise  ■
tenant of any calls or complaints with respect to tenant’s occupancy of 
the premises. But the section also specifies that failure to do so shall 
not be deemed a default under the lease.
Legally unenforceable agreements that are unwritten4.  – An example of an un-
written unenforceable agreement is the expectation of a party – often 
based on promises made by or behaviour of a government representa-
tive – that if he agrees to make a lesser profit on the project under hand, 
the city government will offer him another project. Private parties in the 
Amsterdam Zuidas case mentioned this expectation sometimes as a kind 
of collateral (case interviews Fortis real estate, MAH 10-04-A2 and Amvest, 
GER 02-06-A1).
Positioning of the development 4.4 
agreement within the project universe
The development agreement is a core agreement around which other agree-
ments are located: it is the centre of the project universe. But it may not al-
ways be that easy to locate. The development agreement may be hidden in 
several documents and oral agreements. It may be part of a lease, the docu-
ment embodying it may be so short that its importance is easily overlooked, 
or it may not be found in one single document, its provisions being spread 
over different written agreements. One of the reasons for this complexity is 
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that a development agreement finds its roots in the relations between private 
parties and public parties. In most cases, negotiations with more than one 
government agency are necessary.
In the case of King’s Cross, the council of the borough of Camden signed 
the agreement, but other governmental agencies had to co-sign. The project 
also involved negotiations with English Heritage and the Greater London Au-
thority (GLA). What looks like a written agreement between one public party 
and a consortium of private parties will often consist of a complex relation 
between various public and private parties. In the case studies of this the-
sis, we will find the problems and complexities that result from this mostly 
expressed in the role integrity norm (see Section 3.4.2). Sometimes the agree-
ments specify the various parties involved. An example are the signing par-
ties in King’s Cross (S106 agreement for main site):
Art. 2.1 Identifies as the contracting parties the Mayor and Burgesses of the  ■
London Borough of Camden (the Council), The Secretary of State for Trans-
port, London & Continental Railways Limited (LCR), National Carriers Lim-
ited (NCL), Argent (King’s Cross) Limited (the Developer) and Transport for 
London (TfL).
A development agreement does not confine itself to a signed legal docu-
ment. It will evolve after it has been closed. When new issues come up – or 
just because of the fact that the relation between parties evolves – the agree-
ment will change.
It is therefore not easy to describe the precise scope of a development 
agreement. Where does an enabling contract end and a development agree-
ment start? (see Figure 4.2)
Parties deal with each other at more than one table and at all those ta-
bles they will play (slightly) different roles and perform different tasks. In 
some cases, parties that have not signed the contract may still be a party to 
the agreement. In the Mahler4 agreement, for example, a German bank that 
signed the contract of intent was not included in the cooperation contract. Its 
role in the project changed from a leading party to a party that agreed to buy 
some of the assets when they were built. But its influence remained since it 
had been involved in the project in a preliminary stage and would be one of 
the buyers of the new buildings. Its name was mentioned in the cooperation 
contract (see Section 7.2.7a).
It is necessary to focus also on the relations between parties and not on-
ly on the texts of their agreements. Texts provide an important point of fo-
cus because they create mutual expectations and will be the most important 
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sources of information for a third party who wants to explore the nature of 
the relationship, but they are not necessarily decisive.
Scope of the agreement
We started this chapter by defining a development agreement as the agree-
ment that contains the specific conditions under which all parties are willing 
to cooperate for the realisation of a project.
A project may be as small as the development of one single building within 
a larger project. But the agreement must be crucial for the development in 
question. From that point of view, other agreements are positioned around 
the development agreement: they enable the development agreement, are 
complementary to it or derived from it. In addition, not all these contracts 
necessarily involve all parties that signed the development agreement.
Enabling agreements
Examples of agreements that enable the development agreements to exist are 
a finance contract between a bank and a developer or a contract of intent be-
tween the planning authority/ local government and the developer(s).
A contract of intent was signed in the Mahler4 project between the devel-
opers and the City of Amsterdam. Its goal was to set the limits within which 
the parties would try to reach a final agreement.
Another example of an enabling agreement is a contract between different 
tiers of government and/or government agencies that they will join forces for 
the realisation of the project. Such a contract was closed between the state of 
New York, the City of New York and the Metropolitan Transportation Author-
ity (MTA) in the Hudson Yards Project. Another type of enabling agreement 
is a written agreement wherein developers join forces, by starting a separate 
company in which they will work together for the realisation of the project. 
Such agreements were closed between the developers in the Mahler4 and 
Gershwin projects.
Complementary agreements
A complementary agreement specifies (provisions of) the development agree-
ment, but does not set aside or change the latter. If it were to change the core 
agreement, it would not be a complementary agreement but part of a new 
development agreement.
An example is a contract in which parties specify requirements on the de-
sign of the premises in the project. The Hudson Yards (construction) leases 
state that a cooperation contract may be necessary to coordinate the work be-
tween the lessee and the landlord. This would be a complementary contract 
(see Section 6.2.3).
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Derived agreements
An example of an agreement derived from the development agreement is a 
contract between a developer and a contractor who will actually carry out the 
work. To make things more complicated, a development agreement for an ur-
ban development project may give rise to development agreements for small-
er projects. An example is the realisation of a museum within the context of 
one large mixed-use building. Such a museum is a project in itself, for which 
a development agreement could be closed (cf. Section 7.2.3 and Section 2.3).
There may also be a coordinating agreement – that could be a contract, a 
lease, etc. – and one or more contracts that are positioned under it in an um-
brella construction. An example of this is the contract between a developer 
and the landowner under which contracts with the contractors and sub-con-
tractors are positioned. In the end, these contracts can all be led back to the 
contract between the developer and the landowner (case interview Mary Jane 
Augustine, NY 03-07-A3). The cases in Amsterdam, New York and London all 
provide examples of such structures.
The Battery Park City leases state for example that the tenant’s general 
contractor will meet with the tenant (the developer) and the BPCA (Battery 
Park City Authority) on a bi-weekly basis to discuss the progress of the proj-
ect. It also states that the tenant must use his best efforts to ensure that 25% 
of his contractors are women-based or minority-based enterprises (WBEs and 
MBEs).
Main functions of a 4.5 
development agreement
The development agreements of this study perform at least four functions: 
(1) they sum up the conditions under which exchange will take place; (2) they 
are used as a project statute; (3) they comprise a plan for the execution of the 
project and (4) they serve as a development tool (see Table 4.3). These func-
tions encompass the public-private nature of the agreements. The actual con-
tracts may perform more functions than those mentioned here, but not less.
They may, for example, include provisions on how the project will be main-
tained after its completion, or under which conditions it can be sold (post-
development provisions).
Exchange4.5.1 
The exchange part is not a distinguishing characteristic of the development 
agreement, since exchange is a crucial element of any contract. We saw that 
‘projection of exchange into the future’ is the definition of a contract in rela-
tional contract theory, and this is further emphasised in the mutuality norm 
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(see Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.3).
But even when not a distinguishing feature, the conditions for exchange 
are still an important (if not the main) function of the development. An ex-
ample of exchange in plot 18b, Battery Park City (plot 18b lease):
Art. 2 (first part) reads: “Landlord, does hereby demise and sublease to Ten- ■
ant, and Tenant does hereby hire and take from Landlord, the Premises, to-
gether with all easements, appurtenances and other rights and privileges 
now or hereafter belonging or appertaining to the Premises (...).”
Project statute4.5.2 
One of the main functions of development agreements is to enable parties to 
write their own laws within the borders of general legal rules and values
The development agreement serves as a statute for the project. One of the 
main functions of contracts is to enable parties to write their own laws with-
in the confines of general legal rules and principles; both the classical and 
the relational approach put this up front (cf. Section 3.3). This also applies to 
development agreements, which embody the conditions under which the par-
ties are willing to cooperate for the realisation of the project. I therefore use 
the term ‘project statute’ as a label to emphasise that parties find each other 
in the context of a project, which provides a broader context for cooperation 
than for instance a sales contract. It is better to state that the characteristics 
of the project give rise to the specific rules that parties draw up than to em-
phasise the closed relation between the signing parties since, as we saw, that 
closed relation is mostly a legal fiction.
This yields an interesting picture, in which the project brings parties to-
gether in a specific context. The relations between the parties influence the 
project, but the project also influences the relations between the parties.
More specifically, we may discern four aspects of the statutory function: 
(1) the goals that parties commit themselves to; (2) rules for cooperation; (3) 
rules for dealing with conflicts; and (4) rules for non-compliance.
We may say that the statutory function includes the procedural rules that 
both parties have to obey. Examples are the procedures that have to be fol-
lowed when one of the parties wants to modify a contract, when time sched-
ules are not met or when environmental inspectors want access to the land. 
An example of procedural rules in King’s Cross project (Main Site):
Article 31.1. and 31.2 state that the contract ends when all obligations have  ■
been fulfilled.
25 years after the implementation date, the developer can apply to the council 
for the written approval of the termination of the obligations that do not have 
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Functions of development agreementTable 4.3 
Development The development function is presupposed in the discussion of all functions
Exchange function The conditions for exchange
Statutory function The (procedural) rules parties agree to obey
Planning function The measures the parties intend to take to realise the project
Instrumental function A DA can be a means to realise public goals
an end date. It can also do that five years after 75% of the total permitted floor 
space of the development has been practically completed. The council shall 
give such written approval when the developer has fulfilled all its material 
obligations, the planning purpose underlying the obligation can be reasonably 
said to have been met and the costs to the developer of continuing to comply 
with the obligation do not justify the obligation continuing in effect.
An example of procedural rules in Battery Park City (plot 16/17):
Article 24 (events of default; conditional limitations, remedies, etc.) states  ■
which events shall be an event of default.
24.01(c) reads that “if Tenant shall fail to observe or perform one or more  ■
of the other terms, conditions, covenants, or agreements contained in this 
Lease, including, without limitation, any of Tenant’s obligations under the 
provisions of article 11 of this Lease (other than the obligations referred to 
in the preceding Section 24.01(b)), and such failure shall continue for a pe-
riod of thirty (30) days after notice thereof by Landlord to Tenant specifying 
such failure (unless such failure requires work to be performed, acts to be 
done, or conditions to be removed which cannot by their nature or because 
of Unavoidable Delays reasonably be performed, done or removed, as the 
case may be, within such thirty (30) day period in which case no Event of 
Default shall be deemed to exist as long as Tenant shall have commenced 
curing the same within such thirty (30) day period and shall, subject to Un-
avoidable Delays, diligently, continuously and in good faith prosecute the 
same to completion);…”.
Planning function4.5.3 
We have seen that implementation of planning is a common contract norm 
(see Section 3.4.5). This means that planning is present in all contracts. The 
planning norm is of enhanced importance in discrete transactions (it is part 
of the discrete norm), whereas it depends on the circumstances of the case 
under hand what the meaning of the norms is for relational transactions.
It follows from the nature of the development agreement that the plan-
ning function is of enhanced importance. A development agreement is about 
developing a project in the (near) future. It should contain detailed planning 
or refer to documents and meetings wherein this planning is made.
The difference between the statutory function and the planning function 
of the development agreement is that the former focuses on procedural rules. 
The planning function focuses on how parties will work and cooperate to rea-
lise the project, and not on the formal procedures of the written agreement. 
The plan does not presuppose that something will go wrong but starts by 
supposing that everything will be developed according to plan. The statutory 
function encompasses that function in the sense that it provides the proce-
dures wherein the planning will be made or executed (or both).
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Concrete plans and planning frameworks
Development agreements not only provide rules for cooperation, they al-
so contain a plan for the development of the project (see Figure 4.3). This 
plan can be more or less specific: it can be a concrete plan with deadlines 
and schedules for the realisation of the project, or it can create a (planning) 
framework within which the project will be realised. The most highly speci-
fied plan will include deadlines and will state that when they are not met the 
non-performing party has to pay damages. Examples of such deadlines are 
found in the leases of the cases in New York (see Sections 5.2.5 and 6.2.5).
An agreement may also include deadlines but determine that when they 
are not met, parties will have to look for a solution. Alternatively, a contract 
may specify phases (design phase, building phase, maintenance phase) and 
then determine that when a phase starts, steps have to be taken within fixed 
deadlines. In some agreements we will find a combination: they set a dead-
line for when the project needs to be realised, but use a system of phasing for 
all other moments.
Coordination function
An important aspect of the planning function is that a development agree-
ment may coordinate different aspects of the project, for example the con-
struction of the private infrastructure and the public infrastructure. The 
public infrastructure usually has to be completed before construction of the 
private infrastructure – entrances, private pavements – may start. The devel-
opment agreement may coordinate the works in question. It may also coordi-
nate work on adjacent sites, to prevent nuisance. It would then, for example, 
determine that work on one plot cannot start before the work on the adjacent 
plot is finished. Finally, an agreement may coordinate the work of various 
parties involved such as architects, contractors and subcontractors by imple-
menting meetings between the various actors involved in the project.
An example of deadlines in Battery Park City (plot 16/17):
Article 24.01(b) states that a default exists if commencement of construc- ■
tion has not occurred within thirty days after notice from landlord to ten-
ant and if substantial completion of the building has not occurred within 
522 business days from the construction commencement days and such 
failure continues 10 days after notice for landlord to tenant. Both are sub-
ject to unavoidable delays.
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Instrumental function4.5.4 
The term ‘instrumental’ refers here to the fact that a private law agreement is 
one of the instruments (tools) that can be selected to achieve public goals. It 
includes the function of governing by contract discussed in Section 4.4 but its 
application is not necessarily confined to the government. Other instruments 
that governments use are forms of specific legislation, tax abatements, subsi-
dies etc.
The instrumental function of the development agreement differs from the 
other functions in that it – in this study – focuses specifically on the public 
parties. Note however that the availability of the instrumental function is not 
limited to the government. It can also be used by a private party or by a pub-
lic action group. The cases studied here do not include an example of public 
action groups that use development agreements to enforce certain develop-
ments in their neighbourhoods, but I did encounter such an example in the 
Atlantic Yards project in New York City (New York City, 2005). Here various 
public interest groups joined forces to close a development agreement with 
the developers in which the government did not interfere. As a consideration, 
they undertook to support the developer in the project instead of trying to 
prevent it from implementing it by starting litigation.
We may discern two situations in which the instrumental function is ap-
plied. In the first situation, a public party makes use of a development agree-
ment to promote development in an area that isn’t very popular amongst 
developers. The government could for instance share in the risks of the de-
velopment. Other instruments that may be used are agreements on subsidies 
and tax abatements or re-zoning of the area (cf. Section 4.4). We will not en-
counter these agreements at the level of the focal projects studied here, but 
they are found in some urban development projects. In the New York and 
London cases, the areas concerned shared a history of low popularity with 
developers (see Sections 5.1.5, 6.1.5. 8.1.5), while the Amsterdam case involved 
some uncertainties that required the government to step in to share a part of 
the development risk (see Section 6.1.8).
In the second situation, the area is already popular with developers but 
the government wants to steer the development in a certain direction and to 
promote other interests that are easily overlooked by developers. The govern-
ment may for instance want affordable housing to be created in an expensive 
neighbourhood, office towers to be built in a sustainable way or lower-wage 
jobs to be created for the original inhabitants of a gentrifying neighbourhood. 
Our case studies all involve one or more examples of such situations.
In the sense that development agreements are instruments for the reali-
sation of public goals, they can supplement legislation to specify legal obli-
gations. They are sometimes the most important instrument the government 
uses to reach its public goals; for instance, in the English planning system the 
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above-mentioned S106 agreement, in combination with planning permission, 
is the main instrument used by (local) government to steer development and 
promote public interests (Van der Veen, 2006a). In the Zuidas project in Am-
sterdam, the obligations laid down in the development agreements that re-
late to public interests are merely specifications of private law obligations. In 
Battery Park City the public goals are all part of the lease, which is mostly due 
to the legal characteristics of the BPCA (see Section 5.1.7).
Public goals
The interest of the public is either to attract development to an underdevel-
oped or deprived area, or to steer development in a way that serves a broader 
range of interests than only those of the developer and his partners. Since 
these various interests do not necessarily coincide, there are likely to be fric-
tions. Another situation occurs when the public objects to new development 
and wants everything to stay as it is (e.g. Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006). The 
projects studied here provide no examples of this, however.
In King’s Cross, for example, the friction between the community groups 
on the one hand and the local government and the private consortium on the 
other was mostly about the percentage of affordable housing that would be 
built and the moment at which it would be built (see Section 7.1.18).
We may distinguish two groups of public goals:
The first group is not project-bound; the need for affordable housing or 1. 
green areas also exists outside the project. The project may be used to fos-
ter these general goals.
In most cases, the government will urge the developers to minimise the 2. 
impact the project has on the area (e.g. by paying for extra infrastructure 
or by providing new jobs to compensate for those that will be lost because 
of the new development). In that case the public has an interest that is re-
lated to the development of the project itself.
A development agreement may cover both groups of public goals, as is the 
case in the projects studied in this thesis. In smaller projects, public authori-
ties often confine themselves to minimising the negative impacts of new de-
velopments (Camacho, 2005b).
Most public goals are not fixed but are subject of debate, and the public 
will often disagree on whether its interests are served by the new develop-
ments. In the cases studied here, strong public opposition was only encoun-
tered in King’s Cross. This may be explained by the fact that the other projects 
are situated in new (BPC) or underdeveloped (Zuidas) areas.
An example of Public Goals (type I) in the Zuidas (Gershwin, Zuidschans):
Article 5.1 states that 129 homes out of 390 mentioned in the contract will  ■
be leased for a social rent and 15% will be leased or sold for an affordable 
price (middle segment).
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An example of Public Goals (type II) in King’s Cross (Main Site):
Section I mentions that a police office will be constructed by the developer  ■
and leased to the Metropolitan Police.
Section K deals with the support of local schools needed to teach more  ■
children as a result of rising number of inhabitants in the project area.
Methodological approach 4.6 
of the case studies
Introduction4.6.1 
In this final section, we discuss how the features of the development agree-
ment are approached in the case studies. We saw in Section 3.11 how rela-
tional contract theory will be used to analyse the contractual relations in the 
focal projects of the cases studied. The development agreement as described 
in this chapter provides the context for the project: where is it located, how 
is it supposed to look when it is finished, how much it will cost, etc. Every 
case study therefore starts with two sections. The first discusses the urban 
development project that forms the broader context of the project(s) of focus 
investigated (see Section 2.2). This is not meant as an analysis – it is not writ-
ten from a normative point of view – but rather as a description that puts the 
focal projects (my particular object of research) in perspective.
The second section describes the focal projects for which the underlying 
contracts are subjected to relational analysis. This second section is descrip-
tive, using the functions of the development agreement as a framework for 
the description given. In Chapter 10 we will use analysis of the content of 
the second sections as a basis for discussion of the development agreements 
from a somewhat broader perspective than Chapter 9 where we will compare 
the outcomes of the relational analyses. The aspects described in the follow-
ing chapters will be selected from three sources. Case interviews were used 
to get an idea of the context and specifics of the cases and the interests of 
the various parties involved. Expert interviews were used to get a grip on (1) 
the specifics of the project within the broader context of the city, and (2) the 
specifics of the legal documents within the context of regular legal practice 
(see Appendix A for an overview of the questions asked in the case interviews, 
and Appendix B for a list of the interviewees).
I made a list of 43 questions as a basis for study of the development agree-
ments (see Appendix C). These questions guided me through the various le-
gal documents and showed where the gaps had to be filled with information 
from other sources (interviews, plans etc.). The content of the first section of 
each case-study chapter was informed by the ‘ingredients of success’ iden-
tified by Alexander Garvin. In his book The American City: what works, what 
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doesn’t (1995/2002), he discusses numerous development projects using these 
ingredients. They are:
Market: is there a market for the new buildings?1. 
Location: is the area easily accessible and otherwise feasible?2. 
Design: does the design fit the surroundings?3. 
Financing: is there enough money? How is the project financed?4. 
Entrepreneurship: is anybody taking the lead, does he really want the proj-5. 
ect to succeed?
Time: is the time right for the project?6. 
These factors are challenging, although they do not focus on agreements they 
claim that for a project to be successful all these questions will have to be 
answered in the affirmative. Case interviews were consistent with this practi-
cal ‘bottom up’ approach. I added an extra factor to these six and that is the 
involvement of the public since, as we saw in Chapter 2, this is a critical ele-
ment of urban development projects.
In the remaining chapters we will try to say something about the relative 
success of the various development agreements studied. How well were they 
prepared, did they seem to provide the parties with the best deal? In the fol-
lowing two sections I will briefly introduce the aspects of the cases that we 
will discuss in the case studies and explain how they relate to the other parts 
of the study.
Description of urban development projects4.6.2 
In this section we will discuss the descriptive elements of the urban develop-
ment projects. The numbers refer to the section numbers in the case stud-
ies of Chapters 5-8. This first section provides the context for the study and 
analysis of the focal projects.
The way in which the various topics discussed in each case study are re-
lated to Alexander Garvin’s above-mentioned ‘ingredients of success’ is sum-
marised in Table 4.4.
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Aspects of large urban development projects in the case studiesTable 4.4 
Ingredient of success Corresponding section in case study
Market1. 1.4, 1.9, 1.14, 1.15 (momentum, finance, goals, delays)
Location2. 1.2 (area)
Design3. 1.3 (description)
Financing4. 1.8, 1.9 (ownership and project finance)
Entrepeneurship5. 1.7, 1.16, 1.18b (project management, private parties, conflicts)
Time6. 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.15 (momentum, time frame, history, delays)
Involvement of the public7. 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.13, 1.18a (social housing, sustainability, public 
facilities, involvement of the public, critique)
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Contents of the case study sections 5.1, 6.1, 7.1 and 8.1  
(the urban development project)
1.1 Introduction
The introduction provides a short general description of the urban development 
project in which the focal project is situated.
1.2 Description of the area
The description of the area answers three questions:
Where is the project area located? ■
How is it connected to other parts of the city? ■
Are there already any landmark buildings or other significant places such as  ■
parks or railway stations in the area?
1.3 Description of the project
This section provides a general description of the phases of the project and the 
result envisaged.
1.4 Momentum
Momentum is understood here as the sum of the factors that were decisive 
in determining why the project started up at a specific moment. They include 
economic circumstances, public pressure, public leadership, private leadership 
and political circumstances. The main questions in this section are:
Can we discern the reasons why the project started at a specific moment? ■
Were there any decisive factors? ■
1.5 Time frame
This section answers three questions:
How long will it take to develop the project? ■
When will it start and when will it end? ■
How long will the various phases take? ■
1.6 History and background
This section provides some background information on the project.
Key questions here are:
Were there any plans prior to the one that we are dealing with now? ■
How does the project fit the city’s needs? ■
1.7 Project Management
Urban development projects are often managed in a specific manner. This 
section focuses on the management structure of the project.
How and by whom is the project managed? ■
Is there a specific agency, company or individual that oversees the project? ■
1.8 Project finance
This section focuses on the financing of the public parts of the project. The 
questions asked here are:
How is the project financed? ■
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And in case of public private partnership (PPP) structures: 
Who will pay for what? ■
1.9 Ownership
The main questions in this section are:
Is the area mostly publicly or privately owned? ■
And by which or what kind of public agencies or companies? ■
1.10 Affordable housing
Affordable housing is one of the goals that public parties pursue. Since 
affordable housing is not a cost-effective way of using expensive land, 
negotiations often focus on this issue. Not all kinds of affordable housing are 
meant for the lowest incomes, other forms focus on middle incomes or specific 
target groups. The main questions in this section are:
How much affordable housing is envisaged in the plans? ■
What kinds of affordable housing? ■
How do public parties ensure the realisation of their housing targets (and  ■
how did they do so in the past)?
1.11 Environmental sustainability
Environmental sustainability is usually one of the key issues in plans for urban 
development projects of Western cities. The key questions in this section are:
Is environmental sustainability a concern of the project? ■
How is it defined, and how do the public (and other) parties ensure the  ■
realisation of their sustainability goals?
1.12 Other public facilities
Plans for new neighbourhoods may envisage all kinds of public facilities, such 
as museums, gymnasiums and theatres.
This section provides an overview of the public facilities that are of importance 
for the project as a whole, either because they were strongly debated or 
because they are crucial for the identity of the project.
1.13 Involvement of the general public
The general public is defined in this context as the residents of the project area 
and of the city as a whole. Public parties, by their nature, are obliged to take the 
interests of the general public into account, while private parties will often also 
want to do so nowadays.
The main questions in this section are:
How is or was the public involved in the project? ■
Is the involvement of the public considered to be extensive or minimal? ■
1.14 Goals of the project
This section focuses on the goals of the project as described in various plans 
and other documents. The main question here is:
What are the explicit goals that the urban development project pursues? ■

Focal projects4.6.3 
Having discussed how we will describe the urban development projects of 
the case studies, this final section describes which aspects of the focal proj-
ects we will consider. Despite the many correspondences between this sec-
tion and the previous one, here it was not so much the ingredients of success 
but rather the various functions of the development agreement that provided 
the background for choice of the topics under discussion. This means that the 
case interviews and the study of the legal documents (with the aid of the 43 
questions listed in Appendix C) form part of the basis for description of the 
projects.
The aspects of the focal projects are summarised in Table 4.5.
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1.15 Delays
It is not uncommon for urban development projects to be subject to delays. 
The main question in this section is thus:
Has the project experienced any significant delays? ■
1.16 Role of private parties in the project
This section describes the involvement of private actors in the project. The 
main question here is:
Did private actors play a leading, pro-active role with regard to the project as  ■
a whole?
1.17 Public parties
This section provides an overview of the public parties involved in the project 
and their various tasks.
1.18 Critique
This section discusses the critique to which the project has been subjected, 
including reports of these discussions in the media.
1.19 Conflicts of power
This section focuses on the conflicts of power that often arise between 
various layers of government (for example between the state and the city) and 
discusses their impact on the project.
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The aspects of the projects of focus described in the case Table 4.5 
studies
Topic Corresponding section of case study
Project 2.3 Description of the project
2.4 Momentum
2.5 Pre-contractual procedure
2.8a Other shareholders and stakeholders
2.8b Involvement of the public
Development agreement 2.7 The contracting parties
Exchange function 2.9 Payments
Statutory function 2.10 Conflicts
2.10a Which conflicts arose with respect to the 
project?
7.2.10b How will parties deal with future conflicts?
7.2.14 Goals of the project
Planning function 2.6 Time frame
2.15 Delays
Instrumental function 2.11 Social housing
2.12 Environmental sustainability
2.13 Other public facilities
Contents of the case study sections 5.2, 6.2, 7.2 and 8.2 (the focal project)
2.1 Introduction
This section provides a general description of the focal project and describes 
the actors in the project and the experts who were interviewed.
2.2 Positioning (area)
This section describes the location of the project and any important buildings 
and other features (such as parks) that are already situated in the area.
2.3 Description of the project
The main question of this section is:
What will be built in the project area? ■
2.4 Momentum
Why was the focal project built when it was? The reasons may differ from 
those given in Section 1.4, since we are discussing a smaller project here. The 
reasons given will therefore often depend on the specific market situations etc.
2.5 Pre-contractual procedure
This section focuses on the procedure, if any, used to attract developers. It 
also discusses the negotiations between the various parties that preceded the 
development agreement.

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2.6 Time frame
This section discusses the time frame of the project as a whole and its various 
phases.
2.7 The contracting parties
This section provides an overview of the private parties who signed the contract 
and discusses their roles in the project.
2.8a Other shareholders and stakeholders
This section provides an overview of parties outside the contract who 
influenced the project.
2.8b Involvement of the public
The general public is defined in this context as the residents of the project area 
and of the city as a whole. Public parties are, by their nature, obliged to take the 
interests of the general public into account, while private parties will often also 
want to do so nowadays.
The main questions in this section are:
How is or was the public involved in the project? ■
Is the involvement of the public considered to be extensive or minimal? ■
2.9 Payments
In this section, an overview of the payments is provided. The main question is:
How much will be paid, by which party, for what and at which moment? ■
2.10a Which conflicts arose with respect to the project?
Were there any conflicts between the contracting parties? How did they 
influence the contract?
2.10b Future conflicts
Does the agreement provide a procedure for dealing with future conflicts?
2.11 Affordable housing
Affordable housing is one of the goals that public parties pursue. Since 
affordable housing is not the most cost-effective way of using expensive land, 
negotiations often focus on this issue. Not all kinds of affordable housing are 
meant for the lowest incomes, other forms focus on middle incomes or specific 
target groups.
The main questions in this section are:
How much affordable housing is envisioned in the agreement? ■
What kinds of affordable housing? ■
2.12 Environmental sustainability
Does the development agreement contain agreements on environmental  ■
sustainability?
How do these agreements relate to any targets that are set for the project? ■
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2.13 Other public facilities
Does the development agreement contain agreements on public facilities? ■
2.14 Goals of the project
Are the goals of the focal project mentioned in the contracts and/or in other  ■
documents?
2.15 Delays
Has the project been subject to delay? ■
Does the development agreement provide procedures to be followed in case  ■
of delays
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Case study Battery Park 5 
City, New York 
Plot 16/17 (The River House) and 18b 
(The Verdesian) in Battery Park City’s 
North Residential Neighbourhood
The urban development project: 5.1 
Battery Park City, New York
Introduction5.1.1 
Battery Park City is one of New York’s most successful urban development 
projects of the 1980s and 1990s. It is one of the rare city renewal projects 
that actually succeeded in providing benefits for the City of New York (Gor-
don, 1997a). The esplanade along the Hudson River is one of the best known 
of New York City. The history of the project reflects some important elements 
of the post war history of urban planning. In less than two decades, the devel-
opment plan for the project evolved from a typical 1960s mega-structure with 
a strong emphasis on affordable housing to a commercial neighbourhood that 
focused on sustainable building techniques and sustainable buildings but 
does not include any affordable housing.
Another example of the evolution of the project is that its first design con-
ceived the project as a town-in-a-town, turning its back on the water, whereas 
the later designs conceptualised Battery Park City as a waterfront project with 
the Hudson River as its main asset.
In Battery Park City, two focal projects were studied in the North Residen-
tial Neighbourhood. Both are mixed use towers with a dominating residen-
tial function of about half a million square feet (46,000 sq. m). Some attention 
was also paid to the lease for the 1.3 million sq. ft. (120,000 sq. m) head offices 
of Goldman Sachs. No specific case interviews were conducted for this last-
mentioned project, however.
Description of the area5.1.2 
Battery Park City is a site of 92 acre (37 ha) created from landfill and situated 
in the lower west side of Manhattan (see Figure 5.1), next to the World Trade 
Center (WTC) site. In 2005, Battery Park City had 9.3 million sq. ft. (860,000 sq. 
m) of commercial space and 9,000 inhabitants on 7.2 million sq. ft. (670,000 
sq. m) of residential space. In addition, there were 22 restaurants, three public 
schools, two hotels and a cinema (BPCA, 2006). Six plots were still open for 
development in 2005.
The heart of Battery Park City is the commercial centre that lies west of 
the WTC site. The southern area is residential, the households are small and 
built in high densities. The northern area is also residential; the households 
are larger here than in the southern neighbourhood. Nearly one third of Bat-
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Source: courtesy of Battery Park City Authority
Figure 5.1 Battery Park City, including The River House and The 
Verdesian in the North Residential Neighborhood
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tery Park City consists of public open space. Landmarks in Battery Park City 
are the World Financial Center (WFC), the heart of the commercial area, that 
opened in 1985 and the 1.2 mile (1.9 km) long esplanade along the Hudson 
River.
A network of mass transportation facilities located in Lower Manhattan, 
such as City subway lines and City and Private Bus Lines, serves the area. The 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has established a commuter ferry 
service between the World Financial Center and several locations in New Jer-
sey. Battery Park City is accessible to the entire regional highway system.
Description of the project5.1.3 
The 1979 master plan (see Section 5.1.6 for an overview of the master plans) 
of Battery Park City spells out four major land uses: Residential land (38.1 
acre/15.4 ha), Commercial land (8.7 acre/3.5 ha), Public Open Space (28.0 
acre/11.3 ha) and streets (17.8 acre/7.2 ha). It divides the area in three parts:
The heart of the site is the commercial centre that lies west of the World  ■
Trade Center.
The southern area is residential, the households are small and built in high  ■
densities.
The northern area is residential; the households are larger than in the  ■
southern neighbourhood.
Based on this rough division, the Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) divided 
the site into five parts:
North Residential Neighborhood1. 
World Financial Center2. 
Gateway Plaza3. 
Rector Place residential neighbourhood4. 
Battery Place residential neighbourhood.5. 
The WFC and Gateway Plaza are centrally located, while Rector Place and Bat-
tery Place together comprise the south residential district.
Over the years, the 1979 master plan has been modified, allowing for more 
commercial space. At the time of writing, with only a few plots left to be de-
veloped, Battery Park City comprises 9 million sq. ft. (836,000 sq. m) of office 
space. In total, about 6,800 residential units were developed in 2005 (and an-
other 100 were under construction). There were eight plots left, one of which 
is reserved for Goldman Sachs (see Section 5.2.1) while the other seven will be 
used for residential development.
In 2005, Battery Park City further included two hotels, three public schools, 
some public monuments, 22 restaurants and a skyscraper museum. The most 
important amenity of the site is the waterfront and the esplanade.
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The 1979 plan made sure that the major part of the site (64.8 acres/26.2 
ha) is open space. 19.0 acres (7.7 ha) of the residential land is used as private 
public space, while public rights of way account for 17.8 acres (7.2 ha). The re-
sidual land is public open space.
Momentum5.1.4 
The project notoriously gained and lost momentum over the more than four 
decades of its history (see Section 5.1.6). However, an economic boom that 
resulted in extra demand for office space and strongly rising housing prices 
made the area very popular over the last decade and it has been easy to sell 
off the last plots.
The first impetus was given to the project in 1960, when the plans for the 
construction of the WTC were adopted by the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey, a bi-state agency that owned the land. There was a large demand 
for office space, much of which was planned to be met by the construction of 
the WTC. The soil and rock excavated during the work on the WTC and other 
buildings was disposed of in nearby landfill sites, thus providing an opportu-
nity to create Battery Park City. However, demand for office space fell in the 
1970s, and the WTC with its floor space of 10 million sq. ft. (930,000 sq. m) 
more or less met the entire needs of the whole office market in the area on 
its own (Gordon, 1997a). There was no market left for Battery Park City.
A new impetus was not given until the early 1980s when demand for office 
space was high again and construction of the World Financial Center, a com-
bination of offices with luxury shops and a small harbour, started. At the end 
of that decade there was another market decline and it took until 1997 for the 
momentum to rise again as the economy improved. Since then demand has 
been constantly high. Although the area suffered from the 9/11 attacks that 
destroyed the WTC towers, government subsidies succeeded in keeping the 
area popular (see also Section 5.1.5).
Time frame5.1.5 
The Battery Park City project was initiated in 1962 (Gordon, 1997b). By 
2008 – some 45 years later – it was almost completed. However, New York City 
experienced some serious economic downturns during that period, causing 
the project to be drastically changed in 1979 when a new master develop-
ment plan was drawn up (see Section 5.1.6). One could therefore argue that 
the project in its current state started off in 1979 and took about 30 years to 
complete.
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History and background5.1.6 
The name of Battery Park City comes from nearby Battery Park, which in its turn 
gets its name from The Battery – named after the artillery battery placed at the 
southern tip of Manhattan Island by the Dutch and British to protect the har-
bour in the early days of the settlement. Once its military function ended, it be-
came a recreational area: the Battery provided a popular waterfront promenade 
since at least the 17th century. Later, the area went through many changes; for a 
time, it housed a reception centre for immigrants and a municipal aquarium. By 
the time that plans were made for revitalising the site, it was almost completely 
derelict. It was, however, the only place on the island of Manhattan that offered 
direct access to the Hudson waterfront. The fact that the project was named 
Battery Park City can be regarded as reminiscent of the 1960s ideal of building 
self-supporting neighbourhoods within the city (Garvin, 2002).
The history of Battery Park City can be described in four phases. The first 
phase started in 1962 and lasted until 1979 when after years of non-construc-
tion, the Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) – set up to direct the develop-
ment – threatened to go bankrupt. The second phase lasted until 1989 when, 
after a successful decade, a new economic downturn started and construc-
tion stopped. The third phase started in 1997 when construction resumed. The 
fourth phase starts with the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 (see also 
Section 5.1.15). Surprisingly, these attacks that destroyed the World Trade Cen-
ter did not stop the development of Battery Park City. By 2004, land prices were 
already higher than before the attacks (BPCA, 2006).
The 1968 Master Development Plan
The project to revitalise Battery Park was initiated in 1962. The area had by 
then declined to “little more than rotting piers, ramshackle buildings and 
wayward souls”, as the state Governor put it (BPCA, 2003). Political struggles, 
however, prevented the project from having a quick start.
Several plans were presented by state and city agencies, but it was 1968 
before the first master development plan was drawn up – and 1969 before it 
was adopted. The plan was a compromise that resulted from negotiations be-
tween different state – and city agencies. The city owned the land and had 
regulatory powers over urban development, but the state had the necessary 
capital and legislative authority.
The four major topics on which the agencies disagreed were (Hayes, 1986, 
quoted in Gordon, 1997a):
The proportion of low income housing units.1. 
The design of the project.2. 
The financial return to the city.3. 
The arrangements for continuing city participation in project implementa-4. 
tion.
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It was finally understood that the state would develop the site while the city 
would get the Governor’s support for a Linear City Project over a Brooklyn ex-
pressway (Gordon, 1997a).
The state installed the Battery Park City Authority3 (BPCA) to manage the 
project. The Authority would then pay the city ground rent, payments in lieu 
of taxes (PILOT, see Section 6.18) and any surplus revenue. Of the new hous-
ing, two thirds would be conventional and one third would be assisted (subsi-
dised).
The BPCA was installed by the State of New York on 31 May 1968. The au-
thority consisted of three members appointed by the Governor for six-year 
terms. State legislation allowed the BPCA to issue bonds for corporate purpos-
es to a limited amount of $ 300 million. The City Planning Commission (CPC) 
approved the master plan on 30 August 1969. The city leased its property to 
the state for a period of 99 years (starting in 1970 and ending in 2069).
The 1968 plan envisaged seven pods (six residential pods and one commer-
cial pod) that were tied together by a central pedestrian spine – a seven-storey 
structure about one mile long. The spine would incorporate retail stores and 
a people mover. Because of this spine, the project could best be described as a 
single mega-structure. It suited the town-in-a-town ideal of the time.4
The BPCA agreed to a time schedule that stated that site improvement 
would be completed by 1978 and the housing units by 1983.
The master lease between the city and the state specified the programme 
for the 1969 Master Development Plan. It aimed to develop (BPCA, 1979):
5 to 6 million sq. ft. of office space; ■
12,000-16,000 apartments (divided equally between luxury, moderate and  ■
low-income);
3   “The Hugh L. Carey Battery Park City Authority (...) is a public benefit corporation created under the laws 
of the State of New York to develop Battery Park City, in cooperation with the private sector as a mixed com-
mercial and residential community with substantial civic facilities” (standard formulation, see for example 
RFP [request for proposal], plot 18b and 19b, North Residential Neighborhood, October 2000, page 1).
4   Lewis Mumford advocated the concept of the new towns-in-town to Congress in 1967. He didn’t want to 
add endless acres and square miles of suburbs to the cities, but he wanted to build new planned communi-
ties within the cities. The big advantage of building these communities within the existing city was that they 
could capitalise on sewers, water mains, and traffic arteries that were already in place. In addition, the new-
towns-in-town could provide the mass necessary for a full range of facilities that scattered real estate ven-
tures could never develop. The Federal government provided money for the projects between 1968 and 1971, 
when President Nixon cut all federal housing expenses. In New York, Roosevelt Island was one of the two 
national projects that were approved for funding. But Battery Park City, especially in its original design, pro-
vides a perfect example of a town-in-town. Nowadays, it is believed that these communities can’t turn their 
backs on the rest of the city, and since you need to acquire a site of at least 30 to 50 acres, within an urban 
environment, the projects can be very expensive. Some of them, however, turned out a success. Battery Park 
City, if you can still consider it to be a town-in-town, is certainly one of them (see Garvin, 2002).
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960,000 sq. ft. of retail space; ■
28 acres of parks; ■
community facilities including two schools, a library, police and fire sta- ■
tions, a health centre and a culture and recreation centre.
Some minor changes were allowed at the request of the BPCA and an addi-
tional 23 pages of zoning regulations were attached to the lease by the CPC. 
This was a result of the complex and rigid procedures that the city had in-
cluded in the master lease, hoping that when adaptations were necessary, it 
could renegotiate for a better deal.
Only a few years later, problems emerged: there was no market for the of-
fice space, the implementation of the Master Development Plan turned out to 
be too difficult and both the City and the State were confronted with a fiscal 
crisis. Harry Helmsley (at that time the city’s largest office owner, who had 
been selected to develop the site) and Samuel Lefrak (the city’s largest resi-
dential builder, who had been elected to develop the residential units) refused 
to start construction because of the poor economic climate.
The BPCA had issued $ 141.8 million worth of bonds in 1972. Thanks to 
these funds the BPCA survived the recession of the mid 1970s, but it was 
faced with near-bankruptcy in 1979. By then only one project, Gateway Plaza, 
had made it through the 15-step approval process.
Perhaps the most important problem of the 1969 plan was that it conceived 
the project as one single continuous building, a typical example of the mega-
structures that were often designed in the 1960s but almost never built, and 
certainly not by private developers because of their expense. The plan was 
modified over the years but the spine remained the heart of it and as a result, 
it didn’t give way to the construction of smaller projects because the plan 
couldn’t be split into a collection of small projects. Only a few big companies 
were capable of developing the project and in the end it turned out that none 
of them was willing to. In 1979, only Gateway Plaza out of the large stock of 
planned apartment buildings was about to be constructed (Gordon, 1997a).
The 1979 Master plan
These problems resulted in a new agreement between the State, the City and 
the BPCA on 8 November 1979. As a result of this agreement (Gordon, 1997a; 
BPCA, 1979):
the State acquired the site through expropriation by its Urban Develop- ■
ment Corporation (UDC, now known as the Empire State Development Cor-
poration);
a new master plan was adopted to guide the general development of the  ■
site;
the complicated approval process was abandoned; ■
the city was to provide tax incentives for office development for ten years; ■
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the city would re-acquire the site when the BPCA had paid off its financial  ■
obligations; and
the State would provide $ 8 million in loans to guarantee the bonds. ■
The new master plan involved a change of mind for the planners. The 1969 
master plan had provided a whole new town, with its own public transport 
system, and a strong separation between pedestrians and traffic. It was a 
town in a town.
The 1979 plan – still in force – can hardly be called visionary or revolution-
ary; it may be described as a realistic, not too costly, project that suits the City 
of New York as a whole and especially the Borough of Manhattan. It involves 
more or less an extension of the Manhattan Grid. The commercial centre be-
comes the heart of the project. Land use and development control had to be 
flexible to permit future changes to meet market requirements. The Memo-
randum of Understanding between the State and the City removed the lat-
ter’s planning powers. The only planning controls it retained were a height 
control (buildings not to exceed half the height of the WTC) and a floor area 
ratio (FAR) of 15.0. The BPCA prepared specific guidelines for each of its neigh-
bourhoods.
The implementation process now involved only seven steps (instead of 15) 
and the city’s influence was limited to the approval of building permits. The 
plan allowed the BPCA to approve plans and development proposals for more 
than fifty percent of the area, but only for a 5-year period. The details of the 
Master plan were influenced by the neighbourhood of Tribeca, situated to the 
north of Battery Park City. Loft apartments were very popular in Tribeca at the 
time the 1979 plan was drawn up, and it was therefore decided to build them 
in Battery Park City too (Gordon, 1997b).
Project management5.1.7 
Battery Park City is managed by the BPCA, a public benefit corporation of the 
State of New York. New York City was the landowner in the area until 1979, 
when the BPCA was installed by the State. The Urban Development Corpora-
tion of the State (UDC, see also Section 2.4) acquired the site from the city 
in that year; as a result, the BPCA became basically a subsidiary of the UDC 
(later named the Empire State Development Corporation) and therefore ex-
empt from the city’s planning procedures and public review procedures. With 
the exception of the zoning regulations, different rules – state rules – apply to 
Battery Park City than to the rest of the city.
The BPCA consists of three members appointed by the state Governor. Be-
cause of the way in which it is managed, it forms more or less an island with-
in the city. Because of its agency status, it can implement its policies without 
the involvement of the public.
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Despite the fact that Battery Park City is exempt from city rules, it takes a 
cooperative approach and works together with the city where it can (case in-
terview with Department of City Planning, BPC 11-04-A6).
Project finance5.1.8 
Battery Park City is financed with bonds issued by the BPCA. The excess rev-
enues are transferred to the City (in 2004 these excess transfers amounted to 
$ 100.9 million). In addition to the bonds, the BPCA leases its land to develop-
ers. Its main income consists of the revenues from these leases and of pay-
ments in lieu of taxes (PILOTS, see Section 6.1.8) made by the developers. In 
2003 the outstanding amount on bonds was about $ 663 million with a statu-
tory right to issue another $ 150 million (BPCA, 2003b) to be used for the fi-
nance of infrastructure and improvements of the (public parts of) area.
Land ownership5.1.9 
All land in Battery Park City is owned by the Battery Park City Authority that 
leases it to the developers. The ground leases are subject to the provisions of 
the Master Lease that consists of the general plan for Battery Park City. Since 
1979 the BPCA is both the fee owner and the ground lessee of Battery Park City. 
Hence, it technically leases the land from itself. According to the leases its fee 
ownership does not merge with its lessee status. This means that the rules of 
the Master Lease still apply. It also means that, technically, it sub-leases the 
land to the developers. When the land is developed, developers commonly 
sell apartments and office spaces to corporations and individuals. All these 
leases end in 2069, when the land reverts to the BPCA with the termination of 
the Master Lease. It is not clear yet whether the lease relationships will then 
be continued or the land will be sold to one or more private parties.
Affordable housing5.1.10 
The 1979 Master development plan does not include provisions for any afford-
able housing. Gateway Plaza, the only building constructed under the 1969 
master plan, includes some affordable housing. But apart from that, afford-
able housing disappeared from the plan. The City promised to use any excess 
payments for the construction of affordable housing but this was only a gen-
tleman’s agreement, it was never written down in a legally binding form.
The money that was reserved for this purpose has so far only been used 
for one project in the borough of the Bronx (BPCA, 2005). There were plans to 
use the money for the proposed football stadium for the New York Jets until 
that project was abandoned (see Section 6.1.4).
In a case interview the representatives of the BPCA (BPC 110-4-A1 and A2) 
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referred to the City’s 80-20 programme (embodying tax incentives if 20% of 
the housing you construct is for moderate incomes); for a description of this 
and other programmes (see Section 6.1.10). In practice, however, developers 
never use the 80-20 programme in Battery Park City, because they make more 
profit when they don’t use it than when they do.
Environmental sustainability5.1.11 
Since 2000, the BPCA has made environmental sustainability one of its main 
goals. It published residential environmental guidelines in 2000 and commer-
cial/institutional environmental guidelines in 2002. These guidelines are im-
plemented in the leases (see Section 5.2). In 2002 the first green building, the 
Solaire, opened (BPCA, 2004). A green building is designed to reduce energy and 
water consumption, enhance indoor air quality, utilise recycled materials in its 
construction and recycle construction waste, and monitor and maintain the 
efficiency of its systems through a process called commissioning (BPCA, 2004). 
In addition, developers are required to design all buildings in Battery Park City 
to an LEED rating of Silver or better (see Section 6.1.11 for an explanation of 
the U.S. Green Building Council’s LEED system). It should be noted that the 
design and environmental guidelines would override the zoning if they were 
state rules, but in this case their enforceability is based on the fact that the 
BPCA – a State authority – owns the land and the guidelines in question be-
come part of the lease. This makes them vulnerable: in the case of the Gold-
man Sachs lease, Goldman Sachs managed (thanks to City and State support) 
to negotiate themselves out of most of the provisions of the Environmental 
Guidelines (Goldman Sachs lease and case interview BPCA, BPC 02-07-A1).
Other public facilities5.1.12 
Three public schools are based in Battery Park City. But except for the parks 
and a cinema there are no other public facilities for the residents. The area is 
part of the business district of lower Manhattan and its facilities (shops and 
restaurants) mostly serve the employees of the offices based in the World Fi-
nancial Center and nearby office buildings. Battery Park City is an integrated 
part of the island of Manhattan and its lack of facilities probably contributes 
to its relatively quiet character.
Involvement of the general public5.1.13 
The general public has mostly been kept out of the development of Battery 
Park City. The BPCA is a State owned special purpose company and is not 
obliged to organise public hearings on its policies or to involve the general 
public in any other way (Fainstein, 2001; Gordon, 1997b).
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Goals of the project5.1.14 
The 1979 master plan names eight principles development should comply 
with:
Battery Park City should not be a self-contained new-town-in-town but a 1. 
part of Lower Manhattan.
The layout and orientation of Battery Park City should be an extension of 2. 
Lower Manhattan’s grid system of streets and blocks.
Battery Park City should offer an active and varied set of waterfront ame-3. 
nities.
The design of Battery Park City should take a recognisable, and under-4. 
standable form.
Circulation at Battery Park City should emphasize the ground level.5. 
Battery Park City should reproduce and improve upon what is best about 6. 
New York’s neighbourhoods.
Battery Park City’s commercial centre is the central focus of the project.7. 
Land use and development controls should be sufficiently flexible to allow 8. 
adjustment to future market requirements.
These principles provide the goals of the project. In addition, the project aims 
to make a profit for the city through its lack of affordable housing and its fo-
cus on commercial development. Finally, environmental sustainability is a 
main goal of the project (Section 5.1.11).
Delays5.1.15 
Battery Park City has experienced several severe delays in its development. 
They were due to political struggles, economic downturns and the 9/11 at-
tacks. Political struggles meant that it took seven years to adopt the first mas-
ter plan (1962-1969). Gordon (1997a) points out that the Mayor of New York at 
the time, John Lindsay, had a clear view on the desirable development of the 
site but so did the state Governor (Nelson Rockefeller) the New York City De-
partment of Marine and Aviation (DMA), the Downtown Lower Manhattan As-
sociation (DLMA, led by famous banker David Rockefeller, the state Governor’s 
brother) and the New York City Planning Commission (CPC). After the adop-
tion of the master plan, nothing was built for over ten years. And when New 
York experienced an economic downturn in the early 1990s new delays oc-
curred. Finally, the 9/11 attacks caused further delays since nearby buildings 
(including Gateway Plaza and the Winter Garden of the World Financial Cen-
ter) were damaged and had to be repaired. As a result of the attacks, almost 
50% of the residents left Battery Park City for environmental or other reasons 
(case interview BPCA, BPC 11-04-A2).
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Role of private actors in the project5.1.16 
Private actors play a key role in the development of Battery Park City. The au-
thority refers to the project as a prime example of public private partnership. 
The willingness of private parties to enter into a lease contract with the BPCA 
has been the crucial factor for success of the project.
In 1979, the Canadian firm Olympia & York was willing to develop the 
World Financial Center; this is regarded as the moment when the project took 
off. The 1979 master plan also incorporated the views of Olympia & York (case 
interview, BPC 11-04-A5).
The price that private actors are willing to pay for land very much deter-
mines whether a project is profitable or not. Battery Park City is financed by 
bonds and thereby also depends on its revenue from leases and payments in 
lieu of taxes (see Section 5.1.8) for the construction and maintenance of its 
public facilities. It can only pay off its bonds as long as private parties are 
willing to invest in the project.
Public actors5.1.17 
The following public parties participated:
The Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) – formerly the New  ■
York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC), was installed to foster 
economic development and support starting companies throughout the 
state of New York.
The Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) – the State agency that manages the  ■
site.
The Department of City Planning – responsible for the city’s physical and  ■
socioeconomic planning, including land use and environmental review; 
preparation of plans and policies; and provision of technical assistance 
and planning information to government agencies, public officials, and 
community boards.
The City Planning Commission (CPC) – reviews proposals for zoning map  ■
and text amendments; special permits under the Zoning Resolution; 
changes in the City Map; the acquisition and disposition of city-owned 
property; the acquisition of office space for city use; site selection for pub-
lic facilities; urban renewal plans and amendments; landmark and historic 
district designations.
Critique5.1.18 
When this project was initiated there was, with the exception of some art-
ists, no strong public protest against it. The main reason for this was probably 
that the project was created on landfill and did not involve the demolition of 
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a pre-existing neighbourhood. Later, authors have criticised the project for its 
exclusiveness. Fainstein (2001: 204) argued that the influence of private par-
ties on the project has been out of proportion; the interests of the well-to-do 
and the developers were far better protected than those of the lower classes: 
“To ensure the safe pursuit of profit within the reconstructed city, designers 
essentially set projects off from their surroundings so as to create defensible 
space (…). A number of measures ensure that only certain people can gain 
access to the new constructions that define the urban landscape: isolation of 
projects behind highways, raised plazas, or actual walls; direct connections 
to parking garages and transit, obviating the need to use city streets; segrega-
tion of uses; extensive deployment of security measures; private ownership 
of outdoor parks and indoor courtyards, allowing the banning of unsavoury 
individuals and political speech; high prices for renting active quarters and 
for buying goods sold within the new stores; and stylistic markers that make 
lower-class people feel out of place.”
Another point of criticism is that Battery Park City does not have an iden-
tity of its own. It is a new neighbourhood that does not in any way create a 
new city or contribute to the identity of the metropolis, it refers to nostalgic 
ideas of an old New York that may never have existed, a sort of replica of New 
York taken from a Disney movie (Fainstein, 2001). Battery Park City is an ex-
clusive, perfectly clean, nostalgic neighbourhood that successfully keeps the 
less well-to-do out.
But as Fainstein, Gordon (1997b) and Garvin (2002) comment, the beautiful 
esplanades of Battery Park City are open to everyone, the city makes a profit 
out of the site and intends to use it to provide for subsidised housing. Another 
argument to defend the way in which Battery Park City was developed is that 
it did not involve the destruction of an existing, working-class neighbour-
hood: there was nothing on the landfill; its only amenity was that it was near 
some of the most expensive neighbourhoods of New York. The wish to profit 
from this amenity and to use the money earned to contribute to the welfare 
of the rest of the city does not seem improper.
Conflicts of power: State and City interests5.1.19 
The conflicts that arose with regard to Battery Park City were largely due to 
conflicts of authority between the City and the State.
Another source of conflict is that the BPCA itself sometimes has to set 
aside its own goals because of pressure from the City and the State. It is then 
that it most notably notices that it is not only a private landowner but al-
so a public benefit corporation that has to defer to the wishes of the State. 
The Goldman Sachs lease offers a good example of this tension. The states 
of New York and New Jersey compete to attract businesses. The State and the 
City of New York were afraid that they would lose Goldman Sachs to New Jer-
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sey. Goldman Sachs had in fact threatened to leave Manhattan for New Jersey, 
and had already built an office there. City and State then put great pressure 
on the BPCA to accept Goldman Sachs’ proposal for its new head office (case 
interview BPC 02-07-A1).
Focal projects: plots 16/17 (the River 5.2 
House) and plot 18b (the Verdesian) in 
the North Residential Neighborhood
Introduction5.2.1 
Two projects situated on plots 18b/19b and 16/17 of the North Residential 
Neighborhood were studied in depth. Both projects are best described as res-
idential towers that are mixed-use buildings in the sense that they include 
other facilities. Construction of ‘the Verdesian’ on Plot 18b was completed in 
2006, and that of ‘the River House’ on plot 16/17 in 2008.
Both properties aim to attract buyers from the top end of the housing mar-
ket. They were built in accordance with the environmental guidelines, and 
were advertised as ‘green buildings’. Interviews were held in 2004, 2005 and 
2007 with representatives of the BPCA, the CPC and the developers of plot 
16/17 (the Albanese Corporation) and the plot 18b/19b (the Sheldrake Organi-
zation) as well as with lawyers involved in the project and academics.
Positioning (area)5.2.2 
Both projects are situated in the North Residential Neighborhood (see Figure 
5.1). This neighbourhood will ultimately contain approximately 4,000 apart-
ments. It is situated on the north side of Battery Park City, near the neigh-
bourhood known as Tribeca. The plots are situated near three parks (Rocke-
feller Park, Teardrop Park and the park housing the Irish Hunger Memorial) 
and near the Solaire, the first residential building developed under the Green 
Guidelines.
Description of the project5.2.3 
Plot 16/17 consists of 44,790 sq. ft. (4,161 sq. m) of land with a maximum floor 
area of 537,400 ft (50,000 sq. m) if developed as-of right (FIS of 12). Plot 18b/19b 
allows for a maximum development of 260,000 sq. ft. (24,000 sq. m).
It was stipulated that the plot 16/17 site had to be developed as a residen-
tial building containing apartments with a building-wide average floor area of 
at least 1,000 sq. ft. (93 sq. m). These apartments could be developed either as 
condominiums or as cooperative apartments.
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The building provides 26,000 sq. ft. (2,400 sq. m), predominantly on the 
ground floor, for non-profit uses, as determined by the BPCA. The design, con-
struction and maintenance of this space will not be the responsibility of the 
developer. The space will be leased without charge to the BPCA that will sub-
lease it to non-profit users.
A courtyard is accessible to the public and the seating and tables for it had 
to be provided by the developer. The BPCA will maintain the courtyard.
The developer must provide a minimum of 1,400 sq. ft. (130 sq. m) of space 
for retail establishments that will enhance the use of the courtyard. The de-
veloper will lease the cafe space to a tenant approved by the authority, but on 
terms set by the developer.
The building must contain 100 sq. ft. (9 sq. m) on the ground floor for use 
by the authority to store supplies and equipment for use by the Battery Park 
City Parks Conservancy.
The developer may provide below-grade parking but such parking may be 
provided under the courtyard only if all exhaust is through the roof of the 
tower and 36 inches (91 cm) is available for soil over the roof of the garage.
The developer had to provide sidewalks, street trees, street lighting and 
landscaped areas associated with the development free of charge. He was re-
quired to coordinate the construction of these elements with the Authority 
and with other parties developing neighbouring sites.
The lease spells out (in Section 26.01c) which civic facilities have to be con-
structed by the BPCA and which by the developer.
For both projects, the BPCA as the landlord has to construct and main-
tain the facilities defined as Landlord’s Civic Facilities (in Section 26.01c of 
the lease). In the list of civic facilities given below, items v-ix and xvii are the 
responsibility of the tenant (tenant’s civic facilities) while the others are the 
landlord’s responsibility. Some of the civic facilities, such as xi (landscaped 
park), have to be constructed and maintained regardless of whether the proj-
ect is actually realised. These civic facilities are:
 (i) electrical, gas and telephone mains;
 (ii) water mains;
 (iii) sanitary and storm sewers;
 (iv) fire hydrants and emergency response service (“ERS” ) conduits and 
boxes;
 (v) street lighting (conduit, cable, poles, fixtures and connections);
 (vi) streets;
 (vii) curbs;
 (viii) temporary concrete sidewalks;
 (ix) permanent sidewalks, including planting strip, cobble strip and paving;
 (x) landscaped esplanade including appurtenances located within the pier-
head line of the Project Area (“North Neighborhood Esplanade”);
 (xi) landscaped park (“Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller Park”);
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 (xii) Vesey Street turnaround area (“Vesey Street Area”);
 (xiii) landscaped triangle on Murray Street (“Murray Street Triangle”);
 (xiv) landscaped median strip on North End Avenue (“Median Parks”);
 (xv) a landscaped public open space between sites 19A, 19B, 18A and 18B as 
described in the Design Guidelines (the “Open Space”);
 (xvi) the Irish Hunger Memorial, located at the western end of Vesey Street;
 (xvii) street trees.
Areas (xi)-(xvi) are named the North Neighborhood Residential Parks.
Momentum5.2.4 
Both leases were closed at a time when Battery Park City had recovered from 
the 9/11 attacks. Property prices were high, although not as high as they 
would be in 2007. Just before that time, the BPCA had agreed to re-negotiate 
leases for plots in the South Residential Neighbourhood that it had closed 
prior to the attacks, on better terms (case interview BPCA, BPC 02-07-A1). But 
in 2004 the prices were up again and the housing market was doing very well.
Pre-contractual procedure5.2.5 
The BPCA uses request for proposals (RFPs) to attract bidders. In the RFPs, the 
projects are described in considerable detail. A bidding procedure follows, in 
which not only the price but also other aspects – such as trustworthiness of 
parties, quality of design – matter. The BPCA invites candidates to a meeting 
and finally picks one. The procedure takes about three months (case interview 
BPCA, BPC 11-04-A2).
The BPCA asks for a deposit of the ground rent when a proposal is submit-
ted, to make sure that candidates are serious bidders. It also asks for a ‘pre-
design’ (an architectural outline) of the project.
The lease is a more or less standard document. Negotiations nonetheless 
usually take about three months. According to the case interviews with repre-
sentatives of the BPCA, this was also the case for site 18b. The negotiations for 
site 16/17 were a little more complicated: the developer wanted to amend the 
lease to make sure that it would not experience any trouble because of the 
work and temporary parking in the adjacent plots (case interview Sheldrake, 
BPC 11-05-A3).
The period from the submission of proposal to the acceptance is divided 
into three phases:
Submission of Proposal1.  – Initial deposit, waiver of any claim for any costs 
incurred or for any matters arising thereunder or in connection with the 
negotiation or execution of a Ground Lease. Undertaking to hold harmless 
and indemnify the BPCA from and against any and all expenses, damages 
or liability.
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Designation period 2. – BPCA may use the Request for proposals as a basis for 
further negotiations with more than one actor. The authority will desig-
nate the selected candidate no later than 60 days after submission of final 
proposals and any additional information requested.
Pending designation 3. – When the developer is notified that his proposal is 
chosen, but before official action by the members of the BPCA, he must ex-
ecute and deliver a designation letter. This letter spells out the rights and 
obligations of both the developer and the authority between the time of 
selection and the commencement date of the ground lease. The letter also 
specifies that the developer will execute a ground lease within 60 days of 
its delivery.
Time frame5.2.6 
The lease for plot 16/17 was closed on March 31, 2005, became effective on 
December 29, 2005 and will expire on June 17, 2069. It took about three years 
to develop the project after the lease had been signed. The lease for plot 18b 
was closed on August 19, 2004 and will expire on June 17, 2069. It took about 
two years to develop the project after the lease had been signed.
The contracting parties5.2.7 
Plot 18b is developed by the Albanese Organization, a privately held real es-
tate firm that develops commercial and residential buildings. The company 
owns about six residential buildings and thirteen buildings with a commer-
cial, institutional or not-for-profit use. In Battery Park City it has also devel-
oped the Solaire (see Section 5.1.11). The project is financed by Northwest Mu-
tual Life Insurance that is a subsidiary of Northwestern Mutual, an insurance 
company specialised in long-term investments and insurance.
The lease describes the contracting parties more precisely:
Plot 18b The contracting parties are the Battery park City Authority doing  ■
business as the Hugh L. Carey Battery Park City Authority and North End 
Associates, LLC. The latter is a company owned by the Albanese Organiza-
tion. Section 17.04 of the lease state that: “the sole Persons owning direct 
or indirect interests in Tenant are Albanese North End, LLC, a New York 
limited liability company and The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, a Wisconsin corporation, and that the members of Albanese 
North End, LLC, are Vincent M. Albanese, Anthony A. Albanese, Russell C. 
Albanese and Christopher V. Albanese.”
Plot 16/17 is developed by Site 16/17 Development LLC, a subsidiary of the  ■
Sheldrake Organization, a company specialised in (re-)development of ur-
ban property. It owns, manages, develops and leases residential proper-
ties throughout the state of New York. The company claims that the River 
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House building shows its commitment to sustainability, calling it ‘luxury 
green’. Sheldrake also claims to be committed to affordable housing but 
that commitment does not apply to its projects in Battery Park City.
The joint venture includes the Plaza Construction Corporation, a company 
specialised in construction management with a staff of about 450 people and 
an annual turnover of $ 1.4 billion. Its portfolio includes buildings throughout 
the United States.
The lease spells out more precisely how the tenants are composed (Sec-
tion 17.04): “Tenant represents that, as of the date hereof: (a) the composition 
of Tenant is as follows: (i) Sheldrake Organization, Inc. (67.5%), whose sole 
stockholder is J. Christopher Daly; (ii) Plaza Construction Corporation (22.5%), 
whose sole stockholders are Steven Fisher (25.83%), Ken Fisher (25.83%), RW 
Plaza LLC (15%) (whose sole member is Rudy Washington), Arnold Fisher 
(11.12%), Richard Fisher (11.11%) and the Estate of M. Anthony Fisher (11.11%); 
and (iii) RW Consultants Inc., (10%) whose sole stockholder is Rudy Washing-
ton.”
Other shareholders and stakeholders5.2.8a 
There were, as far as we could determine, no other shareholders and stake-
holders in the project than the parties mentioned in the contract.
Involvement of the public5.2.8b 
The general public was not involved in any part of the process (see Section 
5.1.13).
Payments5.2.9 
The developer is required to make the following payments:
Base rent: the Authority receives a base rent payment for each year of the  ■
Lease Term. The base rent is more or less the selling price of the land.
The core financial obligation of Site 16/17 Development LLC is to make an  ■
upfront lease payment of $ 60 million on the commencement date (3.01).
In addition it agreed to pay a base rent for the building (3.02) and 3% of  ■
the Gross Sale Price for every residential unit it sold, unless the price was 
more than $ 875 per sq. ft. In that case it has to pay 20% over the amount 
by which the amount of $ 850 (sic) is exceeded. To be more precise, it then 
pays twenty percent (20%) of an amount equal to the product of: (x) the 
amount by which the Average Per Square Foot Gross Sales Price exceeds 
eight hundred fifty dollars ($ 850) per square foot; and (y) the aggregate 
square footage of all of the residential Units.
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It will have to pay the base rent (3.01) and other amounts mentioned in ar- ■
ticle 3 of the lease (a percentage rent of 10% over the gross non-residential 
revenue), and 100% of the net non-residential revenues (art. 3.07a).
In addition the developers have to make all kinds of payments in lieu of taxes 
(see Section 6.1.8):
Transaction payments for condominium and corporative unit sales: the de- ■
veloper is required to make a transaction payment of at least one percent 
of the purchase price of the units.
Payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT): since the BPCA holds title to Battery Park  ■
City, the site is exempt from real estate taxes. The developer is required to 
make annual PILOT payments that are no less than the taxes that would 
otherwise be payable.
Payments in lieu of sales taxes (PILOST). ■
Civic facilities payments: an annual payment as determined by the BPCA  ■
is required as its allocable share of the cost of maintaining portions of Bat-
tery Park City’s infrastructure.
Percentage rent: the developer must pay percentage rent with respect to  ■
any non-residential uses located on the site, equal to the greater of ten 
percent of revenue received by Developer from such uses.
Which conflicts rose with respect to the project?5.2.10a 
There were no conflicts reported with regard to the project, only a long-last-
ing discussion on an amendment of the lease of plot 16/17. Sheldrake wanted 
the BPCA to guarantee that work would not be hindered by parking on the 
surrounding lots (case interview Sheldrake, BPC 11-05-A3).
How do parties deal with future conflicts?5.2.10b 
Both leases provide an arbitration procedure to deal with future conflicts dur-
ing development. A general article states that a party may appoint a ‘disinter-
ested party’ as an arbitrator to deal with cases in which the lease expressly 
requires arbitration. Article 11 of the leases (see below) deals in both cases 
with the construction of the building and prescribes arbitration by a profes-
sional with at least ten years experience.
More specifically; Section 35 on Arbitration states that: “in such cases 
where this Lease expressly provides for the settlement of a dispute or a ques-
tion by arbitration, and only in such cases, the party desiring arbitration shall 
appoint a disinterested party and give notice thereof to the other party (...) 
who shall within fifteen (15) days thereafter, appoint a second disinterested 
person (...). The two (2) arbitrators thus appointed shall together appoint a 
third disinterested person within fifteen (15) days (...) and said three (3) arbi-
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trators shall as promptly as possible settle the matter (...) and the decision of 
the majority of them shall be conclusive and binding (...).
If the arbitration takes place according to Article 11 (that deals with the 
construction of the building, MvdV), or concerns any Capital Improvement or 
Restoration then each of the arbitrators shall be a licensed professional en-
gineer or registered architect having at least ten (10) years experience in the 
design of residential buildings (...).
Any first Mortgagee shall have the right to participate in any arbitration 
hereunder, provided that such Mortgagee’s participation shall be with an on 
the side of Tenant, and not of a third party.”
Affordable housing5.2.11 
There is no affordable housing in the projects (see Section 5.1.10).
Environmental sustainability5.2.12 
Environmental sustainability is one of the key goals of the project (see Sec-
tion 5.1.11). It is mentioned in the leases, and interviewees stated that it was 
a reason to accept (slightly) lower bids when the party showed commitment 
to the environmental goals (case interview BPCA, BPC 2-07-A1).
Section 11.14 (environmental guidelines) of both leases states that: “Tenant 
acknowledges that the incorporation of environmentally responsible build-
ing methods and systems into the Building pursuant to the Environmental 
Guidelines are important goals of Landlord, and are thus material obligations 
of Tenant under this lease (...).”
Other public facilities5.2.13 
We already saw that the projects do provide for some public facilities.
Plot 16/17 includes a publicly accessible courtyard and 1,400 sq. ft. (130 sq. 
m) of space for retail establishment that will enhance the use of the court-
yard. In addition there will be a cafe space.
Goals of the project5.2.14 
The leases spell out some specific goals of the project, in addition to the reali-
sation of the residential units.
They mention the environmental guidelines and the goals of non-discrim-
ination (the BPCA has adopted an affirmative action and a fair marketing 
programme). The environmental goals were often mentioned in the case in-
terviews whereas the non-discrimination programmes were accepted as stan-
dard terms and were only referred to in response to specific questions. The 
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non-discrimination programmes include affirmative action and affirmative 
fair marketing.
Delays5.2.15 
Both projects were finished within the time frame. No delays were reported.
Common contract norms5.3 
After the above general description of Battery Park City and the focal proj-
ects we have studied there, it is time to examine how this case fits in with 
relational contract theory as described in Chapter 3 and in particular to ask 
in terms of the second of the research questions posed in Section 1.3: What 
is the significance of the ten common contract norms (see Section 3.4) in the 
context of the development agreements in this case study?
Introduction: general sketch of the agreements5.3.1 
The core documents in the relationship between the BPCA and the developers 
are the ground leases. The leases lay down the guidelines to be followed in 
case of conflict. They are only subject to the master lease, since the leases are 
technically sub-leases (see Section 5.1.9).
The development agreements in Battery Park City have both discrete and 
relational elements. The discrete elements are first and foremost found in the 
sections of the lease that deal with the financial terms; the other parts of the 
agreements leave more room for flexibility. When a developer has won the 
bidding procedure, this means that his proposal meets the demands of the 
BPCA, of which – outside the price – the design guidelines and the environ-
mental guidelines are the most noteworthy requirements (see Section 5.1.11). 
When the leases are closed, the development agreements provide some room 
for relational values such as flexibility, learning and cooperation.
This leaves us with an agreement that starts off with many discrete ele-
ments but turns out to have relational aspects as well. The leases are mostly 
standardised, they all have the same structure: sometimes articles are left out 
but the numbering stays the same.
First of all, I will give an overview of the make-up of the common contract 
norms of this case on a discrete-relational scale. Inspection of Table 5.1 shows 
that in this case, the common contract norms all lean over to the discrete side.
Role integrity: equally discrete and relational5.3.2 
The role integrity norm has both relational and discrete elements. The dis-
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crete elements are found mostly in the landowner-tenant relation between 
the BPCA and the lessee. However, the parts of the lease that deal with devel-
opment have more relational aspects. Here the BPCA and the developer have 
a more intertwined relation although the responsibilities for the various tasks 
remain strictly separated; there are no shared projects.
Landowner and planning authority
The BPCA combines the roles of landowner and planning authority. As a land-
owner it wants to make a profit to pay off its bonds, while as a planning au-
thority it wants to realise goals that are not only financial but also aimed at 
the realisation of a high-quality neighbourhood. The tension between the two 
roles does not result in many conflicts because the BPCA is a public benefit 
corporation and is as such not responsible for the public law regulations (such 
as zoning) that apply to the site. In cases where public law regulations conflict 
with the interests of the developer, the BPCA can choose the side of the latter. 
The role of the BPCA is probably best understood as a special kind of land-
owner that implements its vision in the leases.
The BPCA discussed the fact that it had accepted a bid that reserved more 
money for implementation of the environmental guidelines instead of taking 
the highest bid, thus experiencing the tension between its roles as landowner 
(wanting to make a high profit) and planning authority (trying to implement a 
wider range of interests); see case interview BPC 02-07-A1. It concluded that it 
had a perfect right to weigh up these various interests.
Landowner and lessee
The BPCA is both the landowner and the lessee of the plots. This seems com-
plex but it basically simply means that the duties of the BPCA mentioned in 
the master lease did not vanish when it became the owner of the project area 
(in 1979) instead of leasing the land from the City. We saw that technically, 
you could hold that the BPCA does not lease but sublease the land to its ten-
ants since it leases the land from itself. This fact has no bearing on our con-
siderations here in practice.
[ 135 ]
Discrete/relational matrix for common contract norms in Battery Park CityTable 5.1 
Norm
More discrete 
than relational
Equally discrete 
and relational
More relational 
than discrete
Role integrity ✕
Mutuality ✕
Implementation of planning ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
Flexibility ✕
Contractual solidarity ✕
Linking norms ✕
Creation and restraint of power ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Harmonisation with the social matrix ✕
Mutuality and reciprocity: 5.3.3 
more discrete than relational
The mutuality norm has more discrete than relational elements in the pres-
ent case. In the last resort, the developer receives the right to construct a prof-
itable building in line with the guidelines in exchange for a certain price. He 
is not required to enter into any intertwined relationships.
The quid pro quo of the leases in Battery Park City is first and foremost 
found in the fact that the tenant pays the base rent for the plot to the land-
lord, who in return allows him to develop it. The tenant not only agrees to pay 
money but is also bound to the design guidelines and environmental guide-
lines. In some leases (in particular that for plot 16/17), the tenant agrees to 
reserve a part of its building for rent-free use by the landlord. Because of the 
many rules imposed on tenants (compared to other projects in New York), the 
BPCA in most cases agrees to be reasonable when confronted with a request 
to change something in the plans (case interview BPC 11-04-A1 and A2).
The leases determine that all development rights that are not used in the 
initial building are retained by landlord; this is a standard formulation that 
does not have much practical meaning but nonetheless tells us that the quid 
pro quo for the developer is confined to what he actually realises and does not 
include the prospect of any new developments in the future.
The core obligations of the developers can be divided into an obligation to 
construct the building and an obligation to pay for the lease (see Section 5.2.9).
For plot 16/17 this means that that the tenant agrees to construct the 
building and, in addition to the profitable housing units, provide the non-
profit space and the civic facilities. The other leases include comparable obli-
gations (see Section 5.2.3).
Other obligations are that the tenant will supply the landlord with all in-
formation regarding the innovative building techniques used for educational 
and promotional activities and will cooperate or participate in demonstra-
tions and other activities relating to the Green Building Systems.
The core obligation of the BPCA is found in article 34 (quiet enjoyment) 
that states that “Landlord only covenants that Tenant shall and may (subject, 
however, only to the exceptions, reservations, terms and conditions of this 
Lease) peaceably and quietly have, hold from Landlord or any Person claiming 
through Landlord and free of any encumbrance created or suffered by Land-
lord, except only those encumbrances, liens or defects of title, created or suf-
fered by Tenant and the Title Matters.”
In Section 17.03 (delivery of the premises) the contract states that “Land-
lord shall deliver possession of the Land on the Commencement Date vacant 
and free of occupants and tenancies, subject only to the Title Matters.”
Finally, the BPCA (landlord) has to construct and maintain the civic facili-
ties that are defined as Landlord’s Civic Facilities (see Section 5.2.3).
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Implementation of planning: 5.3.4 
equally discrete and relational
The development agreement has discrete elements in the sense that it in-
cludes a detailed planning. It also includes relational elements: the parties 
intend to work together to realise all aspects of the plans, and the leases pro-
vide a framework for this cooperation.
The lease implements a fairly detailed planning in phases, and sets a dead-
line for the projects. There are four phases: pre-schematics, schematics, de-
sign and construction. For all phases, the tenant has to provide plans within a 
fixed time frame that needs approval from the landlord.
The lease defines when a phase ends and when it begins. It binds both the 
landlord and the tenant to fixed periods for submission of plans and review 
(15 days as a general rule). The lease also specifies when the building must 
be completed. The building on plot 16/17, for example, had to be finished 522 
days after the construction commencement date, which is no later than 40 
business days after the approval of the construction documents.
It should be noted however that the ultimate date for completion men-
tioned in the lease is determined with reference to the tenant’s estimates of 
the time required for the work plus safety margins. If the developer thinks 
that the building can be constructed in 400 days for example, he will probably 
only be willing to bind himself to a period of, say, 700 days thus allowing him 
a wide margin of error to deal with unexpected delays without incurring a 
penalty (case interview BPCA, BPC 02-07-A1).
The period between the initial design and the construction of the buildings 
is divided into four phases:
The pre-schematics consist of preliminary scale drawings of the project, 1. 
which must be included with the proposal (as part of the requirements for 
participation in the bidding procedure).
The schematics have to be prepared by the approved architect and are sub-2. 
mitted 84 days after the pre-schematics.
The design development plans have to be submitted 112 days after the 3. 
schematics, together with an outline of the buildings.
The construction documents finally consist of the (approved) final contract 4. 
plans and specifications of the building and have to be submitted 182 days 
after the design development plans.
The BPCA has to approve all these documents within 15 days of their submis-
sion.
The significance of these dates and terms should not be overestimated. 
They are mostly meant to provide a framework for division of the work, and 
not to put pressure on the developer. It is rather the other way around: the 
developer has the right to fast track the procedures (see also Section 5.3.7), 
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and the BPCA is required to provide the necessary support to make this pos-
sible. The leases leave room for consultation and reaching further agreements 
on most specific elements of the plan after the lease has been signed. For ex-
ample, the concrete plan for affirmative action and fair marketing is drawn 
up and the definitive layout and design of the building are determined after 
the lease has been signed.
An exception was the Goldman Sachs lease, where preliminary design de-
velopment plans and outline specifications had already been submitted by 
the time the lease was signed. Here the main developer (Goldman Sachs) ob-
viously had more power than the two developers of the focus projects. Its de-
signs were included in the negotiations. The City and the State both put pres-
sure on the BPCA to accept a proposal that it did not agree with in all respects 
(Case interview BPC 02-07-A1). Goldman Sachs was given six years after the 
closure of the lease to construct the building and 300 days to prepare the fi-
nal contracts plans and specifications. These long periods show that Goldman 
Sachs was not willing to allow the BPCA to speed up the process beyond the 
rather leisurely tempo Goldman Sachs wanted. Here the phasing of the plans 
was used to limit consultation with the BPCA to a minimum.
The part of the lease that deals with the financial obligations of the ten-
ant is more discrete. It consists of a complete planning for the payments to 
be made by the tenant up to 2069. The only eventuality for which it does not 
plan is what is going to happen when the leases expire. The leases all termi-
nate at the same moment, because the original plan was to find one company 
that wanted to buy the whole project. Since the BPCA is no longer sure what 
will happen after 2069, no concrete plans have been drawn up for this period 
as yet. This insecurity does not affect the prices of the condominiums, or of 
the buildings (case interview BPC 11-04-A3). All parties are confident that the 
BPCA and/or the State will work something out that will not affect their own-
ership and financial interests.
Effectuation of consent: 5.3.5 
more discrete than relational
The consent norm is very precise. Parties know what they consent to when 
they sign the lease. Although not all details of the project are clear, the core 
(the price, the size and the rough design) is. By signing the lease, the parties 
give their consent for the BPCA to sell the lease rights to the developer until 
2069 for a rent mentioned in the lease. Parties also give their consent for the 
developer to realise the project according to the requirements mentioned in 
the lease and the documents the lease refers to. They further consent to work 
together according to the conditions of the lease.
It is clear what the parties consent to when they close the contract, but 
when they sign it, the definitive design of the building has, as a general rule, 
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not been made. It is then not possible to know precisely what the project will 
look like.
Flexibility: equally discrete and relational5.3.6 
At first sight, the leases do not leave much room for flexibility since they pro-
vide a detailed planning of the project. And indeed, many aspects of the proj-
ect, including the pre-design, are already fixed when the lease is signed. But 
a second look shows that the lease leaves considerable room for flexibility in 
the development process. The parties, in other words, are bound to the ‘what’ 
but not so much to the ‘how’ of the project. In this context, the ‘what’ in-
cludes the design guidelines, the environmental guidelines, the requirements 
of the RFP and the submitted proposal while the ‘how’ includes the process of 
the cooperation – the pathway to results.
An example of the (limited) flexibility provided by the lease is the incorpo-
ration of the environmental guidelines in it: these guidelines are material to 
the lease, but the developer can decide during the development process ex-
actly how he will follow them. One obligation that is fixed in this context, for 
example, is however that he has to file monthly reports that need to be certi-
fied by the environmental consultant of the BPCA.
The provisions of the lease on affirmative action and fair marketing use 
the same methodology; the results are fixed but the methods by which they 
are reached are mostly open.
We already saw that the time schedule mentioned in the leases is not very 
tight, and that development can be fast-tracked (see Section 5.3.4) to suit the 
developer/tenant. Another example of (limited) flexibility is the frequent use 
of the word ‘reasonable’ in the leases to make sure that the BPCA will not 
take a rigid, formal approach to its developers.
In interviews, the representatives of the BPCA stated that they tried to be 
flexible within the limits of the lease and the guidelines. They mentioned 
their approach to the size and colour of the bricks used in construction as an 
example of their flexible stance: they usually agreed to the developers’ pro-
posals for use of types of bricks differing from those specified in the design 
guidelines, if a good reason could be given for the change (case interview BPC 
11-04-A2).
In the case interviews, representatives of Albanese and Sheldrake (the de-
velopers) confirmed the flexible attitude of the BPCA (case interview BPC 11-
04-A3 and A4).
One exception to this rule of flexibility is the ‘no discrimination’ sign re-
quired by the fair marketing programme, which the developer is obliged to 
display on his premises. This states that the developer welcomes women and 
members of minorities to buy or rent the apartments. Here both the content 
of the sign and the manner of displaying it are laid down in the lease.
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Contractual solidarity: 5.3.7 
equally discrete and relational
At first sight, the text of the lease does not provide many examples of contrac-
tual solidarity. However, a closer look shows that it does provide a framework 
for a long-term relationship in which parties assist each other in the perfor-
mance of their duties. The exception is the specification of the financial ob-
ligations of the tenants: the lease does not show any willingness on the part 
of the landlord to assist defaulting tenants. This kind of solidarity does exist 
outside the contract, however, and may lead to renegotiation of the terms.
All leases include a ‘no partnership’ article that makes it clear that the 
construction of the building and the financial obligations that stem from it 
can never result in mutual liability for those obligations.
But despite this wording of the leases, the BPCA emphasises the fact that it 
sees itself as a sort of partner of the tenants. It assists in the implementation 
of the environmental guidelines and the design guidelines. Indeed, intervie-
wees representing the developers were positive about the professionalism of 
the BPCA and its willingness to assist. The BPCA also stated that, as a general 
rule, it tried not to be too hard on its tenants. Instead of using the default 
clauses of the lease whenever it could, it preferred to consult with the devel-
opers in search of a solution (case interviews BPC 11-04-A1 and A4).
After the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, the Albanese Organiza-
tion (the developer of plot 18b) found itself unable to finance a previous lease 
that it had already signed. The BPCA then agreed to renegotiate the lease 
and gave the Albanese Organization a discount on the base rent (case inter-
view BPC 02-07-A1). The BPCA even expressed willingness to finance parts of 
the project itself. This later turned out to be unnecessary, since the State of 
New York launched a ‘Liberty Bonds’ programme to help fund the develop-
ment. However, the example clearly shows the interest that the BPCA takes in 
the development. In the last resort, both the BPCA and its tenants are best off 
when the area is flourishing, and the BPCA is willing to take risks to achieve 
this objective in emergency situations.
The Battery Park City leases provide two noteworthy examples of contrac-
tual solidarity. The first is the option of fast-tracking included as a standard 
provision in all leases. If the request is reasonable, the BPCA will try to short-
en the period allowed for review of the plans below the normal fifteen days. 
This option allows the developer/tenant to start the work on the excavations 
and the foundations before all plans have been approved. This fast-tracking 
provision acknowledges the tenant’s interest in finishing the work as soon as 
possible. The willingness of the BPCA to support the tenant in the achieve-
ment of this aim is a good example of contractual solidarity.
The other example is the percentage rate for commercial rental of the 
building and the percentage that the BPCA receives when units are sold.
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The (rental) lease for plot 18b states that the BPCA will receive 3% of the 
rent for the parts of the building that have commercial (non-residential) uses. 
The lease for plot 16/17 states that the BPCA will receive 20% of the proceeds 
when the condominium units are sold above $ 850 per sq. ft. A representa-
tive of the developer I interviewed mentioned this provision as an example of 
how the BPCA became a partner in the project (case interview Sheldrake BPC 
11-05-A3).
The representative of the BPCA, however, stated that these provisions have 
nothing to do with partnership, but simply reflect the fact that the provisions 
in the lease are the outcome of a bidding procedure. As in any such procedure, 
the principal (the BPCA in this case) will accept the offer that is most finan-
cially advantageous to it (case interview BPC 02-07-A1). The BPCA representa-
tive went on to explain that Sheldrake, the developer of plot 16/17, is not the 
same kind of company as the Albanese Organization. The latter, which has 
developed a number of projects in Battery Park City, prefers rentals to condo-
miniums. This reflects its intention to stay in Battery Park City for a long time. 
In contrast, Sheldrake prefers condominiums to rentals: it wants to build 
units, sell them and move on. However, I still hold that these provisions do 
provide an example of contractual solidarity because they give both parties 
a shared interest in the project. They represent a financial incentive for the 
BPCA to assist in the quick realisation of the project and to assist, where pos-
sible, in the sale or rental of the units for the highest possible price.
The linking norms: restitution, 5.3.8 
reliance and expectation interests: 
equally discrete and relational
The parties enter the agreement in the expectation that development will go 
ahead and that they will make a profit out of the agreement. The expectation 
is also that the site is suitable for construction both on a factual and an ad-
ministrative basis.
When the expectations under which the agreement was made are threat-
ened, parties have a reason to renegotiate, as happened in the lease signed 
before the 9/11 attacks (see Section 5.3.7).
Creation and restraint of power: 5.3.9 
equally discrete and relational
The discrete elements of the creation and restraint of power norm are to be 
found in the financial terms and in the duty of the BPCA to provide quiet en-
joyment of the premises in return. The relational elements are found in the 
parts of the agreement related to the ‘how’ of the construction. Here the BPCA 
seeks to assist the developers in the performance of their duties and also 
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gives them a say in how it fulfils its monitoring tasks.
The main transfer of power is that the BPCA has leased its land to the ten-
ant/developers, and is thereby no longer in possession of it. The tenant/de-
velopers can no longer freely dispose of the money they have to pay for the 
land (the base rent). Section 2 (first part) of the leases reads: “Landlord, does 
hereby demise and sublease to Tenant, and Tenant does hereby hire and take 
from Landlord, the Premises, together with all easements, appurtenances and 
other rights and privileges now or hereafter belonging or appertaining to the 
Premises, subject only to the Title Matters.”
These rights are transferred the moment the lease becomes effective. In 
addition, powers that were vested in the BPCA or in the tenant/developers are 
now shared. Most notably: the developer designs the buildings but the BPCA 
has to approve the designs. The developer draws up the environmental pro-
gramme but the BPCA has to approve this too. The developers also draw up 
the fair marketing and affirmative action programmes, but these also have to 
be approved by the BPCA. These shared powers result in a duty to consult and 
cooperate.
When the lease rights are transferred, the BPCA has the right to monitor 
the work of the developer, to inspect the premises and to receive compliance 
reports.
The general provision is the article of the lease dealing with rights of in-
spection, etc., which states that Tenant shall permit Landlord and its agents 
or representatives to enter the Premises at all reasonable times and upon rea-
sonable notice for the purpose of “(…) (b) determining whether or not Tenant 
is in compliance with its obligations (…).”
Section 20.02 states that when the landlord inspects the works of the ten-
ant, he shall use his reasonable efforts to minimise any harm, annoyance etc. 
to the tenant caused by this inspection.
In addition, the developer has to furnish compliance reports with regard to 
goals of non-discrimination (affirmative action and affirmative fair market-
ing). An example is Section D-3, 7 (Monitoring) that deals with the fair mar-
keting programmes. This section reads: “At BPCA’s request and expense, Ten-
ant shall allow BPCA to place a representative at Tenant’s rental or sales office 
to monitor compliance with the Plan, provided that such BPCA representa-
tives shall not interfere with Tenant’s sales and marketing activities. BPCA 
shall determine, in its discretion, when and whether it wishes to commence, 
discontinue or renew monitoring Tenant’s activities under the Plan.”
Propriety of means: more discrete than relational5.3.10 
The lease does not presuppose that all parties are in possession of the means 
to perform their duties. It starts from distrust and asks for assurances and 
warranties.
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Naturally, the BPCA must be in possession of the land to be developed. And 
it must have the expertise and the contractors needed to build the landlord’s 
civic facilities (see Section 5.2.3). The developer/tenant must be in possession 
of the financial resources needed to pay the rent and the means needed to 
construct the building.
The lease tries to ensure that the parties use adequate means to realise 
the project – not so much the financial resources as the right kind of profes-
sionals. The lease requires the developer/tenant to have the contractors, ar-
chitects and most other companies he uses approved by the BPCA. They all 
need to possess the licenses commonly required in New York.
In addition, the requirements on the building materials that the developer/
tenants are allowed to use are quite specific. And although as we have seen 
in Section 5.3.6 the BPCA is prepared to be flexible in applying these require-
ments, it does not allow its developer/tenants to use means it has not ap-
proved.
Harmonisation with the social matrix: 5.3.11 
equally discrete and relational
The supra-contract norms that are most notably present in the leases are 
those requiring each party to take the interests of the counterparty into ac-
count. The BPCA has to understand that its tenant/developers are market 
players who want to make a profit and expect professionalism from the plan-
ning authorities. The market players, on the other hand, have to respect the 
fact that the BPCA is a state-owned special purpose corporation that also 
has to take the interests of the general public into account when it closes its 
agreements. These supra-contract norms are found in the parts of the leases 
where it is stipulated that the developer shall expressly recognise the goals 
of the BPCA. They can also be read in the word ‘reasonable’ that is found 
throughout the lease and that obliges the BPCA to make the interest of its de-
velopers part of its considerations.
Balance of discrete and relational norms in the 5.3.12 
agreements for the Battery Park City projects
The prevalence of discrete and relational elements in the common contract 
norms for these projects has already been surveyed in Table 5.1. We will now 
look at things from a slightly different perspective, by indicating the relative 
importance of the various norms. 
The Battery Park City leases share discrete and relational elements. But on 
a discrete-relational scale they turn out to be more discrete than relational. 
As the above figure shows, all discrete norms turned out to be of enhanced 
importance. This finding is backed up by the fact that in Table 5.1, five of the 
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common contract norms were found to be more discrete than relational in 
the Battery Park City case, while none was more relational than discrete. It 
should be noted that the implementation of planning norm also has rela-
tional elements (this has already been mentioned in a footnote to Table 5.2), 
whereas the role integrity norm also has discrete elements. It follows that, in 
the terminology introduced in Chapter 3, the contracts in this case may be 
called neoclassical (see Section 3.5.2).
The leases, as we saw, combine a relatively short-term agreement on the 
construction of the buildings in question with a long-term agreement on the 
other conditions of the lease.
The relational norms were found to play a particularly important role in 
the parts of the leases relating to development. We find that the agreement 
puts a strong emphasis on propriety of means: the developer should possess 
the means not only to construct the buildings but also to meet the goals of 
the BPCA related to environmental sustainability. It is also the development 
part of the agreement that presupposes that parties will have to meet to dis-
cuss some issues in greater depth. Still, although interviewees emphasised 
their co-operative attitude and their positive approach to the idea of partner-
ship, the development part of the lease takes a more adversarial stance when 
it comes to planning: it reasons from a submit-review model, not from one 
stressing a collaborative attitude between the parties to reach a jointly ac-
ceptable solution. The interviewees from the BPCA emphasised that the co-
operative or adversarial nature of their approach depended strongly on which 
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Importance of discrete and relational norms in Battery Park Table 5.2 
City
1. Discrete norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Discreteness ✕
Presentiation ✕
Implementation of planning* ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
2. Relational norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Role integrity ✕
Preservation of the relation ✕
Resolution of conflict ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Supra-contract norms ✕
* When the norms of discreteness and presentiation are not of enhanced 
importance, it makes more sense to view the implementation of planning 
norm as a relational norm. In other words, the importance of planning in such 
projects then follows from the nature of the observed relation between the 
parties rather than from the wording of the agreements.
developer was involved: they stated that their relationship with Sheldrake 
tended to be adversarial, while that with Albanese was much more co-oper-
ative. The leases, being mostly standard documents, do not reflect this differ-
ence.
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Case Study Hudson Yards, 6 
New York 
No. 7 subway extension
The urban development project: 6.1 
Hudson Yards, New York
Introduction6.1.1 
Between 2002 and 2007, New York, the leading American city in commerce 
and business, experienced a period of economic growth that came with an 
increasing demand for office space and booming prices on both the office and 
the residential markets. In this context, the Hudson Yards project area, also 
known as the West Side development, offers one of the last opportunities for 
a major development project on the island of Manhattan.
The Hudson Yards project is situated in the far West Side of Manhattan. The 
area currently consists primarily of open parking lots, industrial units, small 
commercial and residential buildings, and transportation infrastructure. That 
infrastructure includes the entrance and exit roadways and plazas for the Lin-
coln Tunnel as well as approximately 26 acres of open railyards serving the 
operational needs of the Long Island Railroad and Pennsylvania Station (HYIC, 
2007). The area can be regarded as underdeveloped in the context of the highly 
urbanised island that constitutes Manhattan. Therefore, the Hudson Yards are 
sometimes referred to as the last great frontier in Manhattan (Fox, 2005).
Apart from the work on the infrastructure that forms a key part of this 
project, the redevelopment of Hudson Yards focuses on office and residential 
space but will also create new cultural facilities and parks.
In 2005, the larger part of the project area was rezoned as the special Hud-
son Yards Finance District. This rezoning took place to facilitate the bonds 
programme that the City uses to finance its investments and to provide the 
new conditions for development (see also Section 6.1.8).
The City administration is highly committed to the project as was recently 
confirmed by Mayor Bloomberg when he stated that nobody would be able to 
stop the project when he left office in 2010 (New York Times, 2008b). But after 
a successful start, in October the project suffered from the economic down-
turn in the United States and the higher costs involved in the development of 
the state- and city-owned projects. I selected one of these public projects, the 
No. 7 subway extension, as the focal project in this case; it is discussed in de-
tail in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.
Description of the area6.1.2 
The special zoning district of Hudson Yards comprises the approximately 45 
square block area of Manhattan generally bounded by 7th and 8th Avenues on 
the east, West 42nd and 43rd Street on the north, 11th and 12th Avenues on the 
west and West 29th, 30th and 31st Streets on the south (see Figure 6.1). Land-
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Hudson Yards, with the Hudson River in the back ground 
Source: Regional Plan Association, New York
Source: courtesy of Hudson Yards Development Corporation
Figure 6.1 Hudson Yards, including the No. 7 subway extension
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mark buildings that already exist in the area are Pennsylvania Station – com-
monly known as Penn Station – on 34th Street, the Madison Square Garden 
arena on top of it and the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center on Eleventh Av-
enue. Noteworthy is also Hell’s Kitchen, a district that runs from 31st to 59th 
Street and from 8th Avenue to the Hudson River and that is partly located in 
the project area. Hell’s Kitchen is notorious for its history of ethnic conflicts 
and gangsters. The area has however experienced a rapid gentrification since 
the 1990s.
Another important part of the area is formed by the 26 acre (10.5 ha) John 
D. Caemmerer West Side Storage Yards that are divided in an eastern and 
western portion.
The Eastern Rail Yard (ERY) is an approximately 13 acre (5.3 ha) site located 
between West 30th and West 33rd Streets from 10th to 11th Avenue (see map). 
The Western Rail Yard (WRY) consists of the western portion of the rail yards. 
It is also an approximately 13 acre (5.3 ha) site and is located between West 
30th and West 33rd Streets from 11th to 12th Avenues, and fulfils the same func-
tion as the Eastern Rail Yard. In October 2008 it still awaited rezoning.
Of some importance in this context is Highline Park, the larger part of 
which is located in the adjacent area of South Chelsea but which curves into 
the Eastern Rail Yard. The High Line is an obsolete elevated railway 1.45 miles 
(2.3 km) long between West 34th Street (near the Javits Convention Center) and 
Gansevoort Street in the West Village (see map). Between 1930 and 1980, the 
High Line served the industrial buildings on the west side of Manhattan. It 
will now become a public park, the first part of which was opened in the sum-
mer of 2008.
Description of the project6.1.3 
The Hudson Yards area is intended to become a mixed-use community con-
taining new medium- to large-scale commercial, residential, hotel and retail 
development. The City of New York thus aims to “accommodate the expan-
sion of the Midtown central business district over the long term by provid-
ing space and incentives for commercial, residential, hotel and retail devel-
opment, to expand the amount of public open space and to contribute to the 
cultural and recreational life of the City (HYIC, 2007: 1).”
The project can be divided in five parts:
with the creation of the special zoning district, the City aims to promote 1. 
the construction of new high-rise buildings that could previously not have 
been developed on the site.
In addition there are four public (or public-private) projects:
the development of the John D. Caemmerer West Side Storage Yards (‘the 2. 
railyards’);
the further development of the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center (the 3. 
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‘Javits Convention Center’);
the development of a new stadium and financial district around Penn Sta-4. 
tion; and
the No. 7 subway extension. 5. 
All projects are in different phases of development, and in the current climate 
of higher costs and lower economic growth some projects may not be devel-
oped at all.
The special zoning district
As rezoned, the Hudson Yards zoning district has capacity for approximately 
24 million sq. ft. (2.2 million sq. m) of new office development, 13,500 units of 
housing, of which almost 4,000 will be affordable units, 1 million sq. ft. of re-
tail, and 2 million sq. ft. (204,000 sq. m) of hotel space.
The No. 7 subway extension
The No. 7 subway extension consists of a joint effort of the MTA (Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority) and the City of New York to extend subway line No. 
7 by 1.5 miles (2.4 km). This $ 2.1 billion project is the focal project in this case, 
and is discussed at length in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.
The Javits Convention Center
The plans for the redevelopment and expansion of the Javits Convention Cen-
ter include a 1,500-room headquarter hotel, the largest ballroom of New York 
City (6,000 places) and an extension of meeting and exhibition space from 
790,000 sq. ft. (73,000 sq. m) to 1.3 million sq. ft. (121,000 sq. m). The expansion 
is financed by grants from the City and the State and by the issuing of bonds. 
The bid for the project was won in late 2006 by a consortium consisting of 
the English architect Richard Rogers, together with FXFOWLE architects and 
the design consultant firm A. Epstein International and Sons, Inc. The project 
area is located in the ‘superblock’ bounded by West 34th Street, 11th Avenue, 
West 39th street and 12th Avenue (see Figure 6.1).
The plans for the Javits Convention Center were abandoned at the begin-
ning of 2008 (New York Times, 2008d), though the public authorities remain 
committed to this redevelopment. At the time of writing (October 2008), it is 
impossible to predict whether and in what form the plans will be taken up 
again. Most likely they will be a somewhat watered down version of those in-
dicated above.
Penn Station and Madison Square Garden
Penn Station is situated at 8th Avenue and 31st Street. It is the busiest transport 
hub of New York, serving trains from Washington D.C. and Boston (Amtrak) 
as well as commuter railway services (by LIRR – Long Island Rail Road – and 
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New Jersey Transit) and six subway lines. On top of the station rests Madison 
Square Garden, a 20,000 seat arena hosting various sporting events – includ-
ing the basketball games of the New York Knicks and the ice hockey games of 
the New York Rangers – as well as concerts and many other events.
Cablevision, the fifth largest American cable company that owns the arena, 
had announced plans to replace Madison Square Garden by a new arena on 
the site of the James Farley Post Office, the general New York post office build-
ing situated between 31st and 33rd Streets on 8th Avenue. The building would 
serve as the entrance of the new Penn Station, which would be named the 
Moynihan Station. Plans also existed to move Madison Square Garden one 
block to the west flank of the Farley Building. But in April 2008, Cablevision 
announced that it will instead renovate the existing arena, thus leaving no 
room to create a new financial district around Pennsylvania Station (New York 
Times, 2008a, see also Section 6.1.6).
Plans for Moynihan Station continue, and the proposed relocation of Madi-
son Square Garden has not been completely shelved; however, the (state-
owned) Pennsylvania Station Redevelopment Corporation is experiencing fi-
nancial problems as its mother organisation, the Empire State Development 
Corporation, has been badly affected by the ‘credit crunch’ (New York Times, 
2008c). The costs for the redevelopment of the station are estimated at $ 14 
billion. Thus it is not clear at this time how the project will continue but it 
makes sense to suppose that, now that the plans for a financial district are 
abandoned, it will not be an integral part of the West Side developments.
The railyards
The railyards serve as a storage and maintenance facility for the LIRR oper-
ations at Pennsylvania Station and are owned by the Triborough Bridge and 
Tunnel Authority. Both are affiliates of the MTA. The railyards consist of 36 
tracks.
They will stay where they are, but the future development of the yards will 
require the construction of a platform over the active LIRR operations (MTA, 
2007a). This airspace was procured publicly in July 2007. The railyards were 
divided into two parts that were procured separately; the above-mentioned 
Eastern Rail Yard (ERY) and the Western Rail Yard (WRY).
The platform over the ERY will accommodate approximately 6.6 million 
sq. ft. (613,000 sq. m) of mixed-use development, including office, residential, 
hotel, retail, cultural and parking facilities, and public open space. Approxi-
mately 7 acres (2.8 ha) of public open space will be realised, including a sig-
nificant public plaza. Additionally, it is anticipated that development of the 
Eastern Rail Yard will include a major new cultural facility. The open space 
programme of the Hudson Yards Development Program will connect the open 
space of the Eastern Rail Yards to the proposed Highline Park.
New development of the Western Rail Yard in a manner consistent with the 
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rest of the Hudson Yards area will require zoning changes and associated envi-
ronmental review. In October 2008 the review had not been carried out yet.
In September 2006, the City and the MTA reached an agreement for a co-
ordinated planning and development effort with respect to the Eastern and 
Western Railyards. Pursuant to that agreement, the Hudson Yards Develop-
ment Corporation (HYDC), together with the New York City Department of 
City Planning and in cooperation and consultation with the New York City 
Council and the MTA, prepared a statement of planning as well as design 
guidelines for the Western Rail Yard. The design guidelines foresee develop-
ment of the site as a world class urban environment with a vibrant mix of 
uses that is fully integrated with the surrounding Hudson Yards Area, creat-
ing high quality cohesive open space with a range of uses and activities, and 
a signature addition to New York City’s skyline (MTA, 2007b).
The MTA made clear that with the procurement of the project, it first and 
foremost wanted to maximise value and revenue for its capital financial plan. 
In addition it wanted to assure safe, continuous, uninterrupted LIRR ser-
vice and achieve excellence in architecture, urban design and sustainability 
(2007b: 3).
The request for proposals (RFP) for the site was issued in July 2007. The 
MTA, being the owner of the site, issued the RFP, with the HYDC participat-
ing in the selection process. The RFP states that the development will consist 
of at least 20% of residential development, 20% of commercial development 
and a school. The site allows for a floor area ratio (FAR) of 10, but densities 
can probably be increased since this FAR requirement applies to the site as 
a whole while higher FAR values are possible in the affordable housing pro-
grammes (MTA, 2007b).
At the time of writing (October 2008) the site had not been rezoned but in 
December 2007, five proposals were presented to the public forum that was 
organised by the Hudson Yards Community Advisory Committee. Rezoning of 
the area will take place after acceptance of one of the proposals (MTA, 2007b). 
The MTA will most likely enter into a 99-years lease of its airspace.
In March 2008, a bid for the Eastern and Western Rail Yards was initially 
accepted by the MTA, but the deal collapsed after further negotiations – al-
legedly because of a lack of security for the developer, Tishman Speyer, that 
had not attracted an anchor tenant for the buildings and wanted to start pay-
ments on the 99-years lease only after the WRY was rezoned.
However, a few days later it was announced that another developer, Re-
lated Companies, who had also submitted a proposal was still willing to step 
in despite the fact that its anchor tenant, News Corporation, had dropped out. 
Related Companies, that closed a financial partnership with Goldman Sachs 
bank, will pay $ 1.054 billion, which is more than the MTA had expected (New 
York Times, 2008d). Related Companies will develop both the Eastern and the 
Western part of the Railyards in a manner consistent with the RFP.
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The plan provides for 12 million sq. ft. (1.1 million sq. m) of development 
with the tallest building having a floor space of 1.1 million ft. (102,000 sq. m) 
and 15.1 acres (61,108 sq. m) of open space (see Figure 6.1).
The eastern part of the plan provides for 5 buildings with a total floor area 1. 
of 6.27 million sq. ft. (582,000 sq. m). The most important functions are:
1.67 million sq. ft. (155,000 sq. m) of residential units with 612,000 sq. ft.  ■
(57,000 sq. m) of rental units (830 units, built with the aid of the 80/20 pro-
gramme) and 1.05 million sq. ft. (98,000 sq. m) of condominium residences;
3.57 million sq. ft. (331,000 sq. m) of commercial space; ■
265,000 sq. ft. (24,500 sq. m) of hotel space; ■
200,000 sq. ft. (18,500 sq. m) of community/cultural space. ■
55% of the site will be open public space.
The western part of the plan provides for 8 buildings, 5.75 million sq. ft. 2. 
(530,000 sq. m) of which the most important functions are:
3.363 million sq. ft. (312,000 sq. m) residential (960,000 sq. ft. (89,000 sq. m),  ■
1,324 units, 80/20) and 2.67 million sq. ft. (248,000 sq. m) condominium res-
idences (approx. 1,927 units);
192,000 sq. ft. (17,800 sq. m) of retail space; ■
120,000 sq. ft. (11,000 sq. m) of school. ■
55% of the site will be open public space.
Momentum6.1.4 
Mayor Bloomberg (in office since 2002) helped to build up the momentum 
for this project, as he made the development of the West Side one of the key 
items of his election campaign in 2002. The project is also strongly supported 
by U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer, who had appointed a group of 35 state 
and city leaders who produced a report under the title Preparing for the future: 
a commercial development strategy for New York City (Group of 35, 2001). This re-
port states that New York and especially Manhattan is the nation’s centre of 
commerce and business, with 60% of the dominant office market based in 
Manhattan. But Manhattan has trouble competing with other markets due to 
a lack of available land and inadequate zoning to provide for new office space. 
Hudson Yards would provide a splendid opportunity to develop new office 
space, they claimed.
The Mayor had hoped that New York would win the bid for the 2012 Olym-
pic Games. Part of his plan was the construction of a new stadium for the 
New York Jets on top of the Western Rail Yards (see Section 6.1.6). Although 
the Olympic Games went to London and the plans for the stadium were sub-
sequently abandoned by the State of New York (see Section 6.1.6), they helped 
to create momentum for the Hudson Yards project. In addition, New York’s 
economy recovered remarkably well after the 9/11 attacks, and the City want-
ed to keep New York on the map as a leading financial centre – perhaps the 
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most important one in the world.
By 2007, the project had lost some of its momentum when the economy 
tipped into recession and after the crisis on the housing market and the re-
lated debt crisis, private parties were less willing to take risks. In addition, the 
new state Governor Eliot Spitzer (2007-2008) showed less commitment to the 
project than his predecessor George Pataki (New York Times, 2008b; 2008c).
As a result, the ambitious but costly plans for Penn Station and the Javits 
Convention Center collapsed. The railyards project continued, however, and 
the Mayor has at various moments confirmed his strong commitment to the 
development of the West Side (New York Times, 2008b).
Time frame6.1.5 
The project started with the rezoning of the Hudson Yards area in 2005 and 
is expected to be completed in 2035. It will thus take about thirty years to de-
velop all parts of this area.
Insofar as City and State agencies are involved in the construction of the 
public infrastructure, the project is divided in two phases. These phases are 
expected to end in 2019.
During the first phase, the No. 7 subway line will be extended from Times  ■
Square West to a new terminus at 34th Street and Eleventh Avenue that is 
expected to open in 2013 (see Section 6.2). In addition, a platform over the 
Eastern Rail Yards will be constructed that will allow the construction of 
buildings on top of it. The southern blocks of the new Hudson Boulevard 
(a mid-block street that runs north-south between Tenth and Eleventh Av-
enue from West 33rd Street to West 39th Street) will also be constructed dur-
ing the first phase.
The second phase (due to start in 2012 after completion of the first phase)  ■
will comprise construction of a subway station on 41st Street and the north-
ern blocks of the new Hudson Boulevard. The costs of first phase for the 
City are estimated at $ 2.8 billion and those of the second phase at $ 775 
million. Some of these plans are now, at least temporarily, abandoned (see 
Section 6.1.4; Section 6.2.3 gives full details of the focal project).
The project now has to reframe itself in a changed economic climate, where-
by most of the subprojects are now criticised for their high costs. The costs of 
the redevelopment of Penn Station are estimated at $ 14 billion, and those of 
the redevelopment of the Rail Yards at about the same; both are State proj-
ects.
Still, while the public projects suffer from high costs, the economic down-
turn and lower political commitment at State level, the rezoning of the area 
has been successful and the (re-)development of the parts owned by private 
developers – most of the area – has moved fast.
[ 155 ]
History and background6.1.6 
The Hudson Yards area was a rough industrial neighbourhood until the 1990s, 
built in relatively low densities and with a poor population. In fact, there 
was little housing here, most of the area being occupied by warehouses and 
infrastructure support. During the past decade, the area – in particular the 
historically infamous neighbourhood of Hell’s Kitchen that is partly located 
here – has experienced a rapid process of gentrification.
The history of the present Hudson Yards project starts with the failed pro-
posal for the development of the new West Side Stadium.
The West Side Stadium was supposed to be located on the WRY site (see 
Section 6.1.3), and is the main reason why the Western Railyards have not 
been rezoned yet. Until 2005, the construction of the stadium on a deck to be 
placed over the railyard was central to the plan for the whole area. The plan 
for the stadium coincided with the wish of the City of New York to have the 
New York Jets play in their own city instead of at the Giants Stadium in New 
Jersey where they have been based since 1984 (and will stay for the foresee-
able future).
Opposition against the stadium was strong from the beginning, and de-
spite the strong support of the Mayor (Michael Bloomberg) and the state Gov-
ernor (George Pataki) for the plan, it was abandoned after New York City lost 
the bid for the 2012 Olympics to the City of London and the New York State 
Public Authorities Control Board (PACB) decided against a $ 300 million state 
subsidy for the stadium (Fox, 2005). The PACB is worth mentioning in this con-
text: it is a powerful body that was created in 1976 to manage public author-
ity debts and consists of the speaker of the State Assembly, the State Senate 
majority leader and the State governor. The board must unanimously approve 
the financing and construction of any project proposed by various state pub-
lic benefit corporations (Fox, 2005). The New York State Urban Development 
Corporation (now known as the Empire State Development Corporation), the 
authority that was going to finance the West Side Stadium, falls under the 
purview of the PACB.
The successful opposition against the stadium was led by Christine Quinne, 
who is the speaker of New York City Council – said to be the most important 
city job after the mayor – and representative of Manhattan’s West Side on the 
City Council. Interviewees stated that her influence makes Manhattan com-
munity board No. 4 (which she chairs, and which is responsible for shaping 
policy for the West Side) politically very powerful (case interview HYDC, HY 
02-07-A1).
After the abandonment of the Stadium plan, the planners expected that 
the expansion of the Javits Convention Center and the subway extension to-
gether would create the buzz needed to ensure a successful project (case in-
terview HY 02-07-A1). However, the convention centre plans were abandoned 
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at the beginning of 2008. While private development was moving fast until 
mid-2008, we will now have to wait and see how the project will take shape 
in a period of economic decline.
Project Management6.1.7 
The Hudson Yards project is managed by various City and State agencies. De-
spite the existence of a special agency for the implementation of the project, 
there is no single planning authority that oversees the whole project.
The state agencies involved are the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(MTA) and the Convention Center Development Corporation (CCDC).
The MTA runs the public transportation lines in New York and Long Island. 
It owns the Rail Yards and will construct and run the planned subway exten-
sion. The CCDC is a subsidiary of the Empire State Development Corporation 
(see Sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.17) that owns and runs the Javits Convention Cen-
ter. These two State agencies, the City and the City agencies work together 
in the redevelopment process. In 2006, the City and the MTA signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding and an agreement on redevelopment for the parts 
owned by the MTA. The core of this agreement is that the City will finance the 
subway extension with bonds, whereas the MTA has agreed that the air rights 
related to the space above its lands (see Section 6.1.8) can be used to pay the 
interest on those bonds (estimated at $ 200 million).
The role of the City in the project is mostly to create the conditions that 
will allow the area to be redeveloped in line with its goals. The City does this 
by financing the infrastructure, rezoning the area (see Section 6.1.2), by pro-
viding tax incentives and density bonuses (see Section 6.1.8 and 6.1.10), and 
by setting up the Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation (HYIC) and the 
Hudson Yards Development Corporation (HYDC). The HYIC was established to 
provide financing for the infrastructure improvements that will be executed 
by the MTA.
The HYDC is a special agency created to spearhead the implementation of 
the Hudson Yards plan. In addition, it works closely with the State agencies 
that own and manage the State-owned parts of the project. The City has al-
so acquired some property, necessary to facilitate the subway extension, and 
some public infrastructure. The City does not however develop any significant 
parts of the project.
Project finance6.1.8 
The City and State of New York finance and implement their projects with the 
aid of bonds, tax incentives and the sale of density bonuses. The City is not a 
major landowner (90-95% of the area is privately owned) and as a general rule 
does not finance its projects from its capital budget. It only rarely provides 
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direct subsidies instead of tax incentives. The State of New York is involved in 
the Javits Convention Center, the Rail Yards project, the No. 7 subway exten-
sion and the Penn Station/Madison Square Garden project.
PILOT system
The largest part of the Hudson Yards project (85%) is financed in the same 
way as Battery Park City (see Chapter 5), by using payments in lieu of taxes 
(PILOTS).
PILOTS resemble the tax increment financing (TIF) schemes that are wide-
ly used throughout the USA. PILOTS are used relatively infrequently, whereas 
TIF financing exists in all 50 states of the United States. The difference be-
tween the PILOT system and TIF is that only the payments made under spe-
cific PILOT agreements will go into a special project fund while all other taxes 
collected on PILOT properties will continue to go to the City’s general fund 
(Cerciello, 2005). All revenue from a TIF system, on the other hand, goes into a 
special project fund.
The TIF system allows local governments to finance redevelopment proj-
ects with the (projected) increased tax revenue generated by the redeveloped 
property. It uses this future income to back bonds that are issued for the proj-
ect. The proceeds of those bonds are used to invest in the project.
Cerciello (2005: 706) summarises how the TIF system works: “The initial 
property tax base of the redevelopment zone is frozen on the tax roll. As 
the redevelopment progresses, property values and property tax collections 
should increase. The taxing authorities continue to receive tax revenue based 
on the frozen base value while the excess tax collections (the “tax increment”) 
flow into a special fund that is used to make interest and principal payments 
on the TIF bonds. The original taxing authorities do not get any of the tax in-
crement until the TIF bonds are repaid.”
The TIF system requires a redevelopment agency to issue the bonds and 
collect the tax increments.
Two central assumptions underlie the use of TIF (Cerciello, 2005). The first 
is that property values would remain constant without the stimulation pro-
vided by TIF. The second is that the redevelopment drives the increase in 
property values.
TIF schemes are contested for their supposed unconstitutionality. The 
State constitutions limit the amount of debt that municipalities can occur, 
and the bonds exceed these debts. The constitution of the State of New York 
limits New York City debts to 10% of the average full valuation of taxable real 
estate (N.Y. Const. art. VIII Section 4). The bonds more or less circumvent that 
requirement. They are also contested for their unlawful delegation of legisla-
tive power to an administrative agency and for their lack of voter account-
ability. Finally, they are criticised because when the increase of the value of 
property does not meet expectations, the City often ends up paying the debts.
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The Bonds/PILOT system in Hudson Yards
The Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation (HYIC) issues bonds that total 
up to more than $ 3 billion. The HYIC will first collect $ 2 billion and has the 
authority to collect up to $ 1.5 billion of additional Senior Bonds. It may not 
issue more than $ 3 billion of bonds backed by interest support payments.
The interest on these bonds is paid by the PILOT payments (recurring), the 
sale of transferable development rights of the Eastern Railyards (a portion of 
which has been acquired by the HYIC) and payments in lieu of mortgage re-
cording taxes.
The Hudson Yards PILOT system works as follows: private landowners 
mortgage their lands to the Industrial Development Agency of New York City 
(IDA). The IDA assigns each PILOT agreement and PILOT mortgage to the HYIC 
that assigns the obligations to the Trustee of the fund. The trustee is empow-
ered to exercise the rights and remedies of the mortgagee (Cerciello, 2005).
The IDA is a tax-exempt entity. The developers will make payments to the 
IDA for the duration of the agreement. Developers are not obliged to close a 
PILOT agreement but the PILOT payments are less than the amount of prop-
erty tax that would generally be due if their land fell under normal property 
taxes regulations, which makes the agreement attractive for them. The sched-
ule provides a substantial discount on the real property taxes that would oth-
erwise be due for up to 19 years. It provides an annual rate of increase that is 
equal to the lesser of 3% or the actual increase in assessed valuation of the 
property. After the 20th year of the agreement, the amounts payable equal the 
real property taxes levied by the city but the agreements are expected to last 
for 35 years and can be extended to 64 years. It follows that this arrangement 
is no longer advantageous to the contractor after the 20th year of the agree-
ment. The MTA has agreed to use the same system when it leases or sells the 
air rights of the Railyards for development (MTA, 2007b).
The IDA will funnel the payments into a special fund that is overseen by 
the HYIC. The HYIC then uses this fund to make interest and principal pay-
ments on the bonds. The HYIC and the City have closed an IDA assignment 
agreement, pursuant to which the IDA has assigned the payments to the HYIC. 
The agreement terminates when all principal and interest has been paid on 
the Corporation’s Bonds.
In addition to the PILOT programme, there are (one-off) PILOTS for the 
mortgage registration taxes (PILOMRT) that follow the same system.
The PILOT finance method in Hudson Yards can be criticised because it re-
lies heavily on the presumption that New York will experience an increasing 
demand for office space, which may or may not occur. In addition, Cerciello 
criticises it for its lack of voter accountability and because the bonds it pays 
for do not provide funding for additional facilities such as schools and a fire 
station (Cerciello, 2005b).
Since the bonds are backed only by the proceeds of the project and not 
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by the general funds of the City (that would be unconstitutional), they carry 
a higher risk which makes the interest on them higher than that on regu-
lar bonds. However, in practice the bonds are always backed by the City. Thus, 
the result may be that the general taxpayers end up paying for a failed proj-
ect, while they never had a chance to vote for or against the way in which 
it was financed. This backup was indeed confirmed (off the record) by some 
of the interviewees. Cerciello would rather see the city financing the project 
from its general funds. In previous decades, when the city was very poor, this 
would have been impossible. Now that the city is better off, it would be pos-
sible, though as pointed out above, it has been suggested that this solution 
is unconstitutional. A related problem is the continual underrating of cities’ 
bonds by credit rating companies such as Standard and Poor’s; cities started 
to rebel on this point in 2008 (New York Times, 2008a). Still, PILOT financing 
also allows cities to confine the city budget for a given project (and the atten-
dant risks) to the amount of the bonds issued to cover it, while this construc-
tion also works as an incentive for developers. An interviewee from the HYDC 
stated that they were surprised by the way in which Amsterdam financed its 
projects, which demanded so much pre-investment from capital funds (case 
interview HYDC, HY 02-07-A4).
It may be noted that in 2003, the BPCA received an AAA rating on its bonds, 
the highest level of trustworthiness awarded by Standard and Poor’s (BPCA, 
2007). It could thus hardly be claimed that these bonds were underrated at 
the time.
Other financial incentives
In addition to the PILOTS, there are other incentive programmes in Hudson 
Yards that are intended to generate funds for the public infrastructure (in-
cluding parks), to promote the construction of affordable housing and to in-
crease densities in designated areas. A small programme also exists to pro-
mote cultural facilities.
District improvement bonus
The city has created a district improvement bonus (DIB) system, which allows 
developers to increase the floor area ratio (FAR) of their buildings in desig-
nated areas (see map) in return for a contribution of $ 109.36 per sq. ft. of FAR 
(price of July 1, 2007). (It may be noted here for the sake of clarity that in this 
context ‘bonus’ is not used in the usual sense of an extra payment in return 
for good performance but to denote permission for developers to construct 
taller buildings than would otherwise allowed under the zoning regulations, 
in return for a fee paid by the developer.) The price of the bonus is yearly set 
by the Department of City Planning. The maximum bonuses change per plot 
(the zoning heights range from 6 FAR to 33 FAR). The DIB fund is used to pay 
for the public infrastructure.
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Air rights can be traded from Phase 2 areas to large-scale plan areas and to 
the 10th Avenue Corridor. The price of those rights is set through private trans-
actions. The bonuses may not exceed the DIB bonuses.
Purchase and transfer of air rights at the Eastern Rail Yard by the HYIC
At the Eastern Rail Yard site, the FAR is set at 19.0 but only 11.0 FAR can be 
used on site. This leaves 8 FAR that can be transferred to large-scale plan ar-
eas. A minimum of 4.6 million sq. ft. can be transferred in this manner. Prices 
are set through appraisal and negotiation. The air rights are transferable to 
large-scale plan areas. The rights are only available after maximum use of DIB 
and Phase 2 air rights. They are meant to promote the construction of mega-
projects in the area.
The HYIC has purchased for $ 200 million a portion of the ERY air rights 
that can be used in other parts of the district. It will sell these air rights to de-
velopers and use the proceeds to pay the interest on the bonds, and to cover 
its own administrative costs. Any residual proceeds will be transferred to the 
MTA.
Ownership6.1.9 
Most of the land is privately owned, and the City’s influence on the develop-
ments in those areas is limited to zoning, tax incentives and density bonuses 
(see Section 6.2). State agencies however own some crucial areas – the con-
vention centre and the railyards – that will be re-developed (see Section 6.1.3).
Affordable housing6.1.10 
The City and the State have committed themselves to affordable housing and 
plan 4,000 affordable housing units (out of 13,500 residential units) in the 
project area, some of which will be created on the Railyards sites (see Section 
6.1.3). Affordable housing is not for the lowest incomes but is meant for fam-
ily incomes between $ 32,300 and $ 126,700 per annum.
The City and State do not impose strict rules to achieve this goal. All com-
mitments depend on whether developers want to make use of the bonuses 
and tax programmes offered. The RFPs for the Railyard sites (see Section 6.1.3) 
for example make incentive schemes available but do not require the devel-
opers to make use of them. They only state that if the developers choose to 
develop any rental housing, 20% of the units they build should fall under the 
80/20 programme (this arrangement is not permanent, but only applies for a 
stated limited period). But the RFPs do not oblige the developers to develop 
any rental housing.
Two inclusionary housing bonus programmes (IHB) exist to promote afford-
able housing:
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The Clinton IHB can be used to acquire an additional FAR of 2.0 in the 42 ■ nd 
Street corridor programme, and the Hudson Yards IHB can be used to ac-
quire an additional FAR of 5.5 if 20-30% of building is affordable and DIB 
payments are made (or 3.0 FAR if the proportion of affordable housing is 
set at 10-15%).
For the Railyards, the New York State Housing Finance Agency’s 80/20 pro- ■
gramme is available. This programme offers tax abatements when 20% of 
the residential units are developed as affordable units. The Housing Fi-
nance Agency has stated that it will give priority to applications from WRY 
and ERY projects (letter of June 21, 2007).
Additionally, the City supports a density bonus to foster the creation of per-
manently affordable low income housing. This boils down to a 5% zoning floor 
area bonus when 20% of the units within a building are permanently afford-
able housing.
The plans of Related Companies, the developer that won the bid (see Sec-
tion 6.1.3), allow for 20% of permanent affordable housing (440 units) among 
the rental units.
In addition to the Railyards plans, the City plans the provision of the sum 
of $ 40 million for the construction of off-site units. Two off-site plots that are 
City-owned are considered as locations for such affordable housing (the sites 
are located at West 54th Street and 9th Avenue and West 48th Street and 10th Av-
enue). The first site is now leased by the MTA and the other is under full City 
control.
In May 2008, the City presented a plan for this project, called Harbourview, 
that envisages two buildings comprising 324 apartments, 220 of which are 
meant as affordable housing. The project is supposed to be constructed by the 
Atlantic Development Group that will pay the city $ 10 million for the right to 
do so (New York Times, 2008e).
Environmental sustainability6.1.11 
The city and state agencies have committed themselves to (modest) environ-
mental goals in joint policy documents. These goals are most visible in the 
projects that are led by public parties. No specific rules with which private 
developers have to comply have been adopted.
Nor are there are any specific environmental guidelines for the project. The 
Metropolitan Transport Authority and the City Planning Commission have 
prepared an environmental impact statement in line with their obligations 
under the SEQRA (state) and CEQR (city) regulations. The executive summary 
of the final general environmental impact statement (FGEIS) names six envi-
ronmental objectives of the project (MTA & CPC 2004):
protection of significant cultural, community park and open space resources;1. 
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relocation of incompatible uses from Hudson River Park;2. 
minimal energy consumption, non-transit vehicle miles of travel, and con-3. 
gestion of city streets by providing enhanced transit access to major re-
gional facilities in the Hudson Yards area;
sustainable design and development;4. 
minimal community disruption and environmental impacts during con-5. 
struction of new land uses and traffic improvements, including impacts 
during construction of new land uses and transit improvements, including 
impacts on existing businesses and residences, parklands and open space 
resources, and historic resources;
measures to avoid, minimize and/or mitigate adverse impacts.6. 
The RFP for the Railyards demanded a LEED Gold Standard. LEED stands for 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design. The standard was developed 
by the U.S. Green Building Council, a non-profit organisation that has mem-
bers representing every sector of the building industry, which was set up in 
1998. LEED scores different aspects of environmental quality up to a possible 
total 68 points, corresponding to a Platinum rating for the building in ques-
tion. Gold means between 39 and 51 points and is the second best standard 
(there are also Silver and Certified).
The rating system addresses six major areas: sustainable sites, water effi-
ciency, energy and atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor environmen-
tal quality, innovation and design processes.
The goals of the standard are: to define green building by establishing a 
common standard, promote integrated, whole-building design practices, rec-
ognise environmental leadership in the building industry, stimulate green 
competition, raise consumer awareness of green building benefits and trans-
form the building market (USGBC, 2005).
Interviewees from the HYDC stated that the City had considered imple-
menting its own environmental guidelines for Hudson Yards, as it had done in 
Battery Park City (see Section 5.1.11). This initiative was abandoned because it 
would lower the worth of the air rights and the willingness of the private sec-
tor to participate in the project. In addition, the City is preparing a new envi-
ronmental code (case interview HYDC, HY 03-07-A2).
Other public facilities6.1.12 
Except for housing and residential space we saw that the plans for Hudson 
Yards include a cultural facility in the Railyards, parks and open space, hotel 
space, residential space, an extension of the convention centre and new in-
frastructure. The ‘preferred direction plan’ also mentions an elevated market 
and a High Line market on 32nd Street (Department of City Planning and Eco-
nomic Development Corporation, 2003).
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There is a density bonus programme available to promote cultural facilities 
on 42nd Street, known as the 42nd street Corridor Theater Bonus. The program 
must be used together with the Clinton IHB programme (see Section 6.1.10) 
and can then be used to acquire an additional 3.0 Far. Whereby 1 sq. ft. (930 
csq. m) of every new 3 sq. ft. (2,800 csq. m) must have a cultural use.
Involvement of the general public6.1.13 
The involvement of the general public is mostly channelled through the Com-
munity Board 4 of Manhattan (CB4), which has up to fifty members who are 
appointed by the President of the Borough of Manhattan. The community 
boards have the task of reviewing most applications and procedures that con-
cern land use, and are concerned with all other problems that may arise in 
their neighbourhood. CB4 organises meetings where the plans concerning 
Hudson Yards are discussed with local residents (CB4, 2008).
In addition to the CB4 there is the Hudson Yards Community Advisory 
Committee, a representative body that was formed pursuant to the zoning 
agreement between the City administration and New York City Council.5 The 
HYCAC advises the HYDC regarding the financing, planning, design, and con-
struction of the Hudson Yards redevelopment area from a neighbourhood per-
spective.
5    The HYAC represents various interest groups. The following list of its members dates from July 2006 
(source: http://www.manhattancb4.org/HKHY/docs/HYCACstructure.htm):
Manhattan Community Board 4: Lee Compton, Anna Levin, Walter Mankoff, Joe Restuccia, Jean- ■
Daniel Noland
U.S. Representative Jerrold Nadler (or proxy) ■
City Council Speaker Christine C. Quinn (or proxy) ■
Manhattan Borough President Scott M. Stringer (or proxy) ■
State Senator Thomas K. Duane (or proxy) ■
Assembly Member Richard N. Gottfried (or proxy) ■
Hell’s Kitchen Neighborhood Association – Kathleen Treat ■
Housing Conservation Coordinators – John Raskin ■
Friends of Hudson River Park – Ross Graham ■
Friends of the High Line – Joshua David ■
Manhattan Plaza Tenants Association – Marisa Redanty ■
Rep from 544 West 35 ■ th street – Camilla Pettle
44 ■ th Street Block Association – Renee Stanley
45 ■ th Street Block Association – Justin Krebs
Hudson Crossing Tenants Association – Brian Sogol ■
Save Chelsea – Andrew Berman ■
West Side Neighborhood Alliance – Anita Black. ■
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Goals of the project6.1.14 
The goals of the project are summed up in the FGEIS (see Section 6.1.11). The 
statement also refers to the report Preparing for the future: a commercial develop-
ment strategy for New York City (see Section 6.1.4). The main goal of the project 
can be defined as the aim to secure future (economic) growth of New York by 
providing new office space and thereby securing an income for the City from 
the payment of property taxes (MTA & Department of City Planning, 2004; 
Group of 35, 2001).
The FGEIS mentions as the goals of the Hudson Yards project:
to ensure the future growth of New York City through redevelopment of  ■
the Hudson Yards area;
to provide transit services to support the Hudson Yards area redevelop- ■
ment;
to maintain or improve environmental conditions. ■
It also names specific transit objectives and environmental objectives (for the 
latter, see Section 6.1.11).
The specific redevelopment objectives are:
Zoning to permit a mix of uses and densities;1. 
New opportunities for new commercial, residential, recreational and open 2. 
space uses;
Zoning that reinforces the existing residential neighbourhoods and en-3. 
courages new housing opportunities;
Expansion and modernisation of the Javits Convention Center;4. 
Creation of potential sites for public facilities needing relocation and/or 5. 
consolidation;
A network of new open spaces;6. 
Improvement of the pedestrian environment and access to Hudson River 7. 
Park from upland areas;
Promotion of transit-oriented development;8. 
Opportunities for high-quality architecture and urban design in confor-9. 
mance with sustainable design principles.6
Delays6.1.15 
The project has experienced some severe delays over the past year (2007-2008). 
They were mostly caused by a lack of funds and a decline of economic growth 
and prospects. Expensive projects were abandoned or postponed. These proj-
ects include the expansion of the convention centre that was deemed too ex-
6   In 2004, these goals also included the creation of the West Side Stadium that was later abandoned. 
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pensive and for which a new plan will have to be drafted. It also includes the 
refurbishment of the area around Penn Station. We have already mentioned 
that the Railyards deal was delayed by a few months when the developer 
Tishman Speyer dropped out (see Section 6.1.3).
Still, the city has collected more money on its bonds than it had counted 
on and the rezoning turns out to be very successful (Bond Buyer, 2008). The 
delays therefore concerned mostly the public projects that require City and 
State funding.
Role of private actors in the project6.1.16 
Private actors play an active role in the project. Most of the project involves 
the redevelopment of privately owned land. We saw that the main goal of the 
project is to foster economic development. The zoning regulations therefore 
promote the construction of large buildings (case interview, Department of 
City Planning, HY 03-07-A1). However, there are no public-private partner-
ships (PPP) involving risk sharing in a joint development corporation. We may 
consider the bond financing methodology an example of PPP at a more ab-
stract level, as it causes private investors to accept some risk in the project.
Public actors6.1.17 
I hereby provide a list of the most important public actors in the project, 
drawing a distinction between State and City actors and local actors.
State actors ■
The MTA – owner of the Railyards and the public transport systems. The  ■
MTA plays an active role in the redevelopment: it issues the RFPs for 
the air rights above the Railyards and it will construct the No. 7 subway 
extension.
The Empire State Development Corporation (the former Urban Develop- ■
ment Corporation) – owns and develops the site on which the conven-
tion centre is situated.
The Convention Center Development Corporation (CCDC) – its subsid- ■
iary that actually owns and runs the area and has issued the RFP.
The State Public Authorities Control Board (PACB) – responsible for ma- ■
jor investment decisions of the State of New York and as such blocked 
the development of the West Side Stadium.
City actors ■
The Department of Transportation (NYCDOT) – will rehabilitate the 11 ■ th 
Avenue viaduct (between 2008-2010) and is involved in all transporta-
tion issues.
The City Planning Commission (CPC) – division of the Department of  ■
City Planning and has rezoned the area.
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The Industrial Development Agency (IDA) – responsible for the PILOT  ■
scheme (see Section 6.1.8).
Local Actors ■
The Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation (HYIC) – is the public ben- ■
efit corporation that finances the infrastructure of the project.
The Hudson Yards Development Corporation (HYDC) – responsible for  ■
the spearheading of the implementation of the development and is as 
such involved in all negotiations that concern the area.
Community Board No. 4 of Manhattan (CB4) – organises the involvement  ■
of the (local) public in the development plans. It succeeded in achiev-
ing the preservation of the low-rise units of part of the historic district 
of Chelsea, which attracts much popular support (the organisation Save 
Chelsea has a representative on the HYAC; see footnote 5, p. 164). It is 
very active and played a forward role in the Uniform Land Use Review 
Procedure (ULURP). It has a seat on the board of the HYDC.
The Hudson Yards Community Advisory Committee (HYCAC) – represen- ■
tative body of local organisations and other representative bodies that 
advises the HYDC from a neighbourhood perspective.
Critique6.1.18 
The HYCAC criticised the limited amount of affordable housing in the plans. 
It has also criticised the plans for creating an isolated area instead of an ex-
tension of New York City blocks (HYCAC, 2008). Other criticisms of the project 
include the costs, the PILOT system (see Section 6.1.8) and the low emphasis 
it puts on environmental goals. One newspaper reported that some wondered 
why the administration provided room for 20,000 parking spaces in the area 
(Daily News, 2007). The New York State Assembly member Richard Brodsky or-
ganised a hearing to assess the status of the projects on the West Side. He 
had also proposed to start a Railyards authority that could buy the develop-
ment rights from the MTA (instead of the developer), in much the same way 
as Battery Park City is organised (see par 5.1.7). Brodsky criticises the high 
costs of the various projects and believes that the Railyards deal does not re-
flect a well thought-out economic strategy for what the city and the region 
needs (Atlantic Yards Report, 2008).
Conflicts of power: State and City interests6.1.19 
When the project started off, the city and the state worked (relatively) harmo-
niously together in their plans for the area. They produced the FGEIS together 
and signed a memorandum of understanding on the No. 7 subway extension 
(see Section 6.3).
However, Governor Spitzer (2007-2008) turned out to be less committed to 
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the project than his predecessor. In addition, the Empire State Development 
Corporation is suffering from a lack of funds and internal troubles (New York 
Times, 2008c). The State blocked the development of the West Side Stadium, 
which was a defeat for the City mayor. We have also noted that State Assem-
bly member Brodsky organised a hearing to air his critical views on the proj-
ect (see Section 6.1.18).
Focal project: the No. 7 subway extension6.2 
Introduction6.2.1 
The project that was studied in Hudson Yards differs from the other fo-
cal projects in this thesis. It does not involve the construction of mixed-use 
buildings, but concerns the No. 7 subway extension.
The main documents that were the studied were 7-year leases in which 
the City leases land from private landowners for the construction of the sub-
way extension. The City does so on behalf of the MTA that will construct and 
own the extension. Privately owned land is thus leased by the City for a spe-
cific purpose. The City chose this approach to avoid the transaction costs that 
would be involved with expropriation (see Section 6.2.13).
The official name of the No. 7 subway line is the Interborough Rapid Tran-
sit Community (IRT) Flushing Line. It is about 8 miles (12.9 km) long and runs 
from the Flushing terminus in Queens to Times Square in Manhattan (see 
map). The line opened in 1915. The IRT became part of the MTA in 1953.
The focal project involves extending the line westwards by about 1.5 miles 
(2.4 km) (see Section 6.2.3). The main reason for choosing the subway exten-
sion as our focal project here was that it provides an interesting case in which 
public actors (the City and MTA) need the cooperation of the private develop-
ers for a public project and have to cooperate with private developers who 
want to construct their 1 million sq. ft. (92,000 sq. m) of buildings on top of it. 
This double use of the land makes the project complex.
A more practical reason was that the Railyards lease was not closed until 
May 2008 (see Section 6.1.3). It made sense to study a project of which I was 
sure that I could study the development agreements and interview the par-
ties involved.
When the project was visited, in February 2007, the City was still negotiat-
ing with private developers who had bought land in the area concerning the 
terms of the leases on their property. The leases were closed in the first half 
of 2007. The City now leases the land from the private developers on behalf of 
the MTA that will construct, own and run the subway.
Interviews were conducted with affiliates of the HYDC and the City Plan-
ning Commission (CPC) as well as two of the three developers in the area (Ex-
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tell and Moinian, see Section 6.2.7). The leases were drafted by the in-house 
lawyer of the HYDC. Additional interviews were conducted with lawyers with 
experience in the field. In May 2008, an additional visit was paid to the com-
munity board CB4 (see Section 6.1.17). I divided the four leases that were stud-
ied into two categories: construction leases and the storage lease. In the latter, 
a piece of land is leased for the storage of goods, equipment and materials 
used for the construction of the subway extension. In the three construction 
leases a piece of land is leased to the City for the construction of the subway 
extension, including stations, entrances and exits. The construction leases 
are more important for this study than the storage lease. They involve a com-
plex interplay between the interests of the MTA that wants to construct the 
subway extension, the interests of the private developers that want to con-
struct buildings on their lands and the interests of the City (represented by 
the HYDC) that wants the subway extension and the development of a new 
neighbourhood in which private developers play a key role.
The storage lease is a standard document of which only some aspects are 
relevant in the sense that they provide some insight into the project and the 
contractual relations between the parties. Naturally, as the lease only deals 
with storage it does not include any parts with regard to the actual work on 
the extension.
The main parties that were involved in the negotiations were the MTA, the 
CPC, and the developers. They were brought together by the HYDC that rec-
ognises both public and private interests (case interviews HY 02-07-A1 and 
A4). The developers spoke highly of the professionalism of the public parties. 
The problems that arose during the negotiations were not so much about the 
carrying costs of the leases, but mostly dealt with planning of the work and 
regulation issues. According to the developers, the underground rules did not 
match the above-ground rules (case interviews HY 02-07-A6 and A7). The reg-
ulations therefore had to be changed. The most complex negotiations dealt 
with planning of the work and the location of the columns of the buildings. 
The subway runs under the land that has to carry the buildings, and the MTA 
does not allow any columns to rest on its tubes. A different solution had to be 
found at a time when the parties were not sure what they were going to build 
on the land.
About 20 people – including engineers – were present during the negotia-
tions. The atmosphere was described as professional, rather than adversarial 
or cooperative (case interviews HYDC and developers, HY 02-07-A2, A4 an A6). 
Although one would think that developers shared some interests, they did not 
aim to coordinate their actions, and never met to discuss their mutual inter-
ests.
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Positioning (area)6.2.2 
The No. 7 subway extension runs from east to west. It is about 1 mile (1.6 km) 
long and extends the existing line that terminates at Times Square westwards 
to 41st Street and 11th Avenue and then southwards to 34th Street and 11th Av-
enue (see Figure 6.1). Plans exist to extend the line further south to 23rd Street 
(see Figure 6.1). The precise locations of the leased areas are:
Areas covered by construction leases: ■
400 Eleventh Avenue and 550 West 351. th Street, Block 706, Lots 1 and 55, 
Borough of Manhattan (Meushar lease). The site is known as the P site.
220 Eleventh Avenue, Block 697, Lot 1 (Eleventh lease). The site is known 2. 
as the A site.
Block 705, Lots, 1, 5, 53 (portion) and 54 (portion) (Extell lease).3. 
The site is known as the J site.
Area covered by storage lease: ■
Block 1069, Lots 29 and 34 (Goldman lease). This site is known as the M 4. 
site.
Description of the project6.2.3 
The project is described as ‘the Subway Project’ in the leases and consists of 
the construction of the No. 7 subway extension as described above. It involves 
the construction of the necessary tunnels, 1 or 2 stations and ancillary facili-
ties such as electrical substations, ventilation facilities, mechanical equip-
ment rooms and maintenance rooms (FGEIS, 2004: 2-27).
The two stations are named intermediate station and terminal station. The 
terminal station will be located on West 34th Street at Eleventh Avenue. The 
intermediate station was planned to be located on West 41st Street and Tenth 
Avenue. In October 2007 the plan for the intermediate station was abandoned 
because of the high costs. However, new funding and political and public 
pressure might be successful in reviving the plan (New York Times, 2007b).
In addition to the entrances of the stations, additional entrances are man-
datory for new developments on designated sites. This involves the acquisi-
tion of some properties and a number of easements to allow for the tunnels 
and entrances (FGEIS, 2004: 2-26).
Although the original plans spoke of acquisition of the property required, 
it was decided to lease the properties from the landowners instead of expro-
priating them. The agreements involve these leases (and the easements that I 
leave out of consideration here).
The leases focus on the division of responsibilities between the landown-
ers and the tenant (City).
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Responsibilities of the landlords (developers) and the tenant (the City of 
New York)
The Meushar lease speaks of specific responsibilities of the landlord for the 
demolition and cleaning work on the site. The Moinian Group, the owner of 
the site (see Section 6.2.7) is responsible for the sheeting work, the demolish-
ment of existing structures on the premises, the excavation work, the re-rout-
ing of existing water, sewer and other pipes, the backfilling of the premises 
(other than an Amtrak easement area) with crushed stone or recycled con-
crete, and the dewatering of the premises. The interviewee from the Moinian 
Group stated that Moinian wanted to do this work, to profit from the brown-
field programme of the State of New York that offers an interesting tax abate-
ment, and was willing to risk the fine of $ 20,000 per day levied if the work is 
not finished on time (case interview HY 04-07-A6).
As the tenant, the City assumed (financial) responsibility for the construc-
tion of the subway line and the station, though the actual work would be 
done by contractors engaged by the City.
The subway project involves the construction of the extension and the 
preparation of the land but the construction leases take a broader view. A 
key element for the developers was that their future buildings, or at least 
the foundations of these buildings, would also be subject to the agreement. 
They wanted to construct the foundations simultaneously with the extension 
of the subway to make sure that the underground infrastructure would fit 
their interests. These interests were defined as the option to construct a large 
building the function of which could be decided later.
From the recitals of the construction leases, it becomes clear that the city 
closes the leases, but it is the MTA that requires possession of the premises 
to construct the subway. The city closes the leases on behalf of the MTA. The 
MTA is also the third party beneficiary of the easement agreements in the 
Meushar lease that are necessary to permit use of the subway entrances. The 
most important reason why the City and not the MTA closed the agreements 
with the developers is that the City will pay the rent for the land (see Section 
6.2.9).
Two of the construction leases spell out the various responsibilities of the 
parties more precisely.
Unlike the Moinian lease, the Extell lease does not speak of any responsi- ■
bilities of the landlord with regard to the project. It does mention the op-
tion that landlord may undertake some of the actions needed to make the 
land ready for the construction work. If this option is taken up, it will be 
the subject of a separate agreement (Section 6).
The Storage lease (Goldman lease) defines the project in terms of a lease  ■
of land and focuses on the delivery of the site empty by the landlord. It 
specifies that the landlord only has to ensure that tenants and occupants 
have left the premises by the commencement date but will not be required 
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to perform any ‘demolition, construction, improvement, alteration or other 
work’. The tenant accepts the premises in a ‘as is’ condition, the condition 
in which he found it when the lease was signed (Section 1.3). The project of 
the tenant (the City) here consists only of the staging and storage of trucks 
and construction materials in connection with the subway extension (Sec-
tion 1.2).
Shared projects
There are hardly any shared projects. The leases name one in the Meushar 
lease whereby the MTA will acquire and install escalators to street level for 
the subway station at the costs of the landlord. But the MTA will be responsi-
ble for and carry the costs of the operation, maintenance and replacement of 
such escalators. The agreement is in line with the requirement that new de-
velopments have to provide subway entrances. The Meushar lease also speak 
of the sharing of a part of the costs that the landlord had to incur to deliver 
the site in the required condition (Section 6.01).
Momentum6.2.4 
The momentum for the project was triggered by the bid for the 2012 Olym-
pics (see Section 6.1.6). But even after that bid failed, the City administration 
remained committed to the projects and the construction of the subway ex-
tension is regarded as a necessary part of the project. Thus, the momentum 
of the project is based on the commitment of the City administration to the 
development of the area and its conviction that the subway extension is nec-
essary to create a successful new district.
The interviewee from Extell stated that her company followed political de-
velopments and then made the decision to invest in the area. With regard to 
Hudson Yards, the New York State Senator Schumer was the first to talk about 
the need for new development because commercial jobs need office space. 
In may be noted in addition that the Bloomberg administration has radically 
changed the development climate in New York City. One of the things it did 
was to provide large amounts of relevant information on the Internet, there-
by creating more transparency. Before that, it was more difficult to discover 
whether your neighbour had applied for permits etc. Now, it is easy to follow 
what is happening.
Next to that, Amanda Burdon (head of the CPC) has been very proactive 
with regard to rezoning. The CPC thus opened the West Side for development 
by rezoning Farley Hudson Yards as a primary business district. All these facts 
contributed to Extell’s decision to buy land in Hudson Yards (case interview 
HY 03-07-A7).
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Pre-contractual procedure6.2.5 
It took about six months to reach agreement on the terms of the lease (case 
interview HY 03-07-A5) but after that negotiations on specific issues still con-
tinued. Section 9.05 of the Meushar lease states that the precise location of 
the shaft has to be settled after the leases are signed. And recital 4 in the Ex-
tell lease mentions the negotiation of additional documents. The interviewee 
from the Moinian Group stated that the project more or less grew up around 
its land (case interview HY 03-07-A6, see also Section 6.2.7).
At the time when the representative of the Moinian Group was being inter-
viewed, the company was involved in two processes of negotiation. The first 
was about the properties next to the subway entrance that the City wanted to 
take over via a condemnation procedure to make room for the proposed park-
lands. The second process of negotiation dealt with the projects related to the 
construction of the subway tunnel and station.
The parties decided to separate the negotiations because those concern-
ing the proposed condemnation of some properties developed an adversarial 
character whereas the second set of negotiations was characterised as more 
cooperative (case interview HY 03-07-A6). This example indicates that the 
parties aimed to act cooperatively when possible not for ethical motives but 
because it suited their interests.
Time frame6.2.6 
The subway project started in 2002 with the MTA’s initial conceptual engi-
neering design.
The actual construction of the subway extension will take about seven 
years, after which the land reverts to the private developers, who can then 
start putting up their buildings.
The leases were closed between May 22 and June 10, 2007 and have an ex-
pected expiry date between April 30 and October 31, 2014. The leases can be 
extended for another year, but the price will go up by about 30% if the City 
decides to exercise that option. This provides a strong incentive to finish work 
on time.
The construction leases include the option for the City to terminate the 
lease earlier when construction work has finished. The Extell lease deter-
mines that this shall be not earlier than May 16, 2009 (Section 2.02), The 
Meushar lease determines that this shall be no earlier than November 1, 2012 
(Section 2.02), and the Eleventh lease determines that this shall be no earlier 
than June 1, 2012 (Section 2.02).
The construction leases (with the exception of the Meushar lease) also in-
clude an option to extend their term for one year (Section 2.04 of the Extell 
lease, and 2.03 of the Eleventh lease).
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The storage lease determines that landlord and tenant intend to terminate 
the lease if the owner of the adjacent property makes a portion of his land 
available for the purpose of goods and truck storage (Section 1.4 of Goldman 
lease).
The contracting parties6.2.7 
The leases investigated in this study were closed between:
The City of New York and Meushar 34 ■ th Street LLC, a subsidiary of the 
Moinian Group;
The City of New York and the 220 Eleventh LLC, a subsidiary of the Moinian  ■
Group;
The City of New York and Strategic/ Extell 34 ■ th Street, LLC and West 33rd 
Street LLC, which are subsidiaries of the Extell development company;
The City of New York and the Goldman family, consisting of: (1) Louisa Lit- ■
tle, Allan Goldman and Jane Goldman as co-executors of the estate of Sol 
Goldman (2) Jane Goldman, Amy Goldman, Diane Goldman Kemper and Al-
lan Goldman as co-executors of the estate of Lillian Goldman and (3) Jane 
Goldman, Allan Goldman and Louisa Little, as co-trustees of the Lillian 
Goldman marital trust under the will of Sol Goldman.
Three major developers (Extell, Moinian and Sheldrake) bought the land un-
der which the subway and the subway station are to be constructed as a spec-
ulation on future developments.
Sheldrake also develops one of the projects in Battery Park City (see Sec- ■
tion 6.2.7). It was not interviewed on the Hudson Yards Project.
Extell Development Company is a developer of residential, hotel, office and  ■
retail properties based in New York City. Its portfolio exceeds 10 million sq. 
ft. (930,000 sq. m; see www.extelldev.com). Extell owns three plots in the 
area. The most important one is site J directly to the south of the site of 
the Javits Convention Center (see Figure 6.1).
The Moinian group is a real estate developer with a portfolio of about 20  ■
million sq. ft. of industrial, residential, retail, commercial and hotel proper-
ties throughout the United States, 13 million sq. ft. of which are located in 
Manhattan. It owns and manages about $ 8 billion of assets. The company 
specialises in the development of underutilised land (it holds 5 million sq. 
ft. / 465,000 sq. m of vacant land (see www.moiniangroup.com). Moinian 
owns the midblock at 34th Street, as well as property at 11th Avenue and 34th 
Street. It also owns the site where the subway will go underground (about 
1/3 of the total budget will be spent on Moinian land).
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Other stakeholders6.2.8a 
Other stakeholders in the project are residents of the neighbourhood and fu-
ture users of the subway extension. The Convention Center Development Cor-
poration (CCDC, see Section 6.1.3) is a stakeholder since the extension will 
terminate near the Javits Convention Center.
Involvement of the public6.2.8b 
The public is less involved in the subway extension than in the development 
of other parts of the Hudson Yards area (see Section 6.1.13). The main reasons 
for this are probably that the extension of the subway is widely deemed to be 
necessary, and does not involve expropriation or demolition of existing areas. 
Debate focuses on the costs of the project and the way in which it is financed. 
The CB4 expressed fears that rising costs may mean that the extension is 
never finished (CB4, 2008a). As mentioned in Section 6.2.3, the current plans 
do not include construction of the intermediate station, but some groups are 
lobbying to have the original plans (including construction of the intermedi-
ate station) revived.
Payments6.2.9 
The City will pay the developers rent on the land equal to the carrying costs 
of the leases. These costs are estimated to be about $ 10 million for seven 
years in total (for an overview of the costs of the project, see Sections 6.1.7 
and 6.2.15).
Conflicts that arose during the project6.2.10a 
Conflicts that arose between the parties during the negotiation phase had to 
do with the different interests of the developers and the MTA. These differ-
ences stemmed from the difference in focus between the parties: the City and 
the MTA want to build subway tunnels, whereas the private developers want 
solid foundations for their buildings. These conflicts were however resolved 
without litigation or arbitration procedures (case interviews HYDC and devel-
opers, HY 02-07-A2, A6, A7).
The disagreement about whether the intermediate station should or 
should not be built (see Section 6.2.8) may also be regarded as a conflict as-
sociated with the project. It has not however had any impact on the progress 
of the project so far.
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Future conflicts6.2.10b 
The leases do not provide in any arbitration procedure but they include pen-
alties for non-compliance with their provisions and planning.
The Meushar lease mentions that when the landlord has not delivered the 
site to the tenant on December 1, 2007 he will pay $ 20,000 per day to the ten-
ant until he has delivered the premises.
The other construction leases all speak of an extension of the lease agree-
ment by one year when tenant is not finished on time. The Eleventh lease 
then raises the rent by 33 percent (Section 3.01b), and the Extell lease by 25%.
The construction leases also specify that in a case of a default the landlord 
will have the right to damages, and/or to the payment of interest and/or to 
seek an injunction (for an example, see Section 13.02 of the Extell lease).
The storage lease stipulates a 5% fine if the tenant is late with the payment 
of the rent (Section 3.3). It also states that in the case that the tenant has 
asked for a consent and the landlord refuses, his only remedy is to seek an 
injunction of specific performance: he is not allowed to claim damages (Sec-
tion 27.1).
Affordable housing6.2.11 
The subway extension project does not involve any affordable housing. Af-
fordable housing is a part of the Hudson Yards plans (see Section 6.1.10).
Environmental sustainability6.2.12 
The leases do not mention any specific requirement on sustainability. The 
MTA, however, has developed an Environmental Management System (EMS)7 
that is designed to promote efficient use of energy, enhanced indoor environ-
mental quality, conservation of resources and materials, water conservation 
and site management (CPC & MTA, 2004: 2: 29, see also Section 6.1.11).
Other public facilities6.2.13 
The leases do not mention any public facilities with the exception of the sub-
way line itself and the intermediate station mentioned in the Meushar lease. 
As discussed above, this intermediate station has been dropped from the de-
velopment plans, but there is a possibility that it might be reinstated (see Sec-
tion 6.2.8).
7   EMS requires designers to comply with the internationally accepted ISO 14001:2004 standard for envi-
ronmental management systems (see www.iso.org).
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The FGEIS (2004, see Section 6.1.11) does mention the Arts for Transit pro-
gramme used by the MTA to promote the exhibition of art in subway and 
commuter rail station in the Metropolitan area of New York. It also mentions 
the requirement that every subway entrance will at least have one entrance 
for disabled persons under the American Disability Act.
Goals of the project6.2.14 
The FGEIS (CPC & MTA, 2004) discusses the purpose of the rezoning of the 
Hudson Yards area and the construction of the No. 7 subway extension.
The specific objectives of the subway extension (2004, 2:24) are to:
Provide transit services to support the anticipated level of development re- ■
sulting from the rezoning;
Minimize effects of the new service on system-wide reliability and perfor- ■
mance;
Maximize use of existing transit infrastructure; ■
Minimize the energy consumption and congestion associated with auto  ■
use; and
Minimize disruption during construction. ■
Goals of the parties
The recitals of the construction leases state that parties have opted for a lease 
instead of a condemnation procedure to avoid unnecessary transaction costs 
and otherwise seek to achieve the public interest for implementing the sub-
way project in an as prompt and cost-effective a manner as possible.
The storage lease does not mention the goals of the parties as such but 
implies them in its formulation when it determines that tenant will only use 
the premises for the staging and storage of trucks and construction materi-
als of the MTA (Section 1.2, Goldman lease). It implies the wish of landlord to 
terminate the lease if the City acquires the adjacent property before January 
1, 2008, which implies that the landlord of the latter property does not want 
to rent the land to the City (Section 1.4, Goldman lease).
Despite the 7-years lease term, the two developers that were interviewed 
(Moinian and Extell) were not willing to wait seven years before they could 
start construction of their buildings. But at the same time, as we saw, the de-
velopers did not know what kind of building (office, hotel, residential) they 
would put on their land. They only knew that it would have a size of about 1 
million sq. ft. (93,000 sq. m). Thus, they wanted to construct the foundations 
of their building in such a way that it would be able to carry a building of 
that size while not being confined to any specific function. The Extell lease 
specifically mentions that Extell desires to lease the premises to the tenant 
(the City) in a manner that allows the company to use of the premises for 
construction laydown and staging in connection with the development of the 
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subway and with the goal of constructing a highrise building.
The interviewee from the Moinian Group (case interview HY 02-07-A6) 
stated that Moinian prefers rental buildings to condominiums. The Moinian 
Group wants to own and develop. He stated that if his company were only to 
develop a building and then sell it, it could only profit once from the transac-
tion. If it owned the building, on the other hand, it could profit from the rise 
in market prices. Although Moinian did not yet know what kind of building it 
would construct on the site, it knew that it would be either a residential build-
ing, an office building or a hotel building. Moinian does not prefer mixed-use 
buildings, because of their complexity. The interviewee stated that his per-
sonal preference for the site was a large office building and his least prefer-
ence was a ‘large floor head-office/residential-hotel building’.
The market in 2007 made it most likely Moinian would build an office 
building on the site, but the market may change. To make sure that the site 
would fit every kind of building, the company would build the foundations on 
a regular 30 x 30 ft. (9 x 9 metre) grid. This grid would have to be created be-
fore the work on the subway started.
The interviewee from Extell (case interview HY 02-07-A3) took an opposite 
position to Moinian when she stated that her company favoured mixed-use 
buildings even though these buildings are complex with regard to the eleva-
tors and you need a large footprint to build them. The incentives made it in-
teresting to build residential space on the site but if a buyer needed 1 million 
sq. ft. (93,000 sq. m) of office space without any residential space, her com-
pany would decide to build a ‘single-use’ building after all.
Delays6.2.15 
The project has experienced some serious setbacks related to rising costs and 
the slow-down in the economy. The estimated costs of the project are still 
$ 2.1 billion, even after the abandoning of the plans for the 10th Avenue sta-
tion. The project was left out of a cost review of the MTA because of the ongo-
ing negotiations between the City and the MTA on the expected higher costs 
of the project (NY Observer, 2008). Still, in October 2007 it turned out that one 
bidder was willing to carry out the work for $ 1.14 billion (without the inter-
mediate station, New York Times, 2007a). This means that the project is more 
or less on schedule. When the project was visited in 2007, work was expected 
to begin in late 2007 or early 2008. It did indeed start in December 2007 (Real 
Estate Weekly, 2007).
Critique6.2.16 
The subway project was mostly criticised for its high costs. Some have argued 
that cheaper alternatives for the subway would have been available if existing 
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tracks were used. Senator Schumer, who played a leading role in the project, 
does not share mayor Bloomberg’s opinion that the No. 7 subway extension 
is a top priority. He would have preferred the City to make the Moynihan sta-
tion (the revamped Penn Station, see Section 6.1.3) its top priority (Reuters UK, 
2008).
Some have also argued that the $ 1.14 billion that the MTA paid for the 
construction work (not including the intermediate station) was too high (New 
York Times, 2007a).
Common contract norms in Hudson 6.3 
Yards No. 7 subway extension
After the above general description of Hudson Yards and the focal projects, 
we now examine how this case fits in with relational contract theory as de-
scribed in Chapter 3, with particular emphasis on the ten common contract 
norms (see Section 3.4) in this context.
Introduction: General sketch of the agreements6.3.1 
The core documents that define the contractual relationship between the city 
and the landowners are the ground leases wherein the city leases the land 
from the developers for a 7-year period. These leases are accompanied by per-
petual easements and in some cases by cooperative agreements on how the 
work will be done. In the cooperative agreements, the MTA is not just a des-
ignee but a contract party. When the projects were studied, the cooperative 
agreements had not been negotiated yet and it was not certain whether they 
would be. The need for additional cooperative agreements depended on the 
final plans of the MTA for the construction work. If these plans were found 
to fit the interests of the landowners/developers, there would be no need to 
negotiate further agreements. The easements and cooperative agreements (if 
any) will spell out what both parties (developer/landowner and MTA) may do 
and what they may not do to make sure that all parties can realise their proj-
ects. The agreements will ensure that both parties help each other to carry 
out their projects.
The common contract norms on a discrete-relational scale
I start the description of the various norms with an overview of the outcome 
of an assessment of the norms on a discrete-relational scale. Note that this 
analysis focuses on the construction leases that were studied (see Section 
6.2.1).
Inspection of Table 6.1 shows that in this case, the common contract norms 
tend on balance to the relational side.
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Role integrity: more relational than discrete6.3.2 
Hudson Yards is a complex project because it involves both State and City en-
tities. The leases deal with the problem of role integrity by making clear that 
there is only one contracting party (the City) that contracts on behalf of it-
self and, with regard to the construction work, on behalf of the Metropolitan 
Transport Authority (MTA) – which is an agency of the State of New York. It 
sometimes refers to the Hudson Yards Development Corporation (HYDC) as 
its designee. The State of New York is not mentioned in the agreements. The 
leases also deal with role integrity by determining that the City of New York 
signs them in its capacity as tenant of the sites and in not in any other capac-
ity.
But the matter is more complicated than that. We saw that the leases state 
that other contracts may be necessary in which the parties may assume other 
roles (Section 6.3.1). A landlord may, for example, become an undertaker of 
work that has to be executed by the tenant (the City). A cooperation contract 
may be necessary in which the MTA coordinates its work with that of the 
landlord/developer (see Section 6.3.1).
The City acknowledged the risk of confronting private parties with its com-
plex organisation, and the problem that these private parties may have to deal 
at the same time with the City and with State agencies (in particular, the MTA). 
It therefore founded the Hudson Yards Development Corporation (HYDC) that 
brings parties together and is meant to facilitate the relation between the pri-
vate parties and the government departments and agencies (see Section 6.1.7). 
The HYDC is the key government actor in the project. The private parties were 
enthusiastic about the professionalism of the HYDC (case interview HY 03-07-
A6 and A7) but stated that still about 20 persons from different agencies had 
to be present during the negotiations (representatives of the MTA, HYDC, of 
the private parties, their contractors and their lawyers). This, according to the 
interviewees, was however more caused by the complexity of the project than 
by the complexity of the relationship between the parties.
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Discrete/relational matrix for common contract norms in Hudson YardsTable 6.1 
Norm
More discrete 
than relational
Equally discrete 
and relational
More relational 
than discrete
Role integrity ✕
Mutuality ✕
Implementation of planning ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
Flexibility ✕
Contractual solidarity ✕
Linking norms ✕
Creation and restraint of power ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Harmonisation with the social matrix ✕
Another issue is that the private parties want to start working on the 
(foundations of the) buildings at the same time as the MTA starts the con-
struction work. The private parties are not only landlords, they also sign in 
their capacity as developers. This makes the agreements so complex that in-
terviewees stated that not everything could be written down (case interview 
HY 03-07-A6).
Mutuality and reciprocity: more 6.3.3 
discrete than relational
The quid pro quo in the leases is first and foremost the rent that the City has 
to pay to the landowners (see also Section 6.2.9). The leases explicitly state 
that they (and the easements that come with them) are meant to facilitate 
the construction of the subway line and have no other purpose. The City pays 
the carrying costs of the leases, whereas the developers will see their land in-
crease in value because of the new infrastructure.
The other quid pro quo in the agreements is that the MTA will own the 
new subway extension. The landlord provides the opportunity to develop it. 
The collateral of the private parties then lies in their readiness to cooperate 
with the plan: if they were to refuse to transfer certain properties that the 
City requires (such as those at the entrance to the subway – see Section 6.2.5) 
to the City on a voluntary basis, the City would lose time and money by hav-
ing to start a condemnation procedure. Conversely, the City could adopt a 
more cooperative stance by choosing a construction that allows the private 
parties to retain the rights to their land, thus obviating the need for a con-
demnation procedure. We have seen that the cooperative attitude of the par-
ties is mostly caused by their well understood self interest, while they may 
adopt a different attitude in other negotiations (see Section 6.2.5).
Implementation of planning: more 6.3.4 
relational than discrete
The planning in the leases is strict in the sense that it only specifies an end 
date of the lease and raises the rent by at least 25 percent if the City wants 
to extend the lease by another year (see Section 6.2.15). The time scheme (5-7 
years) relates to real expectations of how long it will take to build the subway 
extension (unlike the Battery Park City leases; see Section 5.3.4). One of the 
interviewees stated that the duty to deliver the land within the agreed time 
frame actually favoured the City (HYDC) whereas it did not favour the MTA. 
That is because for the City the subway extension is a top priority whereas 
for the MTA it is only one of its priorities (case interview HY 03-07-A2).
Planning is a key issue in the agreement since the parties need to work si-
multaneously. But, except for the moment when the land has to be delivered 
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to the City and the provisions for the expiry dates of the lease, the planning 
is not specified. There is no phasing of the project implemented in the lease. 
The planning thus exists in the plan documents and in specific agreements 
that may be closed at a later stage; the leases acknowledge in this context 
that a flexible approach is necessary.
An example is the Meushar lease: Section 9.05 “The parties acknowledge 
that while Exhibit D represents the general scope of the most current draw-
ings as of the date hereof; and the location of the permanent is not expected 
to change, the parties continue to negotiate the locations of the permanent 
infrastructure (…).”
Effectuation of consent: 6.3.5 
equally discrete and relational
The core element of the consent of the parties is that the City will pay rent to 
the various private parties (landlords) and in return receives the land so that 
the MTA can build the subway extension.
The leases are mostly an elaboration of this agreement. Part of the consent 
is a flexible approach of the City and the MTA that acknowledge the interest 
of the private parties in the construction of buildings on top of the subway 
extension.
Flexibility: more relational than discrete6.3.6 
The agreements name flexibility as an important aspect of the contractual 
relation. The end date of the lease is not clearly defined and the parties ac-
knowledge that they will have to reach further agreements on the phasing of 
their work. It is clear that flexibility is a key element of the contractual rela-
tionship, from the fact that two complicated projects have to be carried out si-
multaneously. This requires a flexible approach to the construction work and 
the acknowledgment that not everything can be planned in advance (case in-
terviews HY 02-07-A2, A6, and A7)
Contractual solidarity: 6.3.7 
more relational than discrete
Contractual solidarity is, within the limited scope of the development proj-
ect, of enhanced importance. Parties need each other for the realisation of 
their goals. The City regards the subway extension as vital for the successful 
realisation of the project. The various private parties want to develop their 
high-rise buildings in the most profitable way. The City also has an interest in 
profitable development because its investments have to pay themselves off 
by the collection of property taxes (case interview HY 02-07-A1). The parties 
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thus need each other to a certain extent. To a certain extent because, while 
they are better off when they work together they do have other options. The 
City might ultimately decide to acquire the land by means of a condemnation 
procedure, while conversely the private parties can also realise their buildings 
without the subway extension.
The linking norms: restitution, 6.3.8 
reliance and expectation interests: 
more discrete than relational
Parties have closed their agreements in the expectation that the subway ex-
tension will be constructed. Although not building the subway extension is 
nowhere mentioned as a default option, it is a clear that the contract would 
be pointless if the City and the MTA were not to start construction.
The private parties rely on a cooperative attitude of the City with regard 
to the work they need to do to prepare for the construction of their high-rise 
buildings.
Creation and restraint of power: 6.3.9 
equally discrete and relational
The private parties do not own the land covered by the leases during the lease 
period, while the City cannot use the money that goes to pay rent on the land 
for other purposes.
Parties sometimes give each other a say when plans change, but this is 
more or less confined to changes with regard to the agreements.
However, the contracts are generally drafted in a classical terminology, 
which means that the landlord has to grant permission for everything that 
the tenant wants to do and that is not explicitly or implicitly permitted in the 
lease.
The leases do not include a general article that permits the tenant to do 
everything that is necessary for the realisation of the project, the leases au-
thorise the landlord to monitor the work of the tenant.
Propriety of means: equally discrete and relational6.3.10 
The tenant (the City) has the financial means required for construction of the 
project, but it is the MTA that will actually constructs the subway line.
During the negotiations, the private parties sometimes felt that the public 
parties (the City and the MTA) did not know enough about the building tech-
niques used for the construction of (high-rise) office and residential buildings 
to build the subway extension (and the platform above it; see Section 6.1.3) in 
such a way that they (the private parties) could later construct their high-rise 
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buildings on top of that. This is one of the reasons why they decided to start 
work on the foundations of their high-rise buildings simultaneously with the 
construction of the subway extension. The stress on the need for possession 
of adequate means (in the sense of adequate knowledge of constructional 
techniques) reflected by these negotiations gives the propriety of means norm 
a particularly relational character in this case – though it should be noted that 
the possession of adequate means always lies at the heart of the definition of 
this norm (see Section 3.4.10).
Harmonisation with the social 6.3.11 
matrix: relational and discrete
According to the interviewees, trust plays an important role in the relation be-
tween the parties in this case. The reason is that they could not write every-
thing down and thus had to trust each other. Trust can thus be regarded as an 
external norm here.
Another aspect of harmonisation with the social matrix, in a broader con-
text, is that one of the reasons why the City opted for a lease construction is 
that there is no broad political support in New York for public ownership of 
land. A scenario in which the land stayed privately owned was thus preferred 
to one where the land would be expropriated (case interview, Department of 
City Planning and HYDC HY 03-07-A1 and A2). These views were well known 
to the developers, who used them as arguments against expropriation of their 
land (case interviews HY 03-07-A2, A6, A7).
Balance of discrete and relational norms 6.3.12 
in the Hudson Yards agreements
The prevailence of discrete and relational elements in the common contract 
norms for these projects has already been surveyed in Table 5.1. We will now 
look at things from a slightly different perspective, by indicating the relative 
importance of the various norms (see Table 6.2).
The Hudson Yards agreements share discrete and relational elements. But 
on a discrete-relational scale they turn out to be more relational than discrete. 
We also find that most of the relational norms turned out to be of enhanced 
importance whereas the norms of discreteness and presentiation are not.
The main reason for this is that the assessed agreements are relatively 
simple: they are basically about the lease of land by a government author-
ity for a relatively short period for the construction of the subway extension. 
The key factors here are then only the price to be paid and the duties of land-
lord and tenant with regard to the land. But when the agreements start deal-
ing with the projects, the need for cooperation, flexibility and a lower degree 
of specificity arises. This automatically leads to an emphasis on contractual 
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solidarity, since the parties need each other to realise their projects and it be-
comes less likely that one of them will, in case of default, favour an action 
or remedy for damages to a solution where the other party fulfil its (mate-
rial) obligations. The projects that form part of the agreement are the subway 
extension on the one hand – which is the reason why the local government 
wanted to lease the land – and the high-rise projects that the developers want 
to realise on the other. These projects require close co-operation, since they 
have to be executed simultaneously.
A flexible approach is particularly required because of the complexity of 
underground construction, which means that not everything can be planned 
precisely in advance. The leases reflect this need for flexibility and some-
times explicitly state that their text is deliberately imprecise because the par-
ties were unable to commit to a precise planning at the time when the leases 
were drawn up.
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Importance of discrete and relational norms in Hudson YardsTable 6.2 
1. Discrete norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Discreteness ✕
Presentiation ✕
Implementation of planning* ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
2. Relational norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Role integrity ✕
Preservation of the relation ✕
Resolution of relational conflict ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Supra-contract norms ✕
* When the norms of discreteness and presentiation are not of enhanced 
importance, it makes more sense to view the implementation of planning 
norm as a relational norm. In other words, the importance of planning in such 
projects then follows from the nature of the observed relation between the 
parties rather than from the wording of the agreements.
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Case Study 7 
Amsterdam Zuid as 
The Gershwin and Mahler4 projects
The urban development project: 7.1 
the Amsterdam Zuid as
Introduction7.1.1 
Until recently, Amsterdam, which wants to grow in the (financial) service in-
dustry, lacked a central business district. Head offices were scattered all over 
town.
The Zuid as project started off with the aim of creating an international 
business centre that could attract national and international head offices. In 
addition, the city also aims to create a lively mixed neighbourhood of high 
quality here. The Zuid as has become the biggest strategic urban project in the 
Netherlands. It is also one of the most ambitious and complex. The aim to 
create an international business centre combined with significant new infra-
structure has resulted in major participation of the national government in 
the project.
The complexity of this project is due to the chosen type of public private 
partnership, which is unprecedented in Amsterdam. In addition, the infra-
structure causes complexity as does the project’s aim to create both a major 
business district and a lively urban residential quarter. The aim to create a 
lively neighbourhood, and more than just a collection of office buildings and 
expat apartments, seems to be the more difficult of the two to realise (Salet 
& Majoor, 2006). The main assets of the project are its strategic location and 
the ample room it offers for development. But, in October 2008 it was still not 
clear whether the Zuid as would be developed in the way that the main par-
ties intended.
Still, the Zuid as promises to become a major business district to which 
most important Dutch banks and law firms have moved their head offic-
es during the past five years. A lively high-density neighbourhood has also 
grown up here over this period.
Description of the area7.1.2 
The Amsterdam Zuid as (South Axis) is a more or less greenfield site 1.1 kilo-
metres (0.7 miles) long on either side of the Amsterdam Ring Road, located on 
the edge of Amsterdam between Schiphol Airport and the part of the city to 
the south of the centre known as Amsterdam Zuid (Amsterdam South; see Fig-
ure 7.1). The region covered by the plan has a total area of 225 ha (556 acres).
Until recently, the area was best known for the peaceful suburb of Buiten-
veldert (built in the 1960s) just to the south of the plan area, the football club 
AFC, VU University Amsterdam (and the university hospital attached to it, 
VUmc), the World Trade Center and the RAI Exhibition and Congress Centre. 
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AFC
1
2
Source: courtesy of Zuid as Amsterdam/dRO
Figure 7.1 Amsterdam Zuid as, including the Gershwin and Mahler4 projects
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1 View of the Gershwin and Mahler4 project
 Photo: Zuidas Amsterdam/Doriann Kransberg
2 Gershwin view april 2008
3 Areal view of the Zuid as in progress
4 Gershwin Symphony redering
5  Two office blocks by the architects Raphael Vinoly 
(left) and Toyo Ito (right)
2-5 Courtesy of Zuid as Amsterdam/dRO
5
4
3
Other well-known buildings in the area are the Court of Justice and the Dutch 
branch of Sotheby’s auction house. Despite these facilities, and the presence 
of two railway stations (Amsterdam RAI and Amsterdam Zuid), the area still 
has plenty of room for development. In the 1960s, it was developed in low 
densities and not as an integral part of the city: the various existing build-
ings were not part of any designated suburb. At night the neighbourhood was 
deserted since, despite the presence of VU University Amsterdam, there were 
no nightlife facilities. The situation has changed slightly of recent years, but 
a visitor to the area today will still see a neighbourhood largely dominated by 
offices and not very lively at night.
Description of the project7.1.3 
The most recent master plan (from 2004) provides for 50,000 people working 
in the area and 20,000 people living there. About 1 million sq. m (10.7 million 
sq. ft.) will be developed as residential space and 985,000 sq. m (10.6 million 
sq. ft.) as office space, while 320,000 sq. m (3.4 million sq. ft.) are reserved for 
facilities such as stores, museums, theatres and restaurants (Gemeente Am-
sterdam, 2004). These numbers do not include the Zuid asDok (Southern Axis 
Dock) area described in greater detail below.
The overall Zuid as project area is divided into three parts, Zuid as West, 
Zuid as Centre and Zuid as East. Within each of these three parts, various sub-
projects exist that are all part of the larger plan but the development of which 
is not interdependent. A distinction should be drawn here between Zuid-
as Dock, situated more or less on top of the Ring Road, and the projects on 
both flanks of the Ring Road. Some of the latter have already been developed, 
some are being developed and some will be developed in the future. The Zuid-
as Dock project is still under discussion; it is a prestigious project that is also 
very costly. Most public and private parties however agree that the develop-
ment of the Dock is necessary to create an integrated neighbourhood instead 
of a collection of separate subprojects.
Zuid as Dock
The Zuid as Dock consists of 4,000 residential units (320,000 sq. m, 3.4 million 
sq. ft.), 338,750 sq. m (3.6 million sq. ft.) of office space and 115,000 sq. m (1.2 
million sq. ft.) of other facilities. The aim of the Zuid as Dock project is to bring 
the infrastructure (ring road, light and heavy rail) underground over the entire 
length of the project area (see picture). This would do away with the present 
situation in which the Zuid as is cut in half by the ring road and create one in-
tegrated area. Extra residential and office space and other facilities could then 
be realised in the additional space created in this way (that is, on top of the 
ring road). The development potential of the whole Zuid as area would more 
than double to 2.7 million sq. m (29 million sq. ft.). The costs of the Zuid as 
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Dock operation are estimated at € 4 billion, and would be paid for by the lease 
rights on top of the infrastructure. Despite the attractiveness of this proposal 
from a planning perspective, the business case turned out to be very com-
plex. In 2004, Elco Brinkman, a well-known former politician who headed the 
national coalition of 17 representative organisations in the Dutch construc-
tion industry (known in Dutch as the Algemeen Verbond Bouwbedrijf) was asked 
to write a report on the financial feasibility of the project. He presented his 
findings in 2005 (Brinkman, 2005) and concluded that enough private parties 
showed interest to make the project feasible. Pursuant to this report, in Janu-
ary 2006, public parties signed a contract in which they laid down how they 
would work together and how much they would invest in the project8 (see 
Section 7.1.8). The City of Amsterdam decided to organise an auction in which 
selected parties could bid for shares in the Zuid as Corporation (see Section 
7.1.7) but though the aim had been to attract international parties, only Dutch 
banks expressed interest. In 2005, it turned out that these parties were not 
willing to carry the risks of the project. The project was reshaped and it was 
put out to tender for the second time, which attracted one extra party, the 
Bank of Scotland. Be this as it may, the addition of the Bank of Scotland was 
enough to allow the Zuid as project to go ahead.
But despite these efforts, the Zuid as Dock project remains expensive and 
the tunnelling of the infrastructure is associated with many financial risks. In 
2007, one of the leading banks in the project, ABN AMRO, was sold to a con-
sortium of three banks, the Dutch-Belgian Fortis banking and insurance group, 
HBOS and the Spanish bank Santander. In 2008, Fortis suffered badly from the 
worldwide credit crisis, and later that year the Dutch part of the bank (Fortis-
ABN AMRO) was nationalised by the Dutch government. This leaves the con-
sortium of banks short of one member, while the other banks are also suffer-
ing from the credit crisis. The Zuid as Corporation will therefore probably have 
to look for new investors. In fact, the continuing effects of the credit crisis are 
such that it is doubtful whether the analysis of the Zuid as project given here 
will still retain its validity in a few years time.
Projects on the flanks of the Zuid as area
Other projects are or will be developed on the flanks of the Zuid as area, on 
either side of the ring road. Although development of the Zuid as Dock will in-
fluence the shape and size of neighbouring projects, the development of these 
subprojects does not depend on that of the Dock. The master plan (2004) dis-
8   Bestuurlijke Overeenkomst Zuid asdok (Administrative Agreement South Axis Dock), dated 31 January 2006, 
between the State of the Netherlands, the minister of Housing, Spatial planning and the Environment, the 
minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, the municipality of Amsterdam, the province 
of Noord-Holland and the Regional Organ Amsterdam (ROA).
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cerns the following subprojects: Mahler4, Gershwin, Vivaldi, Noordzone (North 
zone), Ravel, Kop Zuid as (Head of the South Axis), Beethoven and the Univer-
sity Quarter (project centred on the campus of VU University Amsterdam)9. 
Decision-making on these projects takes place in three phases. In the first 
phase, the municipality takes a (draft) decision that gives a general outline of 
the different spatial functions and building volumes of the project. The sec-
ond phase comprises public consultation on this decision. The third phase 
consists of an executive decision embodying a detailed building programme, 
an urban design concept and a cooperation contract with the developers (see 
Section 7.1.16). Details of the individual subprojects are given below .
Gershwin
3 subprojects (including Symphony, see below)
136,000 sq. m (1.5 million sq. ft.) of residential space
10,000 sq. m (108,000 sq. ft.) of office space
12,900 sq. m (139,000 sq. ft.) of other facilities.
Symphony
15,000 sq. m (161,000 sq. ft.) of residential space
10,000 sq. m (108,000 sq. ft.) of office space
12,600 sq. m (136,000 sq. ft.) of other facilities.
The Gershwin project focuses on residential space, but also includes a land-
mark development (Symphony) of two towers that will include a hotel and a 
museum. Gershwin is one of the focal projects of this chapter, and is analysed 
in depth in Sections 7.2 and 7.4.
Mahler4
166,500 sq. m (1.8 million sq. ft.) of office space
41,900 sq. m (451,000 sq. ft.) of residential space (194 apartments)
25,563 sq. m (275,000 sq. ft.) of other facilities (including 1912 parking places).
Mahler4 focuses mainly on office space, but also includes an appreciable 
number of upmarket apartments. Mahler4 is the other focal project in this 
chapter; see Sections 7.3 and 7.5 for an analysis of this case.
Vivaldi
88,000 sq. m (947,000 sq. ft.) of residential space
265,550 sq. m (2.9 million sq. ft.) of office space
9   Note that, although the RAI Exhibition and Congress Centre is located at the fringe of the Zuid as area, 
its redevelopment (consisting mainly of the construction of a new hall, the Expo foyer) is not an integral 
part of the Zuid as plan. The situation here thus differs from that in the Hudson Yards project, where the 
redevelopment of the Javits Convention Center was regarded as one of the main projects (see Section 6.3).
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38,000 sq. m (409,000 sq. ft.) of other facilities.
The Vivaldi project focuses on more intensive use of the area near the RAI 
railway station, where an appreciable number of office buildings had already 
been constructed. The Dutch branch of Sotheby’s auction house is also al-
ready present in the area. The development is undertaken in cooperation with 
existing users of the area.
Noordzone (North zone)
The Noordzone project is a complex because it consists of 5 subprojects, one 
of which, the Forum office centre (15,700 sq. m/169,000 sq. ft.) has already 
been completed. The redevelopment of the Rietveld Academie (a prestigious 
art school), including the construction of a new building, has also been com-
pleted. Other projects include more intensive development of Fred Roeskelaan10, 
where many educational facilities are located, and of a Roman Catholic cem-
etery. A final decision on this last-mentioned project was expected in 2008.
Redevelopment of Strawinskylaan will be concretised after the plans for the 
Dock have been finalised.
The plans for the redevelopment of the Atrium office centre (owned by 
Tishman Speyer, a company that we also encountered in Hudson Yards, see 
Section 6.1.3) and the Court of Justice had not been concretised at the time of 
writing (October 2008).
Ravel
110,000 sq. m (1.2 million sq. ft.) of residential space (880 units)
80,000 sq. m (861,000 sq. ft.) of office space
40,000 sq. m (430,000 sq. ft.) of other facilities.
Ravel will create a new shopping street as well as a new park (Amalia Park) and 
a new canal (Boelegracht). It will therefore be one of the livelier areas in the 
Zuid as.
Kop Zuid as (Head of the Zuid as)
50,000 sq. m (538,000 sq. ft.) of office space
50,000 sq. m (538,000 sq. ft.) of residential space
70,000sq. m (753,000 sq. ft.) of other facilities.
Kop Zuid as will be the nightlife centre of the project. The project includes a 
musical theatre, restaurants and bars.
Beethoven
30,000 sq. m (323,000 sq. ft.) of office space
30,000 sq. m (323,000 sq. ft.) of residential space
10  Laan is a common Dutch name for a street.
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27,000 sq. m (290,000 sq. ft.) of other facilities.
The Beethoven project will be constructed in low densities, and focus on 
smaller office buildings (with an average of 5,000 sq. m of floor space per 
building). It will also include a new Design centre (larger than the existing 
centre, Platform 21) that aims to attract artists and designers.
VU Quarter (project centred on the campus of VU University Amsterdam)
102,000 sq. m (1.1 million sq. ft.) of residential space
143,000 sq. m (1.5 million sq. ft.) of office space
201,800 sq. m (2.2 million sq. ft.) of other facilities (including the new campus 
of VU University Amsterdam)
Goldstar Tennis park and Buitenveldert sports park.
VU University Amsterdam became gradually involved in the project; in March 
2008 it decided to replace its 40-year old main building and become a more 
integral partner in the project by integrating its campus into a plan that in-
cludes cultural facilities, bars, restaurants and (student) housing and is meant 
to contribute to the liveliness of the area (VU, 2008).
WTC and Zuidplein (South Square)
60,000 sq. m (646,000 sq. ft.) of office space (2 towers)
This project consisted of refurbishment of the square in front of the Amster-
dam Zuid rail station and redevelopment of the existing World Trade Center 
(WTC), including the development of 20,000 sq. m of office space in the exist-
ing tower and construction of a new tower with a floor space of 40,000 sq. m. 
The project was completed in 2004.
Momentum7.1.4 
In 1994 the largest Dutch bank at that time, ABN AMRO, decided to move 
its head offices to the Zuid as. It confronted the city with this decision, stat-
ing that if the city did not approve the move it would move its head offices 
abroad. The city permitted the bank to build its new head offices right next 
to the Amsterdam Zuid railway station. The decision by ABN AMRO created 
momentum for the whole area, which from then on became the focus for the 
creation of a new business district instead of the one that the city had intend-
ed to build in the heart of Amsterdam near the central railway station (see 
Section 7.1.6). The IT boom of the mid-1990s also contributed to the demand 
for more office space in Amsterdam.
A decision that helped to boost the project’s momentum was that taken 
by the City of Amsterdam in 1997 to support the idea of a major infrastruc-
ture project in the Zuid as. One of the key advantages of this the area is its 
excellent communications: the Amsterdam ring road (the A10 motorway, con-
structed between the mid 1960s and the mid 1990s) passes through it, and it 
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also contains the Amsterdam Zuid rail station that links the area to Schiphol 
(with a journey time of about 6 minutes), the light-rail ring line that connects 
the Zuid as to other business areas and tram line 5 that provides a fast service 
to Amsterdam city centre and the commuter town of Amstelveen.
The focus on infrastructure turned out to be of key importance for attract-
ing the national government as a major investor in the project (Majoor, 2008). 
The minister of Finance had been reluctant to provide subsidy for the project, 
but was overruled by the national government’s approval of a major country-
wide infrastructure programme that focused on the upgrading of key station 
areas (see Section 7.1.14).
During the past three years, most large Dutch banks and law firms have 
moved their head offices to the Zuid as. The project has been less successful 
in its aim to attract international head offices. Not much can be said yet on 
the future success of the area in its aim to become both a successful neigh-
bourhood for living in and a major business district, but academics are scepti-
cal (Salet & Majoor, 2006; Majoor, 2008).
Time frame7.1.5 
After the decision by ABN AMRO to move its head offices to the Zuid as ar-
ea, the city decided in 1994 to draw up an integrated plan for the whole ar-
ea (Dijkmeester, 2002). The first Master plan was presented in 1998. The city 
presented its first vision on the Zuid as in 1999 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1999). 
This was updated in 2001 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2001), and yet again in 2004 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004).
It makes sense to name 1998, the year in which the Master plan was pre-
sented, as the starting date of the project. The planning foresees completion 
of the project in 2030.
History and background7.1.6 
Amsterdam has long felt the lack of a unified business district like Wall Street 
in New York, the City and latterly Docklands in London and La Défense in Par-
is. Head offices of companies were scattered all over town. In the early 1990s 
the City of Amsterdam decided to develop a new financial centre in the old 
harbour, the IJ, around the central railway station. The project was called the 
Amsterdam Waterfront (AWF), and a public-private partnership, the Amster-
dam Waterfront Financieringsmaatschappij, was set up between the City of Am-
sterdam and two private parties: Nationale Nederlanden, the country’s larg-
est insurance company, and NMB-Postbank, a merger of two major banks. 
The two private parties later merged in 1990 and became the Internationale 
Nederlanden Groep (ING). The world-famous architect Rem Koolhaas made 
a plan for the area envisaging a kind of ‘Manhattan on the IJ’. But the AWF 
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failed to take off – at least to the extent originally envisaged – when ING de-
cided to withdraw in the spring of 1993 (Majoor, 2008).
The main reasons for the failure of the project as initially planned may 
however have been the economic downturn of the early 1990s, and the fact 
that after the fusion between NMB-Postbank and Nationale Nederlanden only 
one private party was left to carry the risks of a very large project (Majoor, 
2008). It then turned out that the private sector preferred the Zuid as area to 
the location around the Central Station, because of its excellent communica-
tions and the fact that it was, by comparison, more or less virgin territory (see 
Section 7.1.2).
In the meantime, the Amsterdam Waterfront project has changed from a 
single grandiose plan to a number of little projects with a strong emphasis 
on housing and cultural facilities and little or none on business (Gemeente 
Amsterdam, 2003). In this revised form, it is generally regarded as a successful 
urban development project.
Project management7.1.7 
The Zuid as project is managed by the Amsterdam City Council, which re-
placed Stadsdeel Zuideramstel as planning authority because of the impor-
tance of this project.11 It manages the project from its Project Office, which 
also manages other municipal projects. The more specific issues are managed 
from the Zuid as project office, which became the Zuid as Corporation in 2007.
We may differentiate between three roles of the city: administrator, de-
veloper and project initiator or broker (entrepreneurial role). The first role in-
cludes the enforcement of the plans. It is undertaken by (various departments 
of) the municipal administration and the city’s Project Office. The second role, 
involving the development of the various sites and including responsibility 
for the public infrastructure and most public spaces, is undertaken by various 
city departments working together with developers, the Project Office and the 
Zuid as Corporation. Finally, the city’s desire to make the project successful 
and to attract high quality end users (its entrepreneurial role) is undertaken 
by the Zuid as Corporation.
In Amsterdam, the city administration has the right to reject design pro-
posals from a developer when they do not suit the area for which they are 
proposed. This task is performed by a project supervisor appointed by the city 
for the whole Zuid as area. He advises the city with regard to issues that con-
cern design quality, from both a cluster specific and a Zuid as point of view.
11   The city is divided in smaller boroughs, each with its own civil servants and council. Stadsdeel Zuiderams-
tel (the Southern Amstel district) is one of these.
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Zuid as Corporation
At the time of writing the public Zuid as Corporation had been set up, but 
not the public-private Zuid as NV, the limited company that will manage the 
project. The Zuid as Corporation is established to manage the development of 
the Zuid as Dock. It is planned to consist of both public and private parties 
whereby the private parties (the banks) will own the majority of the shares 
(see also Section 7.1.8). The public parties involved are the national govern-
ment (represented by the ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Envi-
ronment (which we will call the ministry of Housing for short) and the minis-
try of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (which we will call the 
ministry of Transport for short), the City of Amsterdam, the Regional Organ 
Amsterdam (ROA)12, and the province of Noord-Holland (the Dutch province 
within which Amsterdam is situated). We have seen that the banks involved 
might withdraw now that ABN AMRO no longer exists in its previous form 
(see Section 7.1.8) and Fortis is suffering severely from the worsened econom-
ic climate (Section 7.1.3; Het Parool, 2008a; 2008c). The structure of the corpo-
ration is complex because the Dutch government did not originally intend to 
invest in the project (Majoor, 2008; het Parool, 2008a). After a negative advice 
from the bank Credit Suisse to the government, stating that the latter had to 
assume some of the risks originally intended to be borne by the corporation 
and give the private parties more control, it seems doubtful whether Zuid as 
NV will ever come into existence at all.
Project finance7.1.8 
The private sector and various layers of the Dutch government finance the 
project. The finance structure of the flank projects is not very complicated. 
The city owns the land and finances its part of the project by leasing plots to 
private parties. The city has committed itself to investing the profits from the 
Zuid as in the same area and not in other projects.
Zuid as NV
The Zuid as NV – if it ever comes into existence (see Section 7.1.7) – will con-
sist of the private parties that won the auction for its shares (60%) and public 
parties (40%). It will develop the Zuid as Dock and the remaining parcels in the 
rest of the area.
The private parties that were pre-selected are ABN AMRO Bank, Bank Ne-
derlandse Gemeenten (BNG), Fortis Bank, Bank of Scotland (HBOS), ING, Ra-
bobank and the pension fund ABP. We already saw that in 2007 one of the 
12   The Regional Organ Amsterdam (ROA) involves the co-operation of 16 municipalities in the Amsterdam 
region that (aim to) streamline their transport, spatial planning, housing, childcare and economic policies. 
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main private initiators of the project, ABN AMRO, was sold to a consortium 
formed by Fortis Bank, Bank of Scotland and the Spanish bank Santander. 
ABN AMRO no longer exists as a major bank since it has been divided in three 
parts, one belonging to each of the three purchasers. The Dutch part of that 
new concern was nationalised in 2008.
Dutch Railways and the local and national governments will own the in-
frastructure. The most notable agreement made during the setting up of the 
Zuid as Corporation – which will also apply to Zuid as NV – is that the private 
parties may limit their risks to the sum of € 300 million. If the project were to 
lose more than this amount, they may withdraw from Zuid as NV, leaving con-
trol vested in to the public parties which will bear the residual risks.
The public investments in the corporation, as agreed in the 2006 contract 
(2003 price levels), are:
The national Government will acquire a maximum of 50% of zero coupon  ■
bonds of which the total value is estimated at € 130 million.
In addition, the Ministry of Housing will invest  ■ € 105 million and the Min-
istry of Transport will invest € 420 million. The investments of the minis-
try of Transport involve the infrastructure, while those of the ministry of 
Housing are linked to the development of infrastructure but involve the 
whole Amsterdam Zuid station area (not including the infrastructure).
City of Amsterdam:  ■ € 345 million + 50% of the income from the flank proj-
ects above € 345 million. The city will try to generate an extra income of 
€ 100 million from these projects, which would result in an extra invest-
ment of € 50 million in the corporation.
Province of Noord Holland:  ■ € 75 million. (The Province of Noord-Holland is 
one of the twelve Dutch provinces, and is the one in which Amsterdam is 
situated. It has 2.5 million inhabitants. The provinces have some powers 
with regard to policies that concern the whole province.)
Regional Organ Amsterdam (ROA):  ■ € 50 million (mentioned as an intention 
in the contract).
Ownership7.1.9 
The project land is owned by the city, which leases it to the developers. The na-
tional government owns the national infrastructure (motorways and railways).
Affordable housing7.1.10 
The City of Amsterdam has a policy that obliges developers to reserve 30% 
of all newly developed residential space for affordable housing. In the Zuid as, 
the city implements that obligation by demanding that the development con-
sortia include a housing corporation and by providing a discount on the lease 
price for the construction of affordable housing.
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Environmental sustainability7.1.11 
The plans set high standards for environmental sustainability, but the city 
has to rely on the willingness of private parties to realise its most ambitious 
aims (see Section 7.3.11 for an example concerning Mahler4). One of the (re-
alised) ambitions includes a climate management system for the buildings 
whereby cold and warm water is stored underground to save energy. A system 
has been developed whereby the water from the nearby lake is used to heat 
and cool the space within the office buildings.
Other public facilities7.1.12 
Various public facilities will be developed in the area, for example an exten-
sion of the Beatrix Park and the new Amalia Park, various schools, a musical 
theatre, several museums, restaurants, bars and a new shopping street.
The city hopes that public facilities will help in creating an integrated 
neighbourhood. So far (October 2008), this aim has not been realised and it is 
too early to judge whether it will be achieved in the long run or not.
Finally, The Zuid as plan (2004) includes provisions for a so-called ‘stedelijke 
plint’ (‘urban façade’) which means that the first ten metres of the buildings 
should consist of publicly accessible facilities such as shops or restaurants. 
The city states that the parties aim to find a balance between commercial and 
non-commercial facilities.
Involvement of the general public7.1.13 
The influence of the public on the Zuid as project has so far been kept to a 
minimum. Dutch administrative law is generous in allowing individuals and 
organisations a say in urban development plans that could affect them, and 
Amsterdam is no exception to this rule. But apart from the procedures re-
quired under administrative law, the city has not done much to involve the 
public in the Zuid as project.
Some community groups have been involved in the projects, most notably 
the group Vrienden van het Beatrixpark (Friends of Beatrix Park) that has suc-
cessfully lobbied for the extension of the park and low-density development in 
the surrounding projects. In addition, environmental organisations have suc-
cessfully proceeded against the Mahler4 and Gershwin projects (see Section 
7.2.15). Various stakeholders have been heard with regard to smaller projects, 
such as the function and theme of a museum in one of the Symphony towers.
But, generally speaking, the local population has not been involved in the 
project beyond the minimum requirements that laws and regulations set and 
has not shown much interest in the project either. The main reason for the 
absence of public interest is arguably that the Zuid as is not an integrated part 
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of the city and only known for the presence of the new office towers.
The situation could change if the project were to become too costly for the 
city, as might happen if the other public parties (which means basically the 
national government) were to decide to go ahead with Zuid as Dock without 
the involvement of private parties (Het Parool, 2008a; 2008b). Residents of Am-
sterdam might then start to complain that too much of their municipal taxes 
were being spent on a costly white elephant.
Goals of the project7.1.14 
The goal of the Zuid as project is to create a prestigious new business centre 
in Amsterdam as well as a residential neighbourhood that is characterised by 
its mixed-use buildings, its liveability and high standards of design and its 
compliance with environmental standards. It should be a safe neighbourhood, 
and when the offices close in the evenings and at the weekend, it should still 
be a lively area. As a business location, it should be able to compete with 
prime business centres in other European cities. It should make a major con-
tribution to the economy of the city and to the Dutch national economy.
Majoor (2008) discerns three ways in which the project is framed. His over-
view provides an insight into the goals and interests associated with the de-
velopment of the area. The Zuid as is framed (1) as a new competitive business 
location for Amsterdam, (2) as an intensively urbanised mixed-use area and 
(3) as a major infrastructure project.
The economic competitiveness of the location is enhanced by the fact that 
some strategic institutions are already situated in the area. These included 
the Insurance Stock Exchange, the World Trade Centre and the RAI exhibition 
and congress centre.
The framing of the project as an intensively urbanised mixed-use area has 
strong rhetorical overtones for Amsterdam, which has a tradition of mixing 
functions in the city. In addition, it shapes the project as a new city centre 
and thereby makes the city polycentric. Still, at the time of writing the area 
consists mostly of office building and the image of a new, innovative, urban 
space exists mostly in the heads of those involved in the projects. The Zuid-
as is not known as a lively urban centre by the wider population of the city. 
I have already mentioned that the development of the campus of VU Univer-
sity Amsterdam might change this situation in the near future (see Section 
7.1.3). In addition, the first apartment buildings will open in late 2008. In other 
words, if all goes well, the area may change within a couple of years into the 
lively urban neighbourhood that has long been aimed at.
The framing of the Zuid as as an infrastructure project is helped by its su-
perb location (see Section 7.1.2). The relevance of the Zuid as as a national 
project was mostly framed in infrastructural terms, as the Amsterdam Zuid 
railway station was regarded as a possible stop for the high speed train (HST) 
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that will connect the Netherlands to Belgium and Germany. This development 
resulted in an award of national funds, since the Zuid as was recognised as 
one of the six key national projects in this field, which aim to create top-qual-
ity public infrastructure nodes. Majoor (2008) mentions that for a long time, 
the aim of creating a high-quality station area at Amsterdam Zuid was unre-
lated to the other two aims of the Zuid as project.
He thus points at differences between national goals on the one hand and 
local and regional goals on the other. But since the city needed investments 
from the national government, it reframed the project as one of national im-
portance in which the Zuid as Dock played a pivotal role.
Delays7.1.15 
Financial insecurities have delayed the Zuid as Dock project (see Section 7.1.7). 
At the level of the subprojects, administrative legal procedures resulted in de-
lays of one and a half years for the Mahler4 project and two years for the Ger-
shwin project. The city lost all court cases on the grounds that it could not 
guarantee a sufficient quality of the air in the area, due to high levels of fine 
particulate matter. I will provide more details on these court proceedings and 
the delays they caused in Section 7.2.15.
Role of private actors in the project7.1.16 
Unlike other projects in Amsterdam, private actors started the Zuid as proj-
ect. We have seen that the decisive moment was when ABN AMRO decided to 
build its head offices in the area (Section 7.1.6). The influence of private par-
ties in the project is therefore strong. The private parties have become sup-
porters of the model whereby the Zuid as was to be developed as an integrated 
urban quarter. Not in the last place because investing in the housing market 
in Amsterdam has over the years been a more secure investment than an in-
vestment in the office market. We have seen that the Zuid as Dock is supposed 
to be financed by a consortium of private and public parties in which the pri-
vate parties take the lead (Section 7.1.3).
The way in which the cooperation between the public and private parties 
takes place depends on the existing ownership situations of the various plots. 
In Mahler4 and Gershwin, most lease rights were owned by the city that used 
a selection procedure to attract developers for the Gershwin project (see Sec-
tion 7.4.5). In the other projects the city cooperates with the landowners who 
were already present.
In addition, semi-privatised parties and non-profit parties such as VU Uni-
versity Amsterdam, several art institutions and housing corporations develop 
specific projects within the subproject areas.
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Public actors7.1.17 
The most important public actors involved in the project are:
National Government:
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM): sub- ■
sidises some funds in the project but is not the planning authority in the 
area.
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (VWS): in- ■
volved in the infrastructure parts of the project and subsidises the devel-
opment of the area around the Zuid-WTC station.
Province of Noord-Holland: has some controlling powers in the area and  ■
invests in Zuid as NV.
Regional Organ Amsterdam (ROA): has mostly soft (non-binding) powers  ■
to coordinate actions between 16 government bodies. Intends to invest in 
Zuid as NV.
City of Amsterdam:
Project Office: manages the various subprojects. ■
Zuid as Corporation (formerly Zuid as project office): manages the Zuid as  ■
Dock and is intended to be a private-public company.
Vrienden van het Beatrixpark ■  (Friends of Beatrix Park): community action 
group that was (and is) involved in the plans for the redevelopment of Bea-
trix Park.
Critique7.1.18 
So far (as of October 2008), the Zuid as has not been subject of a broad public 
debate despite some recent efforts to stimulate such discussion. Criticisms 
thus mostly focus on the high (financial) risks involved in the Zuid as Dock 
project, and the high risks to be borne by the city within the context of Zuid as 
NV (Oudenampsen & Uitermark, 2008). A collection of scientific articles was 
published in 2006 under the title Amsterdam South Axis: New European Space 
(Salet & Majoor, 2006) that took a very critical approach to the project. Many 
authors argued that the Zuid as had not been successful in its aim to create 
one of Europe’s most noteworthy projects.
Conflicts of power: State and City interests7.1.19 
We have seen that the state defines its interests in the Zuid as project mostly 
from a perspective of infrastructure whereas, for the city, that is only one of 
the three main goals. The city and the state have managed to reach an agree-
ment in which they defined the project as one of mutual interest and brought 
their land into the Zuid as Corporation. We will have to wait and see how 
strong this mutual interest is if that construction falls apart. So far, the state 
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and the city continue to declare that they have faith in the project and are 
confident that private parties will participate in it (Het Parool, 2008b; 2008c). 
Recent developments whereby the Dutch national government is now the 
owner of Fortis-ABN AMRO might result in new conflicts of interest.
Focal project: (1) The Zuidschans project 7.2 
within the Gershwin project area
Introduction7.2.1 
The Gershwin project is a subproject in the flank of the Zuid as area. It is the 
first project that focuses on the development of residential space. The Zuid-
schans project is one of four projects within the Gershwin area. I studied the 
agreement for that project in depth, as it was the only one of the four Gersh-
win contracts that I could get hold of. Case interviews for the project were 
conducted in 2006 and 2007 (see Appendix B). I studied the Zuidschans project 
within the context of the other projects in the area and am confident to say 
that, with the exception of Symphony, the other projects are mostly similar to 
the Zuidschans project since the city took a standardised approach and the 
various subprojects often involved (partly) the same private parties.
The Symphony towers will provide a new dimension to the project when 
they open: they offer cultural facilities that are now mostly absent in the proj-
ect and that might attract a new public. One aspect of the project that attract-
ed considerable public and media interest is the fact that the Symphony tow-
ers were one of the real estate projects that were sold as part of a major fraud 
scheme involving a former director of Bouwfonds Real Estate and an employee 
of the Philips pension fund. These individuals seem only to have defrauded 
their own companies. At the time of writing neither the city, the civil servants 
involved in the deal, nor the companies have been prosecuted and the fraud 
does not seem to have caused any direct financial disadvantage for the city.
Positioning (area)7.2.2 
Gershwin is located on the south of the Zuid as area (behind Mahler4, see Sec-
tion 7.3.2). It is bordered by Boelelaan, Buitenveldertselaan, Gustav Mahlerlaan 
and Beethovenstraat (see Figure 7.1). Some apartment buildings will be con-
structed along a new 25-metre-wide canal, the Boelegracht. Until recently, the 
area was mostly known for the presence of a BP petrol station that has now 
been removed (see Section 7.2.8).
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Description of the project7.2.3 
Gershwin consists of two subprojects. The first subproject involves the two 
Symphony towers, the second project consists of three projects that focus on 
residential space. Zuidschans is one of the three consortia that are working 
on a project in this area.
Symphony ■
15,000 sq. m (161,000 sq. ft.) of residential space (100 units), ■
10,000 sq. m (108,000 sq. ft.) of office space and ■
19,600 sq. m (211,000 sq. ft.) of other facilities, including a museum (3000  ■
sq. m/32,000 sq. ft.) and a hotel (12,600 sq. m/136,000 sq. ft.).
Other projects ■
The other subprojects occupy an area of 136,000 sq. m (1,46 million sq. ft.), 
the greater part of which will be developed as residential space (1,090 units, 
113,000 sq. m/1.2 million sq. ft.). A limited amount of office space (10,000 sq. 
m/108,000 sq. ft.) and other facilities (12,900 sq. m/139,000 sq. ft.) will also 
be provided.
The plan draws a distinction between ‘water blocks and city blocks’. The 
former will be placed along the new canal, and the latter along Gustav 
Mahlerlaan. The height of the buildings will vary between 35 and 75 metres 
(115-246 feet).
Zuidschans ■
One of the three projects in the Gershwin area, the other two being 
De Complete Stad and Royaal Zuid. Zuidschans consists of 48,750 sq. m 
(525,000 sq. ft.) of residential space (390 units). In addition, 1,700 sq. m 
(18,000 sq. ft.) are reserved for commercial facilities, and 1,700 sq. m 
(18,000 sq. ft.) for non-commercial facilities. Use of air rights allows the 
creation of another 1,600 sq. m (17,000 square feet) of floor space. Every 
250 sq. m (2,700 sq. ft.) of office space or 100 sq. m (1,100 sq. ft.) used for 
any other function generates entitlement for the creation of one park-
ing place. The total maximum floor space that can be realised is 68,700 
sq. m (735,000 sq. ft.).
As in the other subprojects, a consortium of three parties (see Section 
7.2.7) is responsible for the realisation of the programme.
Air rights
The local government and the private parties have agreed to make use of an 
air rights system in this project, in line with official Amsterdam policy of ap-
plying a bouwenvelop (‘building envelope’) to limit the proliferation of very 
high buildings in the cityscape (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005). The air rights 
system reflects the mixed position of the local government as lawmaker and 
landowner. As a lawmaker the local government can set rules for the area, as 
a landowner it has extra powers to specify rules and impose terms. These 
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powers however, are restricted. As a general rule, the local government may 
not impose conditions by private law that it cannot impose by public law. It 
may, however use private law to specify conditions (Van der Veen, 2006).
The land use plan for the project states that developers can build a certain 
amount of square metres as-of-right. Relief can be granted from these rules, al-
lowing the developer to build more square metres. The ‘real deal’ is found in 
the contract between the local government and the consortium. The contract 
points out that the mayor and his aldermen will only give the consortium per-
mission to realise more square metres when they use them to provide ameni-
ties. An example of such an amenity is a more spacious entrance hall. If the 
consortium is permitted to create more square metres it will have to pay more 
rent to the local government (landowner). The local government will keep this 
extra rent apart in an air rights fund. The consortium now can use this fund to 
add more quality to the plan. An example of increased plan quality is the con-
struction of the same quality of facades for social and commercial housing. The 
air rights system thus boils down to a sophisticated density bonus system.
In theory, the air rights system leaves room for creative solutions from 
the market players and allows local government to play a facilitating rather 
than a regulatory role. In practice, however, the developers find the system 
very complex and local government often has to intervene and explain to the 
developers which plans allow them to make use of the air rights fund and 
which do not. From the perspective of the developers, therefore, the air rights 
system only seems to give local government more discretionary powers and 
get it even more involved in actual designs of the plans than it already was. 
This may however also be caused by the fact that the system is new.
Responsibilities of contracting parties
The Zuidschans contract (art. 10) specifically determines that the develop-
ment of the site – the erection of the buildings and the furnishing of the par-
cels – will be at the costs and risks of the consortium.
The city will furnish the land. This means that the city will build the 
streets, will harden the squares, will construct parking strips and car parks, 
along with roads, pavements, cycle and pedestrian paths, including street fur-
nishing, sewerage and drainage systems.
The city is also responsible for creating public green areas, playing fields 
and other public facilities, ponds (and pilings to reinforce the edges of these 
ponds). Finally, the city is responsible for street lighting and the provision of 
road signs and markings and street name signs.
Momentum7.2.4 
The signing of the contracts in 2002 created momentum for the project. Many 
private parties had put in bids (see Section 7.2.5). They were eager to show 
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that they were not only willing to participate in the Gershwin project, but also 
willing and able to take part in the broader Zuid as project. However, a num-
ber of court rulings concerning compliance with environmental regulations 
which were delivered soon after the contracts were signed caused the Gersh-
win project to lose some of its momentum (see Section 7.2.15).
Pre-contractual procedure7.2.5 
As part of the bidding procedure, interested parties were invited to put their 
views for the future of the project down on paper. The bids and these vision 
statements formed the basis for the selection procedure.
Negotiations took longer than expected after the successful candidates 
had been chosen by the mayor and aldermen: the city’s aim had been to use a 
standard contract for all projects, but specific projects turned out to have spe-
cific needs (case interview GER 03-06-A4). While the use of standard contracts 
was retained, it is understandable that this did not speed up the negotiation 
process.
Time frame7.2.6 
The contract was signed on December 12th, 2002. Due to delays (see Section 
7.2.15) construction did not start till the spring of 2008 and is expected to be 
finished in May 2011. Construction of the Symphony towers started in 2006; 
completion is expected in late 2008 or early 2009.
The contracting parties7.2.7 
The Zuidschans contract was signed between the City and the Zuidschans C.V. 
consortium, consisting of the three parties AM, Bouwfonds and Amvest.
AM is a Dutch development company that specialises in the development  ■
of residential and commercial space and also in land development in the 
Netherlands. It has a staff of about 250 employees. ING and BAM group 
own the majority of the shares. In 2006, its own capital was about € 221 
million. In 2006, AM possessed 1,176 ha (2,905 acres) of land (AM, 2007).
Bouwfonds is a Dutch development company that specialises in real es- ■
tate development and property investment. The company is owned by Ra-
bobank, a Dutch bank. Bouwfonds focuses on residential units, office space 
and shopping centres and also finances and invests in real estate. It oper-
ates in Europe, the United States and Canada. In 2006, the company’s pay-
roll amounted to 1,372 FTE (full-time equivalents) and it made a net profit 
of € 189 million (Bouwfonds, 2007).
Amvest is a Dutch development company and investor that specialises in  ■
residential space. It has a staff of about 65 FTE and developed 1,450 resi-
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dential units in 2006 (Amvest, 2007). Amvest’s strategy aims to develop res-
idential units that it wants to own to guarantee a long-term profit. It owns 
both affordable and commercial units but aims to own only commercial 
residential space. It made a net profit of € 120 million in 2006.
In the Zuidschans consortium in particular, the parties in the consortium are 
really too big compared to the size of the project. The interviewee from Am-
vest stated that this was because, at the time the consortium was set up, it 
believed that it could bid for the whole Gershwin project and not just for a 
quarter of it (case interview GER 02-06-A1).
Other share- and stakeholders7.2.8a 
BP (formerly known as British Petroleum) owned a petrol station in the area 
that had to be removed. More importantly, the soil on this site was heavily 
polluted and had to be cleaned. It may further be noted that the city was crit-
icised in a subsequent court ruling for failing to take BP’s interests adequately 
into account (see Section 7.2.15).
Involvement of the public7.2.8b 
In line with standard procedures, the city organised a hearing and appended 
the outcomes to the draft land use plan. No specific influence of the public or 
public action groups on the plans was reported (cf. Section 7.1.13).
Payments7.2.9 
The consortium will buy the lease rights from the city. These lease rights will 
be issued in phases. They are transferred when construction work starts. The 
contract states that the lease rights will be issued no later than one year and 
six weeks after the corresponding building permit was issued, unless the 
building permit was subject to a request for a stay of execution. In that case, 
the lease rights will be issued no later than one year after this request was 
rejected.
The city was not willing to disclose the amount for which it agreed to sell 
the lease rights to the consortium.
Which conflicts arose with respect to the project?7.2.10a 
After the court decisions that delayed the project (see Section 7.2.15), it proved 
to be very hard to get the consortia to finalise their plans. The city bears the 
risk of delays when the lease rights have not been transferred (see Section 
7.2.9). The consortium waited until the parties were certain that they could 
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start building. In the negotiation phase, parties differed on the amount of af-
fordable housing that had to be built (see Section 7.2.11).
How do parties deal with future conflicts?7.2.10b 
The contract states that when the consortium refuses to cooperate with the 
issue of the land it will lose its deposit of one and a half years of indexed 
ground rent (art. 17.6 to 17.4).
There is no specific arbitration clause, the article on arbitration only states 
that legal disputes must be heard by the Court of Justice in Amsterdam (art. 30).
Affordable housing7.2.11 
Of the 390 units in the Zuidschans project, 129 will be social rental units and 
15% of the total amount of space (with a minimum of 48,750 sq. m/525,000 sq. 
ft.) is reserved for the middle segment (affordable housing).
The affordable housing goals are implemented by providing a discount on 
the lease price and by demanding that the members of the consortia include 
a housing corporation. Still, conflicts arose with regard to the costs of creating 
affordable housing and the private parties were allowed to re-interpret the re-
quirement. This provided the option to create small units, such as studios for 
students.
Environmental sustainability7.2.12 
The contract emphasises that energy reduction and environmental quality 
are of key importance. The goals concerning energy reduction and environ-
mental sustainability are mentioned in art. 13.1 of the contract that states 
that the consortium has to demonstrate that it will reach those goals in its 
provisional design for the project. The goals are also mentioned in art. 13.3 
that deals with the definitive design of the project. The goals are implied in 
other parts of the contract, but Dutch law does not allow the government to 
set strict requirements in a contract that are not laid down in laws and regu-
lations. The further environmental aims of the project are part of the (ambi-
tious) goals for Zuid as as a whole (see Section 7.1.11).
Other public facilities7.2.13 
All four projects within the Gershwin area chose a different theme for their 
facilities: Symphony puts the emphasis on culture, Royaal Zuid will create fa-
cilities for small children, de Complete Stad will include a branch of the Hotel 
School of The Hague and Zuidschans will create some medical facilities.
1,700 sq. m (18,000 square feet) are reserved for non-commercial facilities, 
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but no specific facilities are mentioned in the contract. The air rights system, 
which aims to add quality to the project, may result in the creation of some 
public facilities, but no definite undertakings have been made in this context 
so far.
Goals of the project7.2.14 
The contract states that the development strategy for Gershwin aims to cre-
ate a mixed-use area in a high-quality urban environment, and that this strat-
egy is part of the overall development strategy for the Zuid as.
The specific goal of the contract is to provide a framework within which 
plans can be drawn up to build and furnish the Gershwin area, and records 
can be kept of financial and operational data concerning the development, 
land issue and realisation of the project. The final goal is to reach an agree-
ment for the issue (lease) of the land in question.
Delays7.2.15 
The Gershwin project has experienced severe delays that were caused by vari-
ous court rulings. After the rulings, the city offered the consortia the option of 
rescinding the contracts but they decided to honour them. This gave rise to 
problems for the city, since it was the city and not the developers that would 
financially suffer the most because of the delays. These losses were estimated 
to be about € 6 million per year (case interview OGA, GER 03-06-A5).
As long as there were no building permits, the city could not force the con-
sortia to buy the lease rights (see Section 7.2.9). At the beginning of 2007, two 
of the three consortia worked in line with a new planning that aimed to start 
building at the end of 2007 or early 2008.
One consortium (Royaal Zuid) in the area was not willing or able to speed 
the process up. One of its investors had left, making it even harder to finance 
the project. The city organised workshops in 2006 to identify the key prob-
lems within the consortium.
In addition, many options were discussed with all parties. One option was 
not to phase the issue of lease rights but to sell them all at once to the parties, 
but the consortium who proposed that (according to the city) had no memory 
of this proposal when the city wanted to discuss it. According to an intervie-
wee representing the city, this misunderstanding was due to a change of per-
sonnel within the consortium (case interview GER 02-07-A6).
Court rulings
All the cases discussed below were heard before the Raad van State (RvS) 
(Council of State).
December 2002 (RvS, 11 december 2002, 200105817/1): the Mahler4 land use  ■
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plan was voided by the RvS. The city thought that it did not have to pro-
duce an environmental effect report (Milieueffectreapportage, MER, in Dutch) 
because that is only required when 4000 or more housing units are con-
structed in one area or when more than 2000 housing units are planned 
within city borders. Since Mahler4 was only supposed to include 240 apart-
ments, no MER was prepared. However, the city had not prepared a MER for 
the Zuid as area as a whole either. The RvS held that the Zuid as had to be 
regarded as a single area and since the plans, at that time, provided for the 
creation of at least 2500 housing units within part of the city, a MER should 
have been prepared for the whole area.
Delays for both Gershwin and Mahler4 estimated at a year.
June 2005 (RvS, 22 juni 2005, 200406192/1): The results of the air quality  ■
study should have led the Province to withhold approval for the land use 
plan, notwithstanding a later report that favoured the arguments of the 
City of Amsterdam, since the RvS assesses the situation ex tunc and could 
therefore not take the results of the later report into consideration.
Delays 4-6 months.
June 2005 (RvS, 22 juni 2005, 200406190/1): The same ruling for the Gersh- ■
win project.
Delays 4-6 months.
March 2008 (RvS, 12 maart 2008, 200604662/1): The Provincial administra- ■
tion of Noord-Holland should have withheld approval of the Mahler4 land 
use plan since it was not properly prepared. This time the court reviewed 
an air quality report the results of which were favourable for the city, but 
concluded that the air quality data in the report may have included errors. 
In addition, the city could not guarantee that air-borne pollution would re-
main within permissible limits. The rulings had no effect because the con-
struction of Mahler4 was almost finished.
Delays were estimated at 4-6 months.
Gershwin (RvS, 12 maart 2008, 200607251/1): The Province of Noord-Holland  ■
should have withheld its approval of the land use plan for the Gershwin 
area on the same grounds as it should have withheld its approval of the 
Mahler4 land use plan.
An additional ground was that the city had not investigated whether the 
BP petrol station could be relocated within the plan area. This petrol sta-
tion had been located in the area for forty years, and though the city was 
allowed to give more weight to the interests of the new development, it 
should have looked for another location for BP since the plans did provide 
for a petrol station in the area.
Delays were estimated at 4-6 months.
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Focal project: (2) Mahler47.3 
Introduction7.3.1 
The Mahler4 project consists of nine tower blocks. The project is not only im-
portant because of its size but also because it provides the Zuid as with a sig-
nature skyline. Unlike the Gershwin project, Mahler4 is being developed by a 
single consortium consisting of three parties. Case interviews for the project 
were conducted in 2004 (see Appendix B).
Positioning (area)7.3.2 
Mahler4 is situated in the centre of the Zuid as area, next to the ABN AMRO 
head offices. It is surrounded by Buitenveldertselaan, Gustav Mahlerlaan, Mahler-
plein (Mahler Square) and the ring road (A10 motorway). The other focal project, 
Gershwin (see Section 7.2) is located behind Mahler4 (on Buitenveldertselaan).
Description of the project7.3.3 
Mahler4 consists of eight office towers and one residential tower (see Figure 
7.1). When completed, the project will comprise 166,500 sq. m (1.8 million sq. 
ft./6,000 worksites) of office space, 41,900 sq. m (451,000 sq. ft./194 units) of 
residential space, 10,000 sq. m of facilities and a parking garage with a maxi-
mum capacity of 1,912 places.13 The project was divided into three phases. 
The first phase started in 2002 and resulted in the construction of three office 
towers that were completed in 2005 and were called Viñoly, SOM and Ito after 
the eminent architects who designed them.14
The second phase started in 2004 and consists of the construction of the 
Graves office tower and the Mahler apartment tower with 193 apartments. 
The third phase will result in the completion of the parking garage on top 
of which four other office towers will be built. The cooperation contract was 
signed on June 21st, 2001, at that time the project was planned to be finished 
in 2008 but due to delays (see Section 7.2.15) that date was postponed to 2010.
The apartment tower is prestigious since it offers literally the top apart-
ment in the city: 100 metres high. It was sold to a well-known businessman 
in 2008.
13   The contract speaks of a maximum of 160,000 sq. m of office space, 30,000 sq. m of condominiums 
and 10,000 sq. m of facilities. The last two figures are minimum values. In addition it speaks of a parking 
garage of maximum 2,100 places.
14   Rafael Viñoly Architects PC (New York), Toyo Ito & Associates (Tokyo), Nicholas Jacobs, Skidmore Ow-
ings & Merrill (London) and Michael Graves & Associates (Princeton).
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Responsibilities of parties
The land is owned by the City of Amsterdam that sells the lease rights to the 
private parties. G&S Vastgoed (G&S Real Estate) already owned 25% of the 
lease rights before the project started. Section E of the contract mentions that 
G&S Vastgoed will develop 42,500 sq. m (480,000 sq. ft.) of office space at its 
own risk, but the consortium will represent the whole project in dealings with 
the city (see also Section 7.3.7).
The contract specifically states that the development, the building-on and 
the furnishing of the parcels leased by the consortium will be at the costs and 
risks of the consortium.
As in the Gershwin project, it is the city’s responsibility to make the land 
ready for building and for occupation (see Section 7.2.3). This means that 
the city will build the streets, will harden the squares, will construct parking 
strips and car parks along with roads, pavements, cycle and pedestrian paths, 
including street furnishing, sewerage and draining systems.
The city is also responsible for the creation of public green areas, playing 
fields and other public facilities, ponds (and pilings to reinforce the edges of 
these ponds). The city is also responsible for the system of street lighting and 
the provision of road signs and markings and street name signs.
Momentum7.3.4 
The project gained and lost momentum over the years. When the contract 
was signed parties were very optimistic, but it took some time before the 
market became really interested in the office space. Like the Gershwin project, 
Mahler4 lost some of its momentum when the project was delayed by court 
rulings (see Section 7.2.15).
Pre-contractual procedure7.3.5 
There was no bidding procedure. Parties wrote a contract of intent and then 
a cooperation contract. The City of Amsterdam was confronted with the fact 
the G&S Vastgoed already owned 25% of the lease rights in the area. The city 
however wanted the land to be developed by a consortium of at least three 
parties, to avoid risks (case interview ING, MAH 10-4-A3). It took a leading role 
in finding private parties that were willing to invest in the project. This con-
sortium initially consisted of four parties. However, the German company CGI 
couldn’t participate in the consortium because a rule of German law prohib-
ited it from participation in the project as a risk-taker. It will however buy the 
part of the project developed by G&S Vastgoed (see Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.7). 
Negotiations took two years after the contract had been signed, which was 
longer than expected (case interview ING, MAH 10-4-A3).
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Time frame7.3.6 
Mahler4 started in 2002 and expectations are that it will be completed in 2010. 
The rights owned by G&S Vastgoed (see Section 7.3.7) will be transferred as 
soon as the definite building permits are issued by the local government or 
when the consortium decides to start building on permits that have not yet 
become unappealable (art. 10.1a of Mahler4 contract). The city delivers the 
lease rights in phases: every time a subproject of Mahler4 starts up, it delivers 
the land in a furnished state (art. 11 of Mahler4 contract).
The contracting parties7.3.7 
The contract was closed between the city and a consortium of three parties. 
This consortium is named VOF Mahler415 and consists of ING Real Estate, For-
tis Real Estate and G&S Vastgoed.
This consortium initially consisted of four parties. However, as mentioned in 
Section 7.3.5 above the German company CGI could not participate in the con-
sortium because its status as a German speculator prohibited it under German 
law from participation in the project as a developer. It will however buy the part 
of the project (described in Section 7.3.3) that is developed by G&S Vastgoed.
ING Real Estate is an integrated real estate group that is engaged in the de-
velopment, financing and investment management of real estate in all major 
global markets. The company has offices in 21 countries and a staff of about 
2,500.
It owns a portfolio of about € 100 billion and is part of ING, the largest 
Dutch bank and insurance company (see also Section 7.1.5).
Fortis Real Estate is engaged in the development of real estate, property 
management and public parking garages. The company has offices in seven 
countries and a staff of about 1,800. It has developed more than 2 million sq. 
m of office, residential, shopping and mixed-use space. It is part of the Bel-
gian-Dutch bank Fortis, the Dutch part of which was nationalised in 2008 as a 
result of the continuing global credit crisis.
G&S Vastgoed is a Dutch company that specialises in office building con-
struction. In 25 years, it has developed over 130 office buildings in the Neth-
erlands. G&S Vastgoed is the smallest partner in the project. The main reason 
why it participated in the consortium is that it already owned a quarter of the 
lease rights in the area.
15   VOF ‘vennootschap onder firma’, is a legal partnership (not a legal person) in Dutch law in which the part-
ners (vennoten) accept full liability for their mutual obligations. The VOF will be replaced by a new system 
that will only recognise public and non-public legal persons in Dutch legislation late 2009. Because of their 
openness, the use of VOFs as a development partnership has often been regarded as a sign of trust and 
trustworthiness (MAH 10-04-A1). 
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Dutch law holds that, after a change of the destination of a specified area 
of land, the land in question cannot be expropriated as long as the developer 
who owns the land (or the lease rights to it) is capable of realising the new 
destination (articles 4 and 79 Onteigeningswet [Expropriation Act]). The rule 
was of importance for the project because G&S Vastgoed had speculated on 
development of the area and acquired 25% of the lease rights that were at 
that time owned by a squash centre and other sports and leisure companies 
(Tennisvereniging Chandelle, Nieuw Tenniscentrum, Dicky Squash, and Amster-
dam International Sauna).
Other share- and stakeholders7.3.8a 
Involvement of other share- and stakeholders was not reported; as mentioned 
in the previous section, when the project started up G&S Vastgoed had al-
ready acquired the lease rights to an appreciable proportion of the land from 
existing landowners in the area.
Involvement of the public7.3.8b 
The public was involved in the same way as in the Gershwin project: normal 
procedures were followed but no extra initiatives were undertaken to stimu-
late public debate (see also Sections 7.2.8b and 7.1.13).
Payments7.3.9 
The consortium buys the lease rights from the city for a fixed sum (it will not 
pay a ground rent). According to the contract, the consortium pays:
ƒ 2,200 ( ■ € 990) per sq. m of office space
ƒ 1,266.67 ( ■ € 570) per sq. m of residential space
ƒ 500 ( ■ € 225) per sq. m of facilities
ƒ 2,380 ( ■ € 1071) per parking space.
Conflicts7.3.10 
Which conflicts rose with regard to the project?7.3.10a 
The contract was closed in the expectation that the consortium would be able 
to develop 2,100 parking places. Realisation of this number depended on the 
move of a bend in a tram line. The parties subsequently concluded that this 
move would take too long, because of the many legal procedures involved in 
implementing it, and decided to drop it from the plans. This decision means 
that there would only be a maximum of 1912 parking places, and the plans 
had to be fine-tuned to take this into account. One of the interviewees stated 
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that he regretted it that the consortium had not considered going to court on 
this issue (case interview MAH 04-04-A1). One could argue that because of the 
minimum-maximum formulation in the contract, this change had little practi-
cal impact on the project. The need for the parties to adjust their expectations 
did however lead to an appreciable delay in starting building work, which can 
have adverse financial consequences for the city (see Section 7.2.10a).
The consortium experienced some internal conflicts during the setting 
up of the project organisation, which were resolved by changing the director 
(case interview MAH 04-04-A1 and A5).
How do parties deal with future conflicts?7.3.10b 
The contract states that in case of any future conflicts, parties will try to solve 
them by consultation and look for a solution in their mutual interest. If such 
consultation is unsuccessful, the parties are regarded as being in conflict. The 
contract states that in that case they must initially continue consultation. If 
the conflict has not been resolved within three months, each party has the 
right to start proceedings at the Court of Amsterdam. The contract does not 
explicitly mention arbitration as an option, but the 3-month cooling-off pe-
riod seems to point in this direction.
Affordable housing7.3.11 
Unlike the other projects in the Zuid as area, the Mahler4 project only consists 
of housing rented on the open market. The apartment tower of 194 units con-
sists of top end apartments and offers its residents a swimming pool, a fit-
ness centre and sauna. Rents start at € 2,000 per month (www.vesteda.com).
Environmental sustainability7.3.12 
Environmental sustainability is explicitly mentioned as a goal of the project. 
The contract only contains agreements of intent on sustainability but the city, 
when it presented the contract to the council, spoke of ‘good agreements’ on 
construction techniques (flexible and sustainable), green zones and ecology 
(saving rain water using roof gardens and waterproof parking garages). The 
energy study carried out for Mahler4 has resulted in an energy-saving concept 
based on storage of heat and cold. This concept, together with some other 
measures, has resulted in a reduction in CO2 emission of 58% compared with 
a standard energy system for office towers (City of Amsterdam, 2001).
The contract states that the parties should make joint efforts to find a third 
party who will pay the costs of the energy infrastructure up to the border of the 
parcel of the private parties. If this infrastructure were to result in extra costs, 
then the parties should look for a solution (for example, a contribution from 
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the city to meet the extra costs). The environmental programme produced by 
the city’s Environment Department together with the above-mentioned energy 
study for Mahler4 (which was carried out by an independent company) resulted 
in a document titled Afspraken en uitgangspunten voor energievoorziening en ener-
giebesparing Mahler4 (Agreements and points of departure for power supply and ener-
gy savings in Mahler4). These agreements concentrated on unconventional ways 
of saving more energy. The consortium stated in the contract that it intended 
to follow these agreements as long as the unconventional techniques proposed 
were not more expensive than more conventional techniques.
Reports from the city state that all these intentions have been realised 
(Zuid as, 2008).
Other public facilities7.3.13 
We have seen that the project provides for a parking garage with 1912 places. 
The project further provides for bars, restaurants and shops that are mostly 
situated around Claude Debussylaan (see Figure 7.1). The facilities include a 
gymnasium, use of which is mainly restricted to the people working in the of-
fice buildings. In a different field, a debating centre that aims to attract people 
from all over Amsterdam will open in 2008.
In addition, the plan provides for the construction of public terraces on 
Gustav Mahlerplein. The city has done its best to be strict in enforcing the ‘ur-
ban façade’ requirement here (see Section 7.1.12).
Goals of the project7.3.14 
Generally speaking, the goal of the Mahler4 project is to create a successful 
top-end development that will yield profits for the city as well as the develop-
ers and will boost the prestige of the Zuid as project as a whole.
The contract names as its goal the realisation of the project within the 
conditions laid down in the urban design plan (stedenbouwkundig ontwerp) and 
those mentioned in the contract. It must be noted, however, that the state-
ment of the conditions in the contract is incomplete. The contract states ex-
plicitly that the parties’ aim is to create a framework within which plans can 
be drawn up for the construction and lay-out of the project area, but fails to 
state that this framework should also facilitate the recording of financial, op-
erational and other data concerning the development, the issue of the land 
and the realisation of the lease agreement.
Delays7.3.15 
The project was delayed for about two years, mostly as a result of various 
court rulings (see Section 7.2.15).
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Common contract norms in the 7.4 
Gershwin (Zuidschans) contract
Introduction: general sketch of the agreements7.4.1a 
In this part of the chapter we assess the contracts in the Gershwin and Mahler4 
projects from the perspective of relational contract theory. First, however, we 
will first provide an overview of the characteristics of both contracts. This is 
followed by a discussion of each of the common contract norms in turn for 
each contract. Section 7.4 focuses on the Gershwin contract after the present 
general introduction, and Section 7.5 on Mahler4.
General characteristics of the Mahler4 and Gershwin contracts
The Mahler4 and Gershwin contracts were closed at a time when many de-
tails of the project had not been worked out. The contracts exist within a 
context of ongoing negotiations; some of those negotiations are based on 
common practice, while some practices were created specifically for the Zuid-
as project. For example, air rights (see Section 7.2.3) were never used in the 
Netherlands before the Gershwin project.
The goal of the agreements is twofold: the contracts confirm that parties 
will work together to realise the projects within their terms. The contracts are 
not leases and can be regarded as contracts that define the terms and condi-
tions under which the city is willing to sell and the private parties are willing 
to buy the lease rights in the future.
The Mahler4 contract is less specific than the Gershwin contracts but all 
these contracts can be described as establishing a framework of consultation 
platforms in which the parties meet to discuss certain aspects of the project. 
The city takes a leading role in most of these platforms. The contracts do not 
provide a full overview of the project. Many specifics are found in public docu-
ments or in specific agreements made during one of the many meetings.
The Mahler4 contract was closed in 2001, and construction started in 2004. 
The Gershwin contracts were closed in 2002, and construction started in late 
2007. These facts alone (apart from the delays caused mostly by legal proce-
dures that were concerned with administrative law – see Section 7.2.15) tell us 
that the contracts can never provide a full overview of the details of the project.
Cooperation and consultation
The Mahler4 and Gershwin contracts state that the parties will write a com-
munication plan together with the other parties in the area. The Gershwin 
consortia are thus obliged to work together. The Mahler4 project is developed 
by only one consortium and co-operation here takes place between the con-
sortium and the city.
The Gershwin contracts also state that the consortium (and the city) will 
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meet to discuss issues that relate to planning, logistics, and other issues that 
concern more than one cluster. In these meetings, decisions are taken by una-
nimity. The contracts thus create a discussion and decision platform.
The contracts for both these projects state that parties will work together 
in a project organisation during the preparation and realisation phase of the 
project. They name a project director, appointed by the consortium, who will 
communicate with the city. A typical agreement is that the city will draft a 
building protocol and that the parties will discuss whether this protocol will 
become part of the agreement as soon as it is finished. Such an agreement is 
thus kept deliberately vague. Another typical agreement is that the city will 
formulate the plan for the public space in accordance with the Zuid as public 
space plan, the specific planning requirements for the area (Stedelijk Program-
ma van Eisen – SPvE) and the (pre-)design land use plan after it has discussed 
it in the Gershwin ground-level design team.
These kinds of agreements are typical for contracts in Amsterdam; public 
and private parties are used to work together and to give each other a say in 
the way they perform their duties. Thus, the city hears the private parties on 
the public space and the private parties confer with the city about the lay-out 
of the privately owned public space.
In the case interviews, all parties stressed the importance of good rela-
tions to realise the project. Employees of the city and the consortia had con-
tact on a daily basis. Parties generally agreed that their aim was not to reach 
an agreement on all issues before the work started; their normal practice was 
to deal with issues when they came up and to look for solutions that served 
the interests of both parties. They considered this approach to be the most ef-
ficient.
The common contract norms on a 7.4.1b 
discrete-relational scale
Inspection of Table 7.1 shows that in this case, the common contract norms 
all lean over to the relational side.
Role integrity: more relational than discrete7.4.2 
The role integrity norm is of a relational nature in the Gershwin project. Most 
notably because the city acts as a regulator, a landowner and a developer in 
the project and does not strictly separate these roles. Its relation with the 
consortium can be described as intertwined and is despite some discrete ele-
ments mostly relational. This means first and foremost that all details, even 
the moment when the lease rights are transferred, depend on how the con-
tractual relations evolve.
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Complexity
The role of the local government is complex. It is at the same time landowner, 
developer of the public infrastructure, monitor of the project and legislator.
In the Gershwin project, the local government aimed to reduce the com-
plexity of its role. Conflicting roles of the city led, in some cases, to solutions 
that none of the parties thought of as preferable. The contract between the city 
and the consortium was signed in 2002, in the middle of an operation known 
as the grote vereenvoudig ing (‘great simplification’) of the city’s planning or-
ganisation, which included the introduction of the planning tool known as the 
bouwenvelop (‘building envelope’) (see Section 7.2.3). The contract was intended 
to be coherent with the new system (City of Amsterdam, 2006).
The new local government approach did not result in more distance be-
tween it and the developers, as had been feared. It decided to leave more 
room for flexibility and creativity of the market players (see below). Howev-
er, the aim to find new ways for cooperation with market parties led to even 
more complexity in this case. It was hinted that the reason was that the city 
was not used yet to its own new policies (case interviews GER 02-06-A2 and 
GER 03-06-A5).
Another source of complexity is the rotation system adopted by the city, 
whereby civil servants change projects every two years. As a result the city 
constantly has to assign new people to existing projects. This system may also 
lead to a more professional working relation between the city and the private 
parties, since the relations of their employees are not too close or intertwined. 
Private parties however complained of this rotation system and stated that it 
resulted in a less efficient way of cooperation because the new civil servants 
had no knowledge of the history of the project (case interview GER 02-06-A1). 
The same system was used in the Mahler4 project (Section 7.5.2).
The composition of the consortium is complex as three parties have to work 
together in a relatively small project that each could have developed alone. This 
led to a complex structure of co-operation that was designed to avoid the risk 
that one of the ‘mother companies’ tried to dominate the project. This problem 
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Discrete/relational matrix for common contract norms in the Zuidschans projectTable 7.1 
Norm
More discrete 
than relational
Equally discrete 
and relational
More relational 
than discrete
Role integrity ✕
Mutuality ✕
Implementation of planning ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
Flexibility ✕
Contractual solidarity ✕
Linking norms ✕
Creation and restraint of power ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Harmonisation with the social matrix ✕
was also mentioned in the Mahler4 interviews (see Section 7.5.2).
In addition, one of the parties involved is also the only developer of the 
Symphony project. This may result in potential competition between (parts 
of) the two projects.
Conflicts
One type of conflict was due to the principle of equality, an administrative 
principle that is also incorporated in the Dutch civil code: it also applies when 
the government acts in a private law capacity. This means that the city, when-
ever it agrees to change a provision in a standard contract for a case-specific 
solution, has to ask itself whether it also needs to apply this change to the 
two other consortia in the project area in order to guarantee equal treat-
ment of all consortia. Whereas the consortia would naturally demand such a 
change if it would favour their interests (see also Section 7.3.6).
Another source of conflict existed within the consortium when one of the 
parties wanted to develop commercial residential units, whereas the other 
parties prefer to sell the apartment units. Parties therefore met every month 
during the initial stage of the project as directors of the (Zuidschans) consor-
tium. This led to unnecessary discussions. They decided to meet every three 
months, to let the various project leaders do their job and hired an external 
project manager (Section GER 02-06-A1 and 03-06-A3).
Mutuality and reciprocity: 7.4.3 
more relational than discrete
The mutuality norm in the contract is mostly of a relational nature. To realise 
the project parties have to work together and grant each other what we may 
call ‘soft rights’: the right to be heard, to attend conferences, to streamline 
work (see Section 9.2.3).
The quid pro quo in the lease is first and foremost found in the price that 
the consortia will pay for the lease rights on the land. From that perspective, 
the contract sets out the conditions under which a forthcoming lease will be 
signed. The quid pro quo thus also includes the costs that the consortium will 
incur for the preparation of a detailed development plan. As soon as the land 
is delivered, the consortium has to start work on the project.
The city not only delivers the land but also furnishes it and develops the 
public infrastructure (see Section 7.2.3).
Implementation of planning: 7.4.4 
equally relational and discrete
The contract implements a planning that can best be described as a frame-
work of cooperation wherein the project will have to be realised. This purpose 
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is explicitly mentioned in the second section of the contract. It uses a system 
of phasing. The decisive moments are when the building permits are issued 
and when the lease rights are issued. The phases that are mentioned in the 
contract are the pre-design phase and the definitive design phase. After the 
definitive design is approved, the consortium must apply for a building per-
mit.
The planning in the contract has both relational and discrete elements. 
The discrete elements consist mostly of the phasing after the building permit 
has been issued. After that moment, the consortium is under a duty to obtain 
the lease rights and carry out the programme. The other elements can be de-
scribed as relational; they were not fixed at the time the contract was closed 
and depended on cooperation.
The city has to make an offer to the consortium for the sale of the lease 
rights as soon as it has approved the definitive designs (see Section 7.2.5). The 
lease rights will then be issued in phases. The start dates of the lease rights 
are the dates when construction starts in the various parcels.
The contract stipulates the dates when the first and last part of the lease 
rights are supposed to be issued but also mentions that when the planning 
is changed, these dates also have to be changed. Those dates should not be 
regarded as binding requirements but rather as dates that the parties did 
their best to reach. The parties acknowledged in advance that numerous 
causes – which were left unspecified – could give rise to changes.
At the moment when the contract was signed there was no land use plan, 
but the parties expected that a land use plan would be available at the mo-
ment when the building permits were issued. In addition, a more precise 
planning was appended to the contract.
It was also agreed that the dates in the (forthcoming) leases would, unlike 
the dates in the cooperation agreement, represent binding deadlines for the 
consortium.
Effectuation of consent: 7.4.5 
equally discrete and relational
The effectuation of consent norm has both discrete and relational elements. 
Generally speaking, the parties knew what they had consented to when they 
signed the contract. This included an agreement on the price that the consor-
tium would pay for the lease rights.
But they were not aware of all obligations arising from that consent. There 
was no land use plan, there were no definitive designs, so the parties only 
knew within a certain range what they had consented to. Security on most 
details would not be reached before the leases were signed (expected in 2008). 
Parties had to rely on each other’s cooperative attitude (case interview GER 
02-06-A1).
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The contract effectuates the intention of parties to provide a framework for 
the sale and purchase of the lease rights and for development of the project 
by providing a planning and development framework.
In the agreement, the parties consent both to the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of 
the project. To be more precise: they consent to the how of the cooperation 
process, whereas the how of the actual construction process will not be de-
cided on until later. The ‘what’ of the project is the programme that is incor-
porated in the agreement without specifying the details.
Flexibility: more relational than discrete7.4.6 
The contract incorporates the flexibility norm, which makes this norm more 
relational than discrete. The contract explicitly mentions that the parties will 
work together to elaborate unconventional solutions to realise the plan.16 The 
contract aims to leave as much room for flexibility as possible, which is not 
the same as leaving as much freedom as possible for the developer. The con-
tract lays down binding stipulations concerning the framework and the proce-
dures that have to be followed, and concerning the programme of operations, 
but is flexible about the ways of achieving these ends. It only mentions maxi-
mum and minimum values of the square metres that may be developed. It 
explicitly states that the planning can be adapted to the actual circumstances.
There also proved to be room for change in the operational programme. 
The consortium succeeded in its aim of converting some space from resi-
dential to office use since it convinced the city that it would be impossible, 
without excessive costs, to build apartments that complied with all relevant 
nuisance regulations (in particular as regards noise) for apartments (GER 02-
06-A1, GER 03-07-A6).
Flexibility was also one of the city’s goals when it started trying to attract 
developers for the project. It tried to be play a less dominant role and to leave 
room for flexibility and creativity on the part of the market players. It did not 
however fully succeed in its aim of giving the market players more freedom.
16   Section 16.1 reads: “The parties realise that the erection of buildings on and the furnishing of the public 
space and the plots represent a special challenge, among other things as a result of the overall building 
programme for the Gershwin area, the quality aimed at and the parties’ ambitions, the planning, the lim-
ited space and the special characteristics of the plan area and its surroundings. They mutually undertake 
to do their best to achieve the necessary coordination, cooperation with the other parties involved in the 
construction process in the Gershwin area and the search for and cooperation in solutions (if necessary 
unconventional solutions) required for achievement of balanced, logical, cost-effective and optimal working 
methods and execution.”
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Contractual solidarity: 7.4.7 
more relational than discrete
Contractual solidarity is incorporated in this contract, which makes the con-
tractual solidarity norm a relational element in this context (see Section 3.4.7).
The breaking point, at which considerations of contractual solidarity could 
result either in rescission of the agreement or in a decision to continue the 
relationship, emerged soon after the contracts were signed and all plans were 
blocked by the rulings of the Raad van State (Council of State) (see Section 
7.2.15). Because of the delays (which imposed the highest financial risk on the 
city, as explained at the beginning of Section 7.2.15), the city offered all four 
consortia (including Zuidschans) the option of withdrawing from the projects 
but they all decided to honour the contract. To win time, the city proposed 
that the work should be carried out in parallel, which meant that the public 
infrastructure would be finished at the same time as the buildings. Another 
proposal was that the private parties would not have to pay rent on the work-
ing areas (GER 03-07-A6). The private parties honoured the contracts but they 
were not very willing to fast-track the building process.
All these examples illustrate however the parties’ determination to stay 
within the contractual relation. They discussed their individual problems and 
interests, and each party tried to get the best deal. But the main attitude was 
one of contractual solidarity. The parties did not plan to stop the process and 
start legal procedures when (serious) difficulties arose, but meant to develop 
the projects they had signed for. This makes contractual solidarity an integral 
part of the agreement.
The linking norms: restitution, reliance and 7.4.8 
expectation interests: more relational than discrete
The linking norms are relational in the sense that they leave the expecta-
tions of parties deliberately vague. The contract does not mention expected 
incomes, nor does it spell out other expectations of the market players. But 
there are some discrete elements, with regard to the expectations of the city.
The city expects that the consortium will buy the lease rights and cooper-
ate with the procedures that will result in transfer of the lease rights. If the 
consortium refuses to cooperate with the lease contract, it will lose its deposit 
of one and a half years of ground rent.
The parties signed the contract in the expectation that the project would 
be developed in a profitable way that also complied with the public goals of 
the city. Other expectations were the construction of the Zuid as Dock (explic-
itly mentioned as the model on which the parties based their calculations).
These expectations are mentioned in the contract but they are not concre-
tised in the sense that there are fines to link the expectations to numbers.
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Creation and restraint of power: 7.4.9 
more relational than discrete
The creation and restraint of power norm is used to create intertwined rela-
tions, and can thus be regarded as relational.
Within the context of the Gershwin contracts, this norm reflects the provi-
sions of the contract that require the parties to work together in a project or-
ganisation in which they all have some say on all aspects of the project. Par-
ties have agreed to give each other a say in all aspects of the project where 
this is possible. One restriction on the city is that it cannot give the consortia 
any (official) say in the political process, and this is explicitly stated in the 
contract. Note that a say does not always mean a right of veto, it often means 
that parties agree to try to work things out together. In the negotiation phase, 
the city had a say in the composition of the consortium (which must include 
a housing association).
The consortium has contractually subordinated itself to the project super-
visor, whose task is to advise the city on issues that concern design quality 
from both a cluster-specific and a Zuid as perspective.
Parties will work together in a project organisation during the preparation 
and realisation phase of the project. There will be a director of the project, ap-
pointed by the consortium, who will communicate with the city.
Parties will draw up a communication plan together with the other parties 
in the Gershwin plan area.
Parties will meet to discuss issues that relate to planning, logistics, build-
ing space, access and other issues that concern more than one cluster. In 
those meetings, binding decisions can be taken by unanimity.
These examples show that the creation and restraint of power norm is 
used in the Gershwin agreements to create a project organisation in which 
the parties work together and try to avoid formal discussions about authority 
issues.
Propriety of means:  7.4.10 
equally relational and discrete
The city demands firm financial guarantees from the parties in the con-
sortium, which must be regarded as a discrete element. But the propriety 
of means norm also has relational elements in this case. Means are mostly 
meant to be adequate means. Parties had to draw up a vision statement as 
part of the bidding procedure, to show that they knew what they and the city 
wanted for the area. The project needs land, money, knowledge, and organisa-
tion for its development.
In addition to the parts of the contract relating to land and payments, the 
agreement also focuses on knowledge and organisation. It refers to the need 
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to gather more knowledge of building techniques and presupposes that the 
parties know what they are doing and are capable of organising their work. It 
does not however mention any specific requirements on contractors.
Harmonisation with the social matrix: 7.4.11 
more relational than discrete
The contractual relation is embedded in practices that parties are used to and 
their past relations. All parties had worked with the city before and (at least 
as importantly) expect to work with the city in the future.
According to the lawyer who drafted the contract, the unusual aspect of the 
agreement was the fact that it tried to implement the planning in greater de-
tail than is common in Amsterdam (case interview Thunissen, GER 03-07-A3).
The contract mentions cooperation and open-mindedness explicitly as im-
portant requirements. By the latter it means that parties should be willing to 
implement unconventional building techniques.
Balance of discrete and relational 7.4.12 
norms in the Gershwin contract
The prevalence of discrete and relational elements in the common contract 
norms for these projects has already been surveyed in Table 7.2. We will now 
look at things from a slightly different perspective, by indicating the relative 
importance of the various norms.
It may be concluded that the Gershwin contract has more relational than 
discrete elements, though it does attempt to introduce binding requirements 
on issues that can be specified. In Section 7.5.12, I will comment on the prob-
lem of consistency in role integrity, which I regard as of crucial importance 
for these two cases.
Common contract norms in 7.5 
the Mahler4 contract
Introduction7.5.1 
The general characteristics of the Mahler4 and Gershwin contracts were given 
in Section 7.4.1. It may be noted here, however, that unlike the Gershwin con-
tracts which tried to apply a new model to the specific case (cf. Section 7.4.11), 
the Mahler4 contract was drafted by an in-house lawyer from ING Real Estate 
(see Section 7.3.7a) in a more or less standard manner. After this brief intro-
ductory comment, we will now assess the Mahler4 contract from the perspec-
tive of relational contract theory.
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Inspection of Table 7.3 shows that, like the Gershwin contract, the Mahler4 
contract is characterised by common contract norms that are predominantly 
relational.
We will now discuss the individual common contract norms in turn.
Role integrity: more relational than discrete7.5.2 
In the Mahler4 contract, the role integrity norm has more relational than dis-
crete elements. Parties do not strictly contract in one capacity. The govern-
ment adopts different roles in a single contract: it is regulator, landowner and 
developer and does not strictly separate these roles. Even the private parties 
do not strictly confine themselves to their roles of developers but accept more 
responsibilities.
The problems local government experienced in implementing role integ-
rity in relation to the Gershwin contract (see Section 7.4.2) clearly illustrate 
the importance of consistency in this connection.
The cooperation contract for Mahler4 states that the City of Amsterdam 
(mayor and aldermen) cannot guarantee that the city council will approve the 
regulations that are necessary to create the project. It thereby explicitly draws 
a line between its role as a legislator and its role as a landowner (public law 
and private law capacities).
In the interviews, the private parties mentioned the problem caused by the 
fact that G&S Vastgoed already possessed 25% of the leasehold rights in the 
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Importance of discrete and relational norms in the Table 7.2 
Zuidschans project
1. Discrete norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Discreteness ✕
Presentiation ✕
Implementation of planning* ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
2. Relational norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Role integrity ✕
Preservation of the relation ✕
Resolution of relational conflict ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Supra-contract norms ✕
* When the norms of discreteness and presentiation are not of enhanced 
importance, it makes more sense to view the implementation of planning 
norm as a relational norm. In other words, the importance of planning in such 
projects then follows from the nature of the observed relation between the 
parties rather than from the wording of the agreements.
project (case interview Fortis and ING, MAH 10-04-A1 and A2). The other par-
ties were afraid that G&S Vastgoed would use its position to profit first from 
its own projects. This can be defined as a problem of trust. G&S Vastgoed itself 
declined to be interviewed for this study.
Some of the parties were also involved in possibly competing projects in 
the Zuid as or in other parts of Amsterdam. Parties were afraid that one of the 
others might want to try to attract a possible buyer or lessee of office space 
to a location where it did not have to share the profits (case interviews Fortis 
and ING, MAH 10-04-A1 and A2).
Another problem arose because of the fact that all parties were capable of 
developing the project on their own. In other words, the only reason why they 
worked together was because the city had a policy not to grant projects to 
one party but preferred consortia. The Mahler4 contract states that the com-
pany MHG couldn’t combine its role as an investor with one as developer. To 
avoid conflicts, the parties set up a project office. This approach did not work 
well initially, as the first project manager was fired. One of the reasons for 
these initial problems was that the frequent heated discussions in the project 
meetings, where the parties would blame each other and the project manager 
for the lack of progress. In the end, although the project office was expensive, 
it worked well.
Complexity
The local government is at the same time the landowner, the developer of the 
public infrastructure (and also prepares the land for building), the monitor of 
the project and the legislator. A tension exists between these different roles, 
in particular those as landowner and legislator.
The main reason for the complexity of the city’s roles is its desire to realise 
public goals. In Mahler4 the most important ones are sustainability and the 
quality of the design. The contract, as we saw, creates a duty of effort to look 
for ‘green’ solutions that are less harmful to the environment.
We have already commented on that tension between short-term and 
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Discrete/relational matrix for common contract norms in the Mahler4 contractTable 7.3 
Norm
More discrete 
than relational
Equally discrete 
and relational
More relational 
than discrete
Role integrity ✕
Mutuality ✕
Implementation of planning ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
Flexibility ✕
Contractual solidarity ✕
Linking norms ✕
Creation and restraint of power ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Harmonisation with the social matrix ✕
long-term interests within the consortium. Another factor that could also be 
regarded as a tension is the general unwillingness of the private parties to go 
to court when the local government doesn’t perform its obligations, because 
they regard this as contrary to their long-term interests.
The position of G&S Vastgoed was even more complex. Being the owner of 
25% of the lease rights it could, in principle, be a competitor of the project or-
ganisation of which it was a part.
Mutuality and reciprocity: 7.5.3 
equally relational and discrete
The contract has discrete elements: for example, it mentions a fixed price for 
the lease rights. However, other elements are more relational; as in the Gersh-
win project, soft rights like the right to be heard are also granted.
The quid pro quo in the contract is that the consortium promises it will buy 
the right to lease the land from the government for a period of fifty years. In 
return, the city delivers the land in a furnished state and develops the infra-
structure. The city does not guarantee in the contract that all permits will 
be issued or that the binding land use plan approved by the city council will 
make the development possible.
The consortium guarantees that it will develop the project in line with the 
requirements found in the contract and in the documents mentioned in it.
Implementation of planning: 7.5.4 
more relational than discrete
The implementation of planning norm is more relational than discrete, as it 
does not mention deadlines and creates an interdependent planning process: 
parties have to work together to concretise the planning.
The cooperation contract highlights important phases and elements of the 
planning and defers decision moments to committee meetings mentioned in 
the contract. It thus contains a framework for implementation of the plan-
ning. For example, the contract states that 10,000 sq. m of the project are re-
served for various facilities but does not specify the nature of these facilities. 
Instead it refers to the advisory committee on facilities in the Zuid as area.
The contract mentions many duties of endeavour, but is almost reluctant 
to go into detail about them. It states for example that the consortium will 
endeavour to develop more square metres of residential space than specified 
in the description of the contract, without explaining how it will do so. It also 
states that the parties will endeavour to comply with the time schedule that 
is based on the insights that existed during the closing of the contract.
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Pre-building phase
The contract does not mention a time schedule or any date. The decisive mo-
ment is when the definitive building permit is issued. This means a permit 
that is no longer subject to administrative revision procedures (six weeks af-
ter the permit was issued).
When the building permit is definitive, G&S Vastgoed will deliver its lease 
rights to the city so that the city can make the land ready for building and 
build the infrastructure. The consortium can choose to start its work before 
the permit becomes unappealable. The city delivers the lease rights (the land) 
in phases. Every time a subproject starts, the city delivers the land in a ready 
for building condition.
The consortium will present proposals to the advisory committee on fa-
cilities in the Zuid as area. If it is unable to reach an agreement with the com-
mittee, then the Mahler4 steering group will take the final decision. All plans 
have to be discussed with the project supervisor (see Section 7.1.7).
Building phase
The consortium set up to implement the Mahler4 project is called VOF Mahl-
er4 (see Section 7.3.7).
There is a uitvoeringsoverleg (realisation committee) where the consortium 
and the city discuss the progress of the project and draft plans for all sub-proj-
ects. All other issues concerning the project schedules are discussed in this 
platform, which is mentioned at various places in the contract (it is stated for 
example that the parties will discuss issues concerning the lay-out of the pub-
lic space and will conclude agreements on the underground infrastructure in 
this platform). The realisation committee is thus the central platform for con-
crete planning and discussion of operational details. This form of cooperation 
depends on a good working relation between the parties, since there are no 
plans they can fall back on in case of disagreement. The contract thus presup-
poses that the parties trust each other enough to work together intensively.
The contract determines that parties will draw up a construction schedule 
for each sub-project, paying special attention to building logistics in order to 
limit nuisance to people living in the neighbourhood as much as possible.
The contract states that it is probable that the consortium will draw up 
(part of) the inrichtingsplan (layout plan) for the public space and/or actually 
realise the public space within the area. The parties will reach further agree-
ments on these points at the appropriate phase in the project.
Post-building phase
There is a users committee within the city administration that vets possible 
users of the office space. The consortium proposes candidate users to this 
committee, which will then judge each candidates with reference to the fol-
lowing criteria:
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Their reputation: users should be well-known and contribute to the inter- ■
national reputation of the Zuid as.
Their entrepreneurial activity: the users should in general wish to move  ■
their international headquarters to the Zuid as.
Their previous location: candidate users currently located in the centre of  ■
Amsterdam can only apply for space in the Zuid as if it is clear that the city 
centre does not offer them the facilities they need.
The contract also states that the parties aim to conclude a maintenance 
agreement once the layout plans for the private and public spaces have been 
completed. This agreement will determine how the public and private spaces 
in the project area are to be maintained.
The contract thus identifies the many issues that need to be dealt with, but 
does not specify in detail how this shall be done. The planning given in the 
contract is vague and contains many loose ends. It basically states: “Yes, we 
will realise the project and will discuss all issues when they come up.” It thus 
relies very much on the willingness of all parties to cooperate.
Effectuation of consent: 7.5.5 
equally relational and discrete
The contract spells out under which conditions the city is willing to sell and 
the consortium is willing to buy the lease rights to the Mahler4 area.
The discrete part of the contract is that parties have agreed what will be built 
for what price. However, the contract only gives maximum and minimum val-
ues and as mentioned in the Section 7.5.4 it also includes an obligation on the 
parties to endeavour to create more residential space than the minimum values 
specified. In other words, the parties did not have complete knowledge of what 
would be constructed and for what price at the time they signed the contract.
Flexibility: more relational than discrete7.5.6 
The text of the contract leaves much room for ad hoc solutions since nothing 
is fixed apart from the maximum and minimum number of square metres to 
be devoted to commercial space, residential space and other facilities. At the 
time of closure, the contract left room for all kinds of designs and did not 
specify the deadlines for completion of the building work. The basic idea of 
the contract is that matters of detail should be dealt with when they arise 
and not in advance, since that only costs unnecessary time.
Both the private parties and the civil servants agreed with this approach. 
One of the interviewees from the consortium stated that it preferred to start 
working on a plan that was as undetermined as possible (case interview MAH 
10-04-A3).
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Contractual solidarity: 7.5.7 
more relational than discrete
Contractual solidarity is incorporated in the Mahler4 contract. All parties stat-
ed that they understood and respected the position of their contraparty. The 
contract does not mention the duty of good faith specifically but it uses the 
term ‘reasonable’ to indicate that the parties should take each other’s inter-
ests into account.
The contract is called a ‘cooperation contract’, which implies that parties 
knew they had to work together to realise the project. The contract was draft-
ed by an in-house lawyer from ING Real Estate (case interview MAH 10-04-
A3) without interference from other lawyers. This shows that the parties trust 
one another and are willing to work together, not caring too much about legal 
particularities.
The infrastructure was not finished on time by the city. Another problem 
arose when the planned move of a bend in a tram line could did not go ahead 
(see Section 7.3.10a). The contract determined that the parties will discuss the 
financial consequences for the consortium of such changes to the planning, 
but it did not provide any specific guidelines (see Section 7.3.15).
One party complained that the general attitude of all parties was not to 
start any arbitration or litigation procedure because they all valued a good 
long-term relation with the city more highly than the damages they might be 
awarded as a result of such procedures. However, that did not mean that they 
abstained from negotiating with the city for the best possible deal.
The overall duty to behave according to the rules of good faith was men-
tioned as a way of ensuring that all parties would behave reasonably, even by 
interviewees with no legal training (MAH 10-04-A4 and MAH 10-04-A5).
The opening article of the contract states that all parties are obligated to 
do everything that can be reasonably expected from them to ensure that the 
goal of the cooperation contract can be achieved.
The consortium will provide the city with all information concerning the 
progress of the project, so that the city can keep the public and people living 
in the vicinity of the project area adequately informed.
The phasing of the project whereby the city only receives money when the 
building permits have become definitive and when it has performed its side 
of the obligations laid down in the contract means that the city has an inter-
est in quick realisation of the project. Parties work together to make a mar-
keting plan for the project. The parties do not share risks, however. When the 
lease rights have been purchased, the city has made its money and there is 
no percentage rent or any other provision that subsequently binds the parties 
financially.
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The linking norms: restitution, 7.5.8 
reliance and expectation interests: 
equally relational and discrete
As far as restitution is concerned, the contract states that G&S Vastgoed will 
have its lease rights reimbursed if the project is not realised for any reason. It 
does not speak of any pre-investments or similar matters.
The expectation interest embodied in the contract is a little hard to define. 
The contract states that the parties presuppose that the development of the 
Zuid as will include the planned work on Zuid as Dock and that the bend in 
the tram line will be moved (as required for the planned completion of the 
parking garage; see Section 7.3.10). They also expect to make a profit, and that 
they will be able to develop the project as laid down in the contract. They ex-
pect one another to be reasonable. The contract never quantifies any of these 
expectations.
Creation and restraint of power: 7.5.9 
more relational than discrete
As in the Zuidschans contract, the creation and restraint of power norm is 
used to create intertwined relations between the consortium and the local 
government whereby all parties have a right to a say on all aspects of the 
project. This say is sometimes loosely defined as a right to discuss, but in 
some cases it is mentioned as a right to exercise a certain power. The city has 
the right to decide whether the consortium may sign a contract with a candi-
date user of some of the office space. The contractual relation vests powers in 
the local government and the private parties that they would not otherwise 
have. Basically, for example, it empowers the consortium to require that the 
city shall not sell its lease rights to another party and that it will not change 
the prices and conditions of the project from those mentioned in the contract.
The city on the other hand has the right to require the private parties to 
buy the lease rights for the agreed price when it has performed its side of the 
agreement, and to require that the consortium will construct the project ac-
cording to the rules laid down in the contract.
Finally, the consortium can block start-up of the Goldstar project (which 
might possibly compete with the present project).
Propriety of means:  7.5.10 
equally relational and discrete
The city asked for financial guarantees when it granted the project to the con-
sortium, which can be regarded as a discrete element of the contract. Other 
elements are more relational and concern the adequacy of the means em-
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ployed: the parties, for example, must work together to ensure that the de-
sign of the buildings matches the plans for the broader area. The city owns 
the land and the means needed to make the land ready for building, and it 
also has the means needed to realise the infrastructure.
The consortium owns the means (including financial resources) needed 
to realise the project. In other words, the city and the consortium need each 
other.
The city has the obligations that stem from its position as a landowner. 
Since the city also has legislative powers, it could in theory tailor the appli-
cable regulations to ensure that the project meets all legal requirements. This 
would however constitute improper use of its powers, and is therefore explic-
itly excluded from the contractual relation.
The developers have funds to develop the project and take the risk. The 
contract also tries to bring together different perspectives in the sense that 
the city looks at the project as a subproject within Zuid as as a whole. The 
developers therefore have to cooperate with the Zuid as project supervisor to 
make sure that their designs fit in the big picture. This is another aspect of 
the enhanced importance of the propriety of means: the party with specific 
knowledge should contribute it.
Harmonisation with the social matrix7.5.11 
The case interviews revealed that all parties knew what was expected of them. 
They referred to usages and norms of good faith, though the developers also 
complained about the dual standards of the city. The complaints came down 
to the view that the city wants the consortium to act as a business partner, 
while the consortium itself constantly had to bear in mind that the city was 
the local government and could not be held to its word like a normal business 
partner.
Supra-contract norms are of enhanced importance. All interviewees em-
phasised that they wanted the contract to be not so much a legal document 
as one that was accessible for the people in the field. It should have some 
characteristics of a set of working guidelines, and not impose a legal reality 
on the reality of the project.
This is why the project objectives are specifically mentioned in it.
Balance of discrete and relational 7.5.12 
norms in the Mahler4 contract
The prevalence of discrete and relational elements in the common contract 
norms for these projects has already been surveyed in Table 7.4. We will now 
look at things from a slightly different perspective, by indicating the relative 
importance of the various norms.
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The Mahler4 contract turns out to have far more relational norms than dis-
crete ones. This does not mean that implementation of planning and effec-
tuation of consent are unimportant. It means that these norms take shape 
during the process of drafting and implementation of the contract.
I would like to end this chapter with a brief discussion of the problem of 
consistency in connection with role integrity, which came up in both focal 
projects.
Consistency in role integrity
The approach whereby many details are not dealt with at the time the con-
tract is closed results in some insecurity for the private parties and the gen-
eral public.
A specific problem that is related to role integrity is that of consistency. 
The private parties mentioned this problem in relation to political changes 
that are intrinsic to the system of elections. In Amsterdam however this prob-
lem is not of enhanced importance because the social democrats (PvdA) have 
governed the city for decades, therefore the city is known for its relative sta-
bility. In the Dutch system a party almost never has an absolute majority in a 
municipal council (or parliament), the partners with whom the largest party 
chooses to govern will therefore change from time to time, which may cause 
some instability.
More frequently the city’s rotation system of the city whereby civil ser-
vants only stay on the same project for two years was named as a source of 
insecurity. The private parties complained that they constantly had to deal 
with civil servants who were not familiar with the history of the project (MAH 
10-04-A1) or even with different municipal departments with conflicting poli-
cies or that were not familiar with one another’s policies.
Still, although the rotation system may cause some inconsistencies (most 
notably with regard to issues that were not written down), it can also enhance 
integrity. It should be stressed that we are not talking here about role integ-
rity, the ability to stick to a consistent role in dealings with others, but about 
integrity – adherence to high ethical standards in dealings with others. The 
public wants civil servants to keep their distance from the developers for rea-
sons that relate to the wish to prevent corruption and all types of nepotism 
and clientelism. Integrity is then associated with a type of conduct that ab-
stracts from personal relationships with private parties.
Private parties understood the interests of local government but they ob-
jected to the rotation system whereby city officers only stays on the same 
project for two years. However, the system may guarantee a certain distance 
between the government and the private parties, which is necessary to sepa-
rate the legislative and administrative roles of local government from its posi-
tion as a landowner.
We have seen that the city is bound by the principles of good government 
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when it makes use of private law. This includes a duty of consistency: it can-
not arbitrarily impose one condition on party A and another on party B. This 
principle was of importance in the Gershwin project where three similar con-
tracts were signed.
For the private parties, the problem of consistency was dealt with by join-
ing forces in a specific consortium (VOF Mahler4, Zuidschans C.V.) and by 
setting up a project bureau that was responsible for discussing issues with 
the city. This construction appreciably reduced the risk that the three parties 
would convey conflicting messages to local government.
The contracts specifically state that the city is not liable for the conse-
quences of any changes in regulations or statutes made by itself in its role as 
legislator or by the national government; this provision limits the scope for 
conflicts, as did the setting up of a separate project organisation by the con-
sortium.
Because of the openness of the contracts and the duty to discuss many is-
sues further at a later stage, a risk exists that when parties disagree on one 
issue, the conflict may spread because it determines their behaviour in other 
meetings and could finally lead to major conflicts that threaten the very exis-
tence of the project or at least give rise to delays. This has often happened in 
the past.
It would be preferable for the contract to be more specific about the duty to 
discuss outstanding issues, so that small conflicts can remain small.
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Importance of discrete and relational norms in the Mahler4 Table 7.4 
contract
1. Discrete norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Discreteness ✕
Presentiation ✕
Implementation of planning* ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
2. Relational norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Role integrity ✕
Preservation of the relation ✕
Resolution of relational conflict ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Supra-contract norms ✕
* When the norms of discreteness and presentiation are not of enhanced 
importance, it makes more sense to view the implementation of planning 
norm as a relational norm. In other words, the importance of planning in such 
projects then follows from the nature of the observed relation between the 
parties rather than from the wording of the agreements.
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King’s Cross Regent 8 
Quarter, London 
The Main Site
The urban development project:8.1  
King’s Cross Regent Quarter, London
Introduction8.1.1 
King’s Cross is one of the largest and most prestigious regeneration projects 
underway in London. It is one of the six opportunity areas that are described 
in the London Plan (GLA, 2004), the plan that provides an overview of the 
city’s objectives and strategies for the next 15-20 years. King’s Cross Oppor-
tunity Area is superbly located in the northwest part of the centre of London, 
near the city’s most important transport hub that includes the new St. Pan-
cras station, where the trains from and to the European continent stop (see 
Sections 8.1.2 and 8.1.3). The project aims to find a balance between the inter-
ests of the local residents who are in urgent need of affordable housing and 
jobs and the interests of the private sector that needs new office space and 
wants to develop housing units for the market sector.
The context of this chapter differs from the other case studies in one im-
portant manner. Unlike the cases in Amsterdam and New York, in London the 
S106 agreements17, one of which forms the heart of Sections 8.2 and 8.3, is 
not a strictly private law document but is also meant to implement public 
policies. The English planning system is commonly described as a negotiation 
model (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006) and it uses specific agreements to con-
cretise planning goals for a specific project. As a result this chapter may intro-
17   S106 means an agreement pursuant to section 106 of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act. This 
section deals with ‘agreements regulating development or use of land’. It holds that:
(1) A local planning authority may enter into an agreement with any person interested in land in their area 
for the purpose of restricting or regulating the development or use of the land, either permanently or 
during such period as may be prescribed by the agreement.
(2) Any such agreement may contain such incidental and consequential provisions (including financial 
ones) as appear to the local planning authority to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the 
agreement.
(3) An agreement made under this section with any person interested in land may be enforced by the local 
planning authority against persons deriving title under that person in respect of that land as if the local 
planning authority were possessed of adjacent land and as if the agreement had been expressed to be 
made for the benefit of such land.
(4) Nothing in this section or in any agreement made under it shall be construed
(a) as restricting the exercise, in relation to land which is the subject of any such agreement, of any pow-
ers exercisable by any Minister or authority under this Act so long as those powers are exercised in 
accordance with the provisions of the development plan, or in accordance with any directions which 
may have been given by the Secretary of State as to the provisions to be included in such a plan; or
(b) as requiring the exercise of any such powers otherwise than as mentioned in section (a).
[ 237 ]
[ 238 ]
Source: courtesy of London Borough of Camden
Figure 8.1 King’s Cross Regent Quarter
[ 239 ]
1 King’s Cross Regent Quarter at the start of the project
 Source: courtesy of Argent Group
2 King’s Cross Regent Quarter, artist impression of the project as intended
 Source: courtesy of Argent Group
1
2
duce more planning terminology than previous chapters as the agreement we 
study here has to be understood in that context.
Description of the area8.1.2 
The wider King’s Cross area measures 54 ha (134 acres) and is situated in the 
northwest part of Central London. The project is located in the boroughs of 
Camden (the larger part) and Islington. The deprived, but already gentrifying, 
area is situated near three railway stations: Euston, an 18-track railway sta-
tion that opened in 1837, St Pancras and King’s Cross.18 King’s Cross St. Pan-
cras underground station is the busiest in London.
Landmark buildings in the area are King’s Cross station and St. Pancras 
station, the monumental gasholders (that will be protected under the new 
plan) and some Victorian buildings in the neighbourhood, such as the St. Pan-
cras Old Church, Camden Town Hall and the restored Great Northern Hotel 
near King’s Cross station.
Of importance is also that the Opportunity Area is surrounded by the resi-
dential communities of Somers Town, Maiden Lane, King’s Cross and Thorn-
hill that are among the most deprived in the United Kingdom (Camden, 2004: 
13.8). On the map we also find Elm Village, a richer neighbourhood that forms 
the exception to this general picture of deprivation.
Description of the project8.1.3 
The redevelopment of the area is closely linked to the redevelopment of St. 
Pancras and King’s Cross. The project area is often referred to as King’s Cross 
Central in many publications.
The regeneration project is divided into four main proposals. It started 
with the redevelopment and extension of King’s Cross station and St. Pan-
cras station. In December 2007, the London terminus for the Eurostar train 
services to and from Paris moved from Waterloo Station to St. Pancras Station. 
The Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) – also known as High Speed 1 – the new 
high-speed railway line between London and the British end of the Channel 
tunnel which made this move possible – is 109 km (68 miles) in length and 
took eleven years to finish after the enactment of the 1996 Channel Tunnel 
Rail Link Act. St. Pancras will also be the terminus station of the Olympic Jav-
elin for the 2012 Olympic Games in London.
King’s Cross railway station connects London to northern and eastern Eng-
18   Euston station will be redeveloped by Network Rail and British Land; it will be enlarged from 18 to 21 
tracks and will probably be rebuilt but its redevelopment is not linked to King’s Cross redevelopment dealt 
with in this chapter. 
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land as well as Scotland. King’s Cross Station is an important transport hub 
that also services the underground network. Every year, 40 million people use 
the station.
The redevelopment will provide King’s Cross with new ticket halls and 
plazas. The Thameslink railway line from Bedford in the north to Brighton in 
the south – the only railway line to pass through London – now has a stop 
at St. Pancras International, the old King’s Cross Thameslink station having 
been closed permanently in December 2007 (see Figure 8.1). The vacant land 
between and to the north of King’s Cross and St. Pancras stations is The Main 
Site for the redevelopment of the area.
King’s Cross Station is owned by Network Rail, whereas St. Pancras is 
owned by London & Continental Stations and Property, the property develop-
ment company of London and Continental Railways (LCR) that develops the 
stations of High Speed 1. LCR is also the main landowner of the site.
The other projects in the area are Kings Place and Regent Quarter, the lat-
ter being divided in two sub-projects (The Main Site and the Triangle, see be-
low). The Main Site is the focal project of this study.
Kings Place
The Kings Place development includes a seven story office block and a 420 
seat music venue as well as some bars and restaurants. Kings Place is de-
signed by the well-known architects Dixon-Jones, who have designed major 
cultural locations in the city such as the National Opera House and (the re-
development of) Covent Garden. Development of Kings Place started in 2005 
and is expected to finish by the end of 2008. It is located on York Way, besides 
Regent’s Canal and overlooking Battlebridge Basin (see map). The project is 
backed by the American developer Millican & Associates inc. The larger part 
of the new office space is let to the Guardian newspaper and Network Rail.
Regent Quarter
The Regent Quarter development forms the basis of the King’s Cross project. 
It is situated between and to the north of King’s Cross and St. Pancras stations 
(see Section 8.2.2). In 2007 outline planning permission was granted for ap-
proximately 743,000 sq. m (7.9 million sq. ft.) of mixed-use development. This 
permission included 455,000 sq. m (4.9 million sq. ft.) of office space, 1,900 
new homes, 46,000 sq. m (495,000 sq. ft.) of retail space plus hotels, serviced 
apartments, student accommodation, leisure, health, cultural, community, 
education and other uses.
The development is being led by Argent, together with the landowners 
London and Continental Railways (LCR) and DHL-Exel Supply Chain (see Sec-
tion 8.2.7).
Regent Quarter (27.2 ha/67.2 acres) is divided into two parts: The Main Site 
and the Triangle site. The planning applications for both sites were submitted 
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in May 2004. After public consultations, amended applications were submit-
ted in May 2005. The Main Site (26.1 ha) is located in the Borough of Camden 
only, whereas the Triangle site is located in Camden and Islington (see map). 
This means that proposals have to be submitted to two borough councils.
I will not go further into The Main Site development in this section since it 
is the subject of Sections 7.2 and 7.3.
Proposal for the Triangle site
The Triangle site measures 1.1 ha (2.7 acres) and comprises railway embank-
ments, disused railway sidings and vacant land. There are no existing build-
ings on the site. To the south of the site is York Way and Randell’s Road. To 
the east are residential properties along Randell’s Road and Rufford Street, all 
within the Borough of Islington (see Figure 8.1). To the north and northeast 
of the site the land uses are industrial, with the adjacent site being occupied 
by the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL, Gossop 2007). Further to the north are 
the CTRL and North London rail lines. To the west of the site, beyond York 
Way and within the Borough of Camden, are industrial uses. To the north of 
and adjacent to the Triangle Site, there are advanced plans for the CTRL Lon-
don West Portal Muster Area. Consent for these works has or is being secured 
through normal planning procedures and under the CTRL Act 1996 planning 
procedures. This facility is due to be opened as part of the CTRL and will in-
corporate a variety of support activities including signalling, emergency ser-
vices, maintenance and storage facilities and evacuation routes from the 
CTRL and Thameslink 2000 tunnels (Hobma et al., 2008).
The revised Triangle site applications (2005) reflect an increase in total floor 
space proposed to 26,600 sq. m (286,000 sq. ft.) and an increase in the pro-
posed residential floor space to 21,100 sq. m (227,000 sq. ft.), with a range of 
affordable housing units (see Section 8.1.10) to be provided. Argent proposes 
to meet ‘Lifetime Homes’ standards and also prioritises the provision of up 
to 10% wheelchair accessible/easily adaptable social rented homes. The Trian-
gle will also accommodate leisure and health facilities and new open spaces. 
Islington and Camden worked together in one project team for the develop-
ment of the Triangle but in 2007 it turned out that Camden Council approved 
the S106 for the Triangle site but the Islington Council did not. In spring 2008 
new public consultations started. The main objection stated was that the pro-
posal did not meet the 50% affordable housing target but only provided for 
34% of affordable housing.
Momentum8.1.4 
After almost two decades of failed planning initiatives (see Section 8.1.6), the 
King’s Cross project regained momentum when in 1996 the Act that facili-
tated the regeneration of St. Pancras International Station, the Channel Tun-
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nel Rail Link Act (CTRL Act) received Royal Assent. The bid for the project was 
won by London and Continental Railways (LCR) that constructed the new sta-
tion and the CTRL.
LCR also received most of the lease rights in the wider area and hence the 
opportunity to kick-start the King’s Cross project.
At the same time the English economy experienced a boom during the 
past decade, which was felt mainly in London since most of the economic im-
provement stems from the financial sector (the financial sector was respon-
sible for 30% of the economic growth, 20% of London’s workforce is employed 
in the financial sector). This left London with a need for housing and office 
space. Despite the fact that King’s Cross is known as a deprived area, it is also 
superbly located. We already saw that the area is situated on the edge of cen-
tral London near the railway and underground stations of St Pancras, King’s 
Cross and Euston. Leicester Square is only five minutes away by underground.
Finally, London will organise the 2012 Olympic Games, and all foreign trav-
ellers who travel to London by train for this event will arrive at St. Pancras In-
ternational. This provides extra momentum for the redevelopment of the area.
At the time when most of the research for this study took place (2006-2007), 
it was planned for within the context of a booming English economy that was 
mostly caused by the growth of the financial sector in London. During the 
credit crisis, the picture has changed and we will have to wait and see how 
these changed economic circumstances will affect the project. This, to a less-
er extent, is also true of the political climate: in 2008 the London Mayor Ken 
Livingston, a member of the Labour Party, who had been in office since 2000 
was replaced by the Conservative Boris Johnson.
Time frame8.1.5 
The project in its current form started in 2002 (see Section 8.1.6) when Argent 
took the first initiatives by publishing the parameters for regeneration (Argent, 
2002) for the area. The project is expected to reach completion in 2025.
History and background8.1.6 
The King’s Cross area has been in need of regeneration for decades and sev-
eral initiatives have been taken since 1975. Planning history reflects the con-
flicts that arose between (some of) the present residents and landowners 
and local councils. The main point of conflict was, and still is, the amount 
of affordable housing, community facilities and local jobs that the redevelop-
ment would provide. On the one hand, plans have been submitted that take 
the new international railway station as their point of departure, whereas the 
plans that were submitted by local action groups started with the needs of 
the residents. A tension existed and still exists between the strong commu-
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nity action groups (mainly combined in the King’s Cross Railway Lands Group, 
often known by its abbreviation KXRLG; see Section 8.1.13), that took a more 
local focus and the national/ citywide character of the plan. The project is of 
national importance because of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL). In ad-
dition, the City of London was in need of more office space, because of its 
booming economy (cf. Section 2.1.1). On the other hand the city and the bor-
oughs (Camden and in particular Islington are among the poorest boroughs of 
London) are in need of local jobs, community facilities, strong environmental 
standards and affordable housing. The tension between a focus on local jobs 
and the need for affordable housing on the one hand and a more ‘commercial’ 
focus was overcome by the S106 agreement (see Section 8.1.1) in which the 
developer undertook some obligations that had a local focus. However, the 
fact that the community benefit groups started legal actions against the plan-
ning permission proves that the gap was never completely filled (Edwards, 
2006; see also Section 8.1.18b).
A short overview of the planning history (see Table 8.1), based mostly on 
an overview written by Camden council (Camden Council, 2006), shows that 
initiatives for redevelopment started as early as 1978, when the Greater Lon-
don Council (GLC) started work on a redevelopment plan that was left uncom-
pleted when the Thatcher government dismantled the GLC and virtually left 
the City of London without a central government until the establishment of 
the Greater London Authority (GLA) in 1997 (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006; see 
Section 8.1.17). Another decisive moment was 1993 when a previous econom-
ic downturn forced British Rail and the London Regeneration Consortium to 
withdraw their plans, which had become unrealistic.
Project management8.1.7 
Camden Council, the planning authority for the larger part of the project, has 
found its interests somewhere in the middle between the community benefit 
groups and the developer. The boroughs of Camden and Islington have estab-
lished a project team that is concerned with daily practice of the project. The 
interviewees were enthusiastic about this team (case interview LCR and Ar-
gent, KCX 04-06-A2 and A3).
Note that in London, in planning terms, the Boroughs are unitary. This 
means that they are responsible for setting and implementing planning policy. 
From 1999 on the Boroughs must have due regard the London Plan, the strate-
gic framework for London drafted by the Mayor of London. This strategy pro-
vides a context within which individual development decisions are reached 
in each of the 33 London Boroughs. The planning authorities at London Bor-
ough level are required to consult the Mayor extensively; his office may ‘call 
in’ applications to be determined at the metropolitan level if the significance 
of the project is such that it cannot be determined at the local level. Robust 
[ 244 ]
and wide-ranging consultation would normally mitigate the potential for the 
planning applications to be called in by the Mayor. Still, because of the focus 
on the boroughs, one interviewee stated that he often had to deal with inex-
perienced civil servants, as even in a borough like Camden a project with the 
size of King’s Cross is a ‘once in a lifetime’ event for most employees (case 
interview KCX 04-06-A2).
Project finance8.1.8 
The King’s Cross project is mostly financed by private parties. We will see in 
Section 8.2 that an agreement has been negotiated that defines a wide range 
of planning obligations (the S106 agreement for The Main Site). This agree-
ment deals with the public facilities that have to be constructed and stipu-
lates that every time a certain threshold is reached (concerning for example 
construction of office space or commercial housing) the developer has to 
meet certain obligations.
In this project, the developer has secured the performance of its obliga-
tions with the aid of facility bonds (bonds that ensure the performance of the 
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Planning historyTable 8.1 
1974 Regents Canal designated as Conservation Area (extended in 1983 and 1986)
1978-1985 GLC works on Action Area Plan (left uncompleted)
1987 King’s Cross identified as terminus for high speed trains
1988 Community planning brief published by Camden Council
1989 British Rail/ London Regeneration Consortium submit planning application for 
comprehensive development. Application later withdrawn
1989 Second application proposes mixed-use development led by offices and housing
1992 Council’s Environment Committee says that it is minded to grant outline planning 
permission (if conditions are fulfilled)
1993 Government announces preference for CTRL terminus at St. Pancras and halts the 
progress of the plan. Decision coincides with major economic downturn. BR/LRC plans 
become unrealistic.
1994 Applications are withdrawn
1991/1994 Local architect and local community group submit alternative applications. The plans 
had no provision for rail infrastructure
1996 CTRL Act receives Royal Assent
2001 Main construction work on new railway infrastructure and St Pancras station starts
2004 Nine applications submitted by Argent (3 identical applications covering The Main Site 
and the Triangle) and indicative highway proposals for Pancras Road, Goods Way and 
York Way (p.7msr/p37)
2005 Revised planning applications are submitted
2006 S106 signed for main site in Regent Quarter
2008 Construction work on Regent Quarter expected to begin
obligation in the event of default by the developer). The agreement sums up 
the amounts of these bonds. The bicycle storage facility, for example, is se-
cured for £ 26,150 and the two-form entry primary school for £ 2,680,000 (see 
Section 8.2.3).
The project is phased and requires no major public investment from the 
planning authority. Camden Council can however not force the developer to 
start construction; thus a risk exists that the project will remain undeveloped 
in case of a recession.
Ownership8.1.9 
Except for the rights of LCR and Exel (see Section 8.2.7), existing railway lands 
(and the buildings on them) are owned by Network Rail, Transco (British 
Gas), British Waterways and the Borough of Camden (Camden Council, 2006: 
MSR-4). The status of some of the existing buildings as listed monuments (or 
listed industrial monuments) was of importance. The No. 8 Gasholder will 
have to be replaced (instead of demolished) and the Triplet Gasholder will be 
re-erected. Some other buildings had to be restored and made fit for new uses 
instead of being demolished.
The relevant rights to the land that was to be used for the project were 
already in possession of the private landowners. LCR possesses the rights to 
the land (in a perpetual lease) because it won the bidding procedure for the 
development of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (see Section 8.1.3). The lease 
that gives it the right to construct the rail link also gives it the rights to the 
land. Argent, a developer owned by the pension fund of British Telecom, was 
invited by LCR (and NCL) to develop the land.
The fact that some of the land was owned by the Crown influenced the proj-
ect because a different procedure had to be followed. The fact that the Council 
owned land was not material to the agreement. (Camden Council, 2006: 50).
Affordable housing8.1.10 
The English planning system uses affordable housing as a key term and then 
draws a distinction between social rented housing and intermediate housing.
The national planning policy statement 3 (PPS3) on housing (2006) defines 
affordable housing as social rented housing, and intermediate housing as hous-
ing that is provided to specified eligible households whose needs are not met 
by the market. Affordable housing should meet the needs of eligible house-
holds including availability at a cost low enough for them to afford, determined 
with regard to local incomes and local house prices. Another requirement is 
that it must include provision for the home to remain at an affordable price for 
future eligible households or, if these restrictions are lifted, for the subsidy to 
be recycled to ensure the provision of alternative affordable housing.
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PPS 3 defines social rented housing as rented housing owned and managed 
by local authorities and registered social landlords – or another landlord who 
received that right from a housing corporation or a local authority – for which 
guideline target rents are determined through the national rent regime. It de-
fines intermediate affordable housing as housing at prices and rents above those 
of social rent, but below market price or rents. This type of housing can in-
clude shared equity products and other low-cost homes for sale and or to let 
at intermediate rents.
In new developments, as a general rule, affordable housing is financed by 
developers. To receive planning permission from a planning authority they 
must meet the affordable housing targets of local plans or show why these 
targets cannot be met. The various forms of intermediate housing reflect 
mostly various ownership constructions. The exception is provided by the 84 
‘key worker units’ that are let for a sub-market rent of 20% below the market 
price. A ‘key worker’ is an invention of former mayor Ken Livingston, aimed at 
providing housing for people with a job that is vital to the city such as teach-
ers and doctors in order to prevent them from moving to a city where housing 
is cheaper. It is generally accepted that before the credit crunch, house prices 
in London were so high as to make it almost impossible for first-time buyers 
to get on the housing ladder. One of the effects of the credit crunch has been 
to freeze the housing market throughout most of the UK; it is impossible to 
predict at present how the housing market will develop in the coming years.
Camden Council’s revised unitary development plan (RUDP, 2006) sets two 
targets for affordable housing. The first is that 50% of all new housing devel-
opment should be affordable. The second target is that 70% of the affordable 
housing units should be let for a social rent. These targets are in line with the 
London Plan and with the PPS3, which demands that the targets set should 
meet the needs of the local population.
The RUDP lays out the conditions under which the Council is willing to 
sell its planning permission and the conditions under which the developer is 
willing to buy that permission. This makes the negotiations associated with a 
given urban development project a game of offer and acceptance. The above-
mentioned target of 50% means that in the case of the King’s Cross project, 
the council states that it intends not to grant planning permission to a devel-
oper who does not meet this target. But a target and an intention are not the 
same as a rule as we will see in the discussion of the court cases brought in 
connection with the grant of planning permission (see Section 8.2.8b). In re-
spect of The Main Site agreement, the planning authority accepted proof pro-
vided by the developer that only 42% of the new housing could be affordable 
(see Section 8.2.11).
In a very critical statement on the S106 agreement for the Triangle proj-
ect, Michael Edwards (2007) comments that 88% of the population of Islington 
cannot afford so-called ‘affordable’ housing. He adds that a right-to-buy unit 
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is not truly affordable housing because it is only available for first-time buyers, 
who receive a 15-20% discount on the market price of specified units; in other 
words, the affordability is not sustainable. The fact that the S106 agreement 
only provides for 34% of affordable housing was a reason for the borough of 
Islington to withhold planning permission (see Section 8.1.3, cf. Section 2.1.2).
Environmental sustainability8.1.11 
Environmental sustainability is named as an important goal in all planning 
documents. The King’s Cross project as such aims to achieve landmark envi-
ronmental sustainability. The plans speak of low energy buildings, minimal 
car use and enhancement of biodiversity (Camden, 2004: 13). The developer 
must provide an environmental impact assessment for his development, in 
accordance with the Town and Country Planning regulations of 1999 (LBC & 
LBI, 2004). The developer, Argent, has done so. The environmental statement 
that it submitted for the Triangle site was however deemed insufficient by the 
General Inspectorate. Pursuant to article 19 of the regulations, Argent had to 
submit further information concerning wind turbulence and noise pending 
its appeal to the Secretary of State against the refusal of planning permission 
(see Section 8.1.3).
In 2008, it turned out that (at least some of) the good intentions were being 
realised when the design of development zones L and G in the Eastern Goods 
Yard (see Figure 8.1), which includes a new university campus for Central 
Saint Martins College of Art and Design (University of the Arts London), retail 
facilities and a civic square, was praised by the Commission for Architecture 
and the Built Environment (CABE) in an otherwise critical report (The Guard-
ian, 2008; www.cabe.org.uk).
Other public facilities8.1.12 
The King’s Cross project is in many respects creating a new neighbourhood, 
and therefore includes many new public facilities such as ten new public 
spaces and twenty new streets, as well as the construction of a concert hall at 
Kings Place, art galleries and restaurants. In addition, a new university cam-
pus will be developed in an old granary at the site of the Eastern Goods Yard. 
This has led to the proposal of the name Granary Square for the redeveloped 
site, which will be one of the key features of the whole King’s Cross Central 
development (see Figure 8.1; see also Section 8.2.13).
Involvement of the general public8.1.13 
The general public is involved in various ways. Community benefit groups in 
the King’s Cross-area are well organised (see Section 8.1.4). The local popula-
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tion is involved in the King’s Cross Railway Lands Group (KXRLG) and the Cal-
ly Rail Group, a small community group based in Islington that has worked 
together with KXRLG to oppose elements of the Triangle proposal. The proj-
ect has also gone through extensive consultation programmes, parts of which 
were led by the developer that had published a number of consultation docu-
ments itself (see for example Section 8.1.14). The developer, for example, or-
ganised a road show in which it presented the framework of its plans and it 
had made nine vox pop videos based on interviews with local residents (Bor-
ough of Camden, 2006c).
Goals of the project8.1.14 
Goals, targets and objectives are important keywords within the English plan-
ning context. Several plans define targets that parties strive to meet. Targets 
however are not strict requirements and the process of negotiation with the 
developer and the community shows that targets and objectives are flexible 
are often not met in a strict sense (see Section 8.1.10). This can be somewhat 
misleading since the description of the objectives and targets usually names 
precise numbers.
Project goals have to be understood within the context of these targets that 
trickle down from the national level to the level of the boroughs. The nation-
al goals influence the plans on various topics such as sustainability and af-
fordable housing. These strategies of the government (named planning policy 
statements19) influence the plans in the lower layers.
The London Plan (2004), which lays down the mayor’s 15-20 year strategy, 
provides guidelines for the planning authorities at the borough level. The Uni-
form Development Plan of the Borough of Camden (2004), the Revised Uni-
form Development Plan (2006) and the Joint Development brief of the bor-
oughs of Camden and Islington (2004) are key documents.
The planning authorities (the boroughs) use their strategic documents to 
decide whether they will grant planning permission. The higher authorities 
(Mayor of London and Secretary of State) use their plans to refuse planning 
permission after the borough has granted it, or even to ‘call in’ an application. 
The latter means that the Secretary of State will decide on the planning ap-
plication and not the borough (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006; Section 77 Town 
and Country Planning Act 1990). This does not happen often.
In addition to the goals of the city and the boroughs, Argent has also pub-
lished its goals. These goals can be understood as a form of pro-active in-
volvement in the design of the new neighbourhood, but also as an attempt to 
influence later plans (Hobma et al., 2008; case interview LCR, KCX 04-06-A3).
19   Older strategies are named planning policy guidances (PPGs).
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In 2001 Argent published a consultation document Principles for a human 
city in which it defined ten principles that can also be regarded as goals of the 
King’s Cross project. These principles are:
a robust urban framework ■
a lasting new place ■
promotion of accessibility ■
a vibrant mix of uses ■
harnessing the value of heritage ■
work for King’s Cross, work for London ■
commitment to long-term success ■
engagement and inspiration ■
secure delivery ■
clear, open communication. ■
The London plan speaks of the aim to turn the King’s Cross area into a sus-
tainable business and residential community with minimal use of cars (Sec-
tion 5.37). The overall strategy of the London Plan, where the opportunity ar-
eas are named, is to:
seek to exceed the minimum guidelines for housing; ■
have regard to indicative estimates for employment; ■
maximise access by public transport; ■
promote social inclusion and relate development to any nearby Areas for  ■
Regeneration;
take account of the community, environmental and other distinctive local  ■
characteristics of each area.
Within this framework, King’s Cross wants to create 50% of social and afford-
able housing in the new development (see Section 8.1.10), promote local jobs 
and minimise environmental impact. We have already seen in previous sec-
tions (8.1.10-8.1.12) and will see in the remainder of this chapter that these 
goals are neither meaningless nor strict requirements but that they have be-
come part of the negotiations.
The Camden UDP states that the Council seeks the sustainable develop-
ment of the King’s Cross Opportunity Area by achievement of the following 
aims:
to support and develop London’s role as a world business, commercial and  ■
cultural centre;
to achieve economic, social, and physical integration with surrounding  ■
communities;
to contribute positively to meeting the full range of housing, social and  ■
healthcare needs in Camden and thus to contribute to meeting London’s 
needs;
to maximise opportunities for walking and cycling and the use of existing  ■
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and proposed public transport facilities, thereby minimising dependence 
on private car use and traffic generation;
to enhance opportunities for biodiversity and; ■
to promote community regeneration through innovative processes of com- ■
munity involvement in the planning, design and management of the new 
development and services (Camden, 2004: 13.11)
These goals should result in a mixed-used development that is well integrat-
ed with surrounding areas, is characterise by a very high standard of design 
and implemented in a comprehensive, integrated and phased development.
So many other goals and targets are mentioned that it makes more sense 
to summarise them. It is fair to say that the goal in the King’s Cross opportu-
nity area is to create a new commercial district that also meets the needs of 
the local population. In addition, the project aims to adopt high standards of 
environmental quality and design.
Delays8.1.15 
The Triangle project was delayed when, in 2007, the Islington Council refused 
planning permission for the Triangle site. Further delays may occur if the 
demand for office and residential space slows down (see Sections 8.1.4 and 
8.2.4). The planning authorities cannot force the developer to start construc-
tion. They can only force him to start construction of public facilities when a 
certain threshold demand is reached.
Role of private actors in the project8.1.16 
Private actors play a key role in the project. We already encountered the de-
veloper Argent (see Section 8.2), which has taken the lead in most aspects of 
the project.
Planning authorities in England hardly own any land. There are no (bind-
ing) land use plans. Planning authorities therefore have to wait for developers 
to draw up plans before development can actually take place.
We have seen that negotiation plays a key role in the English planning 
model (Section 8.1.14). As a result, the precise content of a development proj-
ect depends on the negotiations between the planning authorities and the 
private developers. From a public perspective, as a general rule, the result will 
be better when development takes place in a profitable area. Still, it is hard 
for planning authorities to take a leading role in the process since they have 
to rely on the proposals of developers to concretise their plans.
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Public actors8.1.17 
The public actors that are involved in the project are:
Secretary of State – holds the freehold to the Excel lands, has the right to  ■
‘call the plan in’ (via the government office for London). Every ministry in 
the British government has a Secretary of State, who is the senior minis-
ter for the department in question, and usually a number of other (more 
junior) ministers too. In this chapter, we use the term Secretary of State to 
refer to the Secretary of State for Transport.
DfT (Department for Transport) – manages the integrated transport infra- ■
structure.
English Heritage – the planning permission for listed buildings is subject to  ■
referral to the Secretary of State and English Heritage.
Traffic for London (TfL) – the traffic authority for the whole of London. ■
London Borough of Camden – one of the two planning authorities at the lo- ■
cal level which has jurisdiction over the major part of the King’s Cross site;
London Borough of Islington – the other planning authority at the local lev- ■
el which has jurisdiction over the minor part of the King’s Cross site.
The Mayor of London’s office – has strategic responsibility for the imple- ■
mentation of the spatial strategy for London through the London Plan.
The London Development Agency – works to deliver the Mayor’s vision for  ■
London to be a sustainable world city with strong, long-term economic 
growth, social inclusion and active environmental improvement. It produc-
es the Mayor’s Economic Development Strategy for London, which focuses 
on places and infrastructure, supporting people, encouraging business and 
promoting London.
The London Assembly – the elected regional assembly for London and en- ■
sures that the Mayor is accountable to the people.
The Greater London Authority – comprises the London Assembly and May- ■
or and contains the directorate responsible for spatial and economic devel-
opment.
The former railway lands are owned by the Secretary of State for Trans- ■
port – The Secretary of State possesses the absolute freehold title to some 
of the land, and the freehold interest to other parts. The difference is that 
in the former case the land is registered (by the Land Registry) in the name 
of the current Secretary of State, while in the latter case it is registered in 
the name of a previous Secretary of State and the rights have been trans-
ferred to the present incumbent. The Secretary of State has also taken pos-
session of some small parts of the land that were previously owned by oth-
er parties.
King’s Cross Railway Lands Group (KXRLG) – A group of mainly local people  ■
supported by some relatively influential barristers and lawyers seeking to 
improve the quality of the development at King’s Cross.
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Cally Rail Land Group – A local community benefit group from the Borough  ■
of Islington.
Critique8.1.18 
The project has mostly been criticised for a lack of focus on the interests and 
needs of the present local population (affordable housing, local jobs). Though 
planning targets were not met, the planning authorities mostly showed them-
selves satisfied with the deal they received (see also Section 8.1.10).
In 2007, a claim for Judicial Review20 was lodged against Camden Coun-
cil by King’s Cross Railway Lands Group (KXRLG). The group challenged the 
decision-making process in relation to the King’s Cross Central planning ap-
plication, and the resolution to grant conditional planning permission, listed 
building consents and conservation area consents. We will discuss this case 
in more detail in Section 8.2.8b.
Conflicts of power: State interests and city 8.1.19 
interests; city interests and borough interests
No major gap of interest exists between the various layers of government al-
though, as we will see, government-sponsored public bodies such as English 
Heritage sometimes have different interests than the developers and plan-
ning authorities (see Section 8.3.1).
The first reason for the absence of major gaps of interest between various 
government levels is that the borough and not the city forms the nexus of the 
planning process. Unlike other projects that we studied, the city mostly has 
negative powers (it can refuse planning permission) but it may not act as the 
leading planning authority in the project. The national government does have 
that right but rarely uses it. As a result, huge battles over conflicting state, city 
and local interests did not emerge.
The second reason is that Camden (and to a lesser extent Islington) has 
taken a pro-business approach whereby it took notice of the national and re-
gional importance of the project. In other words, it tried to think of the project 
as a part of London and not from the perspective of the local residents only, 
since it feared that if it would do so nothing would be built at all (case inter-
view Camden Project team, KCX 04-06-A3). On the other hand, it was precisely 
this attitude that led to most of the criticism of the project from the public, as 
indicated in Section 8.1.18.
20   King’s Cross Railway Lands Group v. London Borough of Camden, Interested Parties CO/1185/2007 
(High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division Administrative Court (2007 WL 1729812)).
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Focal project: the Main Site, 8.2 
Regent Quarter
Introduction8.2.1 
The focal project of this study is the development of The Main Site in Regent 
Quarter. This 27.1 ha (67 acre) site of underused land between and to the 
north of the stations of St. Pancras and King’s Cross comprises the heart of 
the King’s Cross Central project.
The S106 agreement deals with the planning obligations that were im-
posed by the planning authorities on the developers. The legal background of 
the agreement is that development rights in England were nationalised by the 
Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006). This stip-
ulates that a landowner only owns the existing uses of his property, not the 
future uses: the rights to future uses are owned by the government. The gov-
ernment may ‘sell’ these uses to the developer but not for a lump sum (cf. Sec-
tion 8.1 on the public-private nature of the case). In other words, if a planning 
authority is confronted with a request for planning permission from a devel-
oper, it can make its permission subject to an agreement on planning obliga-
tions. These planning obligations should be related to the impact of the devel-
opment. A planning authority can for example not ask for a lump sum payment 
of £ 100,000 for its permission but it may ask for £ 25,000 for a bus line, £ 25,000 
for a local school, £ 25,000 for a day-care facility and £ 25,000 for a construction 
training centre. Instead of financial contributions, a planning authority may al-
so ask for in-kind deliveries, whereby the developer does not pay for provision 
of a facility but provides the facility itself (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006).
The Main Site agreement contains a general provision stating that all parties 
shall use reasonable endeavours to ensure that the planning purpose underly-
ing their respective obligations under the agreement is achieved and carried 
out in accordance with good industry practice at time of performance. This ar-
ticle illustrates once again the administrative nature of the S106 agreement: it 
is a private law contract drafted to achieve certain planning goals, and hence 
the goals underlying the obligations are of key importance (cf. Section 8.1.14). 
The project was visited in 2006. Case interviews were conducted with repre-
sentatives of the private and the public parties and experts (see Appendix B).
Positioning (area)8.2.2 
Regent Quarter lies between King’s Cross Station and St Pancras International 
Station stretching north beyond Regent’s Canal as far as the North London 
Railway Line (see Figure 8.1). The Main Site is the larger part of Regent Quar-
ter, situated wholly in the Borough of Camden. The smaller part, the Triangle, 
is situated in both Camden and Islington (see Sections 8.1.2 and 8.1.3).
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Description of the project8.2.3 
The Main Site is a 26.1 ha (64 acre) brownfield site owned by LCR and Exel. 
Some buildings on the land are owned by Network Rail, Transco (British Gas), 
British Waterways and the Borough of Camden. For the main agreement (the 
S106) this was not of importance.
A general article in the S106 agreement (Section (A), opening section) states 
that: “…the proposed development, the subject of the Agreement involves 
a comprehensive, phased, mixed use development of former railway lands 
within the King’s Cross Opportunity Area.”
The Main Site will consist of 713,000 sq. m (7.67 million sq. ft.) of develop-
ment, including 1700 residential units. The largest part of the development 
consists of office space (455,000 sq. m / 4.9 million sq. ft.).
In addition, up to 650 student flats (150 studio flats and 500 cluster flats) 
will be constructed. The student flats will be owned by the company NIDO 
that specialises in commercial student accommodation. NIDO’s website states 
that they will house 1,045 persons (see www.nidokingscross.com). The rent of 
the apartments will be about 200 pounds a week.
The S106 further provides details on all facilities and buildings that will be 
constructed, except for the commercial parts because they are not subject to 
planning obligations. The maximum permissible amounts of floor space are 
mentioned in the planning consent.
The facilities and other projects that are mentioned in the agreement are:
 (i) bicycle storage facility
 (ii) Camley Street natural park centre
 (iii) community meeting facilities
 (iv) construction training centre
 (v) indoor sports hall
 (vi) leisure facility
 (vii) police office
 (viii) primary health care centre
 (xi) primary health care walk-in centre
 (x) skills and recruitment centre
 (xi) ‘Sure start’ childcare centre
 (xii) two-form entry primary school
And:
 (xiii) multi-use games area (MUGA)
 (xiv) small business space
 (xv) highways.
We will discuss some of these facilities in more detail in Section 8.2.13.
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Momentum8.2.4 
The opening of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) in 2007 created momen-
tum for the project. The land is now cleared and the construction work on 
St. Pancras station is finished. However, as we already mentioned, the credit 
crisis has led to a strong downturn in both the housing market and the of-
fice market in England (The Guardian, 2008a). At the time of writing (October 
2008), it is not clear how this will influence the developments on The Main 
Site (see Section 8.1.6).
Pre-contractual procedure8.2.5 
The relevant rights to the land were already in possession of the private land-
owners. LCR possesses the rights to the land because it won the bidding pro-
cedure that gave it the right to develop the CTRL. The lease that gives it the 
right to construct the building also gives it the rights to the land. Argent was 
invited by LCR (and NCL) to develop the land.
The land was not owned by the council and therefore the council could not 
initiate a bidding procedure. LCR that owns most of the land in a leasehold 
construction (see 8.2.7) attracted the developer (case interview LCR, KCX 04-
06-A1).
Argent took a pro-active approach and published its first consultation doc-
ument in 2001.
In 2004 the developer (Argent Ltd, see Section 8.2.7) submitted the plan-
ning applications. After public consultation, the applications were modified 
and re-submitted in September 2005. Public consultation can be regarded as 
an important part of the negotiation process: since the council, which has 
to approve the planning applications and the S106 agreement, is made up of 
elected members, it is a material consideration for these members that the 
developer takes the public interest into account.
As compared to the 2004 applications, the 2005 applications included:
more public open space ■
new designs for streets and squares ■
new health, education, sports and other community facilities ■
changes to the road layout and the introduction of ‘home zones’ ■
renewable energy initiatives, including use of wind turbines ■
more native plant species ■
more detail on new housing including the number of affordable homes. ■
Planning permission was received (after amendments) in March 2006. The ne-
gotiations on the S106 agreement and the planning permission took place in 
parallel. It took about two years to negotiate the agreement.
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Time frame8.2.6 
Two hundred detailed planning applications are expected within the next 
twelve years. Building started in 2008, after LCR had cleared the site. The 
project is expected to take about twenty years to complete but it uses phases 
rather than a calendar for its implementation. The agreement ends when all 
obligations have been fulfilled.
Twenty-five years after the implementation date, the developer can apply 
to the council for written confirmation of the termination of the obligations 
that do not have an end date. It can also make this application five years after 
75% of the total permitted floor space of the development has been practically 
completed. The agreement states that the council shall give such written ap-
proval when the developer has fulfilled all its material obligations, the plan-
ning purpose underlying the obligation can be reasonably said to have been 
met and the costs to the developer of continuing to comply with the obliga-
tion do not justify the obligation continuing in effect.
The contracting parties8.2.7 
The parties that signed the S106 agreement are the Mayor and Burgesses 
of the London Borough of Camden (the Council), The Secretary of State for 
Transport, London & Continental Railways Limited (LCR), National Carriers 
Limited (NCL), Argent (King’s Cross) Limited (the Developer), and Transport for 
London (TfL).
Transport for London signed the agreement in its capacity as planning au-
thority for the parts of the project that deal with citywide traffic issues. The 
Secretary of State signed in his capacity as the fee owner (lessor) of the rail-
way lands that are in the possession of LCR. Exel PLC is the parent company 
of NCL. Argent, the developer, leads the process. It signed an agreement with 
LCR and DHL-Exel (which have pooled their land), based on which it will be 
in possession of at least 50% of the project in a joint venture after it has per-
formed its part of the agreement.
Profile of private parties
Argent Group Plc ■ . – a 25 year old company, that will manage, partly own and 
develop about 10 million square feet of property in King’s Cross by 2010 
with a value of about £ 3.5 billion. The company is based in London and 
specialises in city centre regeneration in the UK. The net asset value of the 
company is about £ 160 million. Argent is owned by British Telecom Invest-
ment Scheme that is part of the British Telecom Group (one of the world’s 
largest providers of communication and internet services).
LCR ■  – a railway company that won the bid to build and run the Channel 
Tunnel Rail Link ending at St. Pancras International. Due to that agreement 
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it became the long term lessee of most of the land (71 percent) in the area. 
The company consists of a number of shareholders that include National 
Express Group, EDF Energy, Rail Link Engineering, UBS investment bank 
and the French railway company SNCF.
DHL-Exel Supply Chain ■  – an international logistics company that acquired 
the rights to the land that is not in the possession of LCR. The company is 
owned by Deutsche Post World Net.
Other share- and stakeholders8.2.8a 
The contract names various project organisations for the subprojects (fa-
cilities). There is a King’s Cross Development Forum in which local business 
entities are organised. There is a construction impact group that is an exist-
ing forum adapted to allow for liaison with local residents and other interest 
groups regarding potential construction impacts and mitigation. In addition, 
there is a contractors forum described as follows (see S106 agreement, part 2, 
Section A, Definitions): “A forum to enable the Developer, the Developer’s con-
tractors and principal sub-contractors, the Council and occupiers of the De-
velopment using construction contractors to co-ordinate the delivery of con-
struction employment and training initiatives within the Development with 
a view inter alia to improve employment and training opportunities for local 
people across both LB Camden and LB Islington.”
Finally, there is a King’s Cross Business Forum described as follows (see 
S106 agreement, part 1, Definitions): “The existing forum administered by the 
Council’s Culture and Environment Directorate, aimed at businesses in King’s 
Cross and providing networking opportunities, a strong business identity, a 
hub for information and discussion and access to business opportunities.”
Involvement of the public8.2.8b 
We have seen that both the developer and the council have undertaken pub-
lic consultations. However, KXRLG (see Section 8.1.17) was not happy with the 
outcome of the negotiations, mostly because of the limited amount of afford-
able housing included in this development.
In 2007, it lodged an appeal for a Judicial Review21 against Camden Council, 
arguing that it was unlawful of the Council to grant planning permission to 
developers in the King’s Cross Central project.
21   King’s Cross Railway Lands Group v. London Borough of Camden, Interested Parties CO/1185/2007 
(High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division Administrative Court (2007 WL 1729812)).
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Court procedure
KXRLG challenged the decision-making process in relation to the King’s Cross 
Central planning application and the resolution to grant conditional planning 
permission, listed building consents and conservation area consents.
Most importantly, the group held that the council committee had not been 
free to consider whether the percentage of affordable housing in the S106 
agreement was high enough. This is a complex argument that may be sum-
marised as follows: the S106 was preceded by a Head of Terms agreement 
that consisted of general conditions on which the council and the developer 
agreed. The terms in the S106 on affordable housing did not differ from those 
in the Head of Terms agreement. KXRLG argued that lawyers who were in-
volved in the negotiation of the S106 had stated to the committee that they 
could not reconsider the percentage of affordable housing as it did not dif-
fer from the agreement that had received their consent. Without any change 
in the material circumstances, the committee could only review whether the 
S106 was in line with the Head of Terms.
KXRLG held that if the committee had been properly advised it would have 
reached a different conclusion with regard to the percentage of affordable 
housing even when there was no material change in the planning conditions.
This line of reasoning was based on earlier cases that ruled that there is rea-
son for review when the advice to members fettered their discretion or unduly 
boxed them in.22 In deciding whether this was the case, the court should look 
at the whole of the advice (written and oral). Mr. Justice Sullivan, who heard 
this case, concluded however that the committee was not fettered in their dis-
cretion, notwithstanding the letter from a member of the Committee in a local 
newspaper in which she stated that the committee was under the impression 
that it could only review whether the S106 agreement was consistent with the 
Head of Terms, unless there was a material change in circumstances.
As a result the planning permission was upheld even though it was not in 
line with Camden’s revised unitary development plan (RUDP) that included a 
target of 50% of affordable housing (later reduced to 42% after representations 
from the developer; see Section 8.1.10) of which 70% for a social rent (later re-
duced to 66%).
The other point in the case was that the demolition of two Victorian build-
ings, Stanley Buildings North and Culross Building, was not justified by wider 
planning benefits. The court held however that the arguments in favour of de-
molition of those buildings presented by the interested party and the defen-
dant were on balance justified.
22   Justice Sullivan cites R. v Vale Of Glamorgan District Council ex parte Adams (Journal of Planning Law, 
2001, 93) and the unreported case Oxton Farms v Selby District Council (High Court of Justice, 18th April 
1997, both citations under number 34). 
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Payments8.2.9 
The obligations of the developer are mostly in kind which means that it pro-
vides facilities. We could therefore say that the payments in the lease consist 
of the obligations that the developer has to perform. For a period of fourteen 
years the developer has to pay an (indexed) amount of £ 7,500 per annum to 
the council, to allow the latter to monitor whether he has fulfilled his obliga-
tions.
The general part of the lease mentions the duty of the developer to secure 
the performance of its obligations by facility bonds (see also Section 8.1.8). A 
facility bond secures the performance of the obligation in the event of default 
by the developer. The agreement sums up the amounts of these bonds. The 
bicycle storage facility, for example, is secured for £ 26,150 and the two-form 
entry primary school for £ 2,680,000.
Which conflicts arose with respect to the project?8.2.10a 
There were no major conflicts between the council and the developer with re-
gard to project. Negotiations were however tough with respect to the percent-
age of affordable housing that the developer would deliver (case interview with 
Argent and King’s Cross Project Team, KCX 04-06-A3, KCX 04-06-A2 and A4).
How do parties deal with future conflicts?8.2.10b 
The agreement includes a detailed procedure that parties have to follow in 
case disputes rise (article 16). All parties obviously want to keep their conflicts 
out of the courts.
When a dispute rises, a party must write a notice of dispute – a brief de-
scription of the disagreement involved – within ten days after which a settle-
ment meeting must take place. If that meeting is unsuccessful, then five days 
later, mediation starts (unless the parties agree that mediation is not appro-
priate) in accordance with the CEDR model23. If the parties cannot agree on 
a mediator, CEDR will appoint one. If mediation is not successful, any party 
may write a further notice of dispute that will lead to the appointment of an 
expert. The expert’s decision is final and binding (his costs will be divided in 
equal shares between the parties) but he is not an arbitrator since he will act 
as an expert. He is either an experienced solicitor, chartered civil engineer, 
leading landlord or tenant counsel or a chartered surveyor. If the parties are 
unable to agree on an expert, the president of the Law Society will appoint 
23   CEDR stands for Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution, a large non-profit organisation supported by 
private and public sector organisations that specialises in mediation.
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one. The expert will work as quickly as possible and will not take more than 
twenty working days to produce a decision.
Affordable housing8.2.11 
The S106 agreement, in line with Planning Policy Statement 3 of the national 
government, distinguishes between social rented units and intermediate 
housing. It then names the categories of shared ownership units, key worker 
units, home-buy units and right-to-buy units (see also Section 8.1.11).
We have seen that the targets initially set by Camden Council (50% afford-
able housing of which 70% for a social rent) were not met in the final agree-
ment: 44% will be affordable housing units (or 42% if we don’t count the units 
that replace existing units) and 66% of these will be let for a social rent. To 
understand this outcome we have to bear in mind that an S106 agreement 
is negotiable: as pointed out in Section 8.1.10, the council accepted evidence 
provided by the developer that its initial targets had been unachievable.
The agreement includes detailed specifications of the social and affordable 
housing (in Section NN). It states that there shall be a minimum of 53,670 sq. 
m (577,000 sq. ft.) of affordable housing floor space (43,936 sq. m/472,000 sq. 
ft. of net internal floor area), sufficient for the provision of 750 units. It draws 
a distinction between social rented units and various types of intermediate 
housing. A maximum of 500 units will be let for a social rent. Of those 500, 88 
will be specialists social rented units, i.e. units suitable for elderly people who 
require on-site attendance for their everyday needs.
This leaves 250 units of intermediate housing. These are divided into 30 
shared ownership units; 84 key worker sub-market rented units (20% below 
market price, see Section 8.1.10); 40 shared equity units; 50 home-buy units 
and 46 right-to-buy units24. These forms – with the exception of the key work-
er units – reflect various ownership constructions. The realisation of these 
units is linked to the schedule for the building of the market housing units. 
For example, the first affordable housing units need to be realised when the 
first 125 market housing units have been completed. This means that if an 
economic downturn causes the project to be undeveloped, fewer affordable 
housing units will also be constructed.
The developer will not manage the affordable housing units itself but it 
will select an affordable housing provider (AHP) to which it will transfer the 
social rent and shared ownership units.
24   Shared equity means that the developer provides funding for the house and in return receives a share of 
any price appreciation. Home-buy means that a first time buyer receives a 35% discount on the price. When 
he sells the house, 35% of the price he receives is re-invested in affordable housing. Right to buy means that 
the purchaser has the right to buy his house in phases. 
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Environmental sustainability8.2.12 
The plans set ambitious sustainability goals (see also Section 8.1.11) and the 
developer has expressed commitment to them. The documents specifying 
the environmental sustainability strategy take up no fewer than five volumes 
(LBC, 2006: MSR p. 9). Various sections in the S106 agreement reflect these 
goals: Section W deals with environmental sustainability in general, Section 
X with energy, Section Y with construction materials and construction waste, 
Section Z with waste in general, Section AA with water, Section BB with a car-
bon fund, and Section FF with green travel initiatives.
However, although these sections set ambitious goals for the future, all ob-
ligations are formulated as reasonable endeavours. This means that they can-
not easily be enforced by the planning authority.
Other public facilities8.2.13 
Other public facilities that are mentioned in the agreement are:
a small business space (Section D); ■
community meeting facilities (accommodation of not less than 370 sq. m  ■
GEA for the local community, Section H);
facilities for the support of local schools (Section K); ■
a police office will be constructed by the developer and leased to the Met- ■
ropolitan Police (Section I);
there are agreements for Children’s Centres, a two-form entry primary  ■
school and a multi-use games area (MUGA), see Section J. With the excep-
tion of the MUGA these facilities will be constructed by the developer and 
leased for a peppercorn rent to the Council;
there will be a floating classroom (a vessel comprising a floating classroom  ■
using moorings in the vicinity of the Development, Section K definitions) 
that is meant to encourage direct input into the curriculum from occupiers 
within the development (in such areas as financial literacy and the devel-
opment industry);
Section L (leisure) mentions an indoor sports hall (1500 sq. m GIA), a LAP  ■
(“a high quality local area for play of no less than 100 sq. m to include no 
less than four (4) features that enable children to identify the space as 
their own domain, for example a footprint trail, a mushroom style seat 
or a model of an animal or insect and some individual seats for parents 
or carers”), a LEAP (“a high-quality local equipped area for play of no less 
than 400 sq m to include no less than six pieces of play equipment”) and a 
leisure facility (public health and fitness facility of no less than 3,000 sq. m 
GIA).
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Goals of the project8.2.14 
The agreement mentions as its goal the development of “…a comprehensive, 
phased, mixed use development of former railway lands within the King’s 
Cross Opportunity Area” (Section A).
As we discussed in the first section, the English planning system sets many 
goals, targets and objectives (Section 8.1.14) which trickle down to the project 
level. The goals of the various sub-projects (facilities) are mentioned in the 
second part of the agreement, which deals with specific obligations. I give one 
example of the formulation of these goals: Section A of Part 2 of the agree-
ment deals with employment and construction training. Its definition section 
names the following three ‘agreed targets’:
7.5% of the person-weeks of employment used in the on-site construc-1. 
tion of the development should be provided by trainees recruited via the 
Construction Training Centre or other facilities and programmes targeting 
training;
of that 7.5%, two-thirds should be trainees “working towards an NVQ (na-2. 
tional vocational qualification), the balance to include trainees following 
specialist and customised short-course training leading to industry-recog-
nised qualifications and training under the Construction Skills Certification 
Scheme, the split between these various components to be agreed between 
the Developer and the Council on a rolling basis, every two years”; and
these trainee workers should receive appropriate supervision and support 3. 
wherever possible from a qualified trade assessor, to be provided by con-
struction employers on the development site.
Delays8.2.15 
Delays have not been reported yet, but the implementation of the plans will 
be delayed if the economic downturn continues. Argent’s obligations depend 
on its own phasing of the commercial development; it will only start con-
struction of the office and residential space if there is a market for it (case 
interview KCX 04-07-A4).
Common contract norms in King’s Cross, 8.3 
Regent Quarter (The Main Site)
After the above general description of the King’s Cross project, we will once 
again examine the significance of the ten common contract norms (see Sec-
tion 3.4) in the context of the development agreements in this case study.
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Introduction: general sketch of the agreement8.3.1 
The contract that was studied for this case is the S106 agreement for The 
Main Site of Regent Quarter, which was drafted in the form of a deed. One of 
the advantages of a deed compared with a contract is that not every promise 
in it needs to be backed by a consideration (see Section 2.7.2.3).
Camden Council made its planning consents subject to a legal agreement; 
it follows that the goal of the S106 agreement is to make provision for the 
planning obligations that are material to the planning consents.
The S106 agreement in question, dated 22 December 2006, states that it 
was closed pursuant to Section 106 of the 1990 Town and Country Planning 
Act.25
The council and the developer have worked closely together; on some is-
sues they were on the same side of the table when they negotiated with other 
public authorities such as English Heritage and TfL. But on other issues, most 
notably on affordable housing, they took an adversarial approach (case inter-
view King’s Cross project team, KCX 04-07-A4). The execution of the agree-
ment requires a partnership-like approach: the council and the developer will 
have to reach consensus in many issues and organise regular meetings to dis-
cuss them. Therefore, after the parties have signed the agreement, they will 
try to let their relationship be defined by cooperation. In an interview with the 
Times (2006) Argent’s director emphasised that he had never met any of the 
sixteen council members during the time when they had to decide whether 
to grant planning permission or not. However, although the S106 is a consti-
tutive part of the planning permission, it is in itself a negotiated agreement. 
And the parties (with Camden Council’s King’s Cross project team acting on 
behalf of the council) had to negotiate for two years to discuss specifics.
As in previous case studies, we will start our analysis of The Main Site 
agreement with a tabular display of all ten common contract norms on a dis-
crete/relational scale. This will be followed by a discussion of each of the com-
mon contract norms in turn, and the chapter will end with a general assess-
ment of the relative importance of the discrete and relational norms.
In Table 8.2 we see that the common contract norms are quite well bal-
anced between discrete and relational.
25   It also mentions section 16 of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1974, Section 111 of the 
Local Government Act 1972, section 156 and schedules 10 and 11 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 
(art. 2.1) that are of less importance to us.
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Role integrity: more discrete than relational8.3.2 
The S106 agreement makes a strict distinction between the various capacities 
in which the parties have signed the deed and will perform their obligations. 
This is the main reason to conclude that the discrete elements are more no-
ticeable than the relational elements in the agreement. The absence of the 
council members from the negotiation process supports this argument.
Capacities
The deed spells out in which capacity the (many) parties are involved in the 
agreement. Governmental entities at the local, city and national level have co-
signed the agreement and the capacity in which they signed has to be speci-
fied to make sure that no conflict of authority arises. The Secretary of State 
thus only signs the agreement in his capacity as a landowner, not as a legisla-
tor or as an authority controlling the local planning authorities.
Examples are:
Article 7.2 states that approval or consent by Transport for London (TfL) for  ■
any modification or variation is only required when it concerns obligations 
relating directly to TfL.
The lease states in article 9 that nothing in the lease shall fetter the statu- ■
tory rights, powers or duties of the Council or require it to act inconsis-
tently with them. And it repeats that provision for the Secretary of State 
and TfL.
We saw that the parties that signed the lease are the Secretary of State, Trans-
port for London, the Council of the London Borough of Camden, and the pri-
vate companies of London & Continental Railways Limited, National Carriers 
Limited and Argent (King’s Cross) Limited (see Section 8.2.7).
Transport for London (TfL) signed the deed in its capacity as statutory public 
transport services provider and as the highway authority responsible for cer-
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Discrete/relational matrix for common contract norms in King’s Cross Regent Table 8.2 
Quarter (The Main Site)
Norm
More discrete 
than relational
Equally discrete 
and relational
More relational 
than discrete
Role integrity ✕
Mutuality ✕
Implementation of planning ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
Flexibility ✕
Contractual solidarity ✕
Linking norms ✕
Creation and restraint of power ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Harmonisation with the social 
matrix
✕
tain roads in the vicinity of the project area.
The planning authority is the London Borough of Camden that has signed 
the deed because of its interest in the proper planning of the area and be-
cause it is the local highway authority for the area. It has issued the Planning 
Permission, the Listed Buildings Consents and Conservation Area Consents 
subject to the agreement. And it states that in its capacity as highway author-
ity it considers that the subjects of the agreement are of public benefit.
Relation between private parties
The developer (Argent), LCR and NCL have confirmed that they are jointly li-
able for all obligations. Argent will own at least 50% of the area when it has 
performed its obligations under a contract it has closed with LCR and NCL.
Mutuality and reciprocity: 8.3.3 
equally discrete and relational
The mutuality norm has both discrete and relational elements. The discrete 
elements are found in the specific contributions and facilities the developer 
has to deliver. The relational elements are found in the parts of the agreement 
in which the obligations are more intertwined. Argent, for example, pays the 
Council to enable the latter to perform its monitoring obligations (see Section 
7.2.7). This can be easily framed as a quid pro quo.
Another relational element is that notwithstanding the specific formula-
tion of all obligations, the contract also states specifically that the underlying 
planning goals are the reason why these obligations exist.
The main quid pro quo of the agreement is however found in the granting 
by the planning authorities of planning permission for development of the 
site in return for the fulfilling of certain obligations by the developer. The Sec-
retary of State first closed an agreement with LCR in which LCR received the 
right to build and operate the CRTL, and the right to develop the railway lands 
in the area.
Above all, the contract spells out the agreements between the developer 
and Camden Council. It thus tells us under which conditions Camden Council 
(and Transport for London) was willing to allow the development in the area. 
This permission is based on a mixture of in-kind deliveries of facilities by the 
developer and payments for services to be realised by (or on behalf of) the 
Council for the most part or TfL for the lesser part (see Section 8.2.1).
The developer and the council need to work together to realise the facili-
ties mentioned in the lease. But they do not share the financial risks of the 
construction. These risks are all for the private parties.
Still, although it may not share the specific financial risks, the council 
needs the project as much as the private parties do and thus had to accept 
compromises. As a result, another quid pro quo is found in the relaxing of 
[ 266 ]
some requirements. The required percentage of affordable housing was for 
example lowered from 50 to 44% on the basis of evidence provided by the de-
veloper that the 50%-target was not achievable (see Section 8.1.10). Parties 
spoke of a give and take process (case interviews KXC 04-06-A1 and KXC 04-
06-A4).
Implementation of planning: 8.3.4 
discrete and relational elements
The agreement implements a detailed planning that works with phases (not 
dates). Obligations of the developer are due when certain phases are reached. 
For example, when a certain number of residential units or a certain total 
number of buildings has been constructed or a certain number of square 
metres has been realised for a specific use, the developer has to fulfil certain 
stated obligations.
The discrete elements of the planning come into existence when a phase 
starts. The agreement provides for example a detailed planning for the con-
struction of affordable housing. It also provides very specific rules for dealing 
with conflicts. But the council and the developer will have to meet in many 
cases before a phase can start. The details and precise moments of the con-
struction are not yet determined.
The planning is fairly detailed but the council cannot force the developer 
to start building (there are no dates) and the contract urges it to set a new ti-
mescale when the developer does not meet (a specific part of) the planning.
We saw that the contract ends when all obligations are fulfilled. It does 
however state that when the developer has created 75% of the project it can 
ask the council for a written approval that its obligations are terminated. It 
can also do that twenty-five years after the implementation date (the date 
when the development started). Since all parties expect the project to be com-
pleted in 12-15 years’ time (Borough of Camden, 2006b), this is merely a tech-
nical legal obligation (see Section 8.2.5).
Effectuation of consent: 8.3.5 
more discrete than relational
Within a certain range, the agreement offers much security for the develop-
er. He knows what he has consented to and what it will cost. Although not 
all details are clear, as long as the planning goals are not changed, he knows 
what he will have to pay for. For the council, the agreement is not as clear 
since some of its planning goals, most notably the environmental norms, are 
only obligations of endeavour and it will thus have to wait and see what will 
come of them.
The agreement is fairly detailed and most implications of the consent are 
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clear. Although the agreement leaves room for flexibility (see Section 8.3.6), 
the facilities that are to be created are spelled out in detail in the agreement. 
Although the detail is less than the council was used to (Borough of Camden, 
2006b), this agreement strikes the non-English reader as being highly specific.
Still, the second part of the S106 agreement, dealing with the specific ob-
ligations on the parties, uses what we may call a framework consent. Parties 
have agreed which features the facilities should have but still need to agree 
on the concretisation of these facilities.
Examples are agreements on public art and public spaces where children 
can play. In both cases, the parties have agreed on the kind of facilities to be 
constructed, but they have not agreed on the choice of specific artwork or a 
specific design for the local play area yet.
It is thus not possible to know exactly to which physical realisation parties 
have consented.
Flexibility: equally discrete and relational8.3.6 
The flexibility norm has both discrete and relational elements; the aim is to 
provide flexibility within the framework of a strict contract.
Achievement of the right balance between precision and flexibility is seen 
as an important aspect of the agreement (Camden Council, 2006b, case in-
terview KXC 04-06-A1). The project will take 12-15 years to develop, it may 
thus be necessary to adapt it to market circumstances, whereas on the other 
hand facilities made for the public (affordable housing, training programmes) 
should not be allowed to become the victims of such flexibility. The facilities 
however are part of the phasing of the project, they are only realised when a 
certain project target has been met. While at the same time, the developer is 
not under a duty to start building when there is no market for the properties 
he develops (the council cannot force him to start building).
We saw that the agreement introduces a system of maxima. For example, 
it spells out the maximum number of square metres for the whole project, 
and the compulsory percentage of affordable housing to be built (see Section 
8.2.11). The maxima laid down for all parts of the project are compulsory, e.g. 
the maximum area to be devoted to commercial space, but the minima are 
not. It is thus possible to trade some functions within the project (e.g. more 
3-bedroom apartments and fewer 2-bedroom apartments, more commercial 
space and less commercial housing). This is meant to provide some flexibility 
for the project.
In addition, some of the obligations (mostly those related to environmental 
sustainability) are only obligations of reasonable endeavour. The overall goal 
of the project is to achieve a high level of sustainability, but the S106 agree-
ment leaves the developer plenty of flexibility to look for the best ways to 
achieve these goals. It even allows the developer to conclude, after some ef-
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fort, that it cannot reasonably be expected to implement the measures men-
tioned in the agreement.
Contractual solidarity: 8.3.7 
more relational than discrete
The contractual solidarity norm has more relational than discrete elements. 
The developer and the council ‘team up’ to make sure that both parties are 
able to perform their duties. The above-mentioned fact that the developer 
pays for the monitoring costs of the council (see Section 8.2.7) may be seen as 
an example of this.
All parties have an interest in the realisation in the project. Most notably, 
the private parties and the borough of Camden are actively working to realise 
the project. Of the private parties, Argent Ltd, the developer, is the most ac-
tive. The project is unique for Camden and parties need one another to realise 
it: there are few – if any – options for achieving their goals outside the agree-
ment.
Still, not all parties are equally dependent on the realisation of the project. 
The project is essential for the future of the borough of Camden. Argent also 
depends on the realisation of the project, since this is the only way it can be-
come a landowner in this area and/ or recoup its investments.
For LCR, on the other hand, the project is less important than the realisa-
tion of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. Of course, it would like to see a high 
quality environment for its international transport hub at St Pancras Interna-
tional but this is less vital than the creation of the rail link.
For Exel, the project is mostly an investment. It cooperates with the plan-
ning but does not undertake any activity itself.
The governmental entities involved mostly take a passive approach: they 
review the plans and see whether they are consistent with their own objec-
tives, but they do not actively shape the project.
Camden and the developer work closely together and try to be soft where 
possible and hard where necessary (case interview King’s Cross Project Team, 
KXC 04-06-A1 and A2). When problems arise, their aim is to find a solution 
that serves their mutual interests and not to insist on their legal rights.
The agreement specifies an extensive mediation and arbitration procedure, 
the aim of which is to try to work out a solution by consultation or by submit-
ting to the judgment of an expert instead of a lawyer (Section 8.2.10b). We 
may consider this agreement as an example of contractual solidarity; it em-
phasises the parties’ willingness to work together, to confer when things go 
wrong, and to put their faith in experts.
Another example of contractual solidarity is the phasing of the project, 
which motivates parties to work together to realise the project because they 
have no power to force one another to start certain activities such as con-
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struction work. The party most in need of such powers would be the Borough 
of Camden.
Finally, an article in the S106 agreement states that the council covenants 
with the Secretary of State, LCR, NCL and the Developer that it will upon rea-
sonable request certify compliance or partial compliance with the provisions 
of the agreement and will at the cost of the developer execute a Deed of re-
lease or Partial Release (no more than once in any twelve month period). This 
is also an example of contractual solidarity because the article is meant to 
make sure that the council will take the interests of the developer into ac-
count if the latter needs a certification of compliance.
The linking norms: restitution, 8.3.8 
reliance and expectation interests: 
more discrete than relational
Restitution interests are specifically mentioned in the agreement. Sums paid 
by the developer will be reimbursed (after ten years unless otherwise stipu-
lated) if the planning authorities do not use them for the agreed purpose.
Another article determines that when a planning gain supplement is is-
sued for the same purpose as mentioned in the agreement, the council will 
try to convert the obligations so that the developer does not finally have to 
pay more than he had to pay when he signed the agreement (this is an ex-
ample of a reliance interest).
All parties expect that the project referred to in the S106 agreement will 
be realised. For the Borough of Camden, which needs the project the most, 
this expectation interest is of enhanced importance. By that I mean that it 
would probably be less of a problem for Argent to wait for a better economic 
climate if the development of (parts of) the project turned out not to be profit-
able. Whereas the people in need of affordable housing will not disappear and 
their number will more likely grow in case of an economic downturn.
Creation and restraint of power: 8.3.9 
more relational than discrete
The creation and restraint of power norm is more relational than discrete; it 
exists within a context of phasing. In the end, the developer is only bound to 
fulfil his obligations if the scheme as a whole is profitable to him. The agree-
ment does not give the developer much power over the council but it does 
provide it with soft powers: the council is bound to the plans on which the 
agreement is based, otherwise nothing will be constructed at all.
The agreement creates the power for the developer to construct the project, 
without the agreement it could not start since planning permission was made 
subject to it.
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The agreement also vests powers in the borough of Camden. It can moni-
tor the project and, more importantly, has the right to enforce the obligations 
of the developer to develop the stated facilities when he constructs the build-
ings.
The agreement provides some (indirect) rights for third parties, since it is 
not the intention to grant third parties the right to litigate for performance of 
the obligations laid down in the agreement.
Examples of rights for third parties and for parties to the agreement:
Third-party rights: Section I of the S106 agreement determines that the de- ■
veloper shall construct a police station and lease it to the Metropolitan Po-
lice.
Rights for parties to the agreement: Section J states that the developer  ■
shall construct a two-form entry primary school and child care centre and 
lease them to the Council at a peppercorn rent.
Propriety of means: 8.3.10 
discrete and relational elements
The propriety of means norm is of enhanced importance in the agreement 
because of the many parties involved in it. The agreement spells out specifi-
cally which party has which means and how they relate to the project.
It not only states who possesses which means but also, in detail, under 
which conditions it can exercise rights or has to use its means. The propri-
ety of means norm is thus also an adequate means norm. An example of ad-
equate means is:
Section Q which states that the developer shall undertake the commission- ■
ing and programming of public art within the Public Realm Areas: (a) in an 
open and collaborative manner; (b) in consultation with the council and 
other appropriate third parties identified by the council (…).”
Harmonisation with the social matrix: 8.3.11 
more relational than discrete
The supra-contract norms that are most emphasised in the agreement 
are trust and co-operation. The project takes a long time to complete in a 
crowded area where many different parties have interests. It is therefore of 
the utmost importance that the various parties should be able to trust and 
understand one another. This explains why so much emphasis is placed on 
the value of cooperation. Argent organised workshops to which it invited the 
council’s project team. LCR usually attended the workshops; the project team 
did not attend all of them, since it felt that it was obliged to maintain a cer-
tain distance from the other parties. Still, these workshops gave the parties 
the opportunity to understand one another better. They tried for example to 
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use the same definition and points of reference when they spoke of sustain-
ability (case interviews, KCX 04-06-A1, A2, A4). Other examples of harmonisa-
tion with the social matrix are the facts that the council and the developer 
agreed on principles of large-scale mixed-use development (Borough of Cam-
den, 2006b) and that the agreement includes a construction practice code 
(S106 agreement, Section DD).
As described in Section 8.1.13, Argent helped to promote public participa-
tion, for example by organising a road show in which it presented the frame-
work of its plans. It also made nine vox pop videos including quotes from local 
residents. It further worked to create an atmosphere in which its plans would 
be received readily by the council (case interview Argent, KXC 04-06-A2).
All parties have the power to delay the project, but since they all believe 
that they will profit from quick realisation of the project, there is considerable 
motivation for them to work together.
Assessment of the agreements on 8.3.12 
a discrete-relational scale
I start this final section with an overview of the importance of the various 
norms. Inspection of Table 8.3 shows that all discrete norms, and most re-
lational norms, are of enhanced importance. Similarly, Table 8.2 above indi-
cated that the common contract norms are well balanced between discrete 
and relational. The overall result of our analysis of the King’s Cross agreement 
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Relative importance of discrete and relational norms in King’s Table 8.3 
Cross Regent Quarter (The Main Site)
1. Discrete norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Discreteness ✕
Presentiation ✕
Implementation of planning* ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕
2. Relational norms
Enhanced importance of: Yes No
Role integrity ✕
Preservation of the relation ✕
Resolution of relational conflict ✕
Propriety of means ✕
Supra-contract norms ✕
* When the norms of discreteness and presentiation are not of enhanced 
importance, it makes more sense to view the implementation of planning 
norm as a relational norm. In other words, the importance of planning in such 
projects then follows from the nature of the observed relation between the 
parties rather than from the wording of the agreements.
would thus seem to be that there is an even balance between relational and 
discrete elements. The reason for that would seem to be that the agreement 
is complex and speaks of many subjects, whereas it also tries to find a bal-
ance between defining strict obligations for the developer and leaving room 
for more flexible and cooperative approaches. As a result it almost reads like 
two different stories: one based on numbers and obligations, the other deal-
ing with the attempts to build a relationship between the neighbourhood and 
the developer that will last more than a decade. Since that is ultimately what 
will probably be needed for sustainable development.
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Comparative analysis of 9 
the cases on the basis of 
relational contract theory
Introduction9.1 
In the Chapters 5-8, we have used the common contract norms introduced 
in Section 3.4 to analyse contractual relations in five focal projects within 
the context of strategic urban renewal projects. In this chapter we will draw 
comparative conclusions. We will use the same approach as was used in the 
case studies themselves (see Section 3.10), which involves examining all com-
mon contract norms in turn to see how they apply to the case in question. 
This detailed, case-specific treatment now allows us to compare the different 
cases, identifying differences and similarities between them. We will do this 
for each of the ten common contract norms in turn, ending the discussion 
of each norm with suggestions on how some of the agreements could be im-
proved with respect to the norm in question. The aim of these suggestions 
is not to change existing contracts, but rather to lay down principles for the 
drafting of development agreements of the type considered here in general. 
The proposals however are mostly meant as concretised conclusions. They 
provide a direction for development agreements but we are not claiming that 
they could be incorporated into every contract in the formulation given here.
Three further premises inform this chapter. The first premise is that an 
agreement that gives a more specific account of the relations in which it is 
embedded is better than an agreement that fails to do so. The second premise 
is that such an agreement will be able to solve more of the problems that oc-
cur in these relations than an agreement that fails to do so. The third premise 
is that it follows from the nature of the cases that relational norms are of key 
importance for a development agreement to function optimally.
Sections 9.2.1-9.2.10 all have the same structure, starting with a discrete/
relational matrix for the common contract norm in question for all project 
studied. Suggestions for improvement are given at the end of each section. 
After an indication of the recommended timing – or more correctly the phas-
ing – of measures taken to solve the problems arising in connection with the 
various common contract norms (Section 9.3), this chapter ends with some 
general conclusions.
Comparative analysis of the role played 9.2 
by the various common contract norms
Role integrity9.2.1 
Considered as a discrete norm, the role integrity norm is not complex since 
parties enter a transaction in their capacity as utility maximiser and their re-
lation is limited to the context of the transaction: any aspect of the relation 
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not relevant to the transaction is not taken into account. When considered as 
a relational norm, role integrity is a very complex norm that includes many 
different roles.
If we look at Table 9.1, we find that the role integrity norm is more relation-
al in Hudson Yards, Mahler4 and Gershwin and more discrete in King’s Cross. 
In Battery Park City, it has both discrete and relational aspects. Differences 
are found mostly in the approach to the contract and the project. Although 
representatives of the King’s Cross project team emphasised that they worked 
together with the developer, the roles of the developer and the regulator were 
clearly separated (case interview King’s Cross Project Team, KXC 03-06-A3 and 
04-06-A4). In addition, the S106 agreement used in this case tried to ensure 
that the planning authorities always acted in one specific role and left the 
other relations out when they dealt with a specific project. It seems to have 
been successful in achieving this aim.
In Hudson Yards, Mahler4 and Gershwin we saw that the separation be-
tween the roles of the public parties was less strict since they acted both as 
developers and regulators. Role integrity here became a very complex norm. 
Although parties in Hudson Yards could always fall back on a stricter separa-
tion of roles, the contracts in Amsterdam did not include that option.
As mentioned above, the role integrity norm in Battery Park City had both 
discrete and relational elements whereby the financial terms of the lease 
were formulated in a very discrete manner (landlord-lessee relationship) but 
the role of the Battery Park City Authority in the development process clearly 
also had relational aspects.
Similarities and differences
Role integrity turned out to be of key importance in the focal projects in Zuid-
as, Hudson Yards and to a lesser extent in Battery Park City and King’s Cross. 
In Battery Park City, role integrity was a key issue in 1968 when the first mas-
ter plan was drafted and was perhaps the main reason why the BPCA was es-
tablished as a public benefit corporation (see Section 5.1.5). In Hudson Yards, 
role integrity was mostly at issue in the relationship between the developers 
and the public parties: the role of the MTA as a subway developer and that 
of the HYDC which covered the project as a whole were a source of conflict 
and complexity. In King’s Cross, role integrity was of key importance during 
the negotiations on the project as the different planning authorities worked 
out their stance on the agreement. But in the agreement itself, the roles are 
clearly separated and we may conclude that the enhanced importance of role 
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Discrete/relational matrix for the role integrity normTable 9.1 
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
integrity in the negotiation phase is better understood as a struggle for power 
between the different authorities. Once the negotiations are over, role integ-
rity issues lose much of their complexity as we saw in Battery Park City and 
King’s Cross.
Phasing
Problems associated with role integrity may arise in the conceptual phase of 
the project, during the negotiations and after the contracts are signed (see 
Table 9.2).
In Battery Park City, the role of the BPCA as a public benefit corporation 
sometimes led to tensions that emerged from the conflicting goals of closing 
the best business deal and implementing the environmental guidelines and 
design guidelines (case interview BPCA, BPC 02-07-A1). In the focal projects 
considered here, however, the role of the BPCA seemed very clear to both the 
developers and the BPCA itself. The question of role integrity did play a minor 
role when the BPCA had to choose between various proposals and had to bal-
ance between profit maximisation and environmental considerations.
In Hudson Yards, the problem of role integrity also emerged during the 
negotiation phase. The developers wanted to work simultaneously with the 
MTA to construct the grid for their future buildings. As a result the role of the 
HYDC with its pro-development approach conflicted at times with that of the 
MTA, which mainly wanted to build the subway extension. The leases dealt 
with this problem.
In the Zuid as case, the City of Amsterdam was the only contracting party 
on the side of the government in the Mahler4 and Gershwin projects. Prob-
lems of role integrity mostly emerged after the contracts were signed. It was 
then that the tension between the roles of the city as landowner and regula-
tor came to the surface. The land use plans had not been drafted by the time 
the contracts were signed. And although the city took a cooperative attitude 
towards the developers, its goal of creating a lively neighbourhood conflicted 
at some points with its role as a landowner wishing to strike a profitable deal.
Role integrity was a key issue during the negotiation phase of the King’s 
Cross project. Not only the Borough of Camden but also Traffic for London, 
the Mayor of London and the Secretary of State for Transport had interests 
in Regent Quarter (the part of the King’s Cross project we were interested in). 
These different roles were recognised and dealt with extensively in the S106 
agreement.
Phases where problems are most often found are summarised in Table 9.3.
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Problems associated with role integrityTable 9.2 
Role integrity problems 
most visible
In relation between 
public parties 
In public-private 
relations
In relation between 
private parties
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕ ✕
Gershwin ✕ ✕
Mahler4 ✕ ✕
King’s Cross ✕
Thus, in King’s Cross, Battery Park City and 
Hudson Yards, role integrity was mostly an is-
sue during the negotiation phase whereas in 
Zuid as it was mostly an issue after the con-
tracts were signed. We may discern three ex-
planations for these differences: (1) the type of legal agreements involved; (2) 
the approach taken to the legal agreements; and (3) the role of the public ac-
tors in the development process. These three explanations will be discussed 
in greater detail below.
The type of legal agreements involved
The contracts in Amsterdam were closed at an earlier phase of the project 
than the leases in Battery Park City and Hudson Yards. The contracts in Am-
sterdam lay out the conditions under which the leases will be closed in the 
future. This offers an explanation for the differences between those cases but 
it does not explain the differences between the contracts in Amsterdam and 
the S106 agreement that was closed in King’s Cross. The S106 agreement ad-
vances more detailed plans and was closed at the same phase of the proj-
ect as the contracts in Amsterdam. But the S106 agreement is of a different 
nature since it does not specify the conditions under which land is leased 
but the conditions under which the planning authorities are willing to grant 
planning permission. It had to deal with issues of role integrity at the time it 
was drafted, since there would be no other moment to do so later. In Amster-
dam, these issues could be postponed to a later stage, between the time when 
the land use plans were made and the designs reviewed up to the time when 
the leases were closed. In other words, in Amsterdam the city signed the con-
tracts in its private law (or proprietary) capacity, leaving it the opportunity of 
making use of its public law (regulatory) capacity at a later stage. In London, 
the S106 agreement is a private law contract signed by the planning authority 
in its public law (regulatory) capacity and therefore offering almost the only 
opportunity to decide on the project. It is thus a final document from both a 
public and a private law perspective (cf. Section 7.1.1).
The approach taken to the legal agreements
The parties in the New York and London projects took an on-off approach to 
their legal agreements. They wanted to reach an agreement on as many is-
sues as possible before development started. Either there was a signed legal 
agreement on all issues, or there was no agreement at all.
In Amsterdam, the contracts were part of an ongoing negotiation process 
and were left deliberately vague. This approach seems in line with the differ-
ences we discussed in Section 2.7, where we mentioned the existence of an 
objective principle of good faith in the civil law system of the Netherlands, and 
the principle of consideration in the common law system of England and the 
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Phasing of problems associated with role Table 9.3 
integrity
Phase where problem 
is most often found Negotiation Post-contract 
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
United States. The differences between these principles, may – in combination 
with a different mindset that may characterise the actors in the systems – ex-
plain why the parties in Amsterdam aimed to keep their agreements open and 
wanted them merely to highlight the main principles of their cooperation pro-
cess whereas the parties in New York and London accepted that their agree-
ments had to function like statutes (case interview Amvest GER 02-06-A1; case 
interview Sheldrake, BPC 11-05-A3). These differences provide another reason 
why the role integrity norm had to be dealt with extensively in the negotiation 
phase. This argument holds not only for the role integrity norm but also for 
the implementation of the planning norm (see Section 9.2.3 below).
The role of the public actors in the development process
Generally speaking, developers in long-term projects prefer open contracts to 
very precise contracts (e.g. Frieden & Sagalyn, 1989). It provides them with the 
opportunity to deal with problems when they arise and look for flexible solu-
tions. The interviewees in Amsterdam named this as a reason why they opted 
for open contracts. The City of Amsterdam has a long tradition of playing an 
active role in development processes (see Sections 7.3.5 and 7.4.5). In London, 
the Council of Camden had to be convinced that an agreement that leaves is-
sues open had advantages for it as well as being profitable for the developer 
(case interview with Argent, KCX 04-06-A2). These considerations do not how-
ever explain the difference between the cases in New York and Amsterdam.
Complexity
Complexity is a relational feature of the role integrity norm. While the dis-
crete form of this norm confines the role of the parties to that of utility maxi-
miser, the roles involved become very complex in a relational context.
We encountered two sorts of problems that arise in connection with this 
norm. The first is that of complexity, and the other is the lack of complemen-
tarity between the contracting parties or within a consortium of private par-
ties. The latter issue is discussed below later on in this section.
In the relation between the public and the private parties, the problem of 
complexity is most visible on the side of the public parties. It is the result 
of the different tasks that public parties fulfil in the development of urban 
development projects. This often leads to conflicting roles. In addition, in all 
cases more than one tier of government was involved in the project and often 
different departments from a given tier had some authority over the project. 
These different departments (and/or agencies) have different goals. The goal 
of a transport authority like Traffic for London (TfL) to promote the quality of 
the infrastructure may conflict with the goals of English Heritage, which ex-
ists for the protection of cultural relics from the past. It is not easy for govern-
ment – understood here as the amalgam of all those tiers, departments and 
agencies – to speak with one mouth.
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And even if all those different tiers would more or less underwrite the 
same goals with regard to the project (as was most notably the case in the 
Zuid as project in Amsterdam and in Battery Park City), various tiers will have 
to fulfil different tasks that imply different roles.
Here two tensions are most noteworthy: the first is that between the roles 
of landowner and regulator, while the second is that between the roles of con-
tracting party and democratic government.
The tension between the roles of landowner and regulator was most vis-
ible in Amsterdam where the gap was never bridged and resulted in one of 
the most complex agreements of the case studies (in particular the provisions 
concerning air rights in the Gershwin project, see Section 7.2.5). In the Zuid-
as cases, the local government used its position as a landowner to strengthen 
its position as a regulator. The contracts showed a complex interplay between 
those two roles that was the source of most frustrations and conflicts. An ex-
ample of this kind of frustration is that felt by the developers when faced on 
the one hand by the city’s requirement that they should write a vision state-
ment as part of the bidding procedure for the Gershwin project and on the 
other by the city’s desire, as a landowner, to get the best price for its land (see 
Section 7.2.5).
The tension between the roles of landowner and regulator was solved in 
the New York cases by the establishment of special public corporations that 
played specific roles at some distance from the (democratic) local government. 
In Battery Park City this resulted in the establishment of the (state-owned) 
Battery Park City Authority (BPCA), which serves the project and has no in-
terests outside Battery Park City. Similarly, the (city-owned) Hudson Yards De-
velopment Corporation (HYDC) only manages the land and air rights owned 
by the state but is not a landowner itself (see Section 6.2.3). Like the BPCA, it 
only serves the interests of the Hudson Yards project and can defend these 
interests against other city policies.
In London, the fact that the King’s Cross lands were ultimately state owned 
only resulted in the co-signing of the deeds by the responsible Secretary of 
State (see Section 8.2.7a). A few parcels were owned by the borough of Cam-
den, the tension between those positions was overcome by making the con-
tracting process a part of the legislative process and by strictly separating the 
government’s role as landowner from its legislative role.
In Amsterdam, some of the complexities that arose from these conflicting 
roles could probably have been avoided if the city had adopted the London or 
the New York approach. But then again, if it had done so, the city would have 
lost some of its influence. The establishment of the Battery Park City Author-
ity was criticised for its lack of democratic procedures. And the English ap-
proach suffers from the lack of a powerful regulatory instrument.
Still, the role of the government in Amsterdam is at some points over-com-
plex and results in more uncertainty than we encountered in New York and 
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London. However, given the mindset of Dutch administrators it is difficult to 
imagine that they could have acted much otherwise.
Tension between contracting party and democratic government
As mentioned above, the second tension leading to complexity in the role in-
tegrity norm is that between the roles of contracting party and democratic 
government. This tension was most visible in London where the borough 
of Camden issued planning permission under the condition that a contract 
would be signed between the developer and the borough whereas the agree-
ment also mentions planning permission as a condition for its existence. The 
contracting process then becomes intertwined with the regulatory process. 
This results in tensions due to the conflicting roles of the council negotia-
tors who have to work within the limits the council sets for them and at the 
same time have to convince the council of the quality of the agreement they 
reached with the developers. In the smaller part of King’s Cross’ Regent Quar-
ter, the Triangle, this process failed when Islington Council refused planning 
permission because it found the amount of affordable housing proposed in 
the S106 agreement too small (see Section 8.1.3).
In New York, the tension was (partly) overcome by the establishment of 
separate corporations (the HYDC and the BPCA) that managed the project but 
had no legislative power: as a result these corporations are as much on the 
side of the developers as they are on the side of the different departments of 
government when they deal with regulatory issues. It is true that in Battery 
Park City, the BPCA did also impose its own regulations in the leases. These 
regulations are however standardised and are not commonly subject to dis-
cussion by any representative organ, thus developers know in advance which 
requirements they will have to deal with. There is no question of any demo-
cratic process as a source of tensions here.
In Amsterdam, as in the whole of the Netherlands, the tension was solved 
by a separation of powers between the municipal council on the one hand 
and the mayor and aldermen (the city board) on the other. The council pro-
vided the board with the principles within which the board may use its con-
tractual authority. It does not interfere with the actual contracting process. 
The selling of the leasehold rights and the democratic regulatory process are 
(on paper) two strictly separate procedures.
The tension between contracting party and democratic government was 
most visible in London. The kind of problems that can arise from such ten-
sions tend to involve a situation where the negotiators appointed by the plan-
ning authority to act on its behalf reach an agreement with the developers 
that both parties consider to be fair (Hobma et al., 2008), but the council or 
another regulatory body fails to approve this agreement (see Sections 8.1.3 
and 8.1.10, and also Section 8.2.8b for an important court case that hinges 
on a similar issue). Council members may also find themselves forced to ac-
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cept an agreement that they do not really back (see Sections 8.1.3 and 8.1.10). 
Although the public parties try to separate their contracting and regulatory 
roles, in practice a 100% separation is impossible.
Finally, parties in London and New York defined their roles in terms of util-
ity. The BPCA for example enhances its utility if a building is sustainable. This 
allows it to define the best bid in terms of both the price and the quality of 
the design. The considerations in the Hudson Yards leases show the same 
line of reasoning: the city wants to lower transaction costs by leasing the 
land from the developers instead of condemning it. (It should be noted that in 
American legal parlance, ‘condemnation’ in this context means compulsory 
purchase, not as in the UK stating that something is unfit for use.) The plan-
ning authorities in King’s Cross enhanced their utility by fostering the goals 
of their development briefs or other policy documents. The point is not that 
this line of reasoning could not be followed for the Zuid as contracts in Am-
sterdam, but that it is not so evident that it has been followed there as in the 
other cases. The contracts struggle between a way of drafting whereby roles 
are strictly separated and an approach whereby parties undertake a project 
together. Interviewees in this case hinted that it was not always clear to the 
developers why something was expected from them – in the sense that they 
did not understand how the city maximised its utility by setting certain de-
mands, such as those relating to the air rights system (case interview Amvest, 
02-06-A3, see also Section 7.2.3). The city would be well advised to explain 
how it aims to enhance its utility – in other words, to devote more effort to 
making it clear what its goals in the agreements are and to put less emphasis 
on shared goals.
Are the parties complementary?
One question related to the issue of role integrity is whether the various par-
ties to an agreement are complementary – in particular, whether one partner 
in a consortium has a capacity that another partner does not have. In other 
words, do the parties depend on each other to realise the project?
The first question that arises from this is whether the parties are competi-
tors outside the consortium or not. A consortium that consists of a bank and a 
developer would be complementary. Whereas one that consists of two devel-
opers might not be – though it could be complementary if the two developers 
have different expertises (e.g. an affordable housing provider and a commer-
cial developer) or when both companies are too small to develop the projects 
on their own. But in other situations, they will probably be competitors who 
are forced to work together. In our cases, this was true for the private con-
sortia in the cases in Amsterdam. This problem was encountered in both the 
Mahler4 and the Gershwin projects where the parties in the consortia were 
mostly competitors and in addition each party would have been able – with 
the exception of the housing corporation involved in Zuidschans (see Section 
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7.2.7a) to develop the project on its own.
In Amsterdam, the projects were too small to be top priority for the devel-
opers; problems also emerged due to the fact that each party was accustomed 
to taking a slightly different approach to the development process (e.g. case 
interviews with ING Real Estate MAH 10-04-A3 and Amvest GER 02-06-A1).
The parties in Amsterdam solved this problem by establishing separate 
project organisations that worked at some distance from the mother compa-
nies to prevent continuous and endless discussions.
These problems did not arise in New York and in London. The consortium 
in the King’s Cross project did not consist of competitors and neither did the 
consortia in New York.
The complementarity problem may also rise within government, when dif-
ferent tiers of government all have some authority in the case in question, but 
are not complementary. A problem arose in King’s Cross where the smaller 
part of the project (the Triangle) fell within the authority of two boroughs (Is-
lington and Camden). This led to a conflict of policies and political visions on 
the project and did not result in complementary actions (Hobma et al., 2008).
Here again, a line of reasoning that focuses on utility is helpful. The pri-
vate parties in London and New York were not forced to work together but 
needed each other to carry out the project because they were either landown-
ers (King’s Cross), developers or financed the project. These parties entered a 
consortium to maximise their utility. The consortia in Gershwin and Mahler4 
were more complex: here, the parties complained that the composition of 
their consortia did not maximise their utility.
Suggestions for the improvement of contracts
The problem of role integrity should be dealt with as early as possible since 
it may otherwise harm development and impede flexibility; if the roles of the 
actors conflict, this may easily lead to an adversarial atmosphere and poor 
compromises instead of flexible solutions.
In the King’s Cross case, role integrity was a problematic issue during the 
negotiation phase. The public-private nature of the S106 agreement enhances 
that problem and leaves the public parties with a consistency problem in case 
of any legal procedures. The agreement itself is drafted so as to solve most of 
these problems. In the New York cases, the problems also arose during the ne-
gotiation phase and were mostly rooted in the different interests of the public 
parties.
In Amsterdam the role of the public authorities is over-complex. To avoid 
problems, the contract should define the role of the local government better 
and spell out the expectations of the private parties to prevent problems in 
the future. In that respect, a model in which a separate agency such as the 
proposed Zuid as Corporation that only acts as a landowner/developer and not 
as a regulator is promising.
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We saw that role integrity turned out to be problem after the contracts had 
been signed, mostly in the cases in Amsterdam. The City of Amsterdam had 
to play so many different roles that problems of complexity and conflict arose.
The development agreement in the Amsterdam cases could solve this 
problem in three ways:
It should be more specific about the capacities in which the city signs the a. 
agreement.
It should avoid situations where the administration plays different roles at b. 
the same time.
It should recognise the problem of role integrity and be more specific about c. 
the expectations of all parties.
The problem of defining the capacities (a) should not be solved by inclusion 
of a standard term in the agreement. A case-specific term should be used in-
stead, explaining the (private law) role of the city in this particular case, what 
can be expected of the city and what cannot be expected.
The possibility of different simultaneous roles (b) can be avoided by a 
similar approach. The city should define its position in advance and negoti-
ate with the staff of its own administrative departments and the city council 
about their roles and how they will be applied in the specific case. The out-
come of these negotiations could, in complex cases, form part of the contract 
with the developers.
The acknowledgment of the problem of role integrity (c) will help to fulfil 
the first two requirements but will also result in greater acknowledgment of 
the goals and roles of the private parties.
A development agreement should emphasise that the developers aim to 
make a profit, but should also be more specific. It should for example state 
whether their preferred company policy is to own and rent the building (or 
units) to be developed or to sell them. The agreement could also explain some 
of the decision-making procedures used by complex consortia. Dealing specif-
ically with the problem of role integrity in the agreement will save the parties 
time and money in later stages of the negotiations.
In terms of relational contract theory, this means that expectation interest 
(one of the linking norms, see Section 9.2.7) should be combined with the role 
integrity norm.
Mutuality and reciprocity9.2.2 
In discrete transactions the mutuality norm only plays a role in the negotiation 
phase, after which it drops out and becomes part of the effectuation of consent 
norm. It resembles the common law requirement that every promise should be 
backed by a consideration. Since consent is not the leading aspect of a relation-
al contract, mutuality, as a relational norm, is an ongoing requirement.
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The critical issue with regard to mutuality in the negotiation phase turned 
out to be whether affordable housing played a role in the project or not. In the 
cases where affordable housing was not an issue, negotiations were relatively 
easy. Whereas in the other cases the combination of high land prices and the 
aim of building affordable housing often gave rise to problems. In the focal 
projects in Hudson Yards and Battery Park City, affordable housing was not 
an issue. The 1979 master plan for Battery Park City no longer provides for 
affordable housing but instead the profits of the Battery Park City Authority 
are supposed to be used to pay for affordable housing in other parts of the 
City of New York (at the time of writing, they have only been used for a proj-
ect in the Bronx). It was not an issue in the Mahler4 project either. But in the 
King’s Cross and Gershwin focal projects, it was. In King’s Cross, the commu-
nity groups lodged an appeal for judicial review of Camden Council’s approval 
of the S106 agreement when the developer was unwilling to meet the target 
of 50% of affordable housing set by the planning authority – or rather, as ex-
plained in Section 8.1.10, when the developer produced evidence that it was 
unable to meet this target and the council accepted this evidence.
The mutuality norm was found to be more discrete in the focal projects in 
Hudson Yards and Battery Park City. It had discrete and relational elements in 
Mahler4 and King’s Cross Regent Quarter, and was more relational in Gersh-
win (see Table 9.4).
The difference here is partly found in the nature of the documents used. 
In both the Hudson Yards and Battery Park City cases, the parties used leases 
to lay down their agreements. The financial terms of these agreements are 
defined very precisely in standard documents. Gershwin and Mahler4 are 
pre-lease contracts: they specify the conditions under which the parties are 
willing to buy and sell the lease rights for a certain price that may change 
if circumstances change. These contracts involve more insecurity with regard 
to the future. The Regent Quarter agreement is laid down in a deed. We saw 
have seen that some sections of this deed are very precise but that other sec-
tions leave things more open; the quid pro quo then depends on the market 
situation (on the basis of a phasing system, as explained in Section 8.3.3) and 
to a lesser extent on negotiations on details with third parties and the plan-
ning authority at later stages of the project.
Differences and similarities
Mutuality, the quid pro quo approach, is central to the English way of plan-
ning that is best described as a negotiation model. Mutuality is certainly not 
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Discrete/relational matrix for the mutuality normTable 9.4 
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
absent from the cases in Amsterdam and New York, but in King’s Cross it de-
fines the planning system in which the agreement is made.
Many aspects of the project that were not subjects of negotiation in New 
York and Amsterdam are central to the agreement in King’s Cross. Examples 
of such aspects are children’s playgrounds, schools, and (funding for) bus 
lines and police stations. In the final analysis, the planning authority sells the 
right to develop the land to the developer. And the developer does not pay a 
lump sum for that right but pays for a variety of specific services and facili-
ties that it either delivers or finances. This results in as many sub-agreements 
as there are services and facilities mentioned in the deed (see Section 9.3.1).
The quid pro quo in the cases in Amsterdam and New York primarily con-
sisted of the money paid for the right to lease the land and the quality re-
quirements laid down in the proposed development. In Battery Park City, this 
quality has to be understood mostly in terms of (sustainable) design of the 
building. In Amsterdam, quality is defined in terms not only of the individual 
buildings but also of the Zuid as project as a whole. In Hudson Yards, the quid 
pro quo is the money paid by the City of New York to lease the land from the 
developers to permit realisation of the subway extension. Mutuality also re-
lates to the cooperative approach adopted by the subway builders in allowing 
the developers to realise the grids for their future buildings.
The difference between the discrete and relational aspects helps to explain 
some of the differences between the cases in Amsterdam and those in Lon-
don and Battery Park City. In Amsterdam, the relational interpretation of reci-
procity as a quid pro quo in an ongoing relation was obvious. The approach 
became most visible when the plans were delayed by court rulings and in the 
negotiations on the Mahler4 parking garage. The need for reciprocity was also 
visible in the Hudson Yards case where the parties had to adopt a cooperative 
attitude to working simultaneously on the subway extension and on the grid 
for the building. In Battery Park City and King’s Cross, the parties took a more 
discrete attitude towards the mutuality requirement. This means that the 
need for mutuality more or less disappeared after the negotiations were com-
pleted. When the offer was accepted, mutuality became part of the consent. 
The agreement in King’s Cross does provide some room for a more relational 
approach at a later stage, but not with regard to key terms.
Suggestions for improvement
The agreements in Amsterdam could be improved if the contract were made 
more specific on the quid pro quo – apart from the payments for the lease 
rights – of the agreement, whereas it might be appropriate to make the S106 
agreement in London less specific. In the contracts in Battery Park City the 
quid pro quo provisions are easy to understand and very specific. However 
the open nature of the contracts in the Zuid as and Hudson Yards allows for 
an ongoing kind of mutuality that does not imply any modification of the 
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contract. This could be improved in Battery Park City, where the leases do not 
provide for such an open structure.
Implementation of planning9.2.3 
Implementation of planning is one of the core discrete norms, whereas in 
relational situations it depends on the nature of the agreement whether im-
plementation of planning is of enhanced importance. It follows from the na-
ture of the cases studied in this thesis – all of which are development proj-
ects – that implementation of planning is of enhanced importance here.
The implementation of planning norm in the focal projects in Battery Park 
City, Gershwin and Regent Quarter has both discrete and relational elements. 
In Hudson Yards and Mahler4, the norm had more relational than discrete ele-
ments. The difference was that the latter contracts recognised that it was im-
possible to plan the whole project in advance. The other projects (King’s Cross 
and Battery Park City) implemented a more detailed planning (see Table 9.5).
Differences and similarities
In urban development projects, planning is a very important aspect. This may 
result, somewhat paradoxically, in a written agreement that states that be-
cause the planning of the project is so important it will be left to the profes-
sionals to work out the details. Or it can result in the implementation of more 
precise planning as was the case in Battery Park City and King’s Cross.
Thus, agreements can be divided into two groups: one group implements 
a detailed planning, while the other leaves the details of the planning to be 
worked out later. The agreements in Battery Park City and, arguably, in King’s 
Cross fall into the first group, and the agreements for the Mahler4 project and 
Hudson Yards into the second. The Gershwin contracts occupy an intermedi-
ate position.
Unlike the leases in Battery Park City, the Hudson Yards leases do not in-
clude extensive provisions to deal with default situations or other departures 
from planning.
None of the agreements implements a planning that is 100% discrete. The 
planning in the agreements lies somewhere between the neo-classical and 
the relational ends of the spectrum. The exception to this rule is found in the 
terms (if any) on payments. The written agreements in London and New York 
are discrete in the provisions they include on the amounts to be paid and the 
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Discrete/relational matrix for the implementation of planning Table 9.5 
norm
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
timing of the payments. The leases in Battery Park City provide examples of, 
at least on paper, a 100% planning of payments until 2069. Changes to that 
planning require re-negotiation of the leases. This is also true for most as-
pects of the planning of the work on the project.
In Hudson Yards and Mahler4, a change in the project planning does not 
result in re-negotiation of the lease. The Gershwin contracts include a specific 
section that states that the parties will decide every year if the planning is 
still accurate; this is a good example of a framework approach that does away 
with the need for re-negotiation of the lease (see Section 7.4.4).
Phasing
All agreements introduce a framework wherein phases are discerned and in 
which parts of the projects have to be completed for payments to become due. 
Differences exist mostly between the agreements in Amsterdam Zuid as on 
the one hand and those in King’s Cross and Battery Park City on the other. 
The leases in Battery Park City spell out the responsibilities of the Landlord 
(the BPCA) and the developer. Theoretically, the parties are under no obliga-
tion to meet after the contract is signed. The BPCA only has to approve the de-
finitive plans and the environmental programmes of its lessees. The situation 
is different in Hudson Yards, where the leases speak of forthcoming coopera-
tion contracts since the parties have to work simultaneously on certain parts 
of the project. In King’s Cross, the developer assumes almost all financial and 
organisational responsibilities. And because of the many public facilities he 
has to deliver, the developer has to meet executives of the planning authority 
very frequently; he also has some responsibilities to coordinate his actions 
with specific organisations and the public.
Still, all agreements introduce some kind of phasing of the project, and the 
contracts in Amsterdam are no exception to this rule. The phasing (and plan-
ning) is most elaborate in King’s Cross where the decisive moments are the 
realisation of a certain percentage of the project or of the housing part of it 
after which facilities have to be created, payments have to be made or servic-
es have to be delivered. As soon as such a moment is reached, the planning in 
the agreement becomes very precise. But the authorities have no instrument 
to force the developer to start construction.
The leases in Battery Park City mention a date when the project has to be 
completed and a timeframe within which construction has to take place. Here 
the phasing mostly involves interplay between the BPCA that has to review all 
plans and designs and the developer who has to submit them.
The leases in Hudson Yards are less precise due to the complexity of the 
projects. The leases only contain end dates that are enforced by fines for not 
finishing the work on time. The complex plans are not incorporated in the 
leases.
The Zuid as contracts take the issue of building permits as the decisive 
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moment in the phasing. Six weeks after the building permits are issued, the 
developers have to buy the lease rights from the city. The agreements spec-
ify an end date by which the project has to be finished. This end date is not 
strictly enforced, however. If a developer fails to realise the project on time 
but made a serious effort to do so, the city will not impose penalties. The in-
terplay between the developers and the planning authorities is complex here 
because the city plays an active role in the development by coordinating the 
work of the various developers, monitoring the quality of the Zuid as area as 
a whole and developing the public infrastructure. The phasing in the con-
tract is not very precise because many issues are postponed for discussion 
in specific forums where the parties will meet to deal with issues in detail. A 
general conclusion is that the contract in Amsterdam is a less decisive docu-
ment than the agreements in London and New York. In the latter two cities 
the agreements were signed when most of the specificities of the project had 
been dealt with. This is not the case in Amsterdam, where the contracts were 
closed at a moment when there was not even a land use plan for the area. 
The signing of the agreement is only one of the moments in the project, but 
not the decisive moment.
In addition, we find two forms of planning in the Zuid as contracts: the 
planning of the project and the planning of the issue of the lease rights. 
These two forms of planning are interdependent. This is probably the main 
reason why the contracts are sometimes vague on issues where they would 
have been more precise if they had dealt only with project planning or the 
sale of the lease rights.
Suggestions for improvement
The planning in the contracts in Mahler4 and Gershwin was never met, and 
provided no guidance for dealing with delays. The planning in Battery Park 
City turned out to be the most realistic. Its phased approach is easy to under-
stand and provides sufficient guidance in case of delays. The provision that a 
developer may opt for fast-tracking of the procedures included in the Battery 
Park City contract would also have been convenient for the other projects.
Proposal 1 The developer may ask the planning authority to fast-track certain procedures. The 
planning authority will use reasonable endeavours to fulfil this request. 
Proposal 2 Unless otherwise agreed and with the exception of the financial terms of this 
agreement, efficient realisation of the planning goals named in this agreement is more important 
than strict implementation of the planning. 
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Effectuation of consent9.2.4 
Although it also has relational elements, effectuation of consent is of key im-
portance as a discrete norm. The discrete norms of discreteness and presen-
tiation are enlargements of the implementation of planning and effectuation 
of consent norms. Full implementation of planning and full effectuation of 
consent are required if an agreement is to be 100% discrete.
The effectuation of consent norm may or may not be of intensified impor-
tance in a relational situation, depending on the nature of the relation.
Effectuation of consent was found to be either ‘more discrete’ or ‘both dis-
crete and relational’ in the projects we studied (see Table 9.6). The leases in 
Battery Park City spelled out virtually all elements of what the parties had 
consented to. In both cases, the developers knew what their duties would be 
during the period of the lease. In the other projects investigated in this thesis, 
the parties also knew what they had consented to and what the financial im-
plications of that consent would be but some issues were left open to be dealt 
with at a later stage. Thus, the parties to the Hudson Yards and Zuid as agree-
ments cannot be fully sure what their consent will imply. In Hudson Yards, for 
example, the consent might imply that the landowner will undertake some of 
the developer’s work. It follows from the relational nature of the agreement, 
however, that the landowner can be sure that his obligations stem from his 
cooperative relation with the developer: the vagueness in the formulation of 
the agreement does not put either party at risk of exploitation.
Differences and similarities
The effectuation of consent norm turned out to be of enhanced importance in 
King’s Cross and Battery Park City. In the written agreements of those cases, 
the consent is broken down into many pieces and becomes very specific. This 
does not mean that the effectuation of consent is not of importance in Am-
sterdam Zuid as but with the exception of the financial terms of an agreement, 
it is common practice in Amsterdam to specify what the parties are consent-
ing to at a later stage (after the contracts have been signed). The consent to a 
specific design or other element of the plan is derived from the original con-
sent and further insights and/or negotiations. The most specific effectuation 
of consent is found in King’s Cross where the main agreement results in vari-
ous sub-contracts on services, payments and facilities. The Battery Park City 
lease also makes it perfectly clear to which obligations the developer has con-
sented. This consent can be so detailed as to mention the placing of a sign in-
tended to make the public aware of the non-discriminatory rental policy that 
the developer had pledged himself to uphold.
It may further be noted that all agreements often formulate the duties of 
effort expected from the parties in such terms as ‘reasonable endeavours’, 
‘best efforts’, ‘efforts made in good faith’ or ‘commercial best efforts’. The le-
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gal status of such formulations (i.e. the extent to which they are enforceable) 
is not always clear, but they may result in obligations on the developers that 
are partly unforeseeable at the moment of signing the agreement.
Suggestions for improvement
The Amsterdam contracts do not make it sufficiently clear what precisely the 
parties have agreed to. They would be improved by making them more specif-
ic about the costs the parties are willing to accept for new solutions, and what 
the parties have in mind when they speak of the goals of the project. In other 
words, the parties should work out what the effectuation of consent norm 
means for a specific part of the project, and put this vision in the contract. It 
is also instructive to look at the effectuation of consent in connection with 
the linking norms – in particular, the expectation interest. As different par-
ties will have different expectations of the meaning of their consent, it would 
make sense to formulate the agreements carefully in an attempt to avoid this 
possible source of conflict.
The S106 agreement in King’s Cross mirrors this discussion: it is at some 
points over-precise and specifies issues, such as the nature of the furniture of 
a children’s playground, when they are better left open.
The leases in Battery Park City and the King’s Cross agreement sometimes 
define the meaning of ‘reasonable’ or ‘commercially best endeavours’ both in 
general and with reference to specific obligations. It might be a good idea to 
include such definitions in the Amsterdam contracts, where similar obliga-
tions are found.
Proposal (based on the King’s Cross agreement) All parties shall use reasonable endeavours to 
ensure that the planning purpose underlying their respective obligations under the agreement are 
achieved and carried out in accordance with good industry practice at the time of performance, as 
long as this would not constitute an additional obligation on the parties. When the party in question 
cannot fulfil the obligation after reasonable endeavour, it must on request provide an explanation of 
the reasonable endeavours it has undertaken. 
Flexibility9.2.5 
In discrete transactions, flexibility exists outside of the agreement. Since dis-
crete agreements must embody full planning, the requirement of flexibility 
may make it necessary to re-negotiate the agreement. In relational transac-
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Discrete/relational matrix for the effectuation of consent normTable 9.6 
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
tions, flexibility is a crucial internal requirement. Relations cannot be har-
monised or preserved if they do not pay appropriate attention to the demands 
of change.
The agreements in Hudson Yards and in Zuid as explicitly mentioned flexi-
bility as an important aspect of the agreement. The leases in Battery Park City 
and the S106 agreement for Regent Quarter can best be described as trying 
not to be too rigid. Differences may be caused by the fact that the BPC leases 
were signed at a later stage than the contracts in Zuid as, whereas the S106 
agreement in King’s Cross provided the only opportunity for the planning au-
thorities to bargain for facilities (see Table 9.7). It is understandable that such 
an agreement cannot put too much emphasis on flexibility, as the councils 
want hard guarantees that they will get what they want in return for their 
planning approval.
Differences and similarities
In all interviews, flexibility was mentioned as an important aspect of the rela-
tion but it only stands out in the Amsterdam contracts and the Hudson Yards 
leases.
We may say that although flexibility is not absent from the leases in Bat-
tery Park City it exists mostly outside the agreement. The general terms of the 
King’s Cross agreement state that the planning goal is more important than 
the planning obligation. In other words, if the planning goal were no longer 
to exist, the planning obligation should also disappear. But this provision only 
applies to exceptional situations.
The contracts in Amsterdam explicitly mention that the city has to take 
an open attitude towards unconventional, creative solutions that arise during 
the development process. The Hudson Yards leases also acknowledge that not 
all aspects of the plans can be written down in advance. This approach is un-
common, however. The leases in Battery Park City and the King’s Cross agree-
ment only allow for flexibility when they explicitly refer to it. For example, 
when it turned out after the bidding procedure in the King’s Cross case that 
the developer could not find an affordable housing provider that accepted his 
terms, the King’s Cross’ agreement then determines that the developer shall 
negotiate with the planning authority to reach a solution that sticks as close 
as possible to the original requirements.
In Battery Park City, the plans were as precise as possible when the leases 
were signed, and these leases were intended to provide an inclusive view of 
the whole project. Flexibility is however provided by the fact that the ways in 
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Discrete/relational matrix for the flexibility normTable 9.7 
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
which the goals of the leases are met are not determined. This leaves some 
room for ad hoc solutions. In Amsterdam, we encountered examples where-
by a building was converted into an office tower at the last moment because 
there was no (profitable) way in which the original destination of the build-
ing (apartment units) could be realised. These changes are not uncommon 
and are due to the fact that agreements were signed at an earlier stage in 
Amsterdam than in London and New York. The contracts in Amsterdam leave 
many aspects of the project undetermined. All parties accept that the project 
evolves in this way.
This approach can be explained (at least partly) by the existence of an ob-
jective good faith principle and the absence of a requirement of a consider-
ation in a contract in (Dutch) civil law (see Section 2.7). In Anglo-American le-
gal culture, a particular aspect of an agreement is either dealt with explicitly 
in the written contract or is not mentioned in the contract at all. There are 
not many intermediate constructions. This is different in Dutch legal culture 
where it is common to name an aspect of an agreement and then postpone 
its detailed implementation, refer it to a forum or committee or even leave it 
at that.
Still, although these differences between the agreements were observ-
able and can be explained from both a legal and a cultural perspective, they 
should not be exaggerated. The City of Amsterdam plays a very active role in 
development, in a way that has no counterpart in New York and London. It 
owns most of the land within the city boundaries, and is willing to invest in 
it. It is thus an active party in the development, not just a planning authority 
and not just a landowner. This difference must lead to a different approach 
because, as an active developing party, the city will also prefer flexibility to 
security.
In other words, in King’s Cross and Battery Park City, the planning authori-
ties have reasons to prefer security to flexibility even if there are some serious 
downsides to this approach. In Hudson Yards, however, where a government 
agency wishes to construct a subway extension the agreements put more em-
phasis on flexibility. And the only agreement that does not mention any kind 
of flexibility is the storage lease in Hudson Yards (see Section 6.2.1) where the 
lessor is not a developer but only leases his land to the City of New York for 
storage purposes, and his sole aim is to make sure that he receives due pay-
ment on the lease.
If we take a step backwards, we may thus conclude that the agreements 
in King’s Cross and Battery Park City are mostly in line with the ideals of dis-
crete (neoclassical) contracts and start from the point of view that they only 
care about the ‘what’ and not about the ‘how’. This approach makes it pos-
sible to combine rigidity (what) with flexibility (how).
But then the agreements introduce non-binding duties of endeavour. This 
results in a mixture of discrete and relational elements for both agreements. 
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There are also some intermediate duties, such as those required to meet the 
affordable housing targets in King’s Cross. Finally, the agreements do contain 
some requirements with regard to the ‘how’ as they implement affirmative 
action programmes (in Battery Park City) and mandatory meetings (in all 
agreements) or rules aimed at ensuring role integrity (in Hudson Yards).
The difference is that the agreements in Amsterdam start from a flexible, 
‘wait and see’ approach, whereas the contracts in King’s Cross and New York 
start from a much more rigid construction but add some flexibility along the 
way. The Hudson Yards agreements adopt a position intermediate between 
these two extremes.
Suggestions for improvement
The agreements in Battery Park City and King’s Cross would be improved if 
flexibility was more explicitly recognised as an important aspect of the rela-
tionship. The King’s Cross agreement does recognise the importance of flex-
ibility but more as an exception, not as a norm that should dominate the con-
tractual relation. Only the construction leases in Hudson Yards acknowledge 
flexibility in a way that is specifically drafted for the project. The other agree-
ments would be improved if they were to provide a framework for a flexible 
approach to situations they cannot foresee. The contracts in Amsterdam pro-
vide some inspiring examples of this in their provisions concerning the in-
stallation of specific consultation platforms and in their general provisions.
Contractual solidarity9.2.6 
Contractual solidarity in discrete transactions is imposed by general rules of 
law and not by the contract. Contractual solidarity as a relational norm is in-
terpreted as preservation of the relation, and then becomes one of the most 
important norms of the relational contract. All the agreements we studied 
stress the role of partnership, with the exception of Battery Park City (see 
Table 9.8). The Battery Park City leases emphasise the landlord-lessee rela-
tionship and the approach to partnership the BPCA tends to take can best 
be interpreted as an extension of that relationship. In the other agreements, 
contractual solidarity is rather present as a value in itself.
Differences and similarities
Contractual solidarity was of enhanced importance in all cases. Parties need 
to work together to realise their projects. Only in Battery Park City is it con-
ceivable that the BPCA might get rid of a lessee who defaulted on the agree-
ment and find another party to finish the project. But even there, after a pro-
posal is accepted it is the BPCA’s aim to work together with its developers and 
assist them in the performance of their obligations.
The mere existence of public benefit corporations such as the BPCA and 
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the HYDC can be regarded as an example of contractual solidarity in a broad-
er sense: by establishing those corporations, the public authorities show their 
willingness to cooperate with private parties and invest extra time and bud-
get in the success of the project.
The Zuid as project office in Amsterdam and the King’s Cross project team 
in the borough of Camden are further examples of the same trend. We should 
not forget here that contractual solidarity is not altruism. It exists because all 
parties recognise it as a necessary condition for successful realisation of the 
project.
The agreements we studied show many examples of contractual solidarity, 
although it can be argued that contractual solidarity is reflected more in the 
‘spirit of the document’ than in isolated provisions in the Zuid as case where-
as the agreements in New York and London do provide specific examples of 
compliance with this norm. One good example is the option for the developer 
to fast-track the procedures in the BPC leases. This is more specific than the 
obligation of endeavour frequently used by Dutch planning authorities to pro-
mote land use plans and building permits that are in line with the develop-
ment agreements. The many obligations to act in good faith included in the 
Amsterdam agreements can also be interpreted as signs of contractual soli-
darity.
In addition, parties to all the agreements we studied emphasised that they 
did not intend to leave the contractual relation even when circumstances 
arose that could justify this – such as the 9/11 attacks in New York and the 
series of court rulings based on European directives concerning permissible 
levels of fine particulate matter in the air that appreciably delayed the prog-
ress of the Zuid as projects in Amsterdam (see Section 7.1.15).
Finally, whereas the contracts in Amsterdam and the S106 agreement in 
King’s Cross stipulate a mandatory meeting between the parties as the first 
step to deal with any conflicts that may arise, the Battery Park City leases do 
not presuppose that the parties will work out things together. We may con-
clude that the agreements in Amsterdam and in King’s Cross put more em-
phasis on preservation of the relation and resolution of relational conflict.
Suggestions for improvement
The agreements in New York and London could be improved by acknowledge-
ment of a general aim of contractual solidarity. Although all cases provide ex-
amples of this approach, the written agreements do not always specify how it 
can be achieved. Provisions to this end are therefore found in specific sections 
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Discrete/relational matrix for the contractual solidarity normTable 9.8 
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
wherever they seem to be appropriate. But since contractual solidarity is, by 
definition, a general aim it should be acknowledged in the general part of the 
agreement and can be specified there to the extent that the parties deem nec-
essary. The contracts in Amsterdam provide good examples of this. Still, the 
Amsterdam agreements could be improved by more detailed specification of 
the meaning of contractual solidarity.
Proposal (based on Gershwin contract) The development strategy is aimed at the creation of 
a mixed-use area in a high-quality urban environment. The planning authority will assist in the 
realisation of the Plan area wherever possible. The developer will implement the goals of the 
planning authority in its plans. Parties confirm that they will work together in the most efficient and 
flexible manner to realise the plans.
The linking norms: restitution, reliance 9.2.7 
and expectation interests
In discrete situations, the linking norms boil down to the expectation interest 
that is protected by the external source of contractual solidarity. This is not 
the case for relational situations, where the restitution, reliance and expecta-
tion interests may conflict.
The linking norms have discrete and relational elements in the Zuid as 
project but in the other projects they tend towards the discrete side of the 
spectrum (see Table 9.9). The difference is that the agreements in Hudson 
Yards, BPC and King’s Cross all quantify the expectations. Fines have to be 
paid or restitution made when the expectations are not met. Softer approach-
es aimed at preserving the relation are found not in the agreement but in the 
actions of the parties. Such quantified provisions are absent from the Zuid as 
contracts.
Differences and similarities
All private parties entered the various projects studied here in the expecta-
tion of making a profit, while all planning authorities entered the projects in 
the expectation of creating a new high-quality urban area. The Battery Park 
City Authority and the City of Amsterdam also aimed to make a profit.
However, the range of expectations actually encountered, and the prob-
lems that they produced, were much wider than this simple picture would 
indicate. This was most notably so in Amsterdam and to a lesser extent in 
London.
In the King’s Cross project, it was mostly the stakeholders whose expecta-
tions differed from those of the developer. The developer tried to overcome 
this problem by organising workshops where the parties that were directly 
involved (landowners and Camden Council) could discuss these expectations. 
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In the end, an elaborate agreement was drawn up in which most expectations 
were specified – right down to the kind of equipment to be installed in child-
ren’s playgrounds.
The contracts in Amsterdam leave more details open and do not often spell 
out the expectations – or the steps to be taken if the expectations are not 
met. The Mahler4 and Gershwin contracts state for example that the parties 
expect that the Zuid as project will include the development of Zuid as Dock, 
which will have the effect of ending the current division of the Zuid as area 
into two by the ring road (see Section 7.1.3). It is not clear what will happen if 
the planned development of Zuid as Dock does not go ahead. In other words, 
the expectation is clear but the expectation interest is not. The general im-
pression gained from the projects in Amsterdam is that all parties expected 
to work together to develop the project but that they often had discussions on 
specific issues relating to the tension between project quality and profitability.
The reliance interest is not mentioned in the agreements but is visible in 
the relation, most notably when private parties expect that the government 
knows that they rely on policy documents or promises from city officers even 
when they know them not to be legally binding. This kind of reliance interest 
was encountered in all projects with the exception of Battery Park City, where 
a so-called ‘entire agreement’- clause was devoted to explicitly ruling this out.
Suggestions for improvement
All agreements would be improved by greater specificity concerning the ex-
pectations of the parties, either in a linking construction (party A relies on 
party B to use his discretionary powers to ensure that …) or in separate sec-
tions. The upshot is that if parties enter a contractual relation in the expecta-
tion of making a profit, the agreement should make that clear. If they rely on 
the other party acting in a certain manner, that should also be included in 
the agreement. If this is not done, differences between the expectations of 
the various parties may lead to conflicts.
Proposal The developer has invested money and effort in the project. His aim is to recoup his 
investments within X years. The public party is aware of this goal and understands its implications. 
It will use reasonable endeavours, within the context of this agreement and other existing and future 
regulations, not to hinder the developer in this aim. However the aim of the developer should not 
interfere with the realisation of the other goals of this agreement.
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Discrete/relational matrix for the linking normsTable 9.9 
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
Creation and restraint of power9.2.8 
In a discrete transaction, the creation and restraint of power norm is confined 
to the enforcement of consent. It has to stay within these limits. In a rela-
tional transaction, the creation and restraint of power norm becomes more 
complex. The starting point is the acknowledgment that a relation cannot 
survive without the creation and restraint of power. But since these two as-
pects may (and often will) conflict, the relational norms of preservation of the 
relation and resolution of relational conflict tend to dominate the transaction. 
To make things even more complicated, they function in conjunction with the 
supra-contract norms. The creation and restraint of power norm was more re-
lational in the Gershwin and Regent Quarter agreements, and had both dis-
crete and relational elements in the other projects (see Table 9.10). In both the 
Gershwin and the Regent Quarter projects, the parties transferred and cre-
ated powers that would not otherwise have existed and did not necessarily 
follow from the (legal) relation. Whereas in the other projects the powers cre-
ated (and restrained) were an extension of the landowner-lessee relation.
Differences and similarities
In a description of the differences, it makes sense to distinguish between 
hard and soft powers (cf. Williamson, 1995). Hard powers are related to the 
quid pro quo of the agreement: money for land, payments or services in re-
turn for planning permission. In such cases the developer can no longer dis-
pose freely of his resources and the government can no longer decide freely 
over the (destination of the) land.
Soft powers involve one party granting the other a say in his actions and 
his disposal of his resources, but do not provide the latter with any rights he 
could use if he disagreed with the decision taken.
Some hard powers are key elements of the transaction, others could equal-
ly well have been soft. An example is the provision in the BPC leases that a 
developer must choose a qualified architect, where no specific penalties are 
laid down for the case where he opts not to do so.
In London and New York I encountered more hard powers and fewer soft 
powers than in Amsterdam. The New York and London agreements were 
drafted from a more adversarial perspective whereby the parties undertake 
specified obligations and, if necessary, review and monitor the fulfilment of 
the obligations by the other party.
In the agreements in Amsterdam, the hard powers were not as specified 
as they were in London and New York. In addition the contracts contained 
many soft rights. The parties tended to give each other a say in their actions 
without specifying what this meant in terms of remedies. The contracts may 
state, for example, that the parties will meet in various committees to discuss 
specific issues, such as the layout of public and private infrastructure. The re-
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lational norm of preservation of the relation plays an important role here.
The equivalent of these provisions, if any, in New York and London would 
be a stipulation that when party A drafts his plans for the public infrastruc-
ture of site X, he will (in good faith, to a reasonable extent) take the interests 
of party B into account. This is not just a difference in contracting style, but 
also reflects a different way of thinking that pays more attention to the ques-
tion: “And if A does not take B’s interests into account, will B start litigation 
and what will his chances of success be?” instead of: “How can we best re-
solve this real-life problem?” The first approach reflects the Anglo-American 
style of contract drafting, the second the Dutch style. Note that this does not 
mean that the possibility of litigation is absent from Dutch contracts or that 
the idea of negotiating to deal with real life problems (as opposed to seeking 
a solution through the courts) is absent from Anglo-American thinking. The 
negotiations on the percentage of affordable housing to be built as part of the 
King’s Cross project (see Section 8.1.10) is a good example of this.
Still, we did encounter the creation and restraint of soft powers in New 
York and London. In London, the mandatory meetings with local interest 
groups on specific issues could be regarded as restraints on the powers of the 
developer intended to resolve relational conflicts by implementing more so-
cially acceptable measures, resulting in a better relation with both the com-
munity and the planning authority.
Suggestions for improvement
The creation and restraint of power norm could be improved in all agree-
ments. The problems that arise here are caused by the fact that in all agree-
ments, a public authority is involved: these parties are somewhat limited in 
their freedom to create and restraint powers, since they are democratically 
accountable. This problem does not exist to the same extent in Battery Park 
City as in the other cases, but it is certainly not absent from its agreements 
(see the parts of Section 5.3 dealing with the Goldman Sachs lease).
More detailed specification of the duties of endeavour would improve the 
agreements. It would also be helpful if the agreements were to provide more 
insight into the extent to which parties can (or are willing to) exercise their 
powers, for example by specifying the underlying norm. The stipulation in 
Anglo-American contracts that actions should be performed ‘in good faith’ 
is meant to provide a minimum legal standard of performance, but does not 
provide a full insight into the meaning of this qualification. The best exam-
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Discrete/relational matrix for the creation and restraint of Table 9.10 
power norm
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
ples are probably found in the BPC leases where they deal with the rights the 
BPCA has when its developers are in default.
Propriety of means9.2.9 
For a discrete transaction, the propriety of means norm is almost meaning-
less. The contract focuses on the obligations of parties, not on the means they 
use to fulfil them. The only exception to this rule is when parties explicitly 
consent to use certain means. But then we could say that the propriety of 
means norm becomes an extension of the effectuation of consent norm. In 
a relational transaction, on the other hand, the propriety of means norm can 
become very complex. Every social relation entails a whole range of implica-
tions about how ends may be achieved, and how they may not. The more com-
plex the relation, the more complex the propriety of means norm becomes. In 
fact, it then tends to turn into a norm of ‘adequate means’ (see Table 9.11).
Differences and similarities
All the agreements we studied contained sections where the parties guaran-
tee that they possess the means needed to perform their obligations. Private 
parties guaranteed that they could carry the risks of the development. The 
public parties agreed that they would review submitted proposals within a 
certain time frame. The leases in Battery Park City contain many pages refer-
ring to situations of default and bankruptcy, and are very precise about the 
kind of payments that the lessees will have to make and the financial guaran-
tees that are needed.
Still, in all cases, the question as to whether a developer was capable of 
doing the job was most important in the selection procedure or during the 
pre-contractual negotiations: in the agreement itself, this capacity was more 
or less assumed.
All of the contracts contained stipulations concerning the way by which 
the ends were to be reached. The Hudson Yards leases demanded a procedure 
that would enable the parties to work simultaneously on stated parts of the 
project. Stipulations relating to the implementation of social goals (local jobs, 
job trainee programmes) were to be found in the Battery Park City and King’s 
Cross agreements, and goals of sustainability were mentioned in all projects 
except Hudson Yards.
Examples of situations where the propriety of means played an important 
role were found in Mahler4 and Hudson Yards. In the former case, the city 
did not want G&S Vastgoed to develop the project on its own because it did 
not believe that the developer either had the necessary means or was willing 
to meet the city’s requirements (the highest architectural and urban quality, 
compliance with the most stringent environmental standards). It therefore 
demanded that G&S Vastgoed should form part of a consortium that involved 
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two other parties.
In the Hudson Yards case, the private parties did not believe that the de-
veloper of the subway, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), knew 
enough about the building techniques used for the construction of (high-rise) 
office and residential buildings to build the subway extension (and the plat-
form above it) in such a way that they (the private parties) could later con-
struct their high-rise buildings on top of that. They claimed that the MTA only 
knew (or cared) about the construction of infrastructure, which made them 
decide to start work on the foundations at the same time as construction of 
the infrastructure started.
In other projects, possession of the necessary economic resources and 
know-how was not the only relevant element of the propriety of means re-
quirement. Another element was a clear vision of the overall objectives; this 
played a role in all projects except for Hudson Yards. The BPCA, the City of 
Amsterdam and the borough of Camden (and the landowners in King’s Cross 
who selected the developer) named vision as an important element of the se-
lection procedure and were willing to accept a lower bid in return for higher 
quality of the plan submitted.
An example of how propriety of means was presupposed and thus deemed to 
be of less importance than vision was provided by the procedure used to attract 
developers in the Gershwin case. In the preliminary rounds, developers (consor-
tia) were asked to submit only their visions on the project and not their bids.
The provision concerning affirmative action in the BPC leases may be seen 
as an example of a specific propriety of means norm. These leases included 
specific requirements on the percentage of women- or minority-based enter-
prises the developer has to use as contractors for the work.
Suggestions for improvement
The propriety of means norm is central to the agreements, but was perhaps 
not sufficiently emphasised in the present documents. Most notably, the 
means that the parties expect each other to use could have been more clearly 
specified in Amsterdam and in the general part of the agreement in New York 
and London.
Proposal The means used by the developer to fulfil his contractual obligations should be not only 
as dictated by the legal requirements and the specific provisions of this agreement, but should also 
reflect the spirit of this agreement.
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Discrete/relational matrix for the propriety of means normTable 9.11 
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
Harmonisation with the social matrix9.2.10 
In discrete transactions, harmonisation with the social matrix boils down to 
the (social) acceptability of the contract. The decisive factor here is whether 
society will enforce the agreement or not. In relational contracts, on the other 
hand harmonisation with the social matrix is a crucial aspect that is related 
to the supra-contract norms that govern both the internal and external as-
pects of the relation. This is explained in greater detail in Section 3.4.11. At 
this point, I would like to point out that my views on what constitute the key 
social norms differ from those expounded by Macneil. As stated in Section 
3.4.11, he sees such matters as distributive justice, liberty, human dignity, so-
cial equality and inequality, and procedural justice as essential. Without wish-
ing to disparage the importance of such values, I believe that when dealing 
with complex agreements of the type studied in this thesis, values such as 
flexibility, cooperation and good faith which are also subcontract norms.
All agreements are subject to specific laws, with which they have to com-
ply or which enable the drafting of agreement. It follows that the agreements 
have to be interpreted with reference to these laws. We may regard this inter-
pretation as an external norm that is particularly applicable to discrete agree-
ments (see Table 9.12).
Differences and similarities
The harmonisation with the social matrix norms proved to be the hardest 
one to study. The reason is that, although it is obvious that the supra-contract 
norms play an important role in every contractual relation, they are not al-
ways visible. Supra-contract norms enable or hinder; they enable contracts to 
come into existence and provide the language and understandings that the 
contracting parties use to make the transaction. The only moment when the 
social matrix really comes to the forefront of the contractual relation is when 
the different parties have different opinions on what these supra-contract 
norms consist of or when a certain provision turns out to be unacceptable. 
But when they do not, the content of the norm requires a different kind of 
research, one that focuses more on cultural, sociological and anthropological 
aspects. This does not mean that nothing can be said about the social matrix.
In Amsterdam, the rich content of the social matrix was more visible in the 
agreements than in London and New York. The private parties and the local 
government were used to working with each other. Various (internal) norms 
had developed over the years.
In the Netherlands there are a limited number of developers that are ca-
pable of handling projects of the size and ambitions encountered in our case 
studies. In addition, unlike London, Amsterdam has a centralised local gov-
ernment that is the planning authority. Thus, the officials acting for the City 
of Amsterdam and the parties who developed the Mahler4 and Gershwin 
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projects had known one another for years. Despite the city’s aim to develop 
the Zuid as according to a radically new model, the Mahler4 and Gershwin 
projects were in fact developed in a way that for the most part was what all 
parties had been used to for decades. This was not the case in London and 
New York. In London, the borough of Camden had no experience in dealing 
with huge projects like the renovation of the King’s Cross area. The developer 
was much more experienced with projects of this type. In New York, private 
parties had to deal with specific authorities (special purpose corporations) 
with whom they had little or no previous experience. The private parties in 
New York and London were less concerned with the supra-contract norms 
that shaped their contractual relations. This however was not the case for the 
Albanese Organization in Battery Park City (see Section 4.2.5). The BPCA em-
phasised that it liked working with Albanese because it was committed to the 
aims of the BPCA, but interviewees did not mention any specific supra-con-
tract norms that guided that cooperation. Another reason for the differences 
between Amsterdam on the one hand and London and New York on the other 
is that the lawyers in London and New York were involved at an earlier stage 
of the project than in Amsterdam, which resulted in a more case-specific rela-
tionship that was more extensively written down in the agreements.
The parties to the Zuid as projects put their unwillingness to enter into liti-
gation in the perspective of a long-term relationship. They always opted for 
resolution of relational conflicts because they knew they would have to deal 
again with one another in the future. Interviewees from the private parties 
emphasised that they were generally unwilling to adopt an intransigent at-
titude towards the city because they expected to work together with it in the 
future. When asked, none of them could remember an example of litigation 
over an agreement in the Dutch situation.
We may conclude that the relation between the City of Amsterdam and the 
developers was not confined to one specific project. The behavioural norms 
associated with this relation had emerged over time in various projects. This 
was not the case in the other projects where the norms governing the relation 
were, with a few exceptions, a product of that particular project.
The interviewees representing private parties in New York and London 
when speaking of their unwillingness to enter into litigation framed their rea-
sons more in terms of costs. They could not easily imagine a situation where 
they would gain more from suing the government than from trying to work 
things out. In any case, an expectation of a long-term relation with the gov-
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Discrete/relational matrix for the harmonisation with the Table 9.12 
social matrix norm
Projects More discrete
Equally discrete 
and relational More relational
Battery Park City ✕
Hudson Yards ✕
Gershwin ✕
Mahler4 ✕
King’s Cross ✕
ernment was not their prime consideration in this context. It should be noted 
that these answers only involved issues of contract law and not procedures of 
administrative law such as the refusal of planning permission.
Thus, although the result was the same (unwillingness to litigate), the su-
pra-contract norms seemed different in the two cases. The private parties in 
Amsterdam put more emphasis on the preservation of the relation and less 
on the time and costs involved in legal procedures, while in London it was 
just the other way round.
We have already discussed the importance of the principle of good faith 
in Dutch law (see Section 2.7.2). The present analysis seems to indicate that 
good faith is not only a legal concept but also a supra-contract norm. Inter-
viewees in Amsterdam mentioned good faith as the most important reason 
why they had to take each other’s interest into account and act reasonably. 
Interviewees in London and New York never volunteered ideas of good faith 
as a motivation for their actions, although it was mentioned frequently in the 
London and New York agreements.
I have no reason to assume that the parties in the Netherlands encoun-
ter fewer frustrations when working with one another than their English or 
American colleagues, but they definitely use a different approach which can 
be described as consensus-seeking as opposed to the adversarial approach 
common in London and New York.
In brief, the consensus-seeking supra-contract norms appear to play a 
more visible role in Amsterdam than in London and New York.
Suggestions for improvement
Greater acknowledgment of supra-contract norms would improve the agree-
ments in London and New York. These agreements consist of standard provi-
sions that tend to be formulated in an adversarial manner. The agreements as 
such fail to recognise the consensus-seeking aspects of the social matrix.
Explicit mention of these elements would in my opinion enhance the value 
of the agreements. This should be done not only by referring to commercial 
good practice and principles of good faith and fair dealing, but also by speci-
fying the implications of these norms for example by requiring a flexible atti-
tude from the parties to the agreement. The agreement could also specify that 
parties intend to enter into a long relationship and acknowledge that their re-
lations should be understood in this light.
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Proposal This agreement has been drawn up within the context of social norms, of which 
flexibility, cooperation and a businesslike attitude are the most important. 
Proposal By signing this agreement, parties are aware that they enter into a 15-year relationship. 
They acknowledge that this relation will engender behavioural norms that may influence the 
agreement and agree that the agreement should be interpreted in the light of these norms unless 
such interpretation is explicitly excluded. 
When to deal with issues related 9.3 
to the common contract norms
In this section I provide a scheme that specifies at which stage parties should 
deal with problems arising in connection with the various common contract 
norms (see Table 9.13). Note that the pre-contracting phase is not necessarily 
the negotiation phase. Role integrity, for example, plays a role before the ne-
gotiations on the development agreement start.
What becomes clear from this overview is that the implementation of 
planning norm, the flexibility norm and the supra-contract norms (harmoni-
sation with the social matrix) should dominate the whole process since they 
are the only ones that demand intervention at all stages. Planning and flex-
ibility are key factors in urban development projects (Chen, 2007; Trip, 2007; 
Van der Veen & Korthals Altes, 2009). The supra-contract norms are, by defini-
tion, always present. The scheme however indicates that the norms should 
not be imposed on the contracts but be a part of them.
Role integrity is best dealt with before the contracts are closed: parties 
should be aware of the role in which they enter a contractual agreement. We 
saw that in King’s Cross and in the New York cases the relation between the 
various layers of the government had to be worked out in various preliminary 
agreements before the main agreements were closed. This approach is also 
taken in the Zuid as Corporation (see Section 7.1.7). The role of private parties 
as well as public parties may also have to be determined before they enter 
the agreement. We found a good illustration of the importance of this in the 
Mahler4 case, where the status of G&S Vastgoed initially gave rise to some 
problems (see Section 7.3.5).
Mutuality is an ongoing norm that should be dealt with in the pre-contrac-
tual and the post-contractual phase; in the contractual phase, it becomes part 
of the effectuation of consent norm. The latter, on the other hand, should be 
dealt with in the agreement. It becomes part of the mutuality norm in the oth-
er phases. In the post-contractual phase the leading question should not be 
“What did the contract say?” but rather, “How should the consent of party A 
be interpreted at this moment?” Insofar as this differs from the contractual 
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consent, it becomes part of the mutuality norm that evolves when relations 
evolve.
Propriety of means and the linking norms should be dealt with in the pre-
contractual and contractual phases. For the linking norms this is a matter of 
definition; they link the common contract norms to other legal norms. The 
expectation, restitution and reliance interest should be specified and dealt 
with in the agreement. The linking norms may matter after the agreement is 
closed, and since they link other norms to legal categories may be decisive for 
the legal strategy a party chooses. But they should only be of concern when 
the agreement is drafted. When the agreement is closed the linking norms 
disappear into other norms such as mutuality or contractual solidarity and 
only come alive again as independent norms when parties have an insoluble 
conflict.
Propriety of means should be dealt with in the pre-contractual and the 
contractual phase. In the contractual phase more emphasis may be put on 
the kind of means that parties will use (adequate means), whereas in the 
pre-contractual phase more emphasis may be put on the question whether 
a party has access to the means to realise the goals of the contract. When 
the agreement is signed, propriety of means should be presupposed and post-
contract discussions should focus on how the means will be used. In other 
words, in the post-contract phase the means norm becomes part of the plan-
ning norm.
Contractual solidarity, finally, is a post-contractual norm since it means 
that parties should be willing (to some extent) to help each other to perform 
their obligations and put some effort in staying in the relation. The contract 
can however help in providing some guidelines for contractual solidarity; this 
could even be done by making provisions for fines or other penalties to en-
force the norm.
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When issues related to common contract norms should be dealt withTable 9.13 
When should issues be dealt with?
Pre-contractual 
phase In written agreement
Post-contractual 
phase
Role integrity ✕
Mutuality ✕ ✕
Implementation of planning ✕ ✕ ✕
Effectuation of consent ✕ ✕
Flexibility ✕ ✕ ✕
Contractual solidarity ✕ ✕
Linking norms ✕ ✕
Creation and restraint of power ✕
Propriety of means ✕ ✕
Harmonisation with social matrix ✕ ✕ ✕
Conclusion9.4 
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the differences and the simi-
larities that were encountered between the various cases studied, with refer-
ence to each of the common contract norms in turn. I have suggested expla-
nations for these differences and similarities in line with the characteristics 
of the discrete and relational norms. Finally, I have made some suggestions 
for improvement of agreements of the type considered here. In the next chap-
ter I want to provide more general conclusions on the function of agreements 
in the cases and suggest a general approach to development agreements. I 
will also provide some methodological reflections on the theory.
We will end this chapter by revisiting the three premises given in the intro-
duction (Section 9.1).
The first premise was that a contract that gives a more specific account 
of the relations in which it is embedded is better than one that fails to do 
so. The second premise was that such a contract will be able to solve more 
of the problems that occur in these relations than one that fails to do so. The 
third premise held that it follows from the nature of the cases that relational 
norms are of key importance for the success of urban renewal projects.
As to the first premise, it turned out that none of the written agreements 
gave a complete account of the relations in which it was embedded. The con-
tract that came closest to this ideal was the S106 agreement in King’s Cross. 
The contracts in Hudson Yards and Zuid as mentioned the importance of the 
relations and put them up front, but they failed to provide a specific insight 
into the relations. The leases in Battery Park City were standard documents 
and did not provide a specific insight into the underlying relations.
Since the first premise was not fulfilled it is not easy to say much about 
the second. But we may conclude that the contract in King’s Cross, with its 
very detailed mediation and arbitration procedures, offered the most specific 
way of solving any forthcoming problems.
Despite their failure to give a specific account of the relations in which the 
contracts were embedded, the Zuid as contracts were the most suited to facili-
tation of the underlying relations.
The cases provided sufficient support for the third premise. But one of the 
most interesting outcomes of the study is that some contracts would profit 
from a more discrete approach to some norms. Most notably in the Zuid as 
case, problems could have been prevented if role integrity had been ap-
proached from a more discrete angle.
Another significant conclusion from this chapter is that a difference exists 
between the interests of the project and the interests of the relation between 
the parties undertaking the project. Although the relation between the par-
ties tends to be highlighted as the project progresses, and a good relation-
ship is certainly necessary for proper development of the project, we may still 
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conclude that a certain tension sometimes exists between the interests of the 
project and those of the relation. We will return to this point in Chapter 10.
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Conclusion:  10 
reflections on development 
agreements
Introduction10.1 
In this chapter we will answer the main question of this thesis: How do devel-
opment agreements function in the context of urban development projects?
We will evaluate the four functions of the development agreement that 
were discussed in Chapter 4. These functions are the exchange function (Sec-
tion 10.2), the statutory function (Section 10.3), the planning function (Section 
10.4) and the instrumental function (Section 10.5). After that we will provide 
rules of thumb for actors involved in the negotiation of development agree-
ments and then assess the agreements from a normative perspective (Section 
10.6). We will end that Section by drawing conclusions on the differences be-
tween the quality of the various contracts. In the final sections of this chapter 
we will reflect on the usefulness of the methodology (Section 10.7), revisit the 
research questions of this thesis (Section 10.8) and provide suggestions for 
further research (Section 10.9).
Two premises need to be stated before we start the evaluation of the de-
velopment agreements. The first is that a development agreement that speci-
fies – preferably in writing – the functions it aims to perform is better than 
one that doesn’t. The second is that such a development agreement will be 
able to solve more of the problems that occur during the process of develop-
ment than an agreement that fails to do so.
Exchange function10.2 
The exchange function is dominantly present in all agreements. Exchange is 
an important, but not a distinctive function of the development agreement 
(see Section 4.5.1). It cannot be a distinctive function, as exchange is part 
of the general definition of contracts we adopted in Chapter 3. In line with 
the first premise given above, we hold that all agreements should be specific 
about what will be exchanged.
The leases in Battery Park City bring about immediate exchange of the 
lease rights of the various plots. Possession of the land is transferred when 
the leases are signed, the payments to be made in return and other obliga-
tions are spelled out for the period extending up to 2069. The most important 
part of the exchange consists of the payments for the right to construct and 
own a building on the land (see Section 5.2.7 and 5.3.3). The leases in Hud-
son Yards also effectuate transfer of the lease rights but only for a limited pe-
riod (seven years) and the lease only provides the right to build the tunnels 
and entrances for the subway extension, it does not include the right to build 
anything on top of the land (see Sections 6.2.7 and 6.3.3). The contracts in 
Mahler4 and Gershwin are projected-exchange documents. They contain the 
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conditions that have to be fulfilled before lease rights can be transferred and 
payments can be made at a later stage.
In the S106 Agreement (drafted in the form of a deed) for the King’s Cross 
redevelopment project, planning permission is granted in exchange for the 
promise to provide a wide range of different facilities (see Sections 8.2.3 and 
8.3.3).
Since exchange is the core reason for their existence, all agreements per-
form that function well. We have seen in Chapter 7 that the agreements in 
Amsterdam fall a little short in providing clarity on the impacts of the con-
sent given by the various parties (see also Section 9.2.4). But generally speak-
ing, all development agreements make clear what is exchanged in the sense 
that the financial risks involved are made clear to all parties.
Statutory function10.3 
The statutory function of the development agreement is embodied in the pro-
cedures that the various parties have to obey. Like the exchange function, the 
statutory function is not distinctive for development agreements. The various 
agreements we studied differed in the way they dealt with this function. An 
agreement may or may not put much weight on its statutory role. It may also 
choose to put weight on only some aspects (such as the arbitration procedure). 
In our opinion, an agreement should put emphasis on those aspects that are 
likely to cause the most problems. It turned out that these aspects were often 
related to the different goals of the parties (see also Section 10.4).
We may have seen that the statutory function of the agreement boils down 
to specification of (1) the goals that the parties commit themselves to; (2) 
rules for cooperation; (3) rules for dealing with conflicts; and (4) rules for non-
compliance (see Section 4.5.2).
Goals
All written agreements mentioned the goals of the project and the goals un-
derlying them. The King’s Cross agreement proved to be the most specific in 
this respect. Still, the differences between the goals of the various parties 
turned out to be a problematic issue in all cases. The most illustrative exam-
ples can be found in Hudson Yards (see Section 6.2.14).
Cooperation
With regard to cooperation, the most interesting conclusion may be that the 
projects that required the highest levels of cooperation were the least specific 
on this issue in their written agreements. The legal documents acknowledged 
the importance of cooperation and provided some general norms but did not 
go into great detail about the procedures to be followed by the parties. In situ-
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ations that require a high level of cooperation, the parties prefer to work out 
their own rules for cooperation outside of the contract. In this respect, I pre-
fer the Gershwin approach to that of Mahler4 and Hudson Yards as it provid-
ed some rules and principles for the cooperation and guidance for situations 
where the cooperation process did not work out (see Section 7.3.4).
Conflicts and non-compliance
The King’s Cross agreement was also the most specific in its provisions for 
dealing with conflicts, while the BPC leases implemented the most specific 
procedure for dealing with default situations. In these cases, the enhanced 
specificity might favour efficient realisation of the project, but we also found 
some examples of situations where the specificity of the agreement was actu-
ally bad for the project: the provisions in the BPC leases concerning the dis-
play of notices informing the public of public policies on certain issues were 
not taken seriously; one interviewee commented that if the authority really 
took these policies seriously it should have left the parties more freedom in 
the way they implemented the rules (case interview Carl Jafee, BPC 02-07-A1). 
The description of the non-discrimination policies in the Battery Park City 
leases was so detailed that the parties could not see the wood for the trees. 
We also found examples of over-specificity in the storage lease in Hudson 
Yards and the provisions aimed at ensuring role integrity in the construction 
leases for the same project (see Section 6.3.2).
Planning function10.4 
Development agreements put emphasis on the planning function. The im-
portance of planning follows from the nature of urban development projects 
that provide the context of the agreements. Since the present investigation 
was undertaken within the field of planning studies, it is hardly surprising 
that planning is of enhanced importance in all agreements (see Section 2.5). A 
distinction should be drawn, however, between the planning function of con-
tracts and the planning of a project. The planning function of contracts was 
discussed in Section 3.4.4; since a contract is a projection of exchange into the 
future, it must plan for the intended exchange. If a contract plans for all as-
pects of the exchange, the implementation of planning norm is discrete (see 
Section 3.6.1). But the planning function of a development agreement is not 
confined to the planning of the legal relation, it also concerns the planning 
of the project (cf. Section 4.5.3). In a subsequent part of this section (under 
the heading ‘Planning and non-planning’) we will combine these two parts 
when we use Macneil’s (1975/2001) vision on contract planning as a frame-
work within which further details on the planning function may be given.
The planning function should provide guidance but at the same time leave 
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room for flexibility (Trip, 2007; Van der Veen & Korthals Altes, 2009). All agree-
ments recognised this tension, and it was often mentioned in the case inter-
views. Two projects, Hudson Yards and Mahler4, which required much and 
complex planning did not include a detailed planning of the project in the 
contracts and leases but referred to other documents.
We distinguished two different kinds of planning in the agreements (Sec-
tion 4.5.3). The first kind is planning for the performance of obligations, while 
the second kind introduces a framework within which such planning can be 
performed. In addition, we saw that a development agreement may perform a 
coordinating function between various other contracts.
The agreements in Battery Park City and King’s Cross were more precise, 
whereby the King’s Cross agreement left more issues open than the BPC leas-
es. The difference can be explained by the fact that the development covered 
by the BPC leases was expected to be completed in less than two years where-
as the King’s Cross agreement planned for a project lasting 15-25 years.
The contracts for the development of the Zuidas (Chapter 7) all introduced 
a planning framework, and referred to other existing and forthcoming docu-
ments and meetings where the planning would be further specified.
The Hudson Yards leases did not introduce a planning framework, but also 
referred to underlying (and forthcoming) documents for the planning of the 
project. The leases only provided some key principles for this planning.
The Mahler4 and the King’s Cross agreements also had the function of co-
ordinating between the various subprojects. The Mahler4 cooperation contract 
introduced phases in the planning process but further referred to underlying 
and forthcoming plans. The King’s Cross agreement introduced not only a 
phased planning framework but also plans for the various subprojects aimed 
at the provision of public facilities. (All these elements were included in the 
S106 agreement.) Unlike the other agreements studied, the S106 agreement 
did not refer at all to the commercial parts of the King’s Cross redevelopment 
project.
The outcomes of the case studies impel us to take a closer look at the is-
sues associated with planning that arise in legal agreements. We may discern 
three aspects of such problems (cf. Macneil, 1975): (1) determining goals and 
ascertaining costs; (2) planning and non-planning; and (3) performance and 
risk planning. Macneil focuses on contract planning and not on project plan-
ning, but he also acknowledges that the two cannot be separated if one wish-
es to provide a framework within which the planning function of the develop-
ment agreement can flourish.
Table 10.1 contains the aspects of the planning function.
Determining goals and ascertaining costs
The processes of determining goals and ascertaining costs are intertwined 
since parties want the value of the goals they achieve to be higher than the 
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costs of achieving them. The goals of the contract therefore find their natural 
endings when there is no longer any exchange surplus for (one of) the parties. 
This does not necessarily means that the agreement ends at that point, but 
the situation becomes totally different when one of the parties can no longer 
gain anything by staying in the relation.
More importantly, what one party considers a goal often represents a cost 
for the other party. This argument is in line with the finding from the case 
studies that the hardest parts of the pre-contractual negotiations were those 
dealing with the costs for extra facilities (most notably in King’s Cross, see 
Section 7.2) and with the moment when the private parties had to pay them 
(upfront or when a certain project milestone was reached).
One way of dealing with the problem of the tension between goals and 
costs is to keep some of the goals vague. This practice was encountered in the 
Zuidas where the contracts sometimes mentioned vague goals (such as a high 
quality environment). In such situations the point is not so much to ascertain 
costs (at least not at this stage) but to emphasise that parties subscribe to 
each other’s goals while avoiding the conflicts that may arise while specifying 
them.
Planning and non-planning
A second aspect of contract planning is the demarcation between the events 
that are foreseen by the agreement and the events that are not (planning and 
non-planning). The agreement may be vague and only consist of an anticipa-
tion of cooperation in the future, but it may also consist of a detailed sched-
ule of that cooperation that provides for every step and everything in between. 
But even then, planning deals with the future and is therefore almost by defi-
nition never complete (Van der Veen & Korthals Altes, 2009). Macneil (1975/ 
2001: 206) speaks of the planned and unplanned parts of the unexecuted por-
tion of a contract: “Every contract is necessarily partially unplanned, not only 
because of the nature of planning, but also because of the nature of one of the 
major tools of planning: promises. Thus, generally speaking the unexecuted 
portion of every contract contains two parts: the planned and the unplanned.”
Various factors complicate any description of the planned portion of the re-
lationship. One party may plan the relationship differently than the counter-
party. Another complication is that it is not always clear where the unplanned 
portion of a contract begins and the planned portion ends. A development 
agreement may establish a framework to deal with otherwise unplanned por-
tions of the relationship. And, as Macneil (1975/2001: 207) puts it: “... this sort 
of planning itself may be so vague as to be little more than an expression 
of hope for future cooperation: “We’ll worry about that later and work it out 
somehow.”
The agreements in Amsterdam provide many examples of this kind of 
vague planning. They sometimes refer to specific committees in which par-
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ties will meet and sometimes only state that an issue will be dealt with in the 
future.
In all addition, all planning involves tacit assumptions. As Macneil (1975/ 
2001: 208) puts it: “Tacit assumptions are as important in contract planning 
as they are in any other human behaviour. Just as people constantly make 
tacit assumptions while they are eating, driving, playing football, operating a 
computer, or making love, so too they make tacit assumptions when they are 
planning contractual relationships.”
One tacit assumption that may cause trouble is found when one party as-
sumes that the other party is familiar with a custom of his trade, whereas in 
reality he is not. In the King’s Cross case, the acknowledgment of these tacit 
assumptions led the developer to organise workshops to make sure that all 
parties had the same understanding of crucial terms such as sustainability 
which are open to different interpretations (case interview Argent, KCX 04-06-
A2).
Risk planning and performance planning
A contract plans for the performance of obligations and deals with the risks 
of losses that may occur.
The distinction between performance planning and risk planning is that 
between the steps taken to reach the goals of the contract (performance plan-
ning) and the steps taken to deal with risks the possibility exists that certain 
losses may occur (risk planning). Risks are caused by the fact that not all costs 
are known when parties enter into a contract.
We may distinguish in this connection between ‘goal facts’ and ‘mean 
facts’. Goal facts are information about the objectives of a contract whereas 
mean facts indicate what means can be used to reach these goals. Since con-
tracts specify the goals and means of two or more parties, a fact can be both a 
mean fact and a goal fact (Macneil, 1975/2001: 211).
Note that profit is not necessarily financial profit. Profit may be defined dif-
ferently when, as in the cases we studied, the government is involved. Profit 
may then also mean more green zones, jobs for the unemployed, a new school 
etc. Still, for the developers, the profit of the public party will at least in the 
short run be a cost. Over a longer period, developers of property may increase 
the return on their investments in the surrounding area because the quality 
represented by these non-financial profits adds to the value of their proper-
ties. The costs just referred to are thus also means, and furthermore involve 
risks (since the cost-profit calculus is not fully known). For private parties, fi-
nancial profit is the ultimate but not necessarily the only goal. In the cases 
we have studied, many interviewees representing private parties emphasised 
that financial profit was their ultimate goal but they also named other goals 
such as sustainability and turning the development location into an attrac-
tive ‘back yard’ for their head offices. Thus, investing more money may be 
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profitable in helping to attract new customers, image-building, providing an 
opportunity to experiment with new construction techniques etc. A private 
party may also subscribe to goals like affirmative action. Thus, as one of the 
interviewees explained, the profit may be of a more long-term nature and not 
directly translatable into project value (case interview ING, MAH 10-04-A5).
Not all parts of the relationship are spelled out in the contract (Macneil, 
1975/2001: 212). The specification may be too costly (in money or time), or it 
may jeopardise the prospective relationship between the parties. Parties may 
be unwilling to think about all future scenarios because they do not want to 
start an argument about an event that may never occur. The contracts in Am-
sterdam provide a good example of this. They do not deal extensively with sit-
uations of non-performance or with unwanted events that may lead to extra 
costs. One of the interviewees stated that to deal with them more extensively 
would be a waste of time and money since it would be impossible to plan for 
all events in any case (case interview Fortis, MAH 10-04-A2).
Standardisation
The use of standard forms or legal frameworks is convenient and efficient. 
But some forms are much better than others. More importantly, using any 
standard form involves a certain risk (Macneil, 2001). The framework chosen 
may not fit the relationship to be dealt with, or it may be outdated. The latter 
was the case in Battery Park City when, after a period of about ten years, mar-
ket demand increased and the leases that were originally drafted in the 1980s 
had to be rewritten. Still, the use of standard documents that can be adapted 
to concrete cases seemed to work on the whole for Battery Park City. The leas-
es are all drafted in the same way (case interview BPC 02-07-A1, see Section 
4.2). The frameworks used for the 1980s leases were left untouched: the main 
changes concerned the evolution of legal language. The documents contained 
relatively standard legal language and were rewritten in a relatively standard 
way (case interviews NY 11-04-A4 and A5).
In the Gershwin project, standard contracts were drafted for three of the 
four plots (see Section 5.2). This was done to facilitate the drafting and nego-
tiation process, but in the end it slowed the process down instead of making 
it quicker. In the interviews concerning this case, representatives of the city 
and the lawyer responsible for drafting hinted that they would have preferred 
to work without standardised contracts (case interviews GER 03-06-A4 and 
A5). Lawyers involved in other projects also stated that they preferred to work 
without standardised documents (case interviews KCX 04-06-A3, NY 03-07-A2 
and NY 03-07-A3).
Planning for dispute resolution
Contracts can never prevent all disagreements: it therefore makes sense to 
plan for the resolution of disputes. The easiest instrument to use here is the 
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self-help remedy. The law often allows one party to suspend, refuse or stop his 
performance when the other party does not perform his side of the contract 
(Macneil, 2001: 234-235): “Good planning of the refraining-from-performance 
remedy always contains three elements: explicit conferring of rights on a par-
ty to stop his own performance; precise specifying of the events giving rise to 
those rights; and dealing with further remedies and other related matters.”
Planning to keep ahead of the game involves dealing with security and for-
feitures. An example is the pawning of goods to provide an extra assurance 
that the duty required will be performed.
Planning for the uncertain duty risk means taking steps in advance to deal 
with uncertainty about the duties of the parties. If such a situation arises, it 
makes sense to appoint an arbitrator who will decide the point or to agree on 
the procedure by which such an arbitrator can be selected.
There are various types of dispute resolution: one-sided dispute resolu-
tion, negotiation, mediation, arbitration and judicial procedures. Macneil 
(1975/2001: 243) argues that litigation is different from other forms of dispute 
resolution. When a case is brought to court, the court can only review the re-
lationship through documents and witnesses. It also has a limited range of 
possible responses compared to the responses that are available in a viable 
relationship. The court can only order the specific performance of a previous-
ly established duty or award damages.
In the cases studied, interviewees seemed to acknowledge this. In general, 
they failed to see how litigation would fit their interest in a quick realisation 
of the project (e.g. case interview BPC 11-05-A3 and A4).
Instrumental function10.5 
The instrumental function is the function of a development agreement as a 
means to implement public goals. It is a distinguishing function of develop-
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Aspects of the planning functionTable 10.1 
1.  Ascertaining goals  
and determining costs
Goal-cost tension: there has to be an (expected) exchange surplus.
3.  Planning and non-planning Complications that may arise are:
Difference between parties in planning of the relation.1. 
Uncertainty about where the planned part of the contract begins.2. 
Inability of the human mind to focus on all aspects of a problem.3. 
Differences between the tacit assumptions of the various parties.4. 
4.  Performance and risk 
planning
A distinction exists between goal facts and mean facts. Mean facts 
concern the means used to reach a certain goal (for example, a 
payment to receive a product). A mean fact for one party may be a 
goal fact for the other. 
6. Standardisation Standard forms may be convenient and efficient, but they are also at 
risk of becoming outdated or not applicable to the specific situation. 
7. Flexibility A contractual relation is characterised by ‘ongoingness’ and should 
therefore include flexibility. This also requires planning for dispute 
resolution.
ment agreements but it is also a default function; we could imagine a situ-
ation where it does not apply. Public parties have the option to rely on leg-
islation instead of private law agreements. We have seen that the City of 
Amsterdam intends to do that in the case of the forthcoming Zuidas Corpora-
tion (Section 7.2.7).
The public goals can be related to the project or offer a chance to realise 
longstanding policy goals. We defined project-related goals as goals intended 
to mitigate harmful effects of the project (Section 4.5.4). Longstanding public 
goals are not specifically related to the project. An example is the goal of cre-
ating apartments for middle incomes. A development agreement can also be 
used to attract new developers, for example by giving the first developers to 
invest in a project area some special incentives (cf. Section 6.1.7).
We encountered the instrumental function of the agreement in all the ur-
ban development projects we studied, and in all focal projects with the ex-
ception of the subway extension project in Hudson Yards. But even there, 
the Meushar lease facilitated the use of a profitable brownfield cleaning pro-
gramme by the landowner (Section 6.2.3). We may conclude that although the 
Hudson Yards leases were closed to realise a public goal (subway extension), 
they did not include many other public goals with the exception of a standard 
role integrity policy (see Section 10.4).
For the S106 agreement in King’s Cross, implementing public goals was the 
main function of the contract. King’s Cross provided some examples of the 
implementation of public goals that were not project-bound, such as the re-
alisation of a job trainee centre. The Gershwin project provides one example 
of such a goal, namely the building of houses for middle-income groups.
In the New York projects, the fiscal aspects of the project were also made 
the subject of agreement (see Section 6.1.7). The Goldman Sachs lease in Bat-
tery Park City provided an example of a flexible interpretation of the rules due 
to the fact that the City and State of New York did not want the bank to move 
to another state (see Section 5.3.1). The profit then lies not so much in a di-
rect benefit, but in the fact (which may be open to dispute) that New York will 
benefit in the long term when banks and other high profile companies keep 
their head offices in the city.
Assessment of contracts10.6 
In this section I will first provide five rules of thumb for parties involved in 
the process of negotiating a development agreement. In the second part of 
the section we will transform these rules of thumb into principles for drafting 
the written part of such agreements and use those principles to assess the 
agreements examined in the various case studies.
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Rules of thumb10.6.1 
The five rules of thumb given below may help actors who are involved in the 
negotiation process leading up to the drafting of development agreements. To-
gether they constitute a simplified model based on the outcomes of our case 
studies and the theoretical material of Chapters 3 and 4. For the reader of this 
study, their content will come as no surprise.
Focus on relations (cf. Section 3.1) – All development agreements are embedded 
in the relations between parties. Every development agreement should start 
by examining the nature of these relations. If there are too many conflicts or 
misunderstandings, they should be resolved in the pre-contractual phase. Are 
there expectations that cannot be reconciled?
Focus on the interest of the project (cf. Section 4.5.2) – Take a step back and ask 
yourself: What does the project need? In the cases we studied, the agreement 
is meant to provide the basis for an urban development project. What is the 
content of this project? Are there provisions that make sense from a relation-
al perspective but are not in the interests of the project as such?
Specify the functions of the agreement (cf. Section 4.5) – Is it clear what is being 
exchanged? What rules and procedures are (or should be) imposed on the 
parties? Has a project plan been drawn up? Are there any public goals that 
should be implemented in the agreements?
Specify the goals of the agreement (cf. Section 10.3) – What goals does the agree-
ment pursue? And what are the goals of the parties and of the project? Are 
they reconcilable?
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Comparison of functions of the various development agreementsTable 10.2 
Projects Projects
Function
Mahler4
Whole project
Gershwin
Zuidschans
King’s Cross
The Main Site
Battery Park City
Various leases
Hudson Yards
No. 7 Subway extension
Exchange function It is clear what is exchanged It is clear what is exchanged It is clear what is exchanged  
but very complex
It is clear what is exchanged It is clear what is exchanged
Exchange procedure Specific Not very specific Very specific Very specific Very specific
Statutory function Not very specific Specific Very specific Very specific Specific
Cooperation Not very specific Not very specific Specific Specific Not very specific
Goals Specific Specific Very specific Specific Specific
Conflicts Not very specific Not very specific Very specific Specific Not very specific
Planning function Not very specific Specific Very specific Very specific Specific
Plan Framework Framework Specific plan Specific plan Mixture
Coordination Coordinating framework for 
various subprojects
No specific coordinating 
functions
Coordinates between various 
subprojects
No specific coordination 
functions
No specific coordination 
functions
Instrumental function Specific Specific Very specific Very specific Specific
Project-bound? Yes Mixture of project bound goals 
and (other) public goals
Mixture of project bound goals 
and (other) public goals
Yes Yes
Was project meant to attract 
development?
No No No No Yes
continuedTable 10.2 
Plan for flexibility (cf. Section 3.6.2) – Does the contract leave sufficient room for 
change? Does it include a method for revision of the planning? Does it pro-
vide the opportunity for moments of reflection on the method of cooperation 
used?
Principles for preparing the written 10.6.2 
parts of development agreements
Section 10.6.1 provided rules of thumb for the process of negotiating a devel-
opment agreement. The present section has a narrower scope, as it only fo-
cuses on the written part of the agreement.
There are many similarities and differences between the development 
agreements in the various cases we studied. The similarities are mostly ex-
plained by the fact that all the agreements perform comparable functions at 
an abstract level.
Differences are found for example in the levels of specificity. We also saw 
that not all contracts perform a coordinating role between various projects, 
while only the King’s Cross agreement had the implementation of public 
goals as its main function (see Section 10.5).
It is difficult to measure the quality of a written agreement. It may be 
claimed that the agreement is probably functioning well if nobody complains 
about it. Note however that the absence of complaints could be due to the 
fact that the legal agreement has disappeared into a drawer during the pro-
cess and did not provide any guidance for further developments. In line with 
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and (other) public goals
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Was project meant to attract 
development?
No No No No Yes
continuedTable 10.2 
the premises given in the Introduction to the 
present chapter, we consider such an agree-
ment to be not as good as one that guides fur-
ther developments.
On the basis of the three premises given in the Introduction to Chapter 9 
(Section 9.1) and the two premises presented at the start of this chapter (Sec-
tion 10.1), we may conclude that the best contracts provide a specific account 
of the relations in which they are embedded and of the functions they per-
form. These insights lead to the following five basic principles presented in 
Table 10.3.
We will now examine how these principles can be used to assess the vari-
ous agreements we have studied in this thesis.
The BPC leases10.6.3 
The BPC leases specified the functions of the development agreement effec-
tively. We saw however that some of the standard regulations included in the 
leases were so detailed as to obscure the meaning.
The leases did a good job in specifying the relations in which the lease was 
embedded: the various roles of the public parties and their implications for 
the relation with the developers are explained in considerable detail.
The leases did not devote much effort to the introduction of relational 
norms: they took a more adversarial approach.
The leases did not put much emphasis on the importance of flexibility ei-
ther. We saw that they provide room for the developer to reach results in a 
manner that suits him best (the ‘how’) and that the time schedule is not as 
strict as it may seem (Section 4.3.7). But the spirit of the lease is to control the 
development process, using a procedure whereby the BPCA reviews all plans 
and proposals. One of the explanations for the emphasis on security rather 
than flexibility is that the development agreement is embedded in a lease 
that will last for more than 65 years.
The leases did place emphasis on the importance of planning: they intro-
duced a framework and implemented an approach that worked for both the 
BPCA and the developers.
The overall conclusion is that the development part of the BPCA leases 
functions well but is somewhat too standardised and specific and puts too 
little emphasis on flexibility. In addition, the leases do not provide a frame-
work that allows the relation between the parties to evolve. Modifications of 
the plans and proposals will have to be negotiated and will result in changes 
to the leases.
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Quality norms for (the written part of ) Table 10.3 
development agreements
A development agreement:
1. Specifies the functions it performs
2. Specifies the relations in which it is embedded
3. Introduces relational norms
4. Puts emphasis on flexibility
5. Puts emphasis on the importance of planning
The Hudson Yards leases10.6.4 
The Hudson Yards leases could have specified their functions better. They 
hinted at the many aspects involved in the construction of the subway exten-
sion and the development of the plots but failed to take control over the de-
velopment. We saw that the statutory function could have been improved in 
the storage lease, which implemented standard regulations that mostly failed 
to make sense in the specific context.
The leases could have done better in specifying the relations they were 
embedded in, most notably because they involved many public parties and 
were in that sense complex. In addition, the leases did not bring all private 
parties together which would have made sense.
The importance of flexibility was emphasised in the leases. A good balance 
was found between the security needed for the financial obligations and the 
flexibility necessary to have the project carried out in a proper manner.
The leases did moderately well in introducing relational norms; they put 
some emphasis on the importance of cooperation, but could have been more 
specific in stressing the importance of a cooperative and flexible approach 
to the work or in providing a framework wherein the relational norms could 
flourish.
Planning issues should have been more specifically dealt with, but the 
leases still did a good job of explaining the principles underlying the prepara-
tion and modification of the draft plans. Overall, the Hudson Yards leases did 
well but they could have taken more control over the development aspects 
of the project (as opposed to the financial terms): since the project required 
so much cooperation, it would have made sense to lay down some firm prin-
ciples for that process.
The Gershwin contract10.6.5 
The Zuidschans contract gave a clear specification of the functions it aimed 
to perform. The relations in which the contract was embedded needed more 
specification, however. The rather vague description of these led to some 
problems related to role integrity and competing goals (see Sections 9.2.1 and 
10.4).
On the other hand, the contract did introduce relational norms effectively: 
it not only emphasised the importance of good faith but also pointed out the 
merits of an ‘unconventional’ approach.
It also stressed the need for flexibility and seemed to have found the right 
balance between this requirement and the need for firm agreements. The 
stress on unconventionality may also be interpreted as promotion of a type of 
flexibility (see Section 7.4.6).
The contract emphasised the importance of proper planning: it introduced 
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a planning framework and obliged parties to modify this framework in re-
sponse to changes in the situation.
The overall assessment is that the Gershwin contract provided the neces-
sary guidance and did exactly what the Mahler4 contract failed to do (see Sec-
tion 10.6.4), by taking control of contract-specific issues. This became most 
visible in the parts that dealt with planning. The main flaw of the Gershwin 
contract was that it did not provide a solution to role integrity problems, and 
even contributed to their complexity in the context of the introduction of the 
air rights system (see Section 7.2.3).
The Mahler4 contract10.6.6 
The Mahler4 contract did moderately well in specifying the functions it aimed 
to perform. It would have been preferable if the contract had been more spe-
cific in defining its relation to other documents (coordination function). It 
would also have been preferable if it had specified the goals of the separate 
functions it performed. In this respect, it performed best with regard to the 
environmental measures it wanted to implement as it did specify the goals of 
these measures.
The contract did moderately well in specifying the relations in which it 
was embedded. It explained how the various parties who had signed the con-
tract of intent were now involved in the project. However, it only implicitly re-
ferred to the various roles of the public parties and did not explain how these 
various roles resulted in different relations with the consortium chosen to de-
velop Mahler4.
The contract introduced the general norm of good faith as a dominating re-
lational norm. It did well in emphasising the importance of relational norms 
but should have been more specific in explaining their meaning for various 
parts of the project.
The contract stressed the importance of flexibility, even though the word 
‘flexibility’ never actually occurred anywhere in the document: it clearly stipu-
lated that the agreements it referred to were to be further specified in sub-
sequent meetings and documents. Some examples of how this approach left 
room for changes to the project were given in the case study (Section 7.5.6) 
and in Chapter 9.
The Mahler4 contract also emphasised the importance of planning and in-
troduced a planning framework. It should however have provided more rules 
for the cases where the planning was not met. In general, the contract would 
have been improved by the provision of more guidance. It is clear from read-
ing it that it forms part of a much larger body of plans and agreements, but it 
refuses to add anything to those documents with the exception of the parts 
that deal with exchange. But these other documents either refer to the Zui-
das project as a whole or adopted a more general perspective. They lacked the 
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specific characteristics of a contract. As a general conclusion we may say that 
the Mahler4 contract should have taken more control over the project.
S106 agreement in King’s Cross10.6.7 
The King’s Cross agreement (drawn up in the form of a deed) did well in spec-
ifying its various functions. We have seen that the most dominant cause of 
its specificity is the public-private nature of this document (see Sections 8.1.1 
and 8.3.1). As a result, the instrumental function is particularly well devel-
oped. The relation between the various parties was also clearly specified.
Flexibility was an important aspect of the agreement but more stress could 
have been placed on this requirement in the general part of the agreement.
The deed should have introduced (more) relational norms, given the fact 
that the parties concerned were entering into a relation that was expected to 
last at least 15-20 years.
It did a very good job in emphasising the importance of planning and in-
troduced a refined system for dealing with situations in which planning re-
quirements were not met.
Overall, the King’s Cross agreement was very well crafted. Unlike the BPC 
leases, it specified all agreements made in a manner that was appropriate to 
the project and tried to find the proper balance between flexibility and se-
curity (see Section 7.3.6). It should however put more emphasis on relational 
norms, and we saw that the King’s Cross approach leads to a construction in 
which most facilities are planned in advance. Although the contract did leave 
some room for modification, it would have been an improvement to leave 
even more and to omit some of the detail.
Conclusion10.6.8 
The survey given above shows clearly that different approaches to drafting 
lead to different legal documents: in particular, we may say that the ones pro-
viding the most specific account of the functions they performed and the re-
lations in which they were embedded did worst on flexibility and implemen-
tation of relational norms. If we were trying to construct the ideal (written) 
agreement, we might like to pick specific provisions from all the contracts we 
have studied. If however I were to choose one document as a general model 
for the drafting of contracts of this type in future, I would opt for the S106 
agreement used in King’s Cross because of its specificity. The Gershwin con-
tract is also very specific, but it would be more difficult to use as a model be-
cause it is relatively short and hence does not specify as many issues as the 
King’s Cross agreement does.
The BPC leases and the Mahler4 contract were soon put away in drawers 
and forgotten after they had been signed. The BPC leases were standardised 
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documents that could have done more to help preserve the contractual rela-
tions in question and help them to evolve.
The Mahler4 contract more or less disappeared from the table when the 
circumstances governing the execution of the project changed. It should have 
provided more guidance for the parties on how to deal with these issues.
Methodological reflection10.7 
Methodology turned out to be a key issue in this study. The main question 
was whether to choose an investigative method that would be best for the de-
scription of the cases, or to go for a more normative approach. I decided that 
it would be best to start with a descriptive approach because the main re-
search question considered in this thesis was of a descriptive nature: how do 
development agreements function in the context of urban development proj-
ects? The theoretical framework for the study was provided by a combination 
of relational contract theory (described in Chapter 3) and the concept of the 
development agreement (explained in Chapter 4). This gave me a basis for the 
comparison and critical assessment of the selected agreements and hence 
allowed me to draw normative conclusions. After the detailed case-by-case 
analysis given in Chapters 5-8 more general reflections were given in Chapter 
9, leading up to the development of a general method for the assessment of 
new or existing contracts presented in the previous section (10.6). This meth-
odology did not result in one-sided normative verdicts on the agreements. In 
the theoretical part of the study we discussed the problems that would have 
emerged if such an approach had been adopted: we would have had to nar-
row our focus to one or two aspects of the agreements before we knew which 
aspects were most interesting to consider (e.g. section 4.1.1).
The upshot was that I opted for a comparative study that focused on the 
way development agreements functioned and that would provide a basis for 
development of an approach that could be used in future studies and could 
also help (legal) practitioners for example in the drafting of new agreements. 
A more normative research question might be appropriate in future studies if 
the researcher wished to investigate a problem that could be easily confined 
to one or two questions.
Case studies10.7.1 
The case studies presented in Chapters 5-8 were based on an analysis of for-
mal documents, case interviews, and consultation of relevant scientific publi-
cations. Articles from the media were used to provide insights into the back-
ground of the various projects and the discussions that arose around them.
Case interviews were undertaken with professionals who were directly in-
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volved in the project, professionals with a knowledge of the field, and aca-
demics. New York was visited in November 2004 and February 2007. London 
was visited in April 2006 and an additional study was undertaken as part of a 
research project for the Dutch investment management and property devel-
opment group Bouwfonds in cooperation with the University of Westminster 
in 2007-2008. Amsterdam is the home base of the author, therefore the study 
of the Zuidas project had a more continuous character than that of the other 
projects.
The case study approach worked well, it helped to collect the information 
necessary for the study and provided many details on the projects. The data 
I collected did not always make it into the pages of this thesis, but still of-
ten helped me to understand how the development agreements functioned 
within the project and guided my selection of which details were included 
and which were left out.
Applicability of relational contract theory10.7.2 
Relational contract theory was presented in Chapter 3. Key elements of this 
theory, discussed at length in that chapter, were the ten common contract 
norms and the differences between discrete and relational norms.
The biggest problem I faced when trying to apply this theory to the urban 
development agreements involved in my case studies was how to deal with 
the fact that no single real-life agreement transaction is 100% discrete or 
100% relational.
The method that I finally worked out and which I believe to have been ef-
fective was as follows. I started the analysis of each case by describing the 
content of the ten common contract norms in turn and placing each of these 
norms on a three-point discrete-relational scale (more discrete, equally dis-
crete and relational, and more relational). I then summarised these results in 
what I call a discrete/relational matrix for the case in question (see for ex-
ample Table 5.1), with the ten common contract norms down the left-hand 
side and the three-point discrete-relational scale along the top. Secondly, I 
determined the relative importance of the typically discrete norms of presen-
tiation, discreteness, implementation of planning and effectuation of consent, 
and of the typically relational norms (role integrity, preservation of the rela-
tion, resolution of relational conflict, propriety of means and supra-contract 
norms) for the case in question. I summarised these results in another table 
(see e.g. Table 5.2). This gave me two ‘snap-shots’ or ‘X-ray photos’ for each 
individual case, which provided a useful basis for further analysis, discussion 
and comparison of the individual cases.
There were two reasons for using the common contract norms as my point 
of departure. The first was that since real-life agreements will always have 
both discrete and relational aspects it makes no sense to choose between the 
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two sets of norms in advance. The second reason was that since the domi-
nance of either the discrete or the relational elements will also influence the 
content of the common contract norms, the discrete or relational character of 
a given contract will be quite clearly reflected in the corresponding discrete-
relational matrix.
This is backed up by the subsequent (less detailed) assessment of the rela-
tive importance of the typically discrete and relational norms.
Thus, my analysis of the King’s Cross agreement led me to the conclusion 
that it had more discrete than relational elements. The key findings in this 
connection were that implementation of planning and effectuation of con-
sent were of enhanced importance (see Table 8.2) and had more discrete than 
relational elements (Table 3.2).
In addition, role integrity was not a complex norm in the deed (although 
it was during the negotiation phase) and propriety of means and the supra-
contract norms were not of enhanced importance. However, preservation of 
the relation and resolution of relational conflict were present in some parts of 
the agreement as was illustrated by the extensive arbitration procedure and 
the provisions on monitoring. Taking all these facts into consideration, I con-
cluded that the King’s Cross agreement, like all real life agreements, had both 
discrete and relational elements but that on balance it tended to the discrete 
side of the continuum.
The Mahler4 agreement, on the other hand, turned out to be more rela-
tional than discrete. Here implementation of planning and the effectuation 
of consent were not of enhanced importance and were not predominantly 
discrete. In addition, the supra-contract norms, propriety of means and role 
integrity were complex norms that (with the exception of propriety of means) 
turned out to be of enhanced importance. The propriety of means norm was 
predominantly relational: it focused not only on the ‘what’ but also on the 
‘how’. In balance, therefore, this agreement tended to the relational side of the 
spectrum.
I believe this approach is an effective means of describing the agree-
ments – as accurately as possible – in their own context while at the same 
time providing a frame of reference for comparative evaluation. All the con-
tracts were individually discussed and characterised in this way. Naturally, 
the assessment of the norms on a discrete-relational scale is a subjective 
matter, depending on the judgment of the investigator. It could be argued that 
this makes the outcomes of the present study debatable. But I believe this dis-
advantage is outweighed by the fact that the method is very transparent. The 
reader can easily follow the reasoning and decide whether he would draw the 
same conclusions. I regard this scientific transparency as one of the main as-
sets of the method.
A more serious disadvantage of the method is that the conclusions that 
are drawn are highly case-specific. They have a descriptive value, but it is not 
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so certain that they can be used as a basis for appraisal of the practices we 
encountered in our case studies. Suppose that a norm turns out to be more 
discrete than relational. What does this really tell us about the agreement in 
question? In fact, experience shows that analysis of the norms in the way de-
scribed here helps to find out where things went wrong in case of disputes, 
unnecessary delays or other problems that should not have arisen if the con-
tractual relation between parties was functioning well. I believe that this ad-
vantage is often underestimated. The most important argument in favour of 
our method is that the theory can be used in a normative manner, as I have 
shown in the previous sections, and that it helps us to propose case-specific, 
not over-generalising, conclusions.
In the present study, we solved the comparability problem indicated above 
by making use of the premises stated in the introduction of Chapter 9 to pro-
vide a background against which the outcomes were compared.
Another disadvantage of our method is that when agreements are stud-
ied within their own context, they become incomparable, since every context 
is unique. This makes it hard to draw comparative conclusions that promote 
cross-case learning. And since this is true for cases in general, it must be 
even truer for cases situated within different countries. This is a point worth 
stressing. It is in line with the criticism of relational contract theory dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 that this theory puts too much emphasis on all the dif-
ferent aspects of a case, as a result of which it is unable to make meaningful 
pronouncements with regard to the enforceability of contracts. In the same 
manner, it can be argued that the overemphasis on all the different aspects 
of the case makes it hard to draw any generalising conclusions at all. But the 
emphasis relational contract theory puts on all aspects of the case also has 
an advantage, in that it helps us to rethink general opinions and notions on 
contracts and the law. General opinions are then replaced by more case-spe-
cific considerations.
In addition, the method used in the present study forces us to think about 
the relation between the specific rules of the contract and the law as it is ap-
plied in courts, and the possible sources of interference with this relation. But 
since it lacks a general opinion on what is just and what is not and replaces 
it with the notion that courts should do justice to the contractual relations as 
they stand, it only calls for broad categories and does not fill them in. I believe 
that both these viewpoints are sound, and that in fact the argument between 
them must probably remain undecided.
The question is whether the goal of a contract should be to ensure predict-
able enforcement, or whether the way in which it is enforced should depend 
on the way in which the relationship between the parties to the contract has 
evolved. I would say that this depends on the nature of the relation, but for 
the present purpose of studying development agreements it generally makes 
most sense to consider the enforcement of the agreements as they evolve 
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during the development process. Campbell et al. (2003) argue that the parties 
can always implement an ‘entire agreement’ clause as was done in Battery 
Park City, which means that they obviously wanted the contract to be central 
to their relation.
The upshot is that we may state that one of the main assets of relational 
contract theory is that it is reconcilable with other approaches. It is not nec-
essarily a theory that favours relational approaches in preference to classical, 
discrete approaches. It could support a 100% discrete contract, but it would 
do so because it follows from the nature of the relation in which the con-
tract is embedded that the contract is discrete, not because it holds that it is 
most efficient to treat any relation as if it were 100% discrete. It might then be 
asked how the theory would deal with a situation where the parties had spe-
cifically agreed that their relation should be treated as if it were 100% discrete, 
even when it was not. But that is by the way. The point here is that the theory 
worked well when applied to the analysis of our cases.
Applicability of the development 10.7.3 
agreement concept
In Chapter 4 we introduced the development agreement concept that was 
used to provide a general basis for the description of the cases in Chapters 
5-8 and then in the present chapter as a basis for comparison and assessment 
of the various contracts studied.
The disadvantage of this concept may be that it is so precise that the read-
er gets the impression that the researcher found exactly what he had put in-
to his definition. This would be a problem, since the purpose of introducing 
the concept was to provide open categories that allowed many different ap-
proaches to fit in.
The advantage of the development agreement concept as defined in Chap-
ter 4 was that it helped us to structure the description of the case studies, 
while its focus on functions facilitated the description of the meaning and 
function of the various agreements, which was the main question posed 
in this study. The focus on functions also helped us to compare and assess 
the various contracts examined. Once again, we needed to introduce certain 
premises to allow us to draw more normative conclusions. We could also 
have chosen to define the various functions of the development agreement 
in terms of quality rather than of function. One of the main assets of the ap-
proach selected was that it provided an effective basis for assessment of the 
agreements and helped us to formulate the rules of thumb and drafting prin-
ciples given at the end of Chapter 9.
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Revisiting the research questions10.8 
In Chapter 9 and the preceding sections we have compared and analysed the 
case studies, using the theoretical background of Chapters 2 and 3. We have 
also discussed what a good contract should do and provided guidelines and 
principles for contracts and development agreements in the two final sec-
tions of the previous chapter.
In the final part of this chapter we will return to the questions we started 
this study with and provide some suggestions for further research.
1. How do development agreements function in the context of urban development 
projects?
This question was mostly answered in the case studies (Chapters 5-8) that fo-
cused on the ‘how’ parts of this question. The question was approached from 
a more theoretical perspective in Chapter 4. In Chapter 9 and the present 
chapter we revisited this question from a comparative perspective.
Development agreements work in various ways but it is possible to name 
some functions that they all perform: the exchange function, the statutory 
function, the planning function and the instrumental function. In addition 
they all put at least some emphasis on relational norms.
2. What is the meaning of the ten common contract norms in the context of the 
development agreements in the case studies?
The second question of the study was answered in the case studies and then 
in Chapter 9.
(1) The meaning of the common contract norms varies from case to case; but 
(2) Implementation of planning, flexibility and role integrity were found to be 
of enhanced importance in all cases. (3) All agreements at least emphasised 
the relational norms of resolution of relational conflict and preservation of 
the relation.
3. Were the development agreements we studied on balance mainly discrete, or 
mainly relational?
It was not easy to assess the discrete-relational balance in a given case. All 
the agreements studied had both discrete and relational aspects. An overall 
characterisation of the contracts turned out to be very difficult. We therefore 
used an analysis that summed up which of the discrete and relational norms 
were emphasised in the agreements.
By taking the analysis one step further (see Section 3.10 for a description 
of the methodology), we concluded that some agreements were more dis-
crete on balance while others were more relational. The King’s Cross and BPC 
agreements leaned over to the discretional side of the spectrum, the Mahler4 
and Gershwin contracts to the relational side, while the Hudson Yards lease 
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occupied an intermediate position.
More importantly, the overall question turned out to be somewhat mean-
ingless. One of the best qualities of relational contract theory is that it breaks 
agreements up in many pieces when it analyses them. The analysis of the in-
dividual norms and their position on the relational-discrete scale turned out 
to be of more importance than the position of the agreements as a whole on 
the same scale.
It might however be appropriate to use overall characterisation of the dis-
crete-relational balance of agreements in future (comparative) studies aimed 
at testing hypotheses such as: English development agreements are more dis-
crete than Dutch ones.
4. Now that we have studied all development agreements from a common contract 
norm perspective and placed the norms on a discrete-relational scale, does this 
provide us with an effective basis for comparison and assessment of the agreements?
We compared and assessed the written agreements from the perspective of 
relational contract theory in Chapter 9. The theory did indeed provide an ef-
fective basis for comparison of the various agreements, but we needed to in-
troduce extra premises to take a more normative perspective. This was done 
at the beginning of Chapters 9 and 10.
5. Can we finally say anything about the development agreements that could lead to 
their improvement?
The outcomes of the case studies based on relational contract theory and our 
development agreement concept had to be transformed into a normative and 
comparative analysis. The normative basis of that analysis stemmed mainly 
from the case studies and the contracts themselves.
In Chapter 9 we assessed all contracts from the perspective of the common 
contract norms, and provided suggestions for their improvement. In Chapter 
10 we did the same from the perspective of the development agreement con-
cept. We also introduced rules of thumb and drafting principles aimed at im-
provement of the contracts.
Suggestions for further research10.9 
This study aimed to open up a field that has not been subject of much aca-
demic research: the functioning of development agreements in urban de-
velopment projects. Our contribution has been twofold. (1) We have used a 
theoretical approach that emphasises the function of agreements drafted in 
the context of urban development projects. In other words, we took concepts 
derived from planning studies and used them with the aim of contributing to 
the creation of better urban environments. (2) By using specific case studies 
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as a basis for this investigation, I aimed to contribute to the current body of 
knowledge on urban development projects by researching the understudied 
topic of the function of development agreements. Now that we have present-
ed our conclusions, we would like to propose some useful directions for fur-
ther research in this field.
Research on development agreements
Further research could focus on the principles and guidelines presented in this 
and the previous chapter and use them as a critical framework for the study of 
other agreements in (urban development) projects. This research could use the 
outcomes of this study and take a more normative approach towards develop-
ment agreements, using the principles and norms of Section 10.7.
Finally, further research could focus on a more inclusive model of devel-
opment agreements. Urban development projects are not at the forefront of 
democratic and participatory processes. So far, urban development projects 
are the work of a few professionals acting on behalf of the public and private 
parties involved. Further research should focus on developing a model where-
by a development agreement would include procedures for public participa-
tion. This is important, since these agreements involve decisions about many 
issues where major public interests are at stake. Representative bodies, such 
as city councils, often lack the time and expertise needed to be effective ne-
gotiation partners (with the exception of some individual council members). 
The public, which is still usually absent from the negotiations, should have 
its representatives sitting around the bargaining table too. Further research is 
needed to create a model that would facilitate this participation process (see 
also Janssen-Jansen, 2004, on puzzling and powering; Camacho, 2005a, 2005b; 
Trip, 2007; Majoor, 2008).
Back to the undercover lawyer10.10 
In the final section of the first Chapter 1 presented myself as an ‘undercover 
lawyer’, discussing urban development projects with various actors from all 
possible points of view, but most comfortable when hiding behind the pages 
of his newspaper. As an undercover lawyer, I made a difficult but interesting 
journey. The most complicated part was to find the right directions and then 
keep to the right track. But now that I’ve finished it, I’m most happy to say 
that I don’t think of the point where we have arrived as a final destination, 
but rather as a further point of departure. I’m looking forward to continue my 
undercover work in the near future, picking up all kinds of clues, ever willing 
to learn more about the world – which is not all that different from learning 
more about the law.
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Louisa Little, as co-trustees of the Lillian Goldman marital trust under the 
will of Sol Goldman, May 22, 2007.
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Websites
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/hyards/hymain.shtml
Battery Park City
http://www.batteryparkcity.org
http://www.albaneseorg.com
http://www.sheldrake.com
http://www.empire.state.ny.us
Hudson Yards
http://www.hydc.org
http://www.mta.info
http://www.moiniangroup.com
http://www.extelldev.com
http://www.manhattancb4.org
Zuidas-cases
http://www.zuidas.nl
http://www.bouwfonds.nl
http://www.ingrealestate.com
http://www.realestate.fortis.com
http://www.gensvastgoed.nl
http://www.am.nl
http://www.mahler4.nl
King’s Cross
http://www.argentkingscross.com
http://www.lcrhq.co.uk
http://www.dhl.com
http://www.camden.gov.uk/kingscross/
http://www.islington.gov.uk/kingscrossteam
http://www.kxrlg.org uk
http://www.nidokingscross.com
http://www.cabe.org.uk
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 Appendix A Examples of questions 
put to interviewees in 
case studies
Project
In the planning literature it is common to distinguish between the following 
phases: (1) the initial phase, where parties consider whether they are willing 
to undertake the project; (2) The negotiation phase, where they reach agree-
ment on details of the project; (3) The construction phase, where the planned 
work is performed on the project; and (4) The management phase, where the 
completed project is managed.
Do you agree with this division? ■
If you restrict your attention to the legal aspects of the project, which of  ■
these phases took the most time?
What were the main disputes occurring during the negotiation phase, or  ■
the points – not necessarily disputes – that took longest to reach agree-
ment on?
Would you describe the negotiation process as smooth or the opposite? ■
The legal system
Some people say that the common law approach forces parties to spend  ■
too much time dealing with possible liabilities. Do you think there is any 
truth in this claim?
Did real estate law play any role during the negotiations, for instance with  ■
reference to the long leaseholds, or the choice between cooperative apart-
ments and condominiums?
Specificities of project
Can you name some of the specific legal features of the urban development  ■
project we are talking about here?
Relationships
How would you define the relationship you have with the other parties. A  ■
special relationship? A relationship of trust? No relationship at all apart 
from the fact that you are carrying out this project together?
How important is it to trust the developers? What steps do you take to en- ■
sure a sufficient basis of trust?
How often do you contact the developers with reference to the project? In  ■
the Netherlands, it is not unusual for a developer to have contacts with the 
government agency he is dealing with on a day-to-day basis.
Are there agreements between parties that are not enforceable in a court of  ■
law but that you would still regard as essential? Are there any agreements 
that are legally enforceable, but where the chance that you would actually 
go to court to enforce them is very low? There are many such agreements 
in the Netherlands.
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How do you make sure that the construction work will be finished on  ■
time?
Learning
How does your organisation learn from this project? Are there formal  ■
meetings to evaluate modes of cooperation, the project organisation, etc.?
Example of questions put to a lawyer involved in the King’s Cross project
King’s Cross
Can you give me a general picture of the work you do for Camden Council?1. 
Would you say that the King’s Cross project had any special legal or non-2. 
legal features?
Would you say that the negotiations had been smooth or the opposite?3. 
Were there any major disputes?4. 
Contracting and negotiating practices
Dutch urban development contracts are often surprisingly short, even for 5. 
major projects. For example, the contract for a project worth € 800 million 
will probably not be more than a few pages long. The main reason for this 
is that all parties put great trust in their Code of Civil Law (Burgerlijk Wet-
boek) – a detailed codification of all private law obligations and, even more 
importantly, in the principle of good faith which forms an integral part of 
civil law. They therefore usually only state in the contract that they will 
renegotiate their obligations if any problems arise. As a result, legal issues 
play a minor role during their negotiations, the price, and the way the par-
ties will work together, tend to play a major role however. Can you compare 
this way of negotiating with the practice in London? What are the main 
differences?
In the Netherlands, major development companies will often abstain from 6. 
suing the government, because they consider their long-term relationship 
with the government more important than winning a court case. Would 
you say that this is the case in London too?
The common law is said to be unwilling to oblige a party to take the posi-7. 
tion of the other party into account. Do you agree with this statement? Do 
you think this leads to longer negotiation?
Do you think that English contract and planning law imposes unnecessary 8. 
impediments on the quick execution of major projects? 
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 Appendix B Case interviews
Battery Park City
BPC 02-07-A1
BPC 11-04-A1
Carl D. Jaffee, in-house lawyer (senior development council), Battery Park City 
Authority (BPCA)
BPC 11-04-A2
Stephanie Gelb, project manager of BPCA
BPC 11-05-A3
Tim Henzy, executive vice president, Sheldrake Organization
BPC 11-05-A4
Jack Becker, executive vice president, Albanese Organization
BPC 11-04-A5
BPC 04-07-A5
Lawrence Lipson, partner, Proskauer & Rose LLP
BPC 11-04-A6
Maurice Roeser, city planner from the Manhattan office of the Department of 
City Planning
Hudson Yards
HY 07-02-A1
Mr. Dominick Answini, city planner, department of city planning New York
HY 03-07-A2
David Farber, general counsel, Hudson Yard Development Corporation (HYDC)
HY 03-07-A3
Aron Kirsch, vice president, Planning and Construction, HYDC
HY 03-07-A4
Tony Greenberg, associate vice president, Development, HYDC
HY 03-07-A5
Marya Cotten, vice president, acquisitions, HYDC 
HY 03-07-A6
Oskar Brecher, director of development, the Moinian Group
HY 03-07-A7
[ 353 ]
Pamela Samuels, senior advice president for development, Extell
City of New York
NY 03-07-A2
David Alan Richards, partner, McCarter & English LLP
NY 03-07-A3
Mary Jane Augustine, partner, McCarter & English LLP
NY 11-04-A5
Ralph J. Kreitzman, partner, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP
NY 11-04-A6
Susan Fainstein, professor of Planning, Columbia University New York
NY 11-04-A7
Vicky Been, professor of Real Estate and Housing, Furman Hall of Real Estate, 
New York
King’s Cross
KCX 04-06-A1
Ray Willis, vice executive president, London & Continental Railways Limited 
(LCR)
KCX 04-06A2
Mr. Robert Evans, one of the 12 board members of Argent Ltd.
KCX 04-06-A3
Richard Kirby, King’s Cross Team Camden
KCX 03-06-A4
Robert West, e-mail interview, King’s Cross Team Camden
KCX 04-06-A5
Stephen Ashworth, partner, Denton Wilde Sapte
Gershwin
GER 02-06-A1
Michiel Schaap, manager , project development, AMVEST
GER 03-06-A3
A. Lubberhuizen, project developer Zuidas, Bouwfonds
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GER 03-06-A4
Frank Thunnissen, partner, Houthoff Buruma N.V.
GER O3-06-A5
Jaap Gadella, project manager, Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Gemeente Amsterdam 
(OGA)
GER 02-06-A6
Annegien Krugers Dagneaux, assistent project manager, ProjectManagement-
Bureau, Amsterdam
GER 03-07-A7
Kristel-Anne Heijnen, assistent project manager, ProjectManagementBureau, 
Amsterdam
Mahler4
MAH 10-04-A1
Hans Diepenhorst, project manager, Mahler4
MAH 10-04-A3
Joris Kwakkelstein, in-house lawyer, ING Real Estate
MAH 10-04-A4
Richard Lokhorst, project developer, ING Real Estate
MAH 10-04-A5
Fred Schnoor, in-house lawyer, Fortis Real Estate
MAH 10-05-A6
Jeroen Messemaeckers, project developer, Fortis Real Estate
MAH 10-04-A7
Gijs Goossen, project manager, ProjectManagementBureau, Amsterdam
City of Amsterdam
AM 10-04-A1
Ivo de Rooij, in-house lawyer, Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Gemeente Amsterdam 
(OGA)
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 Appendix C Questions used as a basis 
for study of the written 
agreements 
Parties
Who are the contracting parties?1. 
When was the contract closed?2. 
When will the contract end?3. 
Ownership
Who possesses rights to the land?4. 
Who owned the existing buildings, if any? Do they play a role in the 5. 
contract?
Pre-contractual procedure
Which procedure was used to attract contracting parties?6. 
Were there any specific requirements set by the city concerning the kind of 7. 
parties that were invited for a bid?
How long did the negotiation process take?8. 
Drafting the contract
Who wrote the contract?9. 
The contract: transfer of rights
Which rights are transferred?10. 
When are these rights transferred?11. 
Can the consortium freely change its composition or sell its contractual 12. 
position?
The contract: goals and core obligations
What are the core obligations of the parties?13. 
Are the goals of the project mentioned in the contract?14. 
Are the goals of the individual parties mentioned in the contract?15. 
Are the goals of the contract described?16. 
How is the project described?17. 
Agreements on public goals
Are there agreements on job-trainee programmes?18. 
Are there agreements on sustainability?19. 
Are there any agreements on social and affordable housing?20. 
Are there any agreements on other public facilities, such as schools, 21. 
libraries etc.?
Duties of endeavours, duties of good faith, duties to inform, unforeseen 
circumstances, and duties to reach agreement in the future
Are any obligations of endeavour mentioned in the contract?22. 
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Are any duties of good faith mentioned, in such terms, in the contract?23. 
Are any duties to inform other parties named in the contract?24. 
Are any agreements postponed to a later stage?25. 
Are there any duties to discuss, specified, issues further?26. 
Is any procedure for response to unforeseen circumstances laid down?27. 
Risks and responsibilities
Who will responsible for which parts of the project?28. 
Are there any shared projects?29. 
Are any risks shared?30. 
Delays, non-compliance & financial guarantees
What happens if the planning is not met?31. 
Who bears the risk of delays?32. 
Are there any financial guarantees?33. 
Are there any penalties for non-compliance?34. 
Monitoring and project organisation
Are there agreements about the monitoring of the project?35. 
Is a project organisation mentioned in the contract?36. 
Are consultation platforms mentioned or created in the contact?37. 
Third parties and competition
Are any rights relating to competition with third parties created?38. 
Are rights or duties of third parties mentioned?39. 
Are rights or duties of third parties created?40. 
Instruments
Are any specific policy instruments mentioned or created in the contract?41. 
Arbitration, changes
Is there an arbitration clause?42. 
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Summary  
Contracting for better places  
A relational analysis of development 
agreement in urban projects
Menno van der Veen
Starting point
Governments and developers need each other to realise (large-scale) urban 
development projects. In the simplest of all models, the government sets the 
rules after which developers start developing. But often the developers have 
a say in the rules that are being set, whereas the government may take some 
risk in the project. The upshot is that developers and governments work to-
gether in various ways, sometimes because they want to and sometimes be-
cause they need to. 
The starting point of this study is how governments and developers work 
together. That question is studied from the perspective of the agreements that 
they close. The question then becomes: Which written and unwritten rules deter-
mine the contractual relations between developers and governments? This general 
starting point receives its focus by confining the study to an in-depth analysis 
of some contractual relations in some projects. 
The title
The title of this study is Contracting for better places: a relational analysis of devel-
opment agreements in urban development projects. What a ‘better place’ is, is not 
defined in the study, however the title presupposes that parties that close an 
agreement for the development of a certain area, aim to make that area a bet-
ter place than it was before. This ‘better’ can be an economic, cultural, social 
or ecological ‘better’. But it will, in the perception of the parties, at least be a 
better place than it was before the agreement was closed. 
The projects
Four large-scale urban renewal projects in three cities where chosen to study 
those contractual relations. These were projects that were characterised by 
their mixed use approach: the projects combine working, living, cultural fa-
cilities, and bars, hotels and restaurants.
These projects were Battery Park City and Hudson Yards in New York City, 
the Zuidas in Amsterdam and King’s Cross in London. Battery Park City is a 
more or less independent district in Manhattan (New York) behind the WTC-
area. The neighbourhood is best known for the towers of the World Financial 
Center (WFC) and its esplanade along the Hudson river. Hudson Yards is a proj-
ect situated around a 26-track railyards area, around 34th street in Manhattan 
near the Penn-railway station and a convention center (Javits). The project aims 
to transform the area that is now a desolated industrial area in a modern resi-
dential- and commercial center with numerous cultural and leasure facilities.
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The Zuidas in Amsterdam is a project in the south area of Amsterdam, at 
both sides of the Amsterdam ringroad, around the Amsterdam South railway 
station and the World Trade Center. It is the largest urban renewal project in 
the Netherlands and aims to provide the Dutch capital with a business centre 
of international quality. At the same time, it is designated to be an area with 
residential units, university facilities and cultural facilities.
King’s Cross, finally is an urban renewal project around St Pancras and 
King’s Cross Station in northwest London. The project revitalises a deterio-
rated neighbourhood in a business- and residential center with some large 
cultural facilities.
Within these large-scale urban development projects, smaller projects (fo-
cal projects) where chosen that involved agreements between a government 
and developers. The focal projects are the core of the analyses. In the focal 
projects the agreements were studied and parties were interviewed.
The development agreement
The central points of focus of the study are the development agreements. The 
development agreements, of the focal projects (see below), are the central 
points of focus of the study. A development agreement contains the condi-
tions under which parties are willing to cooperate for the realisation of a proj-
ect. The definition is deliberately broad since it had to encompass the various 
legal documents that we encountered in the cases, which were the English 
deed, the American lease and the Dutch cooperation agreement.
The development agreements of this study perform four functions: the ex-
change function, the statutory function, the planning function and the instru-
mental function.
An agreement means that parties mutually accept duties and grant each 
other rights. In Dutch law, the unilateral agreement is an exception to that 
rule that is not of much relevance for this study. Secondly, it is a characteris-
tic of agreements that parties, within the confinements of the law, write down 
their own (procedural) rules.
The planning function and instrumental function are distinctive traits of 
the development agreement. The planning function emphasises that every 
agreeement comes with some planning of the contractual relation. It also 
puts emphasis on the specific function of the develolopment agreement that 
performs a role in the planning of the project as well as a coordinating role 
between various subprojects. The instrumental function, finally, sees to the 
function that an agreement can perform to realise public goals such as afford-
able housing, or (often as a duty of endeavour) certain environmental goals. 
The relational contract theory
The theoretical framework of the study is based on the relational contract 
theory developed by Ian Macneil. The relational contract theory offers a so-
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ciological perspective on agreements. It holds that all contracts are embedded 
in specific relations. The theory defines an agreement (a contract) as a projec-
tion of exchange into the future; a contract is not a direct transfer of a good 
or a right. The relational contract theory distinguishes ten common contract 
norms that are features of all contracts. We will, in this summary, not discuss 
all norms but I will name them briefly so that the reader will understand the 
rest of this summary. I refer to Chapter 3 of the book for an extensive discus-
sion of the norms. 
The ten common contract norms are:
Role integrity:1.  promoting stability through expectations about recognized social 
roles1.
Mutuality/reciprocity:2.  the idea that exchange is a process of mutual benefit.
Implementation of planning:3.  as a means of reducing uncertainty about the fu-
ture.
Effectuation of consent:4.  acquiescence of choice as a basis for obligation.
Flexibility: 5. the recognition of the need to avoid rigidity in implementation and fa-
cilitate adaptation to changing conditions.
Contractual solidarity:6.  involves the extension of reciprocity in social relations 
through time.
The linking norms: 7. the restitution, reliance and expectancy interest.
Creation and restraint of power:8.  to control relations of domination and subordi-
nation.
Propriety of means:9.  placing constraints of the ways in which ends may legiti-
mately be achieved.
Harmonisation with the social matrix: 10. reflects the need for contract norms to 
be consistent with more general social norms.
Next to the common contract norms, the theory distinguishes between dis-
crete and relational contracts. Discrete contracts leave out every relation 
between the parties apart from the simple exchange of goods. Relational 
contracts on the other hand hold that all relations between parties are of im-
portance for an agreement. The ultimate example of a discrete agreement is a 
credit card transaction at an automatic gas station-example. For that transac-
tion, as it seems, no other relation between parties exists except of the trans-
action itself. The ultimate example of a relational contract is a marriage. If 
the reader objects to the idea of marriage being a contractual agreement, a 
transaction between a bakery and a regular customer in a small community 
can be named. In the case of the gas station, efficiency is a main concern and 
the driver and the station owner have no relation with the exception of the 
transaction. In the case of the regular customer and the bakery, we can eas-
1   Short definitions in italics are taken from Vincent-Jones (2006: 4-6).
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ily imagine that the transaction is embedded in other relations. Maybe the 
customer only pays once a month, maybe he expects the baker to give him a 
discount if he doesn’t have enough money on him because the baker should 
know that his customer ‘will make it up’ with him at some later point in time. 
These are relational norms that become part of the transaction. In addition, 
the customer might also know the baker from his football club, greet him at 
night when he walks his dog, and help him out in his garden. Their transac-
tion is embedded in all these relations.
A discrete contract puts emphasis on four norms. Discreteness means that 
no other relation exists between the parties outside of the exchange itself, 
whereas  presentiation is the ideal to bring the future into the present (to be in 
full control of the future).  presentiation is a by-product of discreteness and is 
more precisely defined as the restriction of future effects through definition 
and stipulation of events in the present. In addition the discrete norm is a 
product of a magnified importance of the common norms of implementation of 
planning and effectuation of consent. Discreteness and  presentiation merge the 
two (possibly conflicting) norms of consent and implementation of planning; 
for a transaction to be one hundred percent discrete, one hundred percent 
planning and one hundred percent consent is required.
Unlike discrete contracts, relational contracts put the relation between 
parties upfront and aim to preserve that relation. In addition, every relation 
produces its own norms. Three of the relational norms are common contract 
norms: role integrity, propriety of means and supracontract norms. The other two: 
preservation of the relation and harmonisation of relational conflict consist of the 
relational version (an intensifying and expansion) of contractual solidarity, 
whereby preservation of the relation is the background of harmonisation of 
relational conflict. The difference between the two norms is that the latter 
norm values peace in its own right.
How we do it
We used the common contract norms and the discrete-relational continuum 
to analyse the focal projects. We focused on the development agreements that 
we found in the focal projects of the large-scale urban development projects. 
The relational contract theory holds that the extremes are almost never en-
countered in real life. But agreements have discrete and relational elements 
and may tend to either side of the spectrum. This provided us with a scale 
that ranges from 100% discrete to 100% relational.
We then used the common contract norms to help us to understand how 
the various elements of the development agreements function, while the dis-
crete-relational scale allowed us to characterise the various agreements or 
their sub-parts. Application of the same approach to all development agree-
ments meant that we could compare the outcomes of the various analyses. 
We thus assessed every norm on a discrete-relational scale and character-
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ised the contracts, by asking which discrete or relational norms were of en-
hanced importance.
The research questions
We posed five research questions. These questions where of a more investiga-
tive than problematising character. 
How do development agreements function in the context of urban development 1. 
projects?
What is the significance of the ten common contract norms in the context of the 2. 
development agreements studied? 
What are the relative positions of the different agreements studied on the discrete-3. 
relational scale?
Can we compare and assess the various development agreements?4. 
Can we say anything about the development agreements that could lead to im-5. 
provement of the contractual processes and their content in the future?
Beforehand, we could not say which aspects of the development agreement 
were most suited for a comparative study. Therefore the first question was 
generally put. The formulation of the four functions of the development 
agreements were based on a pilot study. For all case studies interviews added 
to the information that was collected from the agreements and plans. 
To answer the fourth and fifth question, it was necessary to develop five 
premises. The first premise was that a contract that gives a more specific ac-
count of the relations in which it is embedded, is better than a contract that 
fails to do so. The second premise held that such a contract will be able to 
solve more of the problems that occur in these relations than a contract that 
fails to do so. The third premise was that it follows from the nature of urban 
development projects that relational norms are of key-importance for a case 
to be successful. The fourth premise was that a development agreement that 
specifies – preferably in writing – the functions it aims to perform, is better 
than one that doesn’t. The fifth premise was that such a development agree-
ment will be able to solve more of the problems that occur during the process 
of development than an agreement that fails to do so. 
The first three premises served as a basis for a comparison between the 
various agreements from the perspective of the relational contract theory. The 
final two served as a basis for a comparison from the perspective of the func-
tions of the development agreement.
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The outcomes
The results of the various comparisons we made between the development 
agreements (see Chapters 5-8, and the conclusions in Chapters 9 and 10) may 
be summarised as follows.
Different approaches to the drafting of legal agreements, led to different 
legal documents: in particular, we may say that the ones providing the most 
specific account of the functions failed in flexibility and implementation of 
relational norms. If we were trying to construct the ideal (written) agreement, 
we might like to pick specific provisions from all the contracts we have stud-
ied. The development agreement in King’s Cross was attractive, but on the 
other hand it sometimes was over-specific when it would have been better to 
leave some room for flexibility. 
In this summary we focus on the general starting points that were formu-
lated in the concluding chapter. We developed two sets of starting points; the 
first set is for lawyers and practitioners that are involved in the process of 
drafting and negotiating a development agreement. These five rules result in 
five sortlike rules that can be used to quickly assess the quality of an agree-
ment. 
Rule 1. Focus on relations 
Development agreements involve cooperation between public and private par-
ties over a longer period of time. This means that over time their relationship 
(over time) will evolve and become more complex. Negotiators involved in the 
drafting of development agreements should recognise this at an early stage 
and become ‘relation planners’. They should discuss the nature of their re-
lation, mutual expectations and develop procedures that promote the values 
of trust, the preservation of the relation and the harmonisation of relational 
conflict. Relational values should also matter in the sense that parties should 
be limited in their one-sided exit-options (their options to leave the relation 
without consent of the other party).
Rule 2. Focus on the interest of the project 
As the relation between parties has been specified and dealt with, it is the 
project that should become the central focus of the negotiations and not so 
much the interests of parties. Leading questions are: What does the project 
need to be developed? And: Are there provisions that make sense from a rela-
tional perspective but do not promote the construction of the project? An ex-
ample of the latter problem is when parties have agreed to decide on specif-
ics of the project at a later stage because they disagree on them, whereas the 
project needs these issues to be dealt with at an early stage. 
Rule 3. Specify functions of the agreement 
The four functions of the development agreement can be found in most (if 
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not all) agreements. But negotiators often forget to specify the functions and 
separate them, which results in vagueness that may harm the project. 
Rule 4. Specify the goals of the agreement 
The agreement should specify its goals, since goals (more than rules) offer 
both a focus and may leave room for flexibility. We may discern here between 
the goals of the agreement, the goals of the parties and the goals of the proj-
ect. It is not self evident that goals are reconcilable. An example is when one 
party wants to develop rentals and another party wants condominiums. Or 
when the goal of a development project is defined as a mixed-use project and 
the private parties involved only care about the commercial parts of it. 
Rule 5. Plan for flexibility 
As the project takes some time to develop, unforeseen events are likely to 
take place and (market) circumstances are likely to change. The agreement 
should recognise this by leaving room for flexible solutions instead of intro-
ducing a strict regime. Questions that negotiators should ask are: Does the 
contract leave sufficient room for change? Does it include a method to revise 
the planning? Does it include moments to reflect on the method of coopera-
tion? 
Starting points for the assessment of the quality of a development 
agreement
The starting points for the assessment of the quality provide a short check-
list that can be used to assess a development agreement. Unlike the starting 
points for the composition of the development agreement, these rules focus 
on the written document. These five rules are that a good development agree-
ment:
specifies the functions it performs1. 
specifies the relations in which it is embedded 2. 
introduces relational norms 3. 
puts emphasis on flexibility 4. 
puts emphasis on the importance of planning. 5. 
For the close readers of the study, as well as the summary, these rules will, at 
this point, come as no surprise. But that is not to say that there is not much 
to be gained in the quest for the best ways of contracting. 
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Samenvatting 
Contracteren voor betere plekken 
Een relationele analyse van 
‘development agreements’ in 
grootstedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten
Menno van der Veen
Het uitgangspunt
Of ze het nu leuk vinden of niet: overheden en ontwikkelaars zijn op elkaar 
aangewezen voor het verwezenlijken van grote projecten. In het eenvoudigste 
model stelt de overheid regels op waarop ontwikkelaars aan de slag kunnen. 
Maar vaak bemoeien de ontwikkelaars zich met die regels en draagt ook de 
overheid enig risico in het project. Met andere woorden, overheden en ontwik-
kelaars werken op veel verschillende manieren al dan wel niet gedwongen sa-
men.
Dat gegeven levert het uitgangspunt voor een onderzoek dat zich de vraag 
stelt op welke manier de samenwerking tussen overheden en ontwikkelaars 
plaatsvindt. Het onderzoek stelt die vraag vanuit het perspectief van de over-
eenkomsten die overheden en ontwikkelaars sluiten. Welke geschreven en 
ongeschreven regels dicteren de contractuele relatie tussen ontwikkelaars en 
overheden? Dat algemene uitgangspunt wordt vernauwd door de studie te be-
perken tot een diepgravende analyse van enkele contractuele relaties, in en-
kele projecten. 
De titel
De titel van het boek luidt: Contracting for better places. De lezer die de tijd 
vindt om dit proefschrift te lezen komt veel definities tegen maar zal vergeefs 
zoeken naar een definitie van een ‘betere plaats’. ‘Beter dan wat?’, zal hij zich 
wellicht afvragen. De titel beoogt dan ook niet zozeer die betere plek te defini-
ëren; ze veronderstelt dat partijen die een overeenkomst sluiten voor de ont-
wikkeling van een bepaalde plaats, die plaats beter willen maken dan ze was. 
Dat kan een economisch, cultureel, sociaal, of ecologisch ‘beter’ zijn. Maar het 
is in de ogen van partijen ieder geval beter dan het was voordat de overeen-
komst werd gesloten.
De projecten
Vier grootstedelijke vernieuwingsprojecten, in drie steden, werden gekozen 
om onderzoek te doen naar die contractuele relaties. Het betroffen projecten 
die zich kenmerkten door hun mixed use benadering: ze combineren werken, 
wonen, culturele voorzieningen en horeca.
Die projecten waren Battery Park City en Hudson Yards in New York City, de 
Zuidas in Amsterdam en King’s Cross in Londen. Battery Park City is een min of 
meer op zichzelf staande wijk in zuid-Manhattan (New York) achter het WTC-
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gebied. De wijk is vooral bekend vanwege de torens van het World Financial 
Center en de boulevard die langs de rivier de Hudson loopt. Hudson Yards is 
een project rondom twee rangeerterreinen, gesitueerd rondom 34th Street in 
Manhattan, vlakbij het Penn-station en het Javits-conventiecentrum. Het pro-
ject heeft tot doel het gebied dat zich nu laat aanzien als een verwaarloosd in-
dustrieel gebied, om te vormen tot een modern woon- en zakencentrum met 
tal van culturele en recreatieve voorzieningen. De Zuidas in Amsterdam is een 
project rondom station Zuid en het World Trade Center. Het is het grootste 
stedelijke vernieuwingsproject in Nederland en stelt zich tot doel Amsterdam 
een zakencentrum te verschaffen van internationale allure dat tegelijkertijd 
een woonwijk, een studentenwijk en een gebied met culturele voorzieningen 
is. King’s Cross ten slotte is een stedelijk vernieuwingsproject rondom St. Pan-
cras en King’s Cross Station in noordwest-Londen. Het project revitaliseert 
een vervallen wijk in een zaken- en wooncentrum. 
Binnen deze grote projecten zijn kleinere projecten (focal projects) gekozen, 
waarover door de overheid en partijen gecontracteerd werd. Die focal projects, 
vormen de kern van de analyses. Van de focal projects werden overeenkomsten 
bestudeerd en erbij betrokken partijen werden geïnterviewd. 
Het ‘development agreement’
Centraal in het onderzoek staan development agreements. We zouden wellicht 
die term kunnen vertalen met de term ‘ontwikkelingsovereenkomst’, zolang 
we daarbij voor ogen houden dat de inhoud van het gebruikte begrip develop-
ment agreement breder is dan de ontwikkelingsovereenkomst die we in de Ne-
derlandse ruimtelijke ordening tegenkomen. In die laatste overeenkomsten is 
de overheid veelal eigenaar van de grond waarop door de ontwikkelaar een 
project wordt gerealiseerd. De term development agreement in deze studie om-
vat, vertaald naar de Nederlandse praktijk, bijvoorbeeld ook de exploitatie-
overeenkomst. Het begrip development agreement is breder gedefinieerd dan de-
ze overeenkomsten omdat het toepasbaar moest zijn op verschillende typen 
overeenkomsten in verschillende landen. Een development agreement kunnen 
we definiëren als de overeenkomst die voorwaarden bevat waaronder partijen 
bereid zijn samen te werken ten behoeve van de realisatie van een project. 
Daaronder kunnen dus verschillende (juridische) typen overeenkomst vallen. 
In dit onderzoek waren dat de Engelse deed, de Amerikaanse lease en de Ne-
derlandse samenwerkingsovereenkomst.
De overeenkomsten van deze studie vervullen vier functies: een ruilfunc-
tie, een statutaire functie, een planfunctie en een instrumentele functie. De 
ruilfunctie en de statutaire functie zijn niet onderscheidend voor het develop-
ment agreement. Eigen aan een overeenkomst is dat partijen over en weer ver-
plichtingen aangaan en elkaar rechten toekennen. De eenzijdige overeen-
komst vormt daarop in het Nederlands recht een uitzondering die niet veel 
betekenis heeft. In de tweede plaats heeft een overeenkomst tot kenmerk dat 
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partijen, binnen de grenzen van de wet, hun eigen (procedure-)regels opstel-
len. Hierop vormt het development agreement geen uitzondering.
De planfunctie en de instrumentele functie zijn wel onderscheidend voor het 
development agreement. De planfunctie ziet niet alleen op het gegeven dat elke 
overeenkomst ook een vorm van relatieplanning met zich meebrengt, maar 
ook op de specifieke functie van het development agreement dat een onderdeel 
vormt van de planning van een project en er sturing aan kan geven. Goede 
development agreements verdwijnen niet in een la maar blijven boven tafel om-
dat ze een sturende rol vervullen in het project. De instrumentele functie ten 
slotte ziet toe op de functie die de overeenkomst kan vervullen om publieke 
doelstellingen te verwezenlijken, zoals sociale woningbouw of (meestal als in-
spanningsverplichting) bepaalde milieudoeleinden. 
De relationale contractentheorie
Het theoretisch kader van het onderzoek wordt in hoofdzaak gevormd door de 
relationele contractentheorie die is ontwikkeld door Ian Macneil. Deze theorie 
biedt een sociologische kijk op overeenkomsten, nu ze stelt dat alle contrac-
ten ingebed zijn in specifieke relaties. Een overeenkomst definieert de theorie 
als een projectie van een ruil in de toekomst; een overeenkomst behelst im-
mers geen directe overdracht van een goed of recht. 
De relationele contractentheorie onderscheidt tien gemeenschappelijke 
normen die eigen zijn aan alle contracten. Die normen zullen we in de sa-
menvatting niet allemaal bespreken maar ik zal ze hier in het Engels, noemen 
zodat de lezer de onderstaande beschouwing kan plaatsen. De summiere toe-
lichting ontleen ik aan Vincent-Jones (2006: 4-6). Voor een uitgebreide toelich-
ting op de normen verwijs ik naar hoofdstuk 3 van het proefschrift. De tien 
common contract norms zijn:
Role integrity:1.  promoting stability through expectations about recognized social 
roles1.
Mutuality/reciprocity:2.  the idea that exchange is a process of mutual benefit.
Implementation of planning:3.  as a means of reducing uncertainty about the fu-
ture.
Effectuation of consent:4.  acquiescence of choice as a basis for obligation.
Flexibility: 5. the recognition of the need to avoid rigidity in implementation and fa-
cilitate adaptation to changing conditions.
Contractual solidarity:6.  involves the extension of reciprocity in social relations 
through time.
The linking norms: 7. the restitution, reliance and expectancy interest.
Creation and restraint of power:8.  to control relations of domination and subordi-
nation.
1   De cursieve definities zijn overgenomen uit Vincent-Jones (2006: 4-6).
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Propriety of means:9.  placing constraints of the ways in which ends may legitima-
tely be achieved.
Harmonisation with the social matrix: 10. reflects the need for contract norms to 
be consistent with wider social norms.
Naast de gemeenschappelijke normen maakt de theorie een onderscheid tus-
sen discrete en relationele contracten. Discrete contracten gaan voorbij aan 
alle verhoudingen tussen de contractpartijen met uitzondering van die van 
de overeenkomst. Relationele overeenkomsten stellen juist dat alle relaties 
tussen partijen van belang zijn voor een overeenkomst, niet alleen de relaties 
die in de overeenkomst worden benoemd. De uiterste vorm van een discrete 
overeenkomst is een creditcardtransactie bij een onbemand tankstation. Voor 
die transactie geldt dat er geen andere relaties tussen partijen lijken te be-
staan dan die enkele transactie. De uiterste variant van een relationeel con-
tract is een huwelijk of, als het de lezer te ver gaat een huwelijk als een over-
eenkomst te zien, een transactie tussen een bakker en een vaste klant in een 
kleine gemeenschap. In het geval van de transactie bij het tankstation, speelt 
efficiëntie een grote rol en hebben de chauffeur en de pomphouder buiten de 
transactie niets met elkaar te maken. In het geval van de vaste klant en de 
bakker kunnen we ons goed voorstellen dat hun onderlinge verhoudingen een 
rol spelen in de overeenkomst. Misschien betaalt de vaste klant maar eens per 
maand, misschien verwacht hij van de bakker dat deze hem korting geeft als 
hij toevallig niet voldoende geld bij zich heeft omdat hij het ‘wel weer goed-
maakt’. Dat zijn relationele normen die onderdeel uitmaken van de transactie. 
Daar komt misschien nog bij dat hij de bakker ook kent van de voetbalclub, en 
hem ’s avonds groet als hij zijn hond uitlaat en hem bovendien weleens helpt 
bij zware tuinierklussen. Hun transactie is ingebed in al die andere relaties. 
Macneil noemt twee eigenschappen van de discrete overeenkomst die haar 
definiëren: discreteness en presentiation. Discreteness kunnen we als ‘discreet-
heid’ vertalen: er bestaat geen andere verhouding tussen partijen dan die van 
de overeenkomst. Presentiation kunnen we vertalen als ‘het tegenwoordig ma-
ken’. De eigenschap ziet erop toe dat discrete overeenkomsten ervan uitgaan 
dat zij de toekomst volledig kunnen beheersen. Een discrete overeenkomst 
biedt nadat ze tot stand is gekomen voor elke situatie in de toekomst een op-
lossing en maakt die toekomst op die manier dus tegenwoordig. Twee andere 
normen die tevens gemeenschappelijk contractnormen zijn, zijn nog van bij-
zonder belang voor de discrete overeenkomst: implementation of planning en ef-
fectuation of consent. De eerste norm kunnen we vertalen als ‘implementatie 
van een plan’; nu de discrete overeenkomst bestaat bij gratie van het feit dat 
zij de toekomst ‘tegenwoordig maakt’, moet zij wel een sterke nadruk leggen 
op planning. Ze beoogt immers een compleet plan voor de toekomst te leve-
ren. Effectuation of consent kunnen we vertalen als de ‘effectuatie van instem-
ming’; een overeenkomst realiseert de wilsovereenstemming tussen partijen. 
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Het liberale ideaal, dat het overeenkomstenrecht sterk heeft beïnvloed, wil 
dat partijen niet aan meer gebonden zijn dan waar ze uitdrukkelijk mee heb-
ben ingestemd. Een discrete overeenkomst moet op die instemming dus de 
nadruk leggen. Overigens zijn de laatste twee normen, nu het ‘gemeenschap-
pelijke normen zijn’ ook van belang voor relationele overeenkomsten.
Relationele overeenkomsten hebben vijf kenmerkende eigenschappen: har-
monisation of relational conflict, preservation of the relation, role integrity, propriety of 
means, en supracontractual norms (harmonisation with the social matrix). De laatste 
drie normen zijn tevens gemeenschappelijke normen, maar hun belang wordt 
in relationele overeenkomsten benadrukt. 
Nu relationele overeenkomsten de nadruk leggen op de relatie(s) tussen 
partijen moet het behoud van de goede verhouding (preservation of the rela-
tion) en het oplossen van conflicten wel voorop staan. Role integrity (rolintegri-
teit) ziet toe op de moeilijkheid voor een partij om zich te beperken tot de rol 
waarin hij de overeenkomst heeft getekend (bijvoorbeeld de rol van grond-
eigenaren). Dit probleem speelt sterk in relationele overeenkomsten, terwijl 
discrete overeenkomsten het probleem wegredeneren. Propriety of means ziet 
toe op de middelen waarmee een partij aan zijn verplichtingen mag of moet 
voldoen. We kunnen de norm vertalen als ‘het beschikken over middelen’. 
Discrete overeenkomsten beperken zich tot het ‘wat’ van de overeenkomst 
maar het ‘hoe’ laat hen koud. Dat geldt niet voor relationele overeenkomsten, 
juist omdat die ingebed zijn in de verhoudingen tussen partijen zullen niet 
alle middelen om een doel te bereiken geoorloofd zijn. Ten slotte werken de 
supracontract norms (bovencontractuele normen) door in de relationele over-
eenkomst. Bovencontractuele normen zijn maatschappelijke normen die de 
achtergrond vormen van een contract. In de discrete overeenkomst spelen zij 
geen rol, hooguit leiden ze ertoe dat sommige verplichtingen in strijd met het 
recht zijn. De normen werken rechtstreeks door in relationele overeenkom-
sten, in de zin dat ze vormgeven aan rechten en verplichtingen. Denk daarbij 
ook aan de propriety of means norm. Een vergelijking kan hier worden getrok-
ken met de aanvullende werking van de redelijkheid en billijkheid. 
Wat we ermee doen
Het onderscheid tussen relationele en discrete overeenkomsten diende als uit-
gangspunt voor een vergelijking tussen de ontwikkelingsovereenkomsten die 
onderzocht zijn in vier grootstedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten in drie landen. 
Eigen aan de relationele contracttheorie is dat volledig discrete of volle-
dig relationele overeenkomsten in de werkelijkheid niet of nauwelijks voor-
komen. Contracten hebben vrijwel altijd relationele en discrete kenmerken. 
Dat levert het beeld op van een schaal die loopt van discreet naar relationeel 
waarop die overeenkomsten gepositioneerd kunnen worden. Het onderzoek 
neemt die schaal als uitgangspunt alsmede het gegeven dat de uitersten niet 
bestaan. Aan de hand van een analyse van zowel de tien gemeenschappelijke 
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normen als de specifieke discrete en relationele normen, blijkt een overeen-
komst vervolgens meer discreet dan relationeel, meer relationeel dan discreet 
of noch het een noch ander. 
De onderzoeksvragen
Het onderzoek stelde zich vijf vragen die vooral een onderzoekend en in min-
dere mate een problematiserend karakter hadden.
De eerste vraag luidde: hoe functioneren development agreements in de context 
van grootstedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten?
De tweede vraag luidde: wat is het belang van de tien gemeenschappelijke 
contractnormen binnen de context van de development agreements?
De derde vraag luidde: hoe kunnen we de verschillende overeenkomsten posi-
tioneren op een discreet-relationeel schaal?
De vierde vraag luidde: kunnen we de overeenkomsten beoordelen in een ver-
gelijkende context?
De vijfde vraag luidde: kunnen we een uitspraak doen over development agree-
ments die zal leiden tot een verbetering van contractuele processen en de in-
houd van overeenkomsten?
De eerste vraag was erg algemeen gesteld, omdat we op voorhand niet kon-
den overzien welke aspecten van het development agreement zich het best 
leenden voor onderzoek. Op basis van een pilot study zijn de vier functies ge-
formuleerd die als basis dienden voor het onderzoek. Interviews vulden de in-
formatie uit de overeenkomsten en de plannen aan. 
De tweede en de derde vraag vormden de basis van de analyse van de over-
eenkomsten. De overeenkomsten werden aan de hand van de tien gemeen-
schappelijke contractnormen geanalyseerd. Daarop gebruikten we de specifie-
ke discrete en relationele normen om de overeenkomsten te karakteriseren.
Voor het beantwoorden van de vierde en de vijfde vraag bleek het nodig 
premissen te benoemen. Die premissen waren: (1) naarmate een overeen-
komst een specifiekere weerslag geeft van de relaties waarin het is ingebed, 
wint ze aan kwaliteit. (2) Die overeenkomst zal beter in staat zijn om relatio-
nele problemen op te lossen. (3) Het volgt uit de aard van de casussen dat re-
lationele normen van cruciaal belang zijn voor een development agreement om 
goed te kunnen functioneren. (4) Een development agreement dat de functies die 
het wil vervullen specificeert, is beter dan een development agreement die dat 
niet doet. (5) Een ‘development’ agreement dat die functies specificeert, zal 
meer problemen die rijzen gedurende het ontwikkelingsproces kunnen oplos-
sen dan een development agreement die dat niet doet.
De eerste drie premissen dienden als basis voor een vergelijking tussen de 
overeenkomsten vanuit het perspectief van de relationele contractentheorie. 
De laatste twee voor een perspectief vanuit het perspectief van de functies 
van het development agreement. 
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De uitkomst
Het is niet eenvoudig om in een samenvatting uitgebreid in te gaan op de ver-
gelijkingen tussen de diverse development agreements. Die vergelijking is op 
een sterk gedetailleerd niveau uitgevoerd en we kunnen niet stellen dat de 
ene overeenkomst het erg slecht en een andere het juist erg goed deed. De 
precisie van de overeenkomst die we in King’s Cross in Londen bestudeerden 
sprak aan, maar die precisie leidde soms ook tot een overdreven specificatie 
van verplichtingen waar flexibiliteit of iets meer openheid de voorkeur had-
den verdiend. 
Voor een uitgebreide analyse van de overeenkomsten en de projecten ver-
wijzen we de lezer dan ook naar de hoofdstukken 5-8 van het proefschrift. 
Vaak zal hij ook zijn eigen oordeel moeten vellen over de manier van aanpak. 
Een voordeel van de gekozen methode is dat ze hem daartoe in staat stelt, 
een nadeel is wellicht dat ze de lezer soms met veel details opzadelt. 
Ter afsluiting van deze samenvatting willen we hier de vuistregels noemen 
die we in het concluderende hoofdstuk hebben geïntroduceerd. De eerste vijf 
regels zijn uitgangspunten voor degenen die betrokken zijn bij de totstandko-
ming van een development agreement. De laatste vijf regels vormen een hand-
vat om snel de kwaliteit van development agreements te kunnen beoordelen. 
 
Vuistregels voor het totstandbrengen van ‘development agreements’
Deze vuistregels nemen het geschreven development agreement als uitgangs-
punt maar richten zich niet uitsluitend op de juristen die het document op-
stellen. Ze richten zich ook op de professionals die bij die totstandkoming be-
trokken zijn (de onderhandelaars van de diverse partijen). 
Richt je op relaties
De verhoudingen tussen partijen moeten niet op de achtergrond maar ook 
in de overeenkomst een rol spelen. Arbitrageprocedures moeten bijvoorbeeld 
worden vormgegeven in overeenstemming met de aard van de verhouding 
tussen partijen. Maar ook moet het belang van specifieke relationele normen, 
zoals vertrouwen of samenwerking, specifiek worden benoemd in de tot-
standkomingsfase. 
Richt je op het belang van het project
Als de specifieke kenmerken van de relaties tussen partijen zijn benoemd, 
dan hoort het project in de overeenkomst centraal te staan. Leidende vraag 
hoort niet meer te zijn: Wat willen partijen? Maar: Wat heeft het project nodig 
voor een optimale ontwikkeling en hoe verhoudt zich dat tot de relaties tus-
sen partijen? In die volgorde. 
Specificeer de functies van de overeenkomst
Een development agreement vervult verschillende functies, het betreft niet al-
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leen een ‘risicoallocatie’ maar heeft bijvoorbeeld ook een planningfunctie en 
een instrumentele functie. Die functies moeten worden geëxpliciteerd, en niet 
een impliciet onderdeel uitmaken van de overeenkomst. 
Specificeer de doelen van de overeenkomst
Hier gaat het erom de doelen van de overeenkomst expliciet te benoemen, 
ook de doelen van partijen en de doelen van het project. De vraag is vervol-
gens of die doelen elkaar niet tegenspreken. 
Plan voor flexibiliteit
Een development agreement is een overeenkomst voor projecten die in regel 
complex zijn en langere tijd in beslag nemen. Beide feiten leiden ertoe dat 
niet alles valt te voorzien en dat er in de regel gedurende het project voor 
andere oplossingen moet worden gekozen dan was voorzien. Een development 
agreement hoort daarvoor ruimte te bieden, zodat het ‘boven tafel blijft’ en bo-
vendien enige sturing voor die momenten kan bieden. Een development agree-
ment mag oplossingen niet in de weg staan.
Uitgangspunten voor de beoordeling van de kwaliteit van development 
agreement
De uitgangspunten voor de beoordeling vormen vervolgens een korte check-
list die ertoe dient om een overeenkomst te beoordelen. Het richt zich, anders 
dan de uitgangspunten voor de totstandkoming, volledig op het geschreven 
document. Een goed development agreement:
specificeert de functies die het vervult1. 
specificeert de relaties waarin het is ingebed2. 
introduceert relationele normen;3. 
benadrukt het belang van flexibiliteit4. 
benadrukt het belang van planning.5. 
Deze vuistregels zullen na lezing van het bovenstaande geen verrassing meer 
zijn. Maar dat wil niet zeggen dat er niet nog een wereld te winnen valt in de 
zoektocht naar de beste wijze van contracteren.
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pioneering work in a field that has not been subject of much research yet.
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